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ABSTRACT 
FEDERALISM AND FEDERATION IN EUROPE: 
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE GERMANIC TRADITION 
Kurt Richard Luther 
This thesis defines "federation" as a set of structures 
and techniques, by means of which the constituent members of 
a union are given guaranteed access to and are accommodated 
within the decision-procedure of the centre. Meanwhile, 
"federalism" is taken to signify the philosophical, or 
ideological prescription, or promotion, of such a union. 
The thesis commences by identifying the major shortcomings 
of the Anglo-Saxon academic literature on federation for a 
comparative analysis of federalism and federation in Austria, 
Switzerland and Germany. The two main aims of the thesis are 
then outlined. These are first, to identify the nature of the 
tradition of federalism in Austria, Switzerland and Germany. 
The second is to illustrate, by reference to the period 
immediately preceding the crystallisation of the party 
systems of those countries, the use of federalism as a 
political ideology. 
These aims are fulfiled in Parts 2 & 3 of the thesis. By 
means of its systematic, comparative analysis of federalism 
in Austria, Switzerland and Germany from the early sixteenth 
century until 1850, the thesis develops a typology of 
federalism, which permits it to identify the six -dimensions" 
of a distinctive, "Germanic·, tradition of federalism. Second, 
the detailed analysis in the thesis of the use of federalism 
during the first half of the nineteenth century shows how, 
within existing federations, a wide range of political 
groupings constituting the antecedents of modern political 
parties availed themselves of federalism for the promotion of 
their political aims. 
Amongst the conclusions of Part 4 of the thesis is that 
more attention should be devoted to the study of the 
interaction of federalism and federation and in particular, 
to how federalism is utilised by politial parties, both to 
legitimate and to reform federations. 
Polytechnic South West 
August 1989 
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PART 1: INTRODUCTION 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 WHY STUDY FEDERALISM AND FEDERATION IN AUSTRIA, 
SWITZERLAND AND GERMANY ? 
The first justification-for embarking upon a study of 
federalism and federation in Austria, Switzerland and Germany 
is the current topicality of things federal. The "patriation" 
of the Canadian constitution in '1982 and the current 
controversy surrounding the Meech Lake constitutional accord 
are one example [1J. In Western Europe, varying "federal" 
solutions have been proposed for systems as different as the 
European Community (Greilsammer,1979; Heraud,1979; or Burgess, 
1989) and the United Kingdom (Kilbrandon Commission,1973; 
Birch,1977; Burgess 1986a & 1988, or Kendle,1989), while-
developments in Belgium have'led to questions being raised as 
to whether that state is still unitary, or has become federal 
(Rompaey,1980; Delmartino,1986 & 1988; or Senne1le,1989). 
Furthermore, the Swiss Government has for many years been 
engaged in a total revision of its Federal Constitution 
(Germann,1975 & 1977) and in Austria, the existing division 
of power between the Laender and the Bund has recently come 
under attack (Horscher,1980; Pernthaler,1980; Luther, 1986; or 
Berchtold, 1988). 
The current relevance of "federal matters makes all the 
more surprising the paucity of political science- literature 
on the three extant federations "of Western Europe and their 
1 
political antecedents. The dominant Anglo-Saxon debate gives 
them only scant attention. Nor is the amount of German 
literature all that greater, something due in no small 
measure to the fact that Political Science is still a 
relatively young discipline in these countries. A second 
reason for welcoming this thesis is therefore clearly its 
contribution to filling the gap just identified. However, its 
merit lies not merely in the fact that its empirical focus is 
upon three federal systems, of which at least two (Austria 
and Switzerland) have in the past been very much neglected. 
Its value also derives from being a comparative study. For 
the author has found very few truly comparative studies of 
the three countries, despite their eminent suitability for 
comparative analysis. Although there are factors prima facie 
relevant to such a study that differ between the three 
countries (e.g. size, the pattern of social cleavages and 
external relations) there are many more that they have in 
common. These include a shared language (with reservations 
for Switzerland), a comparable level of economic and 
political development, a shared cultural heritage and, above 
all, a shared and distinctive philosophical/ideological 
tradition of federalism. 
The third reason for undertaking the study at hand is the 
dissatisfaction the author felt when reading the Anglo-Saxon 
literature on federal political systems. The causes of this 
dissatisfaction were twofold. First, its interpretation of 
the experiences of the federal political systems of Western 
Europe has been at least debatable and at worst frankly 
erroneous. Accordingly, this thesis will examine and in some 
2 
"-
cases challenge the,assertions made about the origins, nature 
and function of the three countries' federal systems. A 
second and more fundamental shortcoming of the Anglo-Saxon 
literature is that many of the concepts used by the various 
approaches it contains are of limited value. Some of the 
problems they raise attend upon the study of any federal 
political system, while others .arise because of the empirical 
focus of this thesis. ' 
This thesis will primarily be concerned to demonstrate the 
inadequacy of the Anglo-Saxon debate for an accurate 
appreciation of the federal systems of Western Europe and to 
advance, a"prel iminary, alternative framework for the 
examination of West European federations, namely, by reference 
to the interplay of federalism and federation. Howeve'r,' we 
believe that our analysis will not only offer insights into~ 
the West European experience, but will also provide a useful 
analytical perspective for the examination'of federal 
, c 
political systems in general. 
It will be argued that a better understanding of them 
would be facilitated by distinguishing between "federation" 
and -fede~a"ism" [2J. This has recently been done by King 
(1982,9-23) and although his understanding of the nature of 
. ' . 
federalism differs from that advanced in this thesis, the 
" 
distinction between the two phenomena 'is helpful nonetheless. 
Thus '~'hi1e "federation" denotes a form of government -
understood to include inter alia institutions, structures, 
processes and techniques - -federal ism" sig'nifies an 
- . 
organizational principle, usually expressed by way of an 
.. -
ideological or philosophical statement. It is the contention 
of this thesis that the inadequacy of the Anglo-Saxon 
3 
literature is in large measure the consequence of the fact 
that it fails to devote sufficient attention to the 
distinctive philosophiocal/ideological tradition within which 
the West European federations' are set. Instead; it has 
assumed West European understanding of the nature and 
function of federation to be the same as that of the United 
States. This analysis will show those assumptions'to be 
misplaced and will also consider the'extent to which it is 
appropriate to conclude that a specifically Germanic 
federalism can be identified. 
1.2. SHORTCOMINGS OF THE ANGLO-SAXON DEBATE ON FEDERATION' 
The aim of the following appraisal of the Anglo-Saxon 
debate on federation is not to give a detailed, blow-by-blow 
account of every twist and turn in the academic debate since 
Dicey or Wheare. Nor is it to provide an in depth analysis of 
of the arguments of the major protagonists or schools of 
thought. Its purpose is both more modest and more practical. 
What concerns this thesis are the shortcomings of the 
received Anglo-Saxon literature as they affect a study of 
modern federal;sm and federation in Western Europe. 
Consequently, what we shall seek to do is to summarise the 
limitations and flaws of the Anglo-Saxon debate and to 
analyse critically some of its underlying assumptions. Our 
prism will be the west European experience and understanding 
of the nature and function of federation. What will emerge 
will be an assessment of the appropriateness or otherwise of 
aspects of the debate for this study. 
In attempting to extrapolate a lim;ted number of general 
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criticisms of an enormous body of literature, the autHor is 
forced to be selective. This may result in simplifying the 
hypotheses of many scholars in a fashion which might not do 
justice to the intricacy of those hypotheses. Moreover, since 
compartmentalization of criticisms is primarily undertaken 
for heuristic reasons, one should not be surprised if one 
point overlaps with another, nor if a given author or 
approach is criticised for one statement or exposition and 
extolled for another. 
It is in cognizance of these difficulties that we shall 
now proceed to synthesise into the following seven basic 
points the shortcomings for a study of the federal political 
systems of Austria, Switzerland and the Federal Republic of 
, 
Germany, of the Anglo-Saxon debate: 1) The empirical focus 
has only incidentally been West European; 2) The literature 
has made errors of interpretation and fact regarding the West 
European experience; 3) The juridical approach has proved to 
be of limited value; 4) The operationalization of the 
·political· approach's notion of "bargain" is problematical; 
5)"Sociological" approaches are marred by deductive reasoning 
and imprecision; 6) To equate federalism and federation as 
pertaining soley to the territorial distribution of power is 
tantamount to reductionism and finally, 7) The importance of 
the-role of ideology has been underemphasised and misunder-
stood. 
1) A very simple point, but one nonetheless worth making, is 
that the empirical focus of the debate has primarily been 
directed towards the United States, Canada and Australia [3], 
with some attention accorded the experiences of the Third 
5 
World [4J, but very little paid to those of Western Europe 
[5]. This is in part an expression of the understandable 
predominance of domestic concerns. It is also a consequence 
of the scarcity of political science publications (in German 
or English) on the countries with which we are concerned in 
this thesis. This paucity, especially acute regarding Austria 
and Switzerland, is largely self-evident on a survey of the 
political science literature. In the relatively few cases 
where these countries are considered in the Anglo-Saxon 
debate on federation, the treatment they receive is usually 
superficial and at times derisory. Greaves (1940) devotes ten 
sides to Switzerland, of which only three deal with the years 
after 1848. He does not even mention Austria. Since his work 
and that of Brecht (1945) preceded the founding of the Federal 
Republic of Germany, it is obvious why neither examine the 
Bonn republic. The same applies to the first (1946) edition 
of Wheare's Federal Government, but even the 1963 edition's 
coverage of the Federal Republic is minimal [I] and Austria 
referred to merely in order to be dismissed (1963,23). Riker 
(1964 & 1975) allocates more space to West European examples, 
though the content of his comments will be taken issue with 
in points 2 and 4 below. Friedrich (1968) devotes a chapter 
of six sides to Switzerland and one consisting of five to 
Germany, but Austria is excluded. Sawer's (1969) contribution 
constitutes an exception by virtue of the large portion 
concerned with Western Europe. Conversely, in what she terms 
the "climax- (1978,156) of her comparative study. Hicks deals 
with switzerland in a mere twelve sides, of which eight 
antedate the 1848 establishment of the Eidgenossenschaft. 
A concomitant of this predominantly non-West European 
6 
empricial focus has been the assumption of the primacy of the 
United States model. One need only cite Greaves' statement 
that "The United States is the outstanding example of federal 
union" (1940.14). or Wheare's famous dictum that "Any 
definition of federal government which failed to include the 
United States would ••• be unreal" (1963.1). Nor is it the 
case that only the older literature makes these assumptions. 
If one reads Duchacek, one finds that his "ten yardsticks" 
are based upon United States experience (1970,201-8). His 
admission of this bias does of course not improve upon the 
limited value of a comparative study based on propositions 
drawn exclusively from the experience of one federation. The 
three authors here mentioned were explicit in their emphasis 
upon the exemplary value of the United States model. Others 
were less forthright, their bias being expressed tacitly 
instead [7]. 
2) In addition to - and perhaps partly as a consequence of -
the problems posed by the adoption of above all American 
criteria for the interpretation of West European phenomena, 
the received Anglo-Saxon literature has also made errors 
regarding the origins and nature of federalism and federation 
in these countries. Since one of the prime tasks of the 
following chapters will be to demonstrate some of these 
errors, it will suffice at this stage to indicate the kind 
of hypothesis that will be challenged. 
Riker's claims (1964 & 1975) regarding the primacy of 
military factors as determinants of the establishment of 
federal governments have received much praise [8]. Yet a 
closer study of the founding of federations in the three 
7 
countries with which we are here concerned demonstrates that 
Riker's ·expansion condition· and "military condition" 
(Riker,1964,121f & 1975,113f) have little or no explanatory 
value. Inasmuch as a federal government is the institutional/ 
organisational form which emerges from and responds to a 
specific set of problems at a given point in time in the 
history of a state, it must logically reflect this genetic 
imprint and will thus differ from all other federations. The 
same applies for the future development of the federation. To 
assume the primacy at the time of the origin of any and 
every federation of one (military or other) factor must be 
simplistic. Moreover, as Davis (1978,132-8) and King (1982, 
33-6 & 82-6) argue, the existence of military threats does 
not mark the origin of a federal government off as distinct 
from that of any other type. Furthermore, since "to be 
revealing ••• we should require to know exactly how serious 
these threats are" and "Riker, unfortunately, does not help 
us on this point, ••• " his "threat condition remains 
trivial ••• • (King,1982,34). 
The analysis, in the subsequent chapters of this thesis, 
of the history of federalism in Austria, Switzerland and 
Germany will demonstrate beyond any doubt that the types of 
federation envisaged in these three countries have been very 
varied, as have the purposes ascribed to them. In view of 
that rich tradition, it would be pver-simplified to allege 
that in 1848 the Swiss slavishly followed the United States 
example, that the Austrians adopted a federal form in 1920 in 
order to facilitate their future merger with the German Reich 
['], or that federation was imposed upon West Germany after 
World War Two. In each of these cases, there was a 
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significant native tradition of federalism. Moreover, this 
thesis will demonstrate that military considerations were 
only one consideration at times when the structure of 
federations was being discussed in Austria, Switzerland and 
Germany, and were indeed often of less significance than 
considerations of a political or economic nature. 
3) Variously termed "juridical", "legal", or -institutional", 
the distinctive. feature of the approach to which we now ~urn 
our attention lies in an almost exclusive emphasis on the 
constitutional and legal structures and relationships within 
a federation. Its chief exponent is generally taken to be 
K.C. Wheare, who defines federal government as that in which 
there predominates the "federal principle" - i.e. "the method 
of dividing powers so that the general and regional 
governments are each are each, within a sphere, co-ordinate 
and .independent" (Wheare,1963,10). Such analyses are not 
unique to the Anglo-Saxon debate. Weber estimates 80-90% of 
the Germanic literature to be of a constitutional nature 
(1980,1015, f.n.11). That there is value in the analysis of 
the constitutional structures and practices of a federation 
is not in doubt. However, the exclusive concern with only 
.. ,r, ' 
this variable does give rise to problems for the study of 
any federation. These problems have been widely discussed in 
the more recent Anglo-Saxon literature [10] and are 
essentially fourfold. 
The first criticism to be made is that its definition of 
what constitutes a truly federal government is so narrow as 
to make the category a very exclusive one indeed. Of the 
- ,< ' 
three states with which we are concerned, only Switzerland 
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qualifies, while Austria is deemed non-federal and the 
Federal Republic of Germany merely merits the title of 
-quasi-federal" (Wheare,1963,23 & 26). This conclusion is not 
really surprising, given Wheare's above mentioned bias 
towards the United States model, as exemplified in his 
statement that " ••• the federal principle has come to mean 
what it does because the United States has come to be what it 
is· (1963,11). What is paradoxical, is the conclusion that a 
reading of Elazar (1962 & 1966) and Grodzins (1966) leads to, 
namely, that the category is so narrow as to exclude even 
Wheare's archetypal federation: the United States (Riker, 
1975 , 1 04 f) ! 
The second problem inherent in the juridical approach is 
that its overemphasis on structure offers only a very static 
view of federation. As Elazar points out H ••• federalism [sic 
federation] is as much a matter of process as of structure" 
(1979, 30). C.J. Friedrich (1964,1965 & 1968) is the author 
most readily associated with the so-called "process approach" 
and he puts the case for a less static analysis thus: 
-federal ism [sic federation] is more, fully understood if it 
is seen as'a process, an evolving pattern of changing 
relationships rather than a static design regulated by firm 
and unalterable rules" (1968,173). 'And yet to emphasise 
process without reference to structure is equally untenable. 
Friedrich's proposal has itself been criticised, among other 
things for being "mystical" (Riker, 1975,104) [11]. 
The implication underlying the last-mentioned critque 
constitutes our third criticism· of the juridical approach, 
namely, ,its assumption of the exclusive significance of the. 
constitutional and institutional form of a federal 
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government. We shall examine this "sociological approach" in 
point 5 below and thus will content ourselves at his stage 
with noting that the main thrust of this critque is that "The 
essence of federalism [sic federation] lies not in the 
institutional or constitutional structure, but in the society 
itself" (Livingston 1952,84). 
The final and related criticism addresses itself to the 
problems of operationalizing the juridical approach's key 
concepts of co-ordinacy and independence. Davis sums up the 
problems of the latter concept thus: "There are no degrees in 
the dichotomy of legal independence and dependence to take 
significant account of political and social nuance" (1955, 
243) and his harsh conclusion is that we are dealing with Na 
language and a set of premises which are suited, if at all, 
only to the esoteric purposes of their enquiry" (Davis 1955, 
59). The transparent lack of plasticity of the concept of 
independence generated by the juridicial approach caused Vile 
to state that: 
••• federation is a system of government in 
which neither level of government is wholly depen-
dent on·the other, nor wholly independent of the 
other. There is, in fact, a mutual interdependence 
which allows each of them to act indepedently in 
some circumstances, but which means that where the 
vital interests of one level are involved in actions 
of the other, the former will be able to affect 
the decisions taken, even though they concern matters 
formally outside its competence (1961,197) (12). 
The concept'of co-ordinacy is no less problematic. It 
implies the idea of dual or shared sovereignty and can be 
viewed as a legacy of eighteenth and nineteenth century de-
bates about whether or not sovereignty is divisible. King 
suggests one way of resolving this apparent impasse: In the 
case of federations, the 'centre' has to be understood as a 
1 1 
coherent decision-procedure which incoporates into-, 
itself in various ways the constitutional territorial 
units for purposes of-ultimate decision-making. 
Once this is established, it becomes perfectly feasible 
to hold the federal centre to be sovereign, without 
construing this to mean that this coherent'power of 
the centre absolutely excludes the participation of 
the 'periphery' (1982, 115). 
Whether one elects this or any of a host of other ways of 
resolving the dilemma of dividing the purportedly indivisible, 
the fact remains that we are to some extent dealing with an 
,;'-, , 
academic red herring. In practice, the point is that: 
no political system can be an instance of Wheare's 
definition [of co-ordinancy].If a system displayed 
the exact balancing between the center and the 
states in,which he insists,it would - in constant 
stalemate - be unable to act. Real federations are 
always constructed so that in,a crisis one kind of 
government can and does prevail. (Riker 1975,105). 
4) It was this dissatisfaction with the unrealistic picture 
of federation emanating from the juridical approach that led 
to a turning away from constitutional and legal considera-
tions. While some sought refuge in ·sociological" approaches, 
others emphasised the importance for the understanding of 
federation of an analysis of political factors. The former 
approach will be considered in point 5 below. It is the 
relevance for this thesis of the writings of the latter 
school of thought with which we now intend to deal. 
For reasons that are self-evident on a reading of the 
above dicussion of the concepts of co-ordinacy and 
independence, emphasis was placed on the need for a political 
evaluation of the processes of decision-making and 
implementation. Scholars such as Grodzins (1960;1960a & 1966) 
and Elazar (1962 & 1966) undertook this task with detailed 
studies that mapped out the interdependent and co-operative 
nature of policy-making and implementation in a federation. 
12 
, , .. 
Such investigations proved very instructive and were later 
emulated by writers whose empirical focus was West European 
[13). A second concern of the political approach was to 
attempt to establish the causes of the failure of 
federations. Since Austria, Switzerland, and West Germany 
are extant federations, the writings of such authors are not 
directly relevant for this thesis [14]. 
However, the other two questions to which the political 
approach has addressed itself are very much of relevance to 
, 
" 
the task in hand. The issues are the origins of federations 
and their maintenance. We shall examine the last concern 
first. In this context, the term "maintenance" is not to be 
understood as signifying the opposite of failure, where the 
latter denotes abolition of collapse of a federal system of 
government. Maintenance is thus not the expression of the 
longevity of a federation. Instead, it relates to the manner 
in which a federal political system develops in respect of 
the distribution of powers and functions between its consti-
tuent units and the centre. Different authors use varying 
phrases to ask this question. Riker (1964,51) asks what 
maintains the "federal bargain N , while Sawer asks whether the 
constituent units retain an area of autonomy "sufficient to 
be worth considering" (1969,127). Perhaps one of the most 
useful ways of answering the question is that adopted by 
Sawer when he attempts to assess the extent of change by 
reference to the constituent units' "bargaining capacity vis-
a-vis the Centre" (127). Regardless of nomenclature, the 
literature concerned with the maintenance or otherwise of the 
relations between the constituent units and the centre has 
13 
typically involved the study of the party system. Such 
analyses are le~~on [15] though their underlying premise is 
often not overtly expressed. The assumption runs as follows: 
modern government is essentially party government. Since 
federation is one form of modern government, it is important 
to examine the role of parties as agents of centralization or 
decentralization of decision-making. Where there exists a 
shared political and ideological allegiance between centre 
and regional politicians, centripetal tendencies will be fos-
tered. Conversely, the greater the disparity in the alleg-
iances of those governing the centre and those governing the 
regions, the greater the likelihood of centrifugal pressures. 
Measures of the degree of centralization of the party system 
would include, among other things, a tally of the number of 
legislative and excutive posts held by the parties at both 
levels, as well as an examination of the parties' internal 
decision-making structures and ideologies. The issue of the 
nature of the relationship between party systems and the 
structure of federal government is both important and complex. 
One problem revolves around the difficulty of establishing 
which of these two factors (if any) constitutes the 
independent variable. This thesis does not claim to offer any 
final statement on the matter, but will devote considerable 
attention to the role of the parties and the party system in 
the origin and development of federalism in Switzerland, 
Austria, and west Germany. Such investigation should permit 
the formulation of general conclusions as to the validity of 
Anglo-Saxon hypotheses when applied to the West European 
cases. 
The origin of a federation is the fourth aspect to which 
14 
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the political approach applies itself. We have already.criti-
cised the value of Riker's assertion of the primacy of mili-
tary considerations in determining the establishment of a 
federation. What we now propose to do is illustrate the 
considerable problems that attend upon the operationalization 
of the concept fundamental to much of the debate on the 
origins of federation, namely, the concept of "bargain M • 
" 
While we are largely in agreement with Sawer's use of the 
term, we believe that there are at least three problems that 
militate against the validity of the notion when used to 
explain the setting up of a federation. 
The first problem is one of numbers. The concept of bargain 
is useful when applied to the process of conflict-resolution 
between a limited number of actors. Presumably the ideal 
number is two. However, when one attempts to use it in a 
situation such as that which pertained in Switzerland in 1815 
or 1848, where twenty-five separate states severally and 
concurrently agreed to form a common government, the 
explanatory and analytical value of the concept is diminished • 
.. -
The second problem can best be illustrated by reference to 
the hypotheses of Riker (1964 and 1975). For him, federation 
is essentially -a constitutional bargain among politicians" 
(1975,113). To be more precise, it.is "between prospective 
national leaders and officials of constituent governments" 
(1964,11). If one reads on, one finds that the former group 
desires to expand its territorial control and sees federation 
as "the only feasible means to accomplish a desired expansion 
without the use of force" (1964,12). The other party to the 
bargain are the officials of the constituent governments and 
15 
they accept the constraints upon their independence either 
because of a desire for protection from military threat, or 
in view of their wish to "participate in the potential 
aggression of the federation". 
This summary of Riker's propositions highlights at least 
four problems in his analysis. First, Riker implicitly 
assumes that one can adequately distinguish between those who 
offer the bargain and those who accept it. In practice, this 
is often extremely difficult, if not impossible. Second, it 
is taken for granted that it is always the "prospective 
national leaders" that offer the bargain and the officials of 
the constituent governments that accept it. As, for example, 
the case of Austria shows, the centre does not always exhibit 
the dominant influence that such a supposition implies 
(Pernthaler,1979). Third, Riker's elucidation of the factors 
motivating the parties to the proposed new federation fails 
to recognise the significance of their political convictions. 
As this thesis will show, a consideration of political 
motivations is indispensable to a full appreciation of the 
"federal bargain". 
The last problem with the notion of bargain that we shall 
mention is that it appears to assume a clear delineation in 
role between centre and regional actors. Yet prospective 
national leaders are frequently officials of the constituent 
" 
governments and vice-versa. Moreover, there are further 
links, such as membership of the same party, or of the same 
ethnic or religious community. In short, there are a number 
of cleavages that may well (and often do) cut across the neat 
demaracation between regional officials and (prospective) 
~ 
national leaders. In addition, there is the difficulty pre-
16 
sented by the practice of role accumulation. This phenomenon, 
especially prevalent in Switzerland and Austria, makes it 
almost impossible to assess in which capacity the delegate of 
a particular Swiss canton or Austrian Land was acting. Was it 
as a member of the local government, as a party man, as a 
communal representative, or was it as the agent of a specific 
economic or functional interest, just to name a few possibi-
lities? 
5) The last point we made in our critique of the application 
of the notion of bargain to the process resulting in the 
establishment of a federal government could well be stated 
differently. The most obvious alternative would be to phrase 
it in terms of an assertion of the necessity of greater 
atttention being accorded the underlying societal dimension 
of a federation. The primacy of societal factors has been 
affirmed by a considerable proportion of the Anglo-Saxon 
literature on federation. We have already had cause to mention 
the scholar most frequently identified as the pioneer of the 
sociological approach, namely, W.S. Livingston. He wrote that: 
"The essential nature of federalism [sic federation] is ••. 
in the forces - economic, social, political, cultural - that 
" ~ 
have made the outward form of federalism [sic federation] 
necessary· (1952,83). A listing of the writers whose basic 
premises accord with such a viewpoint would include Deutsch 
. " 
(1957), Merkl (1959 and 1964), Tarlton (1965), Watts (1966), 
" ~ 
Stein (1968), Ouchacek (1970) and Oikshit (1975). What we 
propose to do now is not examine the differences in emphasis 
as between these several authors. Instead, we shall adumbrate 
the main hypotheses of the sociolOgical approach, before 
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proceeding to assess the extent to which it can be employed 
in a study of modern federalism and federation in Western 
Europe. 
The sociological approach has two main components. The 
first is the contention that federal political systems. like 
all others, manifest social diversity, but a federal polity 
can be identified by the extent to which the location of a 
society's ·significant diversity· (Livingston 1952,86) corre-
lates with the geographical boundaries of the constituent 
• 
states of the federal system. The degree of correspondence 
is taken as a measure of the -federal qualities" (84) of a 
society. The second component of the sociological approach 
relates to the translation of the federal quality of society 
into federal government. This is accomplished, it is claimed. 
by "the whole pattern of instrumentalities ... employed" in 
response to the. federal quality of society (90). The term 
i nstrumenta 1 it; es ; s said to denote ."~ not on 1 y the 
constitutional forms, but also the manner in which the forms 
are employed; ••• habits, attitudes, acceptances, concepts 
and even theori es" . (91 ) •. 
The initial point to be made is that "to those wearied of 
the elaborate classificatory sophistries of the 'constitut-
ionalists', Livingston's essay first came as a breath of 
fresh air- (Davis,1978,171).The broadening of the focus for 
students of federation was both·, necessary and overdue. We 
believe that this thesis amply demonstrates that a consider-
ation of the societal dimension is not only desirable for a 
more complete understanding of federal political systems, but 
is in fact indispensable to it. Nonetheless, certain aspects 
of the sociological approach are problematical, and are at 
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least four important objections to be raised against it. 
The first of these is that its two key concepts - namely, 
·significant diversity· and "instrumentalities" - are of 
Questionable value. The best critique of the former notion is 
contained in Davis's excellent evaluation of the sociological 
approach (1978,168-72). Rather than attempting to paraphrase 
him, we shall take the liberty of quoting him at length: 
••• if diversity is the quality of any society, is 
it at all likely that there can be any territory 
within it where there are no 'significant' social, 
economic, or cultural elements? Livingston takes' 
the point by arguing that if the diversity is signi-
ficant, then the 'society is likely to provide' 
some instrumentality to satisfy it. But what is 
'the test of significance? ••• If, as it appears 
from his examples, it is success, then we are pre-
sented with an ergo hoc propter hoc argument. Thus:' 
'the fact that Scotland has its own legal system, 
,its own courts, and a Scottish Committee in the 
House of Commons, is evidence that the territorially 
organised social diversity is significant. For were 
it not ••• it is unlikely that 'instrumentalities' 
would exist'. (171f, his emphasis) 
Davis then quotes Livingston's contention that, should -< 
Scotland actively pursue independence it is'unlikelY that 
its right would'be challenged (1952, 92). Of-this Davis asks: 
But how could one 'prove him wrong? Would the 
Scottish failure to secede ••• signify the 
insignificance of the Scottish "diversity in 
Great Britain, the insignificance of the Scottish 
arguments, or the insignificance of Scottish 
arms? ••• Or are the federal qualities of a 
society sufficiently attested by the continued-
agitation of a territorial movement for some 
-recognition, even if resisted by the rest of 
society? We are free, it seems, but we are also 
put out to sea without'a map, a compass or a 
sextant ••• (172)". 
The drawback of the concept of "instrumental ities" 1 ies in 
its nebulous nature. The wide variety of factors included in 
the list of instrumentalities means that while "Propositions 
based upon this use of language ... may not be invalid 
19 
they are unlikely to be specific enough to be helpful" 
(Birch,1966,17). Davis's conclusion is that what we have is 
"a theory without a tool-kit" (1978,171). 
The next shortcoming of the sociological analysis with 
which we shall deal is its assumption of a direct and causal 
relationship between a territorially based societal cleavage 
system and a federal governmental system. As Vile correctly 
points out, -That there is a relationship between the nature 
of a society and its system of government is certain, but it 
, ' 
is by no means a simple relationship" (1977,2). Wildavsky's 
contribution to the nature of this relationship is 
interesting. He believes that it is by no means always the 
case that the societal dimension is the determining variable. 
He distinguishes between "social" and "structural" 
federations (1967,178). In the first type, the federation 
was established because of the variations between the social 
profiles of the constituent units. However, there are other 
federations - which Wildsavsky terms "structural" - whose 
federal governmental institutions preceded and in fact gave 
rise to the territorially based interests which thereafter 
supported the retention of the structure; the example he 
cites is Australia. Respectively, Wildavsky's structural and 
social federations correspond closely to the two ideal-type 
"symmetrical" and "asymmetrical" models proposed by Tarlton 
(1965,867). He writes that to which of the two types any 
given federal system most closely approximates is a product 
of "the level of conformity and communality in the relation 
of each separate political unit of the system to both the 
system as a whole and to the other component units" (867). 
The absence of a convincing marrying of the societal and 
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governmental aspects undermines Tarlton's contribution. For 
it is not clear whether the symmetrical and asymmetrical 
ideal-types are intended to refer to the pattern of societal 
cleavages, or to the behaviour of the governing political 
elite. 
In an article published in World Politics in 1968, Stein 
attempted to link up the societal and governmental dimensions. 
At the same time, he sought to synthesise the sociological 
and political approaches to the study of federation. However 
laudable the undertaking, Stein's major proposal (1968,729) -
that the study of federal political systems be limited to 
those in which multiethnicity and multilinguality both 
pertain - appears to have been motivated exclusively by 
considerations of academic convenience. Such a reductionist 
proposal is out of the question for a study of federation in 
Western Europe, since the only case-study left would be 
Switizer1and. 
Our third criticism is that to speak of a "federal 
society· serves only to confuse. To juxtapose the adjective 
-federal" with the noun "society" is to infer federa1ity as 
an attribute of society. The point is not one of mere 
sophistry. As has been discussed already, societal diversity 
is not unique to federal political systems. Thus the term 
"federal society" logically cannot be used solely to denote 
diversity per se~ Moreover, the spatial correlation between 
societal diversities and the geographical boundaries of the 
constituent units of a federation does not necessarily have 
have any significance for the organisation or functioning of 
the governmenta1.-system. The corollary of this is that the 
21 
distributive pattern of-'cleavages is at best only a precondi-
tion for the establishment or maintenance of a federal 
relationship. What we are suggesting is that the term 
"federal" could be most usefully restricted to Qualifying the 
political relationship which the constituent units of a 
federation enjoy in respect of the ·coherent decision-
procedure of the centre" (King,1982,115). Exactly what the 
Germanic philosophical and ideological tradition of 
federalism understands a federal relationship to be will be 
elucidated in this thesis. At this point we wish only to 
propose the substitution of "federal society" or the "federal 
Qualities" of a society by terminology akin to that used by 
Tarlton. In a word, it would be less confusing and more 
accurate if, when discussing the spatial pattern of societal 
cleavages, we spoke instead of symmetry or of congruence 
(Luther,1985 & 1986). 
The fourth problem of the approach under discussion is 
that it has led to an excessive and often uncritical emphasis 
upon territoriality. The two students of federation who have 
taken this reliance furthest are Duchacek (1970) and Dikshit 
(1975). Territoriality is the linchpin of both authors' 
hypotheses. Dikshit proclaims the focus of his investigation 
to be: 
"the spatial pattern of the total complex of social, 
political, economic and other relevant diversities 
which have imparted to the regional political units 
of the overall national society some sense of indi-
vidual identity-. (1975,19). 
Duchacek states his concern in slightly different terms: 
"The central concept of the book is that of the 
territorial community or territorial interest 
group - an aggregate of individuals and groups 
who share-not only common experiences, values, 
fears and purposes, but also an awareness of the 
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territorial dimensions of their collective ~ 
interest~ and actions". (1970,ix). 
As for the causes of -the birth and growth of any degree 
of territorial awareness H, Duchacek believes that HAll of 
them perhaps could be called political and cultural sociali-
zation- (1970,22, his emphasis). 
It is clear that of the two, Duchacek casts his conceptual 
net much wider. He includes individuals and groups, while 
Dikshit is concerned with the individual's identification 
with the -regional political units H• Regardless of which 
analysis is the more catholic, both share the same inbuilt 
faults. In absence of the empirical evidence to sUbstantiate 
their hypotheses about territorial identification, both 
appear to be primarily deductive in this respect. The poli-
tical scientist looking for data of this kind on Austria, 
switzerland and West Germany finds himself in a position 
similar to that which Merkl bemoaned twenty five years ago 
(1964,1); the systematic collection of the empirical data 
necessary for a study of these countries' ,societal systems 
(in the widest sense of the term) is still in its infancy. 
What few data do exist are hardly suitable for comparative 
analysis. 
A further problem of the uncritical reliance upon territo-
riality lies in the actual content of the territorial commu-
nity to which they refer. Both seem to envisage this 
, 
-aggregateH as being very uncomplicated and quiescent. Yet 
the constituent unit of a federation - in our case the 
Canton, Land or even the Bund - is an abstraction [18J. The 
nebulous and shifting nature of territory can perhaps be 
illuminated by adapting Trager's dictum (in Franck,1968,x) 
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thus: territoriality is not a fixed point on a map. What is 
meant by this is that territoriality is considerably more 
complex than Duchacek appears to suggest. An examination of 
the social, economic and political forces involved in the 
processes of decision-making would show that the composition 
of the territorial aggregate - and thereby its concern -
varies from issue to issue. 
Territoriality should therefore not be given such promin-
ence. nor spoken of in such absolute terms. Unless what one 
is attempting to define is the interests of the administrative 
machinery of the states (Luther,1986), one may well find that 
territoriality is at best an intervening variable that can be 
extrapolated only in abstract terms. 
6) The fifth of our general criticisms of the Anglo-Saxon 
debate on federation illustrated how the sociological approach 
has inter alia contributed to an excessive and frequently 
uncritical reliance upon territoriality. However - and this 
is our sixth criticism - almost the entire body of Ang10-
Saxon literature on federation is predicated upon an under-
standing of'federation in which territory is'the sine gua non. 
Thus Livingston affirms that "federalism [sic federation] 
becomes nothing if it is held to embrace'diversities that are 
not territorially grouped ••• ' (1952. 86). Notwithstanding 
the niceties of the innumerable definitions of federation 
they'offer, the writings of the Anglo-Saxon tradition all 
share one characteristic; they regard the essence of a 
federation as consisting in the structures and / or 
techniques'whereby territorial units are accommodated into 
the decision procedure-on the Centre. However, 'the logical 
imperative which demands that constituent units of a federa-
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tion be territorial in nature rather than say ethnic or 
religious is not immediately apparent. On the contrary, to 
rule out the possibility of non-territorial federations is 
tantamount to reductionism, since it impoverishes the concept. 
Before proceeding to analyse the kinds of arguments 
offered in defence of the traditional and narrow understand-
ing of federation it is necessary to state briefly the 
hypotheses of Friedrich and Elazar, the two Anglo-Saxon 
scholars who do see federation as an (almost) universally 
applicable organisational form. (Their approaches 'of course 
differ in many other respects). Friedrich writes that, 
a federation is a union of groups, united by one 
or more common objectives, but retaining their 
distinctive group character for other purposes. 
Seen thus, federation appears to be on the group 
level what association is on the interpersonal 
level. It unites without destroying the selves 
that are uniting, and is intended to strengthen 
them in their mutual relations and in the picture 
of common objectives or ends. It is organised 
cooperation of groups as groups. (1965,2) 
For Friedrich, a federation exists whenever any union of 
groups is formed for 'limited purposes, on the condition that 
the groups thus uniting 'do not lose their individual identity. 
This could apply to an inter-state union, a federal state in 
the traditional sense, or even a federation of parent-teacher 
associations. 
Elazar's perception is even wider, albeit presented more 
clearly. He differentiates between ·political and social~ 
cultural· federations (1979,esp.32-9). The former type is 
essentially limited to relations among governments or 
polities. The kinds of federations E1azar appears to have in 
mind here are either the traditional federal state (or 
MBundesstaat-) or any federation of nation-states. Presumably 
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this would include, for, example, treaties between states as 
well as confederations (understood in the conventional 
meaning of the term criticised by Hughes in 1963 and 1964). 
Elazar identifies two types of social-cultural federation, of 
which the narrower is based upon, 
essentially permanent religious, ethnic, cultural or 
social groups around which a particular life must 
be organised ••• Whether or not the polity is 
formally structured around those groups, they serve 
as its pillars ••• Consociational arrangements ••• 
becoming constitutionalized ••• brings them into 
the realm of federalism [sic federation] (1979,32f) 
The third and broadest of Elazar's types of federation 
has to do with the proper relationships among 
people as individuals, or in families and groups. 
as well as in their capacity as citizens, whereby 
they relate to each other federally. that is to 
say, as partners respectfu1y of each other's 
integrity while cooperating for the common good in 
every aspect of life, not just in the political 
realm. (ibid.32) 
This last extract makes the distinction between Friedrich 
and Elazar's notions of what constitues a federation abun-
dantly clear. While Friedrich insists that the contracting 
parties must be groups, E1azar believes that federation can 
also apply to -relations among people as individuals". How-
ever, they both consider that what makes the relationship 
distinctive are its limited purposes and the non-infringement 
of the parties' integrity [17]. 
As has been stated previously, the conceptualisations of 
federation just illustrated are not shared by the overwhelm-
ing majority of Anglo-Saxon scholars of federation. Only a 
few bother actually to challenge the view that federation and 
feder'al ism can legitimately be appl ied to unions other than 
those of a territorial nature. Examples of such writers 
include livingston (1952). Vile (1961 and 1977). Duchacek 
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(1970), Dikshit (1975) and King (1973 and 1982) and their 
responses in defence of retaining what might be called the 
traditional notion of federation are of three types. 
The first is a practical 'consideration. ,Forsyth notes 
that, 
Precisely because of its all-pervasive character, 
••• federalism [sic and federation] in this sense 
makes a dangerous object of study. With sufficient 
effort it can' be detected almost anywhere, and 
- endless pursuit can take the place of hard analysis. 
To become significant it would seem to be almost 
essential to differentiate it by relating it to 
the other basic concepts of political life .•• 
(1981, 6-7) . 
The point is well taken; it would be extremely difficult 
to conduct a meaningful analysis of 'federalism and federation 
if one were'to deal in the same breath with, for example, a 
world federation and a local federation of boy scouts. In 
view of this kind of problem, this thesis will also-limit its 
empirical focus. It will concentrate on the federation of 
groups (territorial, functional, religious and ethnic) into 
the process of making decisions vested with the authority of 
the society for which they are made. Phrased differently, 
this means that we will analyse federalism and federation as 
they pertain to the government of Austria, Switzerland and 
West Germany. This is not, however, an argument in principle 
against a wider use of the concepts of federalism and 
federation. 
A second kind of reply is directed at the idea of federa-
tions being functional rather than territorial. Typical 
arguments are of the "Perhaps territorial units are really 
functional anyhow· or "Perhaps federations start off as 
territorially based and then become functional" variety. 
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Examples of these two are Duchacek and Vile respectively. The 
former reasons thus: 
In all political systems there has always been a 
problem ••• as to which is the best principle or . 
organising authority ••• territorial ••• or ••• 
functional? So far the practice seems to indicate 
a trend toward a combination of both; the formula 
is to base parties and governments primarily on 
territorial divisions with functional specializa-
tion within, allowing or encouraging functional 
interests to exercise their pressures on the 
territorial units of authority. (1970,11) 
Though more novel, Vile's hypothesis is no more instruc-
tive regarding t~e question of why' the traditional, territ-
orial federation is the only legitimate form •. He states: 
Federalism [sic federation] is territorial in its' 
origins, but it can change ••• The growth of a 
sense of national identify diminishes the impor-
tance within the political system of territorial 
, loyalties, and therefore begins to erode those ',.'., 
aspects of the political culture upon which the 
federal system was-originally based ••• the-
political structures ••• [may be] gradually 
adapted to the resolution of group conflict, and 
••• become the means by which an institutionalized 
pluralism operates to maintain' a decentralized 
system of govenment. (1977,4-6) 
Regardless of the validity of what they say, neither 
author's contribution is"direct1y relevant. Though they do 
discuss whether federations are functional, the discussion 
remains predicated upon the territorial federation. The 
question is merely the extent to which territories are, 'or 
become, structures through which functional interests are 
articulated. 
The third type of response does in fact deal with the 
validity of the claim that non-territorial unions can be le-
gitimate applications of federalism and federation. Living-
ston's contribution to the question of whether the federation 
can be non-territorially based is that: 
federalism [sic federation] becomes nothing if 
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it is held to embrace diversities'that are not 
territorially grouped, for there are then no 
territorial units that can serve as components 
of the federal system. (1952,86) 
However, this form of reasoning appears to be an example 
of what Hughes termed "federalism is what I say it isH (1964, 
2). Thus a federation cannot be composed of territorially 
dispersed religious, ethnic or other social groupings, 
because, in the absence of territorially concentrated diver-
sities, no territorial units would crystallise. If these 
territorial units did not emerge, there could be no federa-
tion, since a federation is defined as being composed of 
units with a territorial character and of none other. This 
argument is clearly circular. 
" 
Similar reasoning is used by Livingston and King. When 
defending the view that federation is a territorial concept, 
Livingston says: 
If they [i.e. societal diversities] are grouped 
territorially, that is geographical1y~ then the 
result may be a society. that is federal. If they 
are not grouped territorially, then the society 
cannot be federal. In either case coherence in 
the society may depend on the devolution upon these 
groups of the exercise of functions appropriate to 
,the diversities that they represent. But in the first 
case only can this take the form of federalism [sic 
federation] ••• In the latter case it becomes func-
tionalism, pluralism or some form of corporativism • 
••• writers who profess to see federal elements in 
the various forms of pluralism, such as feudalism 
or corporativism ••• have added a meaning that was 
not there before. (1952,85) 
King is more concerned to show that federalism ;s a territo-
rial ideology: 
There is ••• a strict affiliation between the ideal 
of political federalism and that of economic fed-
eralism; and between both of these and philosophical 
pluralism. If we were arbitrarily to divide the 
latter into political, economic, and legal aspects, 
the most convenient terms we could apply to them 
would probably be federalism, syndicalism and 
"'pluralism' (in that order). Thus, federal ist 
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ideology need not be seen as being different from 
pluralism, but as merely relating to a distinct 
aspect of pluralism. (1973,152, his emphasis) 
There is reason to question the validity of the argument 
advanced by Livingston and King. Firstly, the submissions 
seem to be primarily nominalistic. Even if they were not, 
there is a further reason to doubt their value for a study 
of federalism and federation in Western Europe. This lies in 
the fact that what King and Livingston offer are hypotheses 
as to the interrelationship they consider to exist between 
Anglo-Saxon philosophies and ideologies. Even assuming them 
to be correct, such conclusions are of little relevance for 
the study of three political systems with a much more 
variegated philosophical and ideological tradition of 
federalism. 
7) This brings us to our seventh and final criticism of the 
Anglo-Saxon debate on federation. A major shortcoming of the 
literature is that its focus has been almost entirely upon 
federation, to the exclusion of federalism. Consequently, the 
important role of ideology has been persistently neglected, 
or even misunderstood. 
Before proceeding to amplify this point, it is necessary 
to restate briefly the distinction between federation and 
federalism [18). "Federation" is to be understood as referring 
to an organizational form. It betokens a set of structures 
and techniques by means of which the constituent units of a 
union are given guaranteed access to and are accommodated 
within. the decision~procedure of the centre. Conversely, 
"federalism· signifies the philosophical or ideological 
prescription and or promotion of such a union. It is 
therefore the animating principle of federation. 
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To discriminate between an organizational principle and 
its institutional expression is pertinent not only to feder-
alism and federation. Nor is it the case that the Anglo-Saxon 
debate has never made this distinction. One need merely cite 
Wheare, who differentiated between what he termed the "federal 
principle- and -federal government- (1963,10 & 33). However, 
the purpose of such distinctions between federal principle 
and practice has almost always been to use the former to 
adjudicate upon the federality or otherwise of the latter. 
Elsewhere, the terms federalism and federation have been used 
interchangeably, as though they were synonymous. At best, the 
conceptual distinction has been made parenthetically. Yet the 
use of two distinct terms to denote the ideological or 
prescriptive aspect on the one hand and the institutions and 
techniques on the other can be both instructive and 
insightful. 
One'advantage of such a distinction would be the concep-
tual clarity it would promote. A second merit lies in the 
attention it 'would focus upon the relationship between fed-
eralism and federation. As a rule, Anglo-Saxon authors have 
not addressed themselves to this question. Theone exception 
that springs to mind is Franck. Though he was concerned with 
the relationship only insofar as it helped explain the 
failure of four Third World federations [19], his conclusion 
is of interest"nonetheless. He claimed that: 
the absence of a positive political or ideological 
commitment to the primarY goal of federation as an 
end in itself· among the leaders and people of each 
of the federating units ••• was the one consistent 
factor •••• 'The inverse inference ••• is that, 
for a federation to be able to resist failure, the 
leaders, and their followers ••• must· ••• have ••• 
an ideological commitment not only to federation as 
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, a means -••• but •• ~ ·as -an end, as a good for its own-
sake. (1968, 173-4, his emphasis) 
A study of the relationship between federalism and fede-
ration can be expected to offer insights not only into the 
demise of federations. It would also make more intelligible 
the origin, establishment and subsequent development of a 
federation. For federal political systems, like any other, 
are an amalgam of political institutions and processes. All 
institutions and processes are purposive. To understand them, 
one needs to be aware of the ends they were originally 
created to serve. As King puts it, 
Federation might be best understood in terms of 
the problems to which it has been constituted a 
set of historically varying answers. (1973,153) 
, }' 
But problems change. So too do value systems and with them 
changes the perception of the problems and of the most 
.' 
appropriate means for their resolution. It thus follows that 
an evaluation of the development of a federation necessitates 
an analysis of the changing nature of federalism. Such change 
could be monitored by reference to a variety of factors, of 
which the following are but a few. Firstly, it would be 
, . 
indispensable to establish the degree of commitment to the 
general principle of federation, namely, the entrenched 
accommodation of the constituent units into the decision-
procedure of the centre. Second, one would have to consider 
the more specific social, economic and political objectives 
which the federation facilitates and examine the extent, 
nature and awareness of any disparity between the demands or 
claims of federalism and the performance of the federation. 
Finally, a full appreciation of the nature of federalism 
would also require one to ascertain the impact upon 
32 
perceptions of the appropriateness of federation of changes 
in the relevant society's social, economic and po1tica1 
objectives, or in its national identity [20J. 
This is not to suggest that federalism determines federa-
tion. The relationship is clearly symbiotic. The point is 
merely that the failure of much of the received Anglo-Saxon 
literature to see in federalism anything more than metaphysics 
has led to the neglect of the function of philosophy and 
ideology in the establishment and maintenance of federation. 
Instead, federalism has frequently been subjected to 
vilification. Riker, for example, attacked those he termed 
"the ideologists of federalism" (1975,156; see also 1964, 
137-155 & 1969). Similar invective was employed by Neumann 
(in MacMahon,1955) and Sawer (1969, _chapter IX). Yet the 
value of such vituperation is not immediately apparent. It 
would be far more instructive to differentiate federalism 
from federation, to recognise ideological claims regarding 
the supposed benefits of federation as examples of federalism 
and to treat them accordingly. This would not involve the 
acceptance at face value of the claims made. What it would 
require is that the statements be given serious consideration. 
In this way, one could ascertain what their authors 
understand - or allege to understand - the nature and purpose 
of federation to be. 
Our third reason for distinguishing between federalism and 
federation is that the language of the countries with which 
this thesis is concerned demands it. The German terms 
"Foederalismus· and "Foederation" translate directly into 
federalism and federation respectively. Moreover, the German 
academic literature also makes the conceptual distinction; 
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the various types of union (or "Sund") are indicated by means 
of varying compound nouns. Thus a "Bundesstaat" is a ,federal 
state, a "Staatenbund N an interstate federation and a 
"Bauernbund" a federation of farmers. Alternatively, "Foedera-
lismus· signifies the overarching organizational principle. 
Finally, the distinction between federalism and federation 
is especially'valuable for any study, the empirical focus of 
which is not,Anglo-Saxon. This is because its application in 
such studies will highlight the relationship not only between 
federalism and federation, but also,between federal isms. Our 
investigation of federalism in Austria, Switzerland and West 
Germany. for, example, will demonstrate how different this, 
philosophical and ideological tradition, is. from Anglo-Saxon 
federalism. The extent and nature of this difference will 
become clear later. For'now"we will ,content ourselves with 
noting that, for example,·while Anglo-Saxon federations were 
-the product of liberal thinking and ••• clearly associated 
with mechanistic attitudes toward government-(Aiyar, 1961 ,59), 
West European federalism'is more variegated. It includes the 
advocacy of federation by groups as distinct as catholic 
corporatists, liberal constitutionalists and anarchists (see 
Weber,1980a,25-8). 
1.3. ,CONCLUSIONS AND STRATEGY 
The aim of this section is threefold. First, we shall 
summarise some of the conclusions of the preceding analysis 
of the Anglo-Saxon debate on federation that are most 
significant for this thesis. Second, we shall proceed to 
identify the contribution which this thesis aims to make to 
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the Anglo-Saxon analysis of West European federation. Third, 
we shall outline how the thesis will be structured in order 
to achieve those objectives. 
The stated purpose of section two of this chapter was to 
arrive 7 by means of a critical analysis of the Anglo-Saxon 
debate on federation, at an -assessment of the appropriateness 
or otherwise of aspects of the debate- for the study of 
federalism and federation in Western Europe (see p4 above). 
It may be helpful to recapitulate the conclusions reached. 
The first of these is that the empirical focus of the Anglo-
Saxon debate has been mainly non-West European, and the 
second is that it has contained errors of interpretation and 
fact regarding the West European experience of federation. 
Both conclusions make a thesis concerned with federalism and 
federation in Austria, Switzerland and Germany a useful 
undertaking. Third 7 the perspective on federation offered 
by the juridical approach is over-reliant upon the United 
States example 7 which it at least implicitly regards as a 
prescriptive model. Moreover, the juridical approach is also 
static and its concepts demonstrably lack plasticity. 
Fourth, it was argued that the Anglo-Saxon debate's 
political approach,has overemphasised the importance, for the 
establishment of federations, of military considerations, 
while the operationalization of some of its exponents' 
notions of -bargain" remain problematical. On the other hand, 
the preceding section concluded that the political approach 
offers some welcome analytical advances. Of these, two were 
highlighted. The first is the emphasis placed by some upon 
the origin of federations. It appears that this constitutes a 
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sensible attempt to assess federations by reference not to an 
abstract~ ideal-type federation~ but to the purposes for 
which the specific federation was established. The second and 
related aspect of the political approach which the preceding 
section identified as potentially instructive is its 
recognition of the important role played within extant 
federations by their party systems. 
The latter are one of the major agents affecting the 
"maintenance- of the federation. (It may be recalled that it 
was stated above that>in this context~ "maintenance" is not 
to be,confused with the longevity ofa federation, but 
relates to the manner in which the federation develops in 
respect to the distribution of powers,and functions as 
between the constituent units and the centre.) We have already 
argued elsewhere (Luther,1985 & 1986) with reference to 
contemporary Austria that there appears to be a prima facie 
case that the centrifugal or centripetal pressures in a 
federation are in no small measure a product of the degree of 
symmetry or asymmetry in its party system. To this aspect of 
the federation's maintenance may be added its development as 
regards the fulfillment of the purposes for which it was 
established. Both aspects suggest that an understanding of 
the dynamics of federation,necessitates the consideration of 
their normative dimension. In other words, an analysis of 
federalism is essential. 
The fifth conclusion of our analysis of the Anglo-Saxon 
debate on federation was that ~sociological" approaches are 
marred by deductive reasoning and imprecision. Sixth, despite 
no obvious logical imperative, the Anglo-Saxon debate is 
predicated upon the reductionist assumption that,the 
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constituent units of federations must be territorial rather 
than say ethnic or religious. Indeed, Livingston insists that 
all ,federations must be territorial and asserts that 
those who profess to see federal elements in the 
various forms of pluralism such as feudalism or 
corporatism ••• have added a meaning that was not 
there before. (1952,85). ' 
"Finally, though the preceding section has demonstrated" 
that federalism and federation are distinct phenomena,' and 
that neither can be understood without an appreciation of the 
other, the Anglo-Saxon literature has failed to distinguish 
adequately between'federalism and federation [21]. This is 
primarily because the Anglo-Saxon literature has been too' 
quick to dismiss federal ideologies as irrelevant. It has 
therefore not even < addressed" itself to extant federalism, let 
alo~e to the hist~rical' origins and d~velopment of federalism 
"" 
in Austria, Switzerland and Germany. As a consequence, it 
" ' <' ~ , 
has failed to recognise the variety of federal isms, as well 
as to give due weight to the significan"ce of federal ism in 
the origin and 'maintenance of federa'tions. 
( • , f-
Having summarised our conclusions as to the uselfulness" of 
aspects of the Anglo-Saxon debate on federation, it is now 
, , 
time to outline what contribution this thesis intends to make 
to the Anglo-Saxon analysis of federal political systems. The 
thesis has two main aims. First, it will attempt to fill a 
" 
gap in the Anglo-Saxon literature by identifying the nature 
of the tradition of federa~ism i~ Austria, Switzerland and 
Germany. Our purpose is to provide a broad outline of the 
evolution of federalism in the German-speaking countries of 
Western Europe. Such an outline is indispensable, since 
modern federalism in Austria, Switzerland and West Germany 
37 
cannot be understood without an appreciation of ,the longer 
tradition of which it constitutes but the most recent 
expression. Of necessity, a history of federalism is.not 
merely the history of an abstract idea, but of its 
relationship to practical politics. In other words, 
federalism is best understood by reference to the specific 
problems to which it has constituted a proposed remedy. 
Contemporary federalism in Austria, Switzerland and West 
Germany owes a great ,debt not only to Germanic federal, 
ideas of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, but also 
to earlier and more general aspects of Continental European 
political thought. 80th the nature of the problems to which 
it has addressed itself and the wider philosophical milieu 
of which it has been a part, have,made the Germanic tradition 
of federalism dist.inct from its ""Anglo-Saxon counterpart. 
However, the tradition of political thought from which 
Germanic federalism emerged and upon the assumptions of 
which it frequently relied, will itself only be outlined in 
brief. This is not a thesis primarily in political thought. 
, , " 
Instead, the thesis intends to identify the various different 
types of federation that have been envisaged in the Germanic 
tradition. 
To do this, we will need to ask three questions. The first 
is the nature of the constituent units propo,sed. ~he second 
is the proposed location in the federation of sovereignty and 
the third is the formal purpose of the federation. We shall 
seek to classify the different federal isms, rather than to 
adjudicate upon the feasibility of distinguishing conceptually 
or empirically between the proposed federations. In short, 
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this is not an exercise in nominalism. It is not a case of 
"federalism [sic federation] is what I say it is'~ (Hughes, 
1964,2), but an ,investigation into what Germanic federalism 
has claimed federation to be. No shopping-list,of famous 
names of Germanic federalism is intended. Instead, the aim is 
to illustrate the origins of Germanic federalism in - as well 
as its relationship to- the major political issues of its 
time., This will be done by means of a broad brush approach to 
German, Austrian and Swiss ,history, in which the links 
between political history and the history of ideas will be 
emphasised. Throughout, the focus will be upon establishing 
the various writers' views about the nature of, the component 
units of the federations they envisaged, as well as their 
claims as to the purpose of those federations. 
The second and related aim of this thesis is to illustrate 
the analytical utility of our distinction between ,federalism 
and federation. We hope to show that an acceptapce of this 
distinction, accompanied by a willingness to analyse the 
interaction of these two elements, rather than dismissing 
federal ideology, provides useful insights into the dynamics 
of federal political systems. We will do this by. illustrating 
how federalism and hence federation have from the very outset 
been ideological and inextricably linked to political 
interests. Moreover, we shall then seek to demonstrate how 
Germanic feder~lism developed alongside and thus into the 
political parties that came to be formed in the nineteenth 
century. 
In the process of fulfilling the two major aims of this 
thesis, we shall seek also to assess the accuracy of two 
claims of the Anglo-Saxon literature. One is Livingston's 
39 
above mentioned claim to the effect that to propose 
federations not based upon territorial units is to add a new 
dimension to federalism (1952,85). The second is the claim 
made by Riker (1964 & 1975) that the prime consideration of 
those proposing federations has always been of a military 
nature. These claims will be addressed in the process of 
identifying the content of the Germanic tradition of 
federalism and when illustrating its ideological nature. 
Though it would be desirable for this thesis to cover the 
whole period from the beginnings of federalism in the 
seventeenth century right up to the present day, that is an 
impossibly ambitious task. Accordingly, we shall restrict our 
focus to the period up to 1850. The reasons for this include 
the following. First, the period prior to the establishment 
in the second half of the nineteenth century of the party 
systems of Austria, Switzerland and Germany is less well 
covered than the period thereafter [22). Second, by analysing 
the development of federalism up to 1850, we shall be 
providing insights into the antecedents of subsequent 
Germanic federal isms. Third, this thesis will trace the link 
between federalism and the loose political groupings that 
constitute the ancestors of the modern political parties. In 
this way, we hope to show how, by the time of the advent in 
the second half of the nineteenth century of the Austrian, 
swiss and German party party systems, federalism could - in 
its various dimensions and for various political ends -
legitimately be claimed to be an intrinsic part of the 
political ideology of a number of of political parties, if 
not of all parties. 
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In sum, this thesis intends to provide a preliminary 
framework for the analysis of West European federal systems 
in a new context, namely, by reference to the interaction 
within them of federalism and federation. In doing so, it 
will also furnish insights not only into how and why 
federalism is a significant element in explaining the 
dynamics of federations, but also into how and why parties 
are such important agents in their maintenance. 
Prior to launching into that endeavour, it is necessary 
to clarify two matters. The first concerns the use in this 
thesis of the term -Germanic". The second relates to the 
structure which this thesis will adopt to realise the aims 
outlined above. 
When speaking of -Germanic" federalism, we mean federalism 
in Austria, switzerland and Germany. This usage requires 
some explanation and Qualification, however. First, our use 
of the term should not be taken to signify any commitment to 
a pan-Germanic nation or state. Indeed, the use of the label 
should not even be taken to imply that all federal isms under 
that rubric were articulated in the German language. Given 
the linguistic diversity of Switzerland, it should come as no 
surprise that Germanic federalism includes a number of 
French-speaking exponents of federalism. These have in part 
been of considerable significance within the Germanic 
tradition, as will be illustrated below [23]. 
Second, just as Anglo-Saxon federalism is not impervious 
to "foreign- influence (eg. Friedrich, 1968 & Elazar, 1973 & 
1979), neither is Germanic federalism a closed milieu. 
Writers other than Austrians, Germans and Swiss have been 
instrumental in shaping it. De Tocqueville is one example 
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[24]. Third, the use of the term "Germanic" is not meant to 
imply that federalism in Austria, Switzerland and West 
Germany is monistic. On the contrary, it has already been 
argued above that it is extremely variegated. This diversity 
is apparent not only in the philosophical and analytical 
writings, but also - and more markedly - in the ideological/ 
prescriptive or promotive literature. 
Accordingly, this thesis will consider a range of types of 
federalism, selected by reference to a threefold criterion 
of relevance. First, we shall not restrict ourselves to an 
exclusive consideration of either highly elaborate federal 
philosophies or theories, or of Germanic federalism in the 
guise of political polemics, but will seek to include a wide 
range of intellectual levels. Thus we shall include treatises 
such as those of Althusius (Carney,1964) and Haller (1820-5), 
as well as pamphlets such as those of Troxler (eg 1833,a-e) 
and Gagern (1856). Second, we shall seek to include examples 
from as wide a range of political groupings as possible, 
including reactionary and reformist conservatives, as well as 
"moderate" and radical liberals. Finally, we shall attempt to 
include examples of each of the "dimensions" of Germanic 
federalism which this thesis will identify (see 2.4 below). 
For a major task of the thesis is to demonstrate not only 
the political, but also the substantive variety of Germanic 
federalism. As will become apparent, the differences in 
federalism are primarily not between the three relevant 
countries, but within a distinctive tradition. Put another 
way, Germanic federalism consists of a corpus of literature 
and a philosophical or ideological tradition that is 
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variegated in its statements and - to a lesser extent - also 
in its origins. This tradition is significantly different 
from the dominant Anglo-Saxon paradigm dicussed in the 
preceding section and is a genre in its own right: a Germanic 
federalism. 
Having explained both the aims of this thesis and what is 
meant by -Germanic", the final task of this section is to 
outline the structure of the thesis. It has been decided to 
divide the substantive material in this thesis into two 
sections (Parts 2 & 3). This division denotes a broad 
distinction in emphasis. 
Part Two is primarily concerned with identifying the 
dimensions of the Germanic tradition of federalism, though it 
will also illustrate the political uses to which it was put. 
Accordingly, Chapter 2 will deal with early Germanic 
federalism, that is to say, with federalism from the early 
seventeenth century writings of Althusius until the late 
eighteenth century federalism of Kant. This will allow the 
identification of five "dimensions" of Germanic federalism. 
Chapter 3 will examine the application of those dimensions of 
Germanic federalism during the revolutionary Napoleonic 
period, though it will also include federal isms published 
immediately prior to the Congress of Vienna. 
The main contribution of Part 3 of the thesis, ie of 
Chapters 4 to 6, is the analysis of the use by the earliest 
antecedents of modern political parties of federalism as a 
political ideology to rationalise and to promote their 
existing political interests within extant federations. 
Chapter 4 is devoted to an elucidation of the relevant 
background factors to Germanic federalism from 1815, when the 
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Congress of Vienna imposed on all three relevant countries 
conservative federations which substantially altered the 
context 'in which federal speculation took place, until the 
outcome of the revolutions of the late 1840s was decided. In 
Switzerland, it was settled by the short civil war of 1847 
and the subsequent introduction in 1848 of a liberal 
constitution. In Germany, by contrast, the failure of the 
federal proposals of both the liberal Frankfurt National 
Assembly and of the conservative Erfurt Union spelt a return 
to the federation of 1815. The aim of Chapters 5 & 6 is to 
illustrate the various ways in which federalism was used by 
the two major political groupings of the time: the 
conservatives and the liberals, as means to their different 
ends. To enhance the comparative nature of the thesis, 
Chapters' 5 & 6 will not be structured 'chronologica11Y~ but 
will concentrate upon conservative and liberal Germanic 
federalism respectively. 
In the fourth and final part of the thesis, Chapter 7 will 
first offer a summary 'of the major findings of this thesis. 
section 7.2. will be concerned with its conclusions regarding 
the nature of the Germanic tradition of federalism, while 7.3. 
will focus upon those relating to the use of federalism as a 
political ideology. Finally, section 7.4 will consider the 
contributions which we-believe that this thesis has made to 
the academic study of federalism and federation. 
NOTES FOR CHAPTER 1 
1. On developments up to the early 1980s, see for example 
McWhinney (1982). On the issue of Meech Lake, see for example 
Leslie/Watts (1988), or "The Meech Lake Accord-, which 
constitutes a recent Special Supplement of the journal 
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Canadian Public Policy, (Vol. 14, September 1988). 
Alternatively, see Burgess (1990). 
2. For a further discussion of this distinction, see point 
seven of 1.2. below. The author of this thesis first advanced 
this argument in a paper at the Joint Sessions of the 
European Consortium for Political Research (Luther,1984), of 
which section 1.2 of this thesis constitutes an ammended 
version. In the book that emerged from that conference, he 
provided an empirical illustration (Luther,1986) of some of 
the points suggested in that paper. See also the introduction. 
to that book by Burgess (Burgess,1986,15-33). 
3. This claim hardly requires corroboration. It will suffice 
to direct the reader's attention to the extensive , 
bibliographies in Riker, (1975,161-72), Davis (1978,224-232), 
as well as to that of this thesis. 
4~ See especially Birch (1966), Watts (1966), Franck (1968) 
and Hicks (1978). 
5. A notable exception in Sawer (1969). 
. . 
6. One paragraph on page 26 and four incidental references 
on pp 55, 63, 77 & 19. 
7. It would be invidious to pick out individual authors. A 
review of the literature will corroborate this claim. 
8. e.g. Birch (1966,20f and 33), Wildavsky (1967, viif), as 
well as Riker himself (1969 and 1975). 
9. Riker (1964,41) refers to Austria as a case of 
·prospectively imperial federation", presumably as a result 
of the Anschluss option. 
10. See, for example, Livingston (1952), Birch (1955 & 1966), 
Davis (1955, 1972 & 1978), Vile (1961 & 1977), Friedrich 
(1968), Elazar (1979) and King (1982) •.. 
11. For a detailed critique of the process approach see Davis 
(1978,esp.173-82). 
12. This point has been made in different ways by other 
authors. See, for example, Grodzins (1960a, esp. 265), Birch 
(1955) and Davis (1972 & 1978). 
13. Notably Mayntz/Scharpf (1975), Scharpf/Schnabel/Reissert 
(1976), but also much of the research conducted in and on 
Switzerland by writers such as Germann (1975 & 1975a) and 
Nuessli (1985). 
14. Franck (1968) is one such author. One of his major 
conclusions is worthy of note and will be referred to later, 
namely, that· for a federation to be able to resist failure, 
the leaders, and their followers, must ••• have ••• an 
ideological commitment not to federation only as a means •.• , 
but as and end, as a good for its own sake." (173, his 
emphasis.) 
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15. e.g. Truman, O.B. (1955), Riker and Schaps, (1957), 
Pennock (1959), Riker (1964 & 1975), Mayer (1970) and even 
Wheare (1963), to name but a few. 
16. Vile also makes this point (1961,196). 
17. The aim of_this elucidation of Friedrich and Elazar's 
concepts of federation is merely to contrast the range of 
possible applications they envisage with the narrowness of 
equating federation and federalism as pertaining solely to the 
territorial distribution of power in a federal nation state. 
We shall therefore not proceed to criticise their approaches 
in detail, despite obviously being aware of, for example, the 
problems attendant upon Friedrich's notion of a "federal ising 
process". For a good critique of Friedrich, see Davis (1978, 
173-82). 
18. See p3 above, where we have already indicated the nature 
of the distinction and also mentioned that in this respect 
our analysis coincides with that of King (1982,19-23&74-6). 
19. East Africa,Rhodesia,Nyasaland,the West Indies & Malaysia. 
20. For a related consideration, namel~ the way in which the 
development of a sense of a common (national) identity 
throughout.the union can militate against the importance .of. 
retaining the special status of the constituent units, see 
Vile (1977,esp.4-6). 
21. The nub of the.argument. we are advancing is of course not 
that the Anglo-Saxon literature has failed to distinguish 
adequately between the words .federalism and federation, but 
that it has not distinguished between the phenomena these 
terms denote and has thus. failed to consider the diversity of 
federalism and the dynamics of its interaction with 
federations. 
22. See for example Berchtold (1967). Bergstraesser (1960), 
Charmatz (1907), Gruner (1977) and Wedl (1969). 
23. For example see Monneron(1800), Rossi(1832) and Fazy 
,(n.d.)., covered below in chapters 3,5, & 6 respectively. 
24. De Tocqueville (1835). See section 6.2. ,below also . 
. . , 
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PART 2: EARLY GERMANIC FEDERALISM 
CHAPTER 2: GERMANIC FEDERALISM IN THE 17TH AND 18TH CENTURIES 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this chapter is to provide an overview of 
Germanic federalism from its 17th century origins, up to and 
including the federalism of Kant at the end of the~18th 
century. The purpose of that undertaking is to help fulfil 
the two main objectives of.this thesis, namely, to identify 
the nature of the Germanic tradition of federalism and to 
illustrate the advantages of examining the ideological nature 
of federalism. We shall also seek to assess the accuracy of 
the Livingston and Riker hypotheses on federalism. 
As argued in 1.3. above, the nature of the federalism 
that emerges in anyone country is in many respects a product 
of its political and philosophical environment. A broad 
understanding of this environment is thus necessary for a 
rounded appreciation of that federalism. The provision of 
such an overview of the background to early Germanic 
federalism is the task of this introductory section [1]. 
When examining the political and philosophical history of 
Switzerland and Germany [2] during the sixteenth to 
eighteenth centuries - i.e. the century preceding the advent 
of Germanic federalism and the first two centuries of its 
development - one encounters innumerable factors which were 
. 
significant in influencing the form which that federalism 
47 
took. These factors range from isolated events to long-term 
developments. To facilitate an understanding of the nature 
and impact of these factors, this at times bewildering 
kaleidoscope of events will be synthesised into four major 
political and philosophical themes. 
The four themes are: 1) the conflict between secular and 
ecclesiastical authority; 2) the relationship between central 
and regional authority; 3) foreign power relationships, and 
4) socio-political changes in intrastate relations (i.e. 
the rise and consolidation of {petty} absolutism). In short, 
the four themes relate respectively to religious, territorial, 
interstate and socio-economic aspects. 
Clearly, these themes are not completely discrete - nor 
could they be. However, they do enable us to identify those 
aspects of the political and philosophical background to 
early Germanic federalism which led to different perceptions 
of the nature and function of federation. In other words, 
these themes help explain why, even from its earliest days, 
Germanic federalism had conflicting views about the nature of 
the constituent units of which it held federations to be 
composed and about the purpose of federation. 
The religious cleavage - manifested originally in the 
conflict between secular and ecclesiastical authority - had 
by the beginning of the seventeenth century largely been 
resolved in favour of the secular power, which hencefort~ 
increasingly wielded both "Gelasian swords". This development 
was furthered by the conflicts arising from the Reformation. 
In terms of political philosophy, this exacerbated the 
long standing conflict between those who argued that even in 
religious matters, subjects owed unmitigated passive 
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obedience to their ruler, and those who defended the right 
to resist in certain circumstances. This right was most 
commonly advocated by those who saw the purpose of the state 
to lie in the maintenance and furtherance of "true" worship. 
Thus resistance was justified in cases where the state failed 
to fulfil its prime function vis-a-vis the faith. However, it 
was the case of those advocating passive obedience that was 
to be the more influential. 
This was also true as regards early Germanic federalism, 
where the Calvinist precepts of A1thusius - who will be 
discussed in detail in the next section of this chapter -
were the exception rather than the rule. A1thusius was also 
distinct from most other seventeenth century proponents of 
Germanic federalism (with the notable exception of Grotius), 
by virtue of the fact that his political philosophy was not 
theological. Almost all other seventeenth century political 
philosophy remained theological - both in terms of the 
assumptions upon which it was predicated and in respect of 
the arguments it employed. By the end of the eighteenth 
century, rational theories came to dominate. 
The second theme alluded to above was that concerning 
territorial or central-regional conflict. In the period 
preceding the Reformation, central-regional relations in 
Switzerland and Germany were moving in opposite directions. 
The weakness of successive German Emperors in the fourteenth 
and fifteenth centuries facilitated a corresponding increase 
in the power of the German cities and princes. Indeed, the 
very existence of Switzerland bears testimony to the Empire's 
disintegration. Meanwhile, the trend in Switzerland had been 
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towards greater centralization, albeit from a very different 
starting point. 
Yet the steady advance of central authority in 
switzerland during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries 
came to an abrupt halt with the outbreak of the Reformation 
in the early sixteenth century. Though from now onwards, 
Swiss central authority declined, it did not do so either 
as swiftly or as irretrievably as was the case in Germany, 
where the experience from the sixteenth century onwards was 
of a substantial decline in the authority of the centre. 
In view of the pervasiveness of the Bodinian view of 
state sovereignty, the growing political impotence of the 
centre and the fact that the interaction of the regions came 
increasingly to resemble that of independent states, it is 
not surprising that Germanic federalism focused almost 
exclusively upon the idea of a federation of sovereign 
states. However, there were a few writers who still viewed 
Germany in central-regional terms (e.g. Hugo and Leibniz) and 
the component units of the federation which they espoused 
were thus not sovereign states. Nonetheless, the dominant 
political paradigm was the relationship of sovereign states 
and in turn, the dominant philosophical theme was 
interstate relations. 
The third of our four broad themes concerns interstate 
relations or - to be more precise - the relationship to 
foreign powers of the Swiss cantons and of the states of the 
German Empire. The first mentioned relationship went through 
two stages; one lasted until 1515 and the second from 1516 to 
1798. Swiss foreign relations during the fourteenth century 
were largely defined in term of successful conflict against 
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the Habsburgs, while the fifteenth century saw the height of 
Switzerland's "imperialist" phase, which lasted until its 
defeat by France at Marignano in 1515. The perpetual peace 
treaty signed with France in 1516 marks the start of a new 
stage in Swiss foreign relations, namely, one of an 
overwhelming influence of France, which grew in direct 
proportion to the increased power of the French monarchy. 
From the Reformation onwards, another important aspect was 
the fact that Switzerland's internal religious cleavage 
continued to threaten to entangle the country in foreign 
wars. Foreign relations partly fomented two civil wars, 
though military involvement abroad was miraculously avoided. 
For her part, Germany was not so lucky. The history of her 
foreign relations during the sixteenth, seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries is one of a succession of bloody military 
conflicts, the majority of which were fought on German soil. 
As Barraclough says, "Germany sank more and more into the 
condition of a subordinate factor, a field for annexations 
and compensations fought over by other states" (1972,362). 
This unremitting belligerency was very costly. It contributed 
to the collapse of the ancien regime in France and the 
cumulative cost of unrelenting military activity was largely 
responsible for the bankruptcy of Austria in 1811. However, 
it is the human cost that was the greatest. The enormous toll 
in lives and human misery and suffering is incalculable. In 
addition, there were "the effects of social and economic 
dislocation, "to say nothing of the political upheavals. 
The foreign power relationships of the Swiss and Germans 
had at least two consequences for Germanic federalism. The 
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continued threat of Swiss entanglement in foreignO'wars meant 
that Swiss deliberations came 'increasingly to stress the 
importance for the survival of the federation of a policy of' 
armed neutrality~ However, it was not the persistent'threat, 
but the costly reality of continual war which was to prove 
the more significant influence upon Germanic federalism~ 
In an age which' increasingly claimed to be that of reason 
and enlightenment, it is no wonder that this ceaseless 
carnage provided food for philosophical thought. As we shall 
see in 2.3., some of those concerned to find a lasting peace 
- including the Abbe de Saint Pierre,Rousseau and Kant -
were convinced of the 'value of federation as a means to this 
end. Such considerations wererto constitute a new, important 
and recurrent dimension of Germanic federalism. 
The previous two of our four broad themes have really 
concerned interstate relations. However, our fourth and final 
theme-concerns the changes in intrastate relations that 
occured in Germany and Switzerland during the sixteenth-to 
eighteenth centuries. The political trends within the Swiss 
cantons and German states were broadly similar; with the 
emergence of absolutism, there was a concomitant decline in 
the power of'institutions - such as the cities, guilds and 
other mediaeval corporations - that had previously shared in 
the exercise of political authority. 
Barraclough states of' late fifteenth century Germany that 
a new stability and balance had been struck 
within the territorial state ••. ; we saw, 
in particular, the beginnings of fruitful 
co-operation between princes and estates 
which boded well for a healthy development 
of political life and institutions, on a 
basis of progressive "constitutionalism"." (1972,374) [3] 
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In Switzerland, the so-called "democratic movem~nt" of the 
previous century had led to the early abandonment of serfdom 
and a thoroughgoing democratisation of cantonal politics. The 
"constitutionalism" of the Swiss cantons was therfore much 
further advanced by the beginning of the sixteenth century 
than that of the German states. Generally speaking, Germany 
differed both in terms of a greater prevalence of 
monarchical, ecclesiastical or other non-republican states, 
as well as in the more rudimentary nature of those popular or 
corporate forms of participation which did exist. 
For Swiss cantons and German states alike, earlier 
interstate conflict was from the seventeenth century onwards 
to be overlaid by and subordinated to, the religious 
cleavage. So large did this new animosity 100m, that the 
states' perception of being threatened by external attack led 
them to consolidate internal political authority. Power was 
progressively concentrated in the hands of an ever smaller 
coterie. In ecclesiastical states, it was united into the 
. I 
hands of the bishop; in monarchical states it was the head of 
the incumbent dynasty, who came to exercise absolute 
authority. In patrician dominated states (e.g. the Swiss 
cantons of Freiburg and Bern), the power of the nobility was 
enhanced. Even in the pastoral cantons ruled by the 
Landsgemeinde [4J, popular sovereignty was undermined in 
favour of government emanating from an urban oligarchy. 
Among the factors which militated in favour of a 
strengthening of absolutism, the following were some of the 
most important. First was the principle ciys regio eius 
religio, as enshrined in the 1555 Peace of Augsburg, which 
meant that ecclesiastical and secular authority were no 
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longer counteractive. Instead the union of the two served to 
reinforce the dominant - and usually secular - partner. 
" . 
Second, the modernization and professionalisation of the 
bureaucracy reduced dependence upon the estates for policy 
implementation. In Austria, the development of a modern 
administrative machinery had started in the reign of 
Maximilian I (1493-1519). Especially in the sixteenth 
century, the new bureaucracy was successfully used by the 
Catholic Habsburgs as a weapon in their struggle to impose 
absolutist government upon the mainly Protestant estates. It 
was only during the "enlightened absolutism" of the reigns of 
Maria-Theresa (1740-80) and Joseph II (1780-90) that the 
Austrian civil service finally came to be an institution 
whose duty was to serv~ not dynastic interests, but solely 
those of the state. In Prussia, such principles had long 
governed the activity not only of the administrative 
apparatus, but also of the government - including the 
Hohenzollern dynasty itself. The Swiss cantons never had the 
large bureaucracies which German states boasted. However, 
even in the cantons - and especially in the urban ones - the 
principle of territorial administration came to replace that 
of involving the estates of the realm in a corporate 
administration of government. 
A third factor which militated in fav.our of absolute 
government was the more effective assertion of its coercive 
power. The function of the Prussian army as a pillar of the 
state is well known. In other German states, the perception 
and reality of eternal military threats resulted in the 
maintenance of a state of virtually permanent mobilization. 
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Accordingly, the armed forces were usually readily available 
to suppress any domestic disorder. In Switzerland, the 
articles of the 1481 Covenant of Stans, in which the cantons 
pledged each other support in the event of internal disorder 
were applied in a new and harsh manner. In the 1653 Peasants 
War, the various cantonal governments rallied to suppress the 
spreading peasant protest ruthlessly. Bluntschli says of 1653 
that it marked the breakthrough in Switzerland of the 
principle of absolute government (1875,429). Thereafter, 
confederal intervention in support of cantonal governments 
under popular attack became more frequent and more bloody [5]. 
A fourth and related agent of absolutism - and one which 
applied especially in the German states - was the 
marginalisation of the cities and estates as a result of the 
economic and social upheavals wrought by the frequent wars. 
The nadir of the cities came during the Thirty Years War, 
when trade and commerce - their very life-blood - collapsed. 
The exigencies of war were an important factor in assisting 
the princes to arrogate to themselves powers of taxation 
which had previously been the preserve of the States 
General. In addition, the wars also disrupted and fatally 
undermined the guilds and other corporations. This meant that 
there were no longer any institutions capable of acting as 
counters to princely absolutism. 
Finally, absolutism was also strengthened by the 
beginnings in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries of 
industrialization. While the creation of ever larger 
landholdings was accompanied by the decline of the peasantry, 
industrialization sealed the fate of the artisans and 
increased the wealth and standing of the urban bourgeoisie. 
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In most of Switzerland, the impact of early industrialisation 
was, however, not as great upon the social structure. The 
nature and scale of much of the industry - weaving, watch 
making and textiles - allowed it to be conducted as a cottage 
industry. Thus the development of a large urban proletariat 
was avoided. In contrast, the specially Austrian brand of 
mercantilism resulted in large-scale state involvement in 
industry. Here as in other German states, the eighteenth 
century was the time when urban proletariats came into being 
and practices such as child labour made their first 
appearance. 
In summary, therefore, at the beginning of the sixteenth 
century absolutism was not yet fully established and there 
were a number of voices raised against the progressive 
marginalization of the traditionl political authority of 
institutions such as the guilds and other estates of the 
realm. Indeed, the federalism of Althusius constitutes 
preciselY,such a defence of mediaeval corporations. 
From the early sixteenth, century, however, absolutism was 
successfully established. This was done by the following 
process: the erosion and subsequent demise of all independent 
sources of political authority; the harnessing of the support 
of the church, the coercive power and a modernized bureaucracy; 
the creation and accentuation of a gulf between rulers and 
ruled, and the increasing ossification of the social 
structure. 
The issues to which political philosophy was to address 
itself as a result of these developments are well known. 
They concerned in the main the question of the relative 
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validity of the mutually hostile beliefs that power should 
be absolute and the belief that authority should be shared 
by other groups, such as corporate actors, other classes, or 
even by the populous at large. 
As absolutism was consolidated, the territorial 'principle 
of rule replaced the notion of participation in government 
decision-making.by-corporate actors. Federalism was concerned 
primarily with interstate-relations. As Riley explains (1976, 
7-41), .this was largely a consequence of the fact that the 
only possible component units of federations-were held to be 
sovereign states, since the notion of intrastate accommodation 
was antithetical to the conventional (Bodinian) wisdom that 
the essence of statehood lay in the indivisibility·and 
supremacy of the sovereign's will. It was only in the latter 
part of the eighteenth centurY,with the Enlightenment and 
events such as the French Revolution, that the "dominance of 
this rigid view of the state was shattered. Eighteenth 
century Germanic federalism really only questioned absolutism 
incidentally. An example of this is the assertion of 
Montesquieu and Rousseau that federations composed of 
republican and democratic states were more likely to survive 
than those whose internal structures were absolutist. It was 
not until the nineteenth century that federalism again 
concerned itself primarily with intrastate authority 
relations. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, 
federalism took as its main focus interstate relations. 
The completion of this summary of the political and 
philosophical developments which were linked closely .to early 
Germanic federalism up to the end of the eighteenth century 
enables-us to shift the focus of our attention. We shall now 
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now examine the major proponents 'of early Germanic federalism. 
2.2. GERMANIC FEDERALISM 'FROM ALTHU5IUS'TO PUFENDORF 
It is only right to start a geneaology of Germanic 
federalism with Johannes Althusius, whom the Encyclopaedia 
~ • ' ''> -
Britannica claims to have been "the intellectual father of 
modern federalism" (Mircopaedia,I,277). This reputation is 
based upon his Politica methodice digesta (or politics), 
first published in 1603 and revised in 1610 and 1614 [I]. Its 
significance lies not in its very brief discussion of 
"partial confederation" - ie federation between fully 
sovereign states - since in this respect it 'fully agrees with 
the conventional wisdom of its day. The novelty of the 
treatise lies in the manner, but above all in the fact, of 
its application of federalism to intrastate relations. 
To have 'done so while retaining a Bodinian view of 
sovereignty would have been logically impossible, but it is 
precisely Althusius's aim to ref~te Bodin. While hii Politics 
too holds that sovereign power "recognises rio ally, nor any 
superior or equal to 'itself" (69), sovereign rights are not 
ascribed to'the'ruler. H~ is ~erely "the steward, 
administrator and overseer of these rights". Instead, their 
"ownership and usufruct properly belong to the total realm 
or 'people"(5). The members or constituent units of the realm 
are not individuals, but corporations such as estates, cities 
and provinces. So for Althusius, federation at the level of 
the'state amounts to the accommodation of the corporate 
constituent units' in the decision procedure' of the 
"universal administrators". Moreover, inasmuch as they 
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existed before the state and contracted to create it, these 
"lesser" associations in fact take-precedence over the state 
(see esp 201f). In true Aristotelian fashion, Althusius 
regards such "universal" associations as distinctive solely 
by· virtue of their size and the greater range of functions 
which this enables them to fulfil. They are most definitely 
not repositories of absolute authority. Tne Aristotelian 
principles of the Politics are'clearly evident in its 
opening sentences:-
Politics is art of associating (consoc;andi) 
men for the purpose of establishing, cultivating, 
and conserving social life among them. Whence it 
is called 'symbiotics'. The subject matter of 
. politics is therefore association (consociatjo), 
in which the symbiotes pledge themselves each 
to the other by explicit or tacit agreement, 
to mutual communication of whatever is useful 
and necessary for the harmonious exercise of 
social life. (12) 
Having defined politics as the art of associating, 
Althusius proceeds to divide associations into two main 
types: simple and private on the one hand and mixed and 
public on the other. He then further divides the former type 
into associations that are ~ither private and natural, or 
private and civil. The first of these is the family and 
embraces both conjugal and wider "kinship" consociatia. 
Althusius holds citizens to be heads of families interacting 
with other family heads outside the private and natural 
association in which each is individually sovereign· t7l • In 
this extra-familiar environment~ they unite to form voluntary 
and transitory associations. These are the private and civil 
associations, in which: 
three or more men of the same trade, training 
or profession are united for the purpose of 
holding in common such things they jointly 
profess as duty, way of life or craft. Such an 
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association is called a collegium ••• (28f) 
What Althusius has in mind are primarily professional or 
vocational associations {32f).The constituent elements of 
these collegia are the family heads, while the voluntary 
associations in turn unite with related collegia to form the 
"larger general collegia" or estates (33). 
-The simple and private associations "are the seedbeds of 
the public association" (27). The latter "exists when many 
private associations are linked,together for the purpose of 
establishing an inclusive political order" (34) and is one 
of three types. In ascending order of generality, there are 
the city (or commune), the province and the universal assoc-
iation or realm. The association immediately larger than a 
collegia is the city, or commune 
formed by fixed laws and composed of many 
families and collegia living in the same place 
••• The members of a community are private and 
diverse associations of families and collegia, 
not the individual members of private associa-
tions. These persons, by their coming together, 
now become not spouses, kinsmen and colleagues, 
but citizens of the same community. (35) 
The community entrusts its government to a prefect whom it 
remains entitled to remove. Cities also have senates of "wise 
and honest men", in which the city's constituent units are 
represented. City government consists of the communication 
and administration of public "things", services and rights. 
Two aspects of Althusius's city government deserve particular 
mention. The first of these is the emphasis placed upon the 
co-operative ownership, use and maintenance of items such as 
pastures, schools and roads. The second aspect relates to how 
the administration of public functions is divided. Those 
pertaining to the first table of the Decalogue are deemed 
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ecclesiastical and thus rightly subject to clerical 
administration. Those relating to the second are considered 
to be political and therefore the responsibility of the 
secular power (42f). 
The second of Althusius's particular public associations 
is the province, the constituent units of which are again not 
individuals, but corporations: all the villages, towns, 
cities and estates located inside the boundaries within which 
the laws of the province are exercised. The "head" or 
"prefect" of the province is appointed. by the supreme 
magistrate and accountable to him (8) .His duties are: 
to exercise diligent watch and care over 
sacred and secular provincial affairs and to 
provide that they be lifted up and directed 
to the glory of God and to the welfare of the 
entire province and the members thereof •••. 
secondly. rightly to administer justice to 
individual persons ••• thirdly, to inquire 
concerning those things that need correction 
or support ••• (58). 
For all important decisions, he requires the assent of a 
majority of the members of the "provincial collegium". This 
assembly of all the provincial estates is convoked by thee 
prefect. These estates also share with the prefect in the 
governing of the province. Althusius divides them into ecc-
lesiastical and secular estates, allocating to them the 
supervision respectively of matters relating to the spiritual 
life and those pertaining to temporal existence. Thus the 
ecclesiastical estate is charged with the following: 
1) the defence and promotion of ••• heavenly 
doctrine; 2) the calling of ministers of the 
Word; 3) the censorship of morals; 4) schools 
for children and youth; ••• " and so on (51). 
The secular estate comprises the nobility, the burghers 
(including merchants and businessmen, craftsmen and 
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mechanics) and the agrarians. While the role of the nobility 
is military, that of the commons is to: 
strive to produce and bring forth for the 
fatherland merchants, farmers and workmen 
••• skilled, industrious and distinguished. 
By ••• (their endeavours) self sufficiency can 
be obtained ••• " (56). 
The principles governing·secular conduct are those contained 
in precepts five to ten of the Decalogue (47) and secular' 
commuincation encompasses: 
1) executive functions ••• , 2) ••• discipline' 
••• , 3) the provision for provincial security, 
4) the mutual defence .~. against force and 
violence ••• , 5} the collection and distribution 
of monies for public needs and uses ••• , 6) the 
support of commercial activity, 7} {uniform} 
language and money, and 8} the care of public 
goods (48). 
The majority of Althusius's Politics is concerned with the 
largest, or "universal" public assoication [9], composed 
not of individual men, families or collegia 
••. Instead, members are many cities, provinces 
and regions agreeing among themselves on a 
single body constituted by mutual union and' 
communication •.. The bond of this body .•• is 
consensus ••• a tacit or expressed promise to 
communicate things. mutual services ••. and the 
same common laws to the extent that ••• universal 
social life .•• shall reQuire (52) 
The universal association's right of sovereignty remain 
with the sum of its constituent associations, which Althusius 
often confusingly refers to as "the people" (eg 61). The 
administration of these rights of sovereignty is delegated 
to the "ephors" and the supreme magistrate. Since sovereignty 
is inalienable, their authority cannot legitimately be 
absolute, but is subject to law (64f & 92f). Althusius makes 
a point of the fact that these administrators should not act 
in a manner contrary to either the first table of the 
Decalogue, or to holy charity. Nor might they use their 
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office for purposes of personal aggrandisement (92). 
, 
As is apparent from his frequent empirical references 
(eg 111f), Althusius's ephors are modelled upon the seven 
Imperial Electors. The ephors' duties are fivefold, namely 
to constitute the supreme magistrate; to ensure that he does 
not overstep the bounds of his office; to act as trustees in 
times of interregnum; to remove a tyrannical supreme magis-
trate and, finally, to support him in the legitimate exercise 
of his office (98ff). These rights accrue to the ephors only 
as a collegiate body; individually they remain inferior to 
the supreme magistrate (100). Althusius claims that this 
state of affairs amounts to a "mutual watchfulness ..• 
(which) keeps the condition of the realm sound" (103). The 
reality would more than likely be very different, however. 
Though ephors are to be elected by the "entire people", 
the possibility of royal appointment is conceded (94). 
Moreover, even if the ephors are popularly elected, the fact 
that they will wear a second hat as provincial prefects 
makes them dependent, at least in that capacity, upon royal 
patronage. Althusius probably recognised that. the ephors 
might well be dependent upon the supreme magistrate, rather 
than independent arbiters of his actions. This might well 
explain the following caveat: 
••• by the negligence, perfidy, deceit, fraud, 
or betrayal of ephors ••• or by their 
conspiracy or collusion with a prince, nothing 
is taken away from the right of a people, and 
nothing is added to the licence of a tyrant. (114). 
The appointment of the supreme magistrate is to be 
performed by the ephors in the name of the universal 
association. It takes the form of a "reciprocal contract 
(in which) the obligation of the supreme magistrate comes 
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first" (116). He agrees to administer the rights of 
sovereignty in accordance with the Decalogue, positive law 
and his electoral capitulations (117). Should he break this 
covenant, it is up to the ephors - not to the individual 
corporations [10] and still less to individual persons - to 
get him-to mend his ways. In extreme circumstances, or if all 
other measures had been tried and failed, the ephors might 
depose him (129 & 185ff). The second party to the electoral 
convenant is the "people", who promise to obey the supreme 
magistrate in all things but "impious commands for 
obedience to God is more important than obedience to man" 
(128). If the people renage on their duty, the supreme 
magistrate is entitled to resort to force of arms. 
Having dealt with the constituting of the supreme 
magistrate, Althusius proceeds to examine the communication 
and administration of the rights of sovereignty of the 
universal association. In respect of both of these, he 
advocates the by now familiar division between secular and 
ecclesiastical authority. What makes Althusius' consideration 
of these matters at the level of the universal association 
different is the insight which his more detailed exposition 
offers into the kind of secular-ecclesiastical relationship 
which he really envisages. 
The clergy is to be responsible for the introduction and 
the conversation of orthodox religious doctrine and practice 
(155-60). Apart from involving them in school and church 
matters, this responsibility gives them rights in respect of 
the persecution of heretics, atheists and all "impious and 
profane men" (165f). The means by which this is to be done 
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included the Inquisition (173ff). Throughout, the exercise of 
ecclesiastical authority is presented by A1thusius as though 
it consisted in the mere application of a set of rules 
divinely predetermined. In reality, however, the clergy is to 
elect from its midst "faithful and pious ministers" (163) who 
are to decide upon the meaning to be attached to the vague 
first table of the Decalogue. Moreover, ecclesiastical and 
secular authority are not really to be coordinate in 
Althusius's federation. On the contrary, the former is to be 
prior, as the following quotation demonstrates: 
The adminsitration of the supreme magistrate 
directs the clergy as long as he enjoins them 
to perform the parts of their office according 
to the Word of God (which the clergy is to 
interpret) ••• On the other hand, the supreme 
magistrate· is subject to the administration and 
power of the clergy with respect to censures, 
admonitions, and whatever concerns enternal 
life and slavation. In the adminsitration of 
ecclesiastical matters the magistrate does 
nothing without the counsel and consent of the 
clergy based on the Word of God. 
(155, parenthesis added) 
The authority of the supreme magistrate is checked by not 
only the ephors and clergy, but by the universal councils of 
the realm. This comprises "a meeting of each and all members 
and estates of the realm for the purpose of deliberating and 
making decisions about (its) condition and welfare .•. " 
(178). The supreme magistrate is empowered to summon such a 
council, set its agenda, preside over the meeting, promulgate 
the decisions made and to prorogue the council. The assembly 
is nonetheless his superior and "the opinion of the combined 
orders and estates prevails over the opinion of the 
presiding officer or the supreme magistrate'" (180). 
In view of the several and real limitations upon the auth-
ority of the supreme magistrate, it is difficult to subscribe 
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to Davis's claim that "Althusius" theory of the state is 
essentially monistic" (1978, 47). If anything, the opposite 
is true. The core aim of the Politics is to provide a 
philosophical counter to the monistic view of the state pre-
sented by Bodin. Althusius is opposed to absolute government, 
as his approach to sovereignty amply demonstrates. For if 
sovereignty is an inalienable attribute of the corporations 
of the realm and the ruler merely its administrator, it is 
clearly indefensible for him to exercise absolute government. 
Althusius goes so far as to deem the exercise of such 
"plenitude of power" to be tyrannical (186). He defends the 
right to resist - and in extreme cases to depose - a supreme 
magistrate in three circumstances. These are if he breaks the 
law of the realm by violating the rights of the association 
of which it is composed. if he betrays his electoral vows. 
contravenes natural law, or if his administration is not in 
accordance with the precepts of the Decalogue. 
This brings us to a second feature of the Politics: the 
important role ascribed to religion. That this should be the 
case is not at all surprising, of one recalls that Althusius 
was a committed Calvinist. Religion plays a vital role 
firstly in respect of the principles in accordance with which 
the federation is to be governed - ie those of the Decalogue. 
Thus Althusius states that "The end of political 'symbiotic' 
man is holy, just comfortable, and happy symbiosis, a life 
lacking nothing either necessary or useful." (12). Second, 
religious considerations impact upon the nature of the 
political structures, with the clergy allocated a pivotal 
function as, in effect, the sole adjudicator of whether 
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those principles are being observed. The power of the 
ecclesiastical authority at the highest level of the state is 
such that one might be inclined to conclude that Althusius is 
either advocating theocratic government, or at least a 
reassertion of the coordinacy of ecclesiastical and secular 
authority. 
However, it would be mistaken to conclude from this that 
the Politics is a theological treatise. It is not. Like 
earlier theological doctrines such as Thomism, it does see 
society in terms of a series of organic communities in which-
there is a mutual exchange of goods and services in the 
interests of the good life, but that is where the similarity 
ends. Althusius's system is predicated upon a rational 
natural law theory grounded much more exclusively in 
Aristotelianism and not dependent upon revelation. While 
Thomism views society as a hierarchy with God as its apex, 
Althusius sees it as created from the bottom up. In the sense 
that their formation is dependent not upon external factors, 
but upon personal volition, the associations of the Althusian 
federation are natural. They are also self-sufficient, with 
the larger associations merely the product of the lesser and 
subsidiary to them; 
Contract and consent are thus the linchpins of the 
Althusian system. The internal workings of all consociatia 
except the family are based upon them, as are the unions of 
both'indivdual associations and hence of associations of 
associations. Contractualism even governs the highest level, 
for the state is itself constituted by'means of a free, 
contract imposing reciprocalobl igations upon the"constituent 
units and 'the person whom they appointed as steward of their 
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inalienable ,rights' of sovereignty. 
,In summary, Althusian federalism is concerned to'present 
intrastate relations as a system of reciprocal contractual 
obligation within and between progressively more complex 
associations. The smallest are of a familial or' "civil" (ie. 
usually vocational) nature. Thereafter, associations are of 
mixed composition and are primarily either municipal or 
provincial; The contracting parties soon change-from being 
individual citizens to being corporations. The largest, or 
"universal" association is the state. This is a federation 
[11], the individual constituent units of which are 
function~l, municipal or territorial corporations. They', 
jointly enter ,into a contractual agreement; whereby the-
exercise of ' their collective sovereign rights is conditionally 
entrusted to a "supreme magistrate". The rights of the 
constituent units are protected by the actions of the 
optimates, by the councils of-the realm'and,~ultimately, by 
the right to depose a contumacious supreme magistrate. 
Riley, asserts that since 
the "federalism" of Althusius has little to 
do.with the modern notion of the federal state, 
in which central and regional governments, both 
of them states, exercise ordinary legal power 
directly over individuals •.• Althusius must. 
be considered a late expositer of medieval 
politics, rather than an early anticipator of 
the federal state ••• (1976,36 & 38) 
Mogi (1931,1,329) goes further, claiming that until well 
after the founding of the United states "Feudal-coloured 
federalism continued to shed its dim light upon the 
continental federal idea ... ". As was mentioned in 1.3. 
above, it is not the intention of this thesis to make what 
could well be an arbitrary judgements upon whether or not a 
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given exponent of federalism was really writing about 
federation as opposed, for example, to corporativism. The 
assessments of Riley and especially of Mogi are, however, 
informative. They tell us more about the absence of a 
feudal tradition in American federalism, than they do about 
the significance of Althusius in and for Germanic federalism. 
For although Althusian federalism was consigned to 
obscurity for almost two centuries, it did reappear at the 
very beginning of the nineteenth century, influencing the 
federalism of Swiss conservatives such as Monneron (1800, see 
Chapter 3.3 below). Its major revival was of course through 
. 
Gierke (1880) in the late nineteenth century. Many aspects of 
Althusian fed~ralism were to be echoed in nineteenth and 
twentieth century Germanic federalism. For example, federation 
was variously perceived to have either a religious or a 
constitutionalizing purpose. Moreover, the cooperative nature 
of relations within and between consociatia and the notion of 
the subsidiary rights of more exclusive associations, were 
both to be in evidence, as were more general aspects of 
mediaeval corporatist ideas. These later developments will be 
considered in chapters 3, 5 and 6 below. 
It is now time to look briefly at Ludolph Hugo and 
Georg Leibniz, two other exponents of Germanic federalism 
who share with Althusius the distinction of seeking to 
demonstrate that the German Empire is more than a set of 
independent, sovereign states [12]. Both refute the Bodinian 
and more recent Hobbesian claims that anarchy can be avoided 
only by the establishment of centralised and unitary 
government by an omnipotent ruler. Leibniz seeks the 
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resurrection in Europe of the two Swords of imperium and 
sacerdotium (see 2.1. above). Only the Emperor is to be 
sovereign, in the sense of having "the right to command 
without being subject to commands". Leibniz terms this 
"majesty". All other rulers are to exercise "sovereignty", but 
by this he only means territorial supremacy ("Ge~ietshoheit"), 
that is to say, the ability effectively to assert authority 
within a given territory (Riley,1976, 26). In the same way 
that Duchacek (1970) denies the validity of the unitary-
federal-confederal typology by attacking the concept of a 
unitary state, Leibniz attacks the Bodinian-Hobbesian concept 
of a unitary and absolute state by demonstrating that no 
state could be governed in such a fashion. Instead, all 
governments are characterized to a greater or lesser degree 
by negotiation and compromise. In this respect, Leibniz has 
much in common with the cooperative, anti-hierarchical theory 
of Althusius. 
Another seventeenth century exponent of Germanic 
federalism who not only refutes the notion that the governing 
power of a state has to be centralized, unitary and absolute, 
but also welcomes limitations upon central authority is 
Ludolph Hugo. Hugo's, main contribution to Germanic 
federalism is the concept of "double rule", which he uses to 
characterise the German Empire of his day. Double rule 
characterises a type of union mid-way between confederal 
leagues and unitary, albeit deconcentrated, states. As an 
example of the first type, Hugo cites the United Provinces 
and Switzerland, maintaining that one should not be deceived 
by the apparent closeness of the union into believing that 
the constituent units sacrificed their independence. They did 
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not and remained above the treaty, not subordinate to it. 
Hugo's example of the second type of union is the Roman 
Empire, where the exigencies of governing a large area led to 
,administrative deconcentration, but not to any diminution or 
division of the central authority. 
The German Empire is an example of the third type of 
union: double rule. This involves a division of powers 
between higher and lower governments, " .•• so that the higher 
manages those matters pertaining to the common welfare, the 
lower those things pertaining to the welfare of the individual 
regions". The crucial factor is Hugo's contention that the 
lesser governments, though not in possession of completely 
independent power, are nonetheless at least analogous to 
states, since the powers they exercise are "universal and 
wide enough to seem to take something from the highest power" 
(cited in Riley,1976,23). The significance of this view is, 
as Riley correctly notes, that " ••. for the first time in 
federal theory a local member was considered a state (or a 
quasi-state) without thereby reducing the central government 
to a mere alliance, to a non-state" (24). 
Although Hugo wrote with different aims in mind and 
reached different conclusions about the German Empire, he 
shared with Leibniz and Althusiusa refusal to accept the 
zero-sum approach to sovereignty which was so typical of the 
conventional Bodinian-Hobbesian wisdom. Hugo feels that 
central sovereignty and .regional sovereignty were by no means 
necessarily mutually exclusive and that a system of double 
rule (a "Staatenstaat") combines the civic advantages of 
small states with the security advantages of large states. 
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As has been stated a number of times already, this was'a' 
minority viewpoint in the seventeenth ~entury~ The more 
widespread and for a long time more'influential viewpoint 
held the sine qua non of statehood to be the existence of a 
single and indivisible will. This is the assumption upon 
which the writings of the two perhaps most celebrated 
seventeenth century exponents of Germanic federlism: Hugo 
Grotius'and Samuel Pufendorf [13] are based. Consequently, 
they~cannot accept the notion of intrastate federation, 'as 
expounded for example by Althusius. For in their opinion. if 
a state is worthy of the name, the "right to command without 
being subject to commands" - ie sovereignty - logically 
cannot be divided. Similar logic leads them to reject Hugo's 
concept of a state composed of states. Their writings were 
not influenced solely by logic, however, but also by their 
subjective'evaluation of the German Empire. 'Pufendorf, for 
example. regarded the Empire as a monstrous-aberration, a 
hybrid destined to fall apart; No doubt that perception was 
due in no small measure to the fact that he was writing 
immediately after the 'Peace of Westphalia, rwhen the weakness 
of the Emperor was only too apparent. Davis sums up 
Pufendorf's approach very succinctly when he says that it: 
rests on two simple normative equations: 
the regular state = undivided sovereignty 
= strength/perfection/moral polity 
the irregular state = divided or compromised 
sovereignty = weakness/imperfection/shameful 
po 1 it y (1 978 '. 58) 
In light of so firm a belief in the superior virtue of 
undivided sovereignty. it is not surprising that for,. 
Pufendorf. the constituent units of federations. have to be 
sovereign states. Interstate federation - or confederation as 
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it came to be known - is the closest of three possible forms 
of interstate relations envisaged by Pufendorf. The others 
are the simple treaty or alliance and a "personal" union 
resulting from the dynastic rights of one monarch over two or 
more states. The confederation - or "states system" .as 
Pufendorf'terms it- is distinguished ,from a loose treaty or 
alliance because it isca perpetual agreement in which the 
contracting parties agree.not to exercise a part of their 
sovereign rights unless the others consent. However, a states 
system differs from·a simple state by virtue of the very 
important fact that the constituent states retain their 
sovereignty. This is ensured by the stipulation that the 
members of the Diet are to'be ambassadors, the validity of 
whose joint decisions depends upon them being reached 
unanimously [14]. 
Pufendorf's interstate (con)federation continued to be 
the dominant theme of Germanic federalism for the next, 
century and came to.·be the classic formulation of the 
principle of confederation. The reasons why the interstate 
dimension came to be overwhelmingly dominant when compared to 
intrastate federalism have already been mentioned in the 
preceding section of this chapter. Foremost among them was 
the fact that the federal theorists' prime focus of 
attention, namely, the German'Empire, came increasingly to 
resemble a set of independent states rather than a single· 
state, as A1thusius'and Leibniz had argued. 
2.3 GERMANIC FEDERALISM FROM SAINT PIERRE TO KANT [15) 
The four best known eighteenth century exponents of 
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~uro~ean federalism - the Abbe de Saint-Pierre, Montesquieu, 
Rousseau and Kant - were all interested primarily in inter-
state federation. With the exception of Montesquieu, they all 
saw federation as a means of bringing about universal peace. 
Before proceeding to discuss their ideas, it might be useful 
to say a brief word about why it is that Montesquieu and 
Rousseau are so frequently cited in the context of 
discussions about intrastate federation. 
That this should be so is initially surprising, for 
neither had very much to say about federation within a state. 
An examination of Montesquieu's The Spirit of the Laws (1748, 
126-8) reveals his total contribution to federalism per se to 
be limited to three remarks on the first three sides of Book 
IX His first assertion, that confederations combine the 
civic virtues of small states with the military advantages of 
large states, was in those days almost axiomatic and 
certainly adds nothing to Hugo's above mentioned comments. 
Montesquieu's second contribution is to recommend that 
confederations be composed of states with the same type of 
government, which should preferably be republican, since 
"peace and moderation are the spirit of a republic". Finally, 
he advocates the weighted representation of the constituent 
units, rather than their equal representation. 
Most of what Rousseau had to say about federation within a 
state is to be found his The Government of Poland and Project 
for Corsica [18]. As Riley (1973) has pointed out in a 
stimulating article, Rousseau's prescription of a federal 
state fits very uneasily into his overall philosophical 
scheme [17]. This is due mainly to the seeming incongruity 
between intrastate federation and Rousseau's insistence upon 
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the indivisible sovereignty of the "general will". Even if 
it were possible to overcome this apparent contradiction, 
we believe that Roussseau's reputation as a theorist of 
intrastate federation derives less from what he wrote about 
federation qua federation, but from other aspects of his 
political philosophy. The same is true for Montesquieu. 
In order to explain this paradox, it is necessary to 
. , 
recall that one of the most important factors motivating the 
two men was the malaise they perceived in the eighteenth 
century absolutist state of the Bourbons. Montesquieu bemoaned 
the fact that the powers of estates and "parlements" had been 
so undermined that they were no longer able to counter 
monarchical absolutism. In his view, this situation 
threatened the permanent extinction of liberty. This was his 
main concern and federation merely a form of interstate union 
of peripheral relevance. His rather imprecise ideas on the 
separation 9f legislative, executive and judicial powers and 
on legal and social checks and balances - ideas that were in 
themselves not new - were intended to provide a remedy to 
monarchical absolutism. However, as will be illustrated in 
the next chapter of this thesis, these notions were to be 
conflated by later admirers with that of interstate federation 
and legal-constitutional balance. This is a connection which 
Montesquieu himself did not make. 
A similar fate was to befall Rousseau's very limited 
discussion of interstate federation. As is well known, 
Rousseau was obsessed by what he perceived as the decadance, 
exploitation and immorality of the large states of his day. 
Though he shared with Montesquieu a sociological approach, 
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he eschewed the latter's faith in reason in favour of a more 
irrational and emotive style. Rousseau's ideal was a 
romanticised notion of a small, pastoral republic. Here the 
problems of alienation brought on by the large, absolutist 
state would not exist, because the smallness of the state 
would allow the community to exert its moral ising influence. 
The community was conceived in organic terms, its members 
being at once master and subject of its general will. The 
difficulties of accommodating a federation within such a 
system have already been alluded to. However, since smallness 
was so crucial to Rousseau's republics, the existential 
importance of alliances to safeguard their security from 
external attack had not escaped him. His predictable solution 
was to argue that a federation between such states would be 
the best way of combining their community-based virtue with 
the military security of large states. 
Paradoxically, much of the subsequent literature that made 
reference to Rousseau inverted what he had actually said. 
Thus Rousseau's federation has been presented not as a 
mechanism by which small states associate in order to 
preserve their virtues from external attack. Instead the 
insinuation of many commentators has been that Rousseau saw 
the civic virtues as a function or consequence of federation. 
Chapter 3 will demonstrate how this adaptation found its 
expression in conservative Swiss ,federalism, ~here Rousseau's 
ideal of a federation of small', mainly agrarian and moral 
communities was claimed by many Swiss writers to have been 
realised. 
In summary, the significance of Montesquieu and Rousseau 
for Germanic federalism of the intrastate variety lies less 
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in what they actually wrote, than in the manner in which 
they were subsequently presented. Montesquieu's concept of 
the separation of powers as a means of ensuring political 
liberty was frequently quoted by nineteenth century liberal 
constitutionalists, who presented his advocacy of federation 
between small republics as though it had been advanced by 
Montesquieu as an additional mechanism for achieving or 
maintaining constitutional balance within a state. Conversely, 
conservatives were to use Montesquieu's emphasis upon the 
necessity for laws to be in agreement with the social, 
cultural and other peculiarities of the country to which they 
were to be applied as indicative of support'for: the autonomy 
of the constituent units of federations. (See 3.3. below) 
For his part, Rousseau was to be interpreted as having 
claimed a moralising function for federation,'and was also to 
be cited approvingly by many of those who were later to' 
reassert more organic, community-based'or romanticised brands 
of'federalism. That this should occur was rather ironic. if 
one accepts Riley's conclusion that: 
an inquiry into Rousseau's well-established 
but unexamined reputation as an "advocate" of 
national and international federalism (sic 
federation) reveals, or at least tends to 
suggest, that he was really an advocate of 
neither (1973, 17). 
Just to compound this irony, it is worth noting that 
Rousseau's emphasis upon political equality endeared him to 
nineteenth century liberal radicals, so that he was to be 
cited approvingly not only by conservatives, but also by 
those championing a centralised, liberal intrastate 
federation. (See Chapters 3 & 6 below) •. 
Regardless of whether or not Rousseau really was himself a 
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champion 'of intrastate federation, there is no doubting the 
fact that he did contribute to a new and important dimension 
of Germanic federalism: the discussion about federation as a 
means to achieve universal peace. The two other main 
contributors to this eighteenth century debate were the Abbe 
de saint Pierre and Immanuel Kant [18J. It would exceed the 
scope of this chapter to give detailed individual accounts of 
the federalism of all three writers. Accordingly, we shall 
focus ou~ attention upon answering the tw6 questions 'posed'in 
at the beginning of this thesis (see 1~3 above): namely~'what 
the writers understood the purpose of federation 'to be and 
what their views were regarding the nature of the component 
units of that federation. 
As noted in the opening section of this chapter, the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were marred bya 
seeming1y'unending series of wars. "Saint Pierre, Rousseau and 
Kant were all three interested in federation as a means of 
ending this belligerency and'of introducing universal peace. 
However, they differed as to why the latter was preferable to 
the former. At the root of Kant's argument was a belief in 
the moral superiority of peace over war. This belief is based 
upon two premises, which Beck outlines 'thus~ 
The first .•.• is the categorical imperative 
which enjoins us always to act on a maxim of 
respect for human beings as ends in themselves. 
Kant says that in warmaking the ruler does not 
obey this principle, and ..•. treats them as 
things to be used - and used up. The second 
premise is the juridical principle which 
underlies the dynamics of government, that 
men ought to, and as rational beings do, seek 
to extend the rule of law (1957,xii) 
That is not to suggest that Kant is oblivious to the more 
pragmatic arguments favouring the establishment of universal 
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peace. Thus he says at the end of his "First Supplement" 
entitled "Of the Guarantee for Perpetual Peace" that 
The spirit of commerce, which is incompatible 
with war~ sooner or later gains the upper 
hand in every state. As the power of money 
'is perhaps the most dependable of all the 
powers (means) included under the state power, 
states see themselves forced, without'any 
moral urge, to promote honorable peace and by 
mediation to prevent war when it threatens to 
break out. (32). 
It is material considerations such as these which most 
impress both Saint-Pierre and Rousseau. This is borne out by 
an examination of the latter's eight point summary of the 
advantages which could be expected as a consequence of the 
establishment of perpetual peace. Rousseau mentions security 
from the threat of external attack and from the danger of 
internal rebellion. This would, he asserts, mean considerable 
financial benefits in the form of reduced military spending 
and the restoration of free trade and commerce (cited in 
. ' 
Riley,1973, 14). 
While Saint-Pierre and Rousseau are in broad agreement 
about the likely benefits of universal peace, they differ 
profoundly in their assessment as to what will be required to 
make the prospective partners federate. Saint-Pierre believes 
that the impetus will arise from the self-evident material 
advantages of peace over war. All states are suffering the 
disadvantages of continuous war and all would derive not 
inconsiderable benefits from its cessation. The incentive 
to federation therefore lies in its universal utility. For 
his part, Rousseau is much more sceptical. Though he too 
believes that it is in the rulers' objective interests to 
federate, Rousseau feels that they are unlikely to assent to 
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such a scheme. The reasons for this include their desire for 
relative wealth and power - as distinct from a universal 
increase in prosperity - and the absence of the kind of 
common external enemy which the Swiss cantons had faced and 
united against in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries 
(see 2.1. above). In the absence of voluntary agreement, 
Rousseau sees violence as the only means of establishing the 
proposed federation and concludes: 
That being so, which of us would dare to say 
whether the League of Europe is a thing to be 
desired or feared? It would perhaps do more 
harm in a moment than it could guard against 
for ages (cited in Riley, 1973, 16). 
By contrast, Kant neither believed in the immediate 
likelihood of a universal federation, nor was he quite as 
pessimistic as Rousseau. Instead, he forecasts a very 
incremental development, with piecemeal but progressive 
change leading in the long term to an approximation of his 
idealized notion of perpetual peace. The way forward is not 
to be achieved by sudden changes in the moral convictions of 
rulers or in political organisation. As Forsyth says, 
the main theme of Perpetual Peace is .•• 
about the three paralled paths, civil, inter-
national and cosmopolitical, by which the human 
species as a whole ..• moves from a state of 
nature or war to a state of right or peace. 
Perpetual Peace was the simultaneous perfection 
of all three forms of right. (1981,98). 
That Kant envisages this change as gradual is evident 
from his acknowledgement that self-interest such as was 
outlined in the preceding quote from perpetual Peace is the 
th~ kind of consideration upon which the initial moves in 
this slow process will be based. Similarly, Kant does not 
imagine that even his "Preliminary Articles" will be 
implemented simultaneously and unreservedly. Instead, he sees 
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them as being realised gradually (8). This is all the more 
true of his three "Definitive Articles" [19], since they are 
based upon moral principles to a much greater extent than the 
more pragmatic "Preliminary Articles". 
Having examined the views of Rousseau, the Abbe se Saint 
Pierre and Kant on the purpose of federation and how the 
parties were to be motivated to federate, it is time to look 
in more detail at how their federations are to be structured. 
In this respect, Roussseau concurred with Saint-Pierre's 
scheme of a treaty of five articles to be agreed by all 
European sovereigns [20). The first article establishes a 
perpetual alliance (reminiscent of the Swiss Oath Fellowship 
of .1291) and sets up a Diet for the negotiated resolution of 
all conflicts outstanding between the contracting parties. 
The second article is to enumerate the contracting states, as 
well as their allocation of Diet seats. It also regulates the 
size and nature of their contributions to the common expenses 
of the federation. Finally, it foreses a rotating presidency 
similar to the Swiss "Vorort" system. The third article 
takes the form of a guarantee by the "Confederation" of the 
territorial integrity and internal authority [21] of the 
constituent states as they exist at the:time of the 
agreement. Moreover, this article also contains the crucial 
requirement?that constituent units all irrevocably renounce 
the use of force as a means of settling differences amongst 
themselves. The fourth article concerns the circumstances 
under which the Confederation as a whole be empowered to use 
force to compel a recalcitrant member state to mend its ways. 
States are to be deemed in breach of the treaty if they 
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prepare for war, conclude a treaty hostile to the ends of the 
Confederation, or if they use force against any member or 
all of the Confederation. The fifth and final article 
stipulates that, while the Diet can provisionally pass 
measures to the advantage of the Confederation and its 
members by bare majority, such decisions will have to be 
ratified within five years by a three quarters majority. 
Furthermore, it is set down in this same article that any 
alteration of these five basic articles of the treaty can 
only be undertaken with the unanimous consent of the 
confederates. In this way, the sovereignty of the constituent 
states is to be retained, since they are deemed to be subject 
merely to those articles to which they have already 
consented. 
These five articles give a good idea of how Saint-Pierre 
and Rousseau think a federation directed towards universal 
peace should be organised. By contrast, Kant's Perpetual 
Peace tells us very little about the nuts and bolts of his 
proposed federation, despite the fact that the text is 
presented in the form of a treaty [22]. His six "Preliminary 
Articles" are as follows: 
1. No Treaties of Peace Shall be Held Valid 
'in Which There is Tacitly Reserved Matter 
for a Future War •.. 
2. No Independent States, Large or Small, 
Shall Come under the Dominion of Another 
State by Inheritance, Exchange, Purchase 
or Donation ••• 
3. Standing Armies Shall in Time 'Be Totally 
Abolished ..• 
4. National Debts Shall Not Be Contracted with 
a view to the External Friction of States •.. 
5: No State Shall by Force Interfere with the 
constitution or Government of Another State .•• 
6. No State Shall, during War, Permit Such 
Acts of Hostility Which Would Make Mutual 
Confidence in the Subsequent Peace Impossible: 
Such Are the Employment of Assasins, Poisoners, 
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Breach of Capitulation and Incitement·to 
Treason in the Opposing State. (3-7). 
Clearly, these articles are not comparable to those 
framed by Rousseau and Saint-Pierre. Instead of outlining the 
form of the federation, they merely exhort the rulers to 
conduct themselves in a morally correct fashion. Similarly, 
the three "Definitive Articles" [23J tell us nothing about 
matters such as the voting rights of the constituent states, 
the powers of the Diet, how its presidency is to be 
determined, nor about a host of other factors relating to 
form and organisation. 
That the contours of Kant's federation are not to be found 
in a constitutional document becomes even more apparent when 
one reads the "First Supplement", the opening sentence of 
which asserts that "The guarantee of perpetual peace is 
nothing less than that great artist, nature" (24). What Kant 
is suggesting is not that men are naturally peace-loving, but 
rather, that their very conflicts will provide, by means of a 
dialectical process, the impetus towards the establishment of 
perpetual peace. The timescale envisaged by Kant is 
obviously enormous when compared to the Abbe's. The fact that 
perpetual peace is seen by Kant as the eventual outcome of a 
process of human evolution provides one reason why the 
mechanics of such a federation do not figure prominently in 
his work. A second reason is to be found in the fact that 
Kant's priorities are ethical or moral rather tham pragmatic/ 
political. This is clearly evidenced by an examination of the 
"Second Supplement" and the First and Second Appendices of 
Perpetual Peace. 
In comparison to the federation outlined by, Saint-Pierre 
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and Rousseau, that of Kant is perhaps best characterised as 
metaphysical. Its contours are determined by reference to 
moral rather than legal-constitutional criteria. However, all 
three writers have in common millenarian expectations of 
federation. 
So far, this section's discussion of eighteenth century 
Germanic federalism has been restricted to interstate 
chiliastic federalism. However, the eighteenth century also 
witnessed the renaissance of intrastate-territorial 
federalism. It was Puetter (1725-1807) who was to assert 
(1777-79,1,20-30) that the German Empire was a "state composed 
of states", that is to say, it contained both sovereign 
territorial states and a common, superordinate authority. His 
views were so influential, that by the beginning of the 
nineteenth century they had come to constitute the orthodox 
approach to the classification of the German Reich (Schlie, 
1961,1f). It is ·therefore indispensable to a proper 
appreciation of early nineteenth century federalism in 
Germany that the theory of Puetter be outlined. That outline 
will be provided by reference to Puetter's two volume 
Beytraege zum Teutschen Staats- und Fuerstenrechte (1777-79) 
(Contrjbutions to German Constitutional and Princely Law). 
As it had been in the seventeenth century of Hugo, the 
dominant view of sovereignty was still that the co-existence 
of sovereign powers within one state was a logical 
impossibility. The idea of states composed of states still 
flew in the face of that view. What enables Puetter to 
maintain his assertion is his methodology. Unlike Althus;us, 
however, Puetter does not replace the theory of sovereignty 
with an alternative, natural law theory. He eschews natural 
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law and other a priori theories in favour of seeking to 
explain the constitutional law of the Reich as it is, namely, 
as the product of historical development. He is perhaps the 
most outstanding exponent, during the last decades of the 
Empire, of positivist jurisprudence and is thus concerned not 
with generating an abstract theory of the state, but with 
what in essence amounts to a description of the historical 
practice of constitutional law in the German Empire, from 
which he deduces principles a posteriori. In other words, 
Puetter is an empiricist. His considerations are not so much 
predicated upon, as rationalised in, his theory about the 
possible types of state. 
Puetter's "theory" starts with the assertion that the 
Aristotelian classification of states is of only limited 
value and that it would be more insightful to base one's 
classification upon the nature of the composition of states, 
that is to say, upon whether states are simple or compound 
("einfache oder zusammengesetzte Staatskoerper") (1777-79,1, 
20f). He then distinguishes two types of union. The first is 
the "personal union", such as that between Great Britain and 
Hannover, based upon the coincidence between two or more 
states of a common ruler, but where those units remain 
completely independent states. The second type of union he 
describes as "real unions", of which simple states are one 
subtype (ibid,22f). Thus far, Puetter's comments contain 
nothing remarkable. 
They become more interesting when he considers the second 
subtype of real union, namel~ federations ("zusammengeseizte 
Staatskorper") (1777-79,1,25). Puetter first mentions 
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interstate federations ("systemata foederatum eiutatum"), 
citing the United Provinces and the Swiss Confederation as 
examples. Such federationas are, he says, united in 
perpetuity, but, despite that union, have no common superior 
and thus do not constitute a state (iQig,24-6). Distinct 
from such interstate federations are the second type of 
federation: "states composed of states". The latter are made 
up of internally completely sovereign territorial states 
which are nonetheless subject to a common higher authority. 
As examples of such federations he names the German Empire and 
various medieval states (~,26- 8). Every German state is, 
Puetter claims, subject to higher positive law (~,42). 
Puetter's classification of states thus identifies two kinds 
of federation. The first corresponds to the traditional 
notion of confederation, as articulated by Pufendorf (see 
2.2 above). The second type of federation of which Puetter 
conceives is very similar to Hugo's idea of intrastate 
federation characterised by double rule (see 2.2 above). 
However, one must recall that Puetter's very method means 
that his theory is little more than a rationalisation, or 
legitimation, of the centripetal developments in the recent 
history of the German Empire. This becomes clear when one 
examines Puetter's explanation of the division of authority 
between the territorial states and the imperial power. He 
does not employ the kind of theoretical considerations 
typical of Hugo (see 2.2. above), but relies on an argument 
based upon practice and convention (1777-79,1,186-209). Thus 
his assertion that composite federal states can be formed by 
either centripetal or centrifugal processes, is underpinned 
by no theoretical considerations, but is merely the product 
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; 
of his observations of the history of Switzerland and the 
Netherlands on the one hand and the Reich - whose historical 
development was of course his main concern - on the other 
( i..bjjL 28-30) • 
For Puetter, there are two significant periods to be 
discerned in the constitutional history of the German Empire 
(iQig,186-201). The first started with a sovereign Emperor, 
who was the sole source of legal authority. There was then a 
gradual accummulation by the territorial rulers of legal 
powers, the effect of which was to transform these previous 
vassals of the Emperor into territorial sovereigns. The 
second phase started when the powers of the territorial 
rulers amounted to territorial sovereignty ("Landeshoheit") 
(ibid,192-4). The principle Puetter perceives in this de facto 
development is the assumption by the territorial rulers of 
responsibility for the general welfare of their state and its 
subjects (;bid,317-50). The sUbstantive political role of the 
Emperor is now limited to one of indirect rule over all but 
his own hereditary lands and a few imperial cities, from 
which he still receives direct taxation (~,44-7). 
Puetter justifies this by again generating principles out 
of his understanding of legal practice. Thus he argues that 
after this establishment of Landeshoheit (which Schlie 
assumes to have taken place at about the end of the 15th or 
the beginning of the 16th century) (1961,34), all new powers 
which relate to the establishment or maintenance of the 
general welfare of territorial states automatically had to 
accrue to the territorial rulers. Similarily, all previously 
existing powers relating to the territorial states' welfare 
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were, regardless of whether they were then exercised by the 
, ~ < ' ' 
terrftorial rulers or the Emperor, now devolved upon the 
former. Conversely, imperial powers all antedate 
Landeshoheit. Moreover, only those relating to all the 
territories, or to a number of them, remain the preserve of 
the Empire (1777-79,1,186-201). 
Even these very limited imperial reserved rights 
(Reservatrechte) are undermined and largely nullified by two 
further principles which Puetter derives from his examination 
of legal practice. These principles are (iQid,210-23) that 
Landeshoheit is exclusive and that territorial rulers have 
the right to avert what they deem potenti~lly har~ful to 
their state. In effect, this means that the Empire,~lacking 
its own military or administrative structu~es; is left with 
merely the right of exclusive initiation in certain limited 
and insignificant areas, while the territorial rulers act as 
mediators of imperial authority. Schlie's apposite conclusion 
is that "Puetter has thus applied the legal seal to the 
p6litically already completed emasculation of the Empire." 
(1961,40). 
For obvious reasons, the limited range of powers 'of the 
Empire mirrors the situation of the Reich at the time Puetter 
wrote. Simi1ari1y~ his theory of the relationship-between the 
, 
Reich and its constituent territorial states also reflects 
the contemporary situation. Puetter presents the 'imperial 
'authority (Reichsgewalt) as comprising not only the personal 
majesty of the Emperor and his reserved rights, but also 
the activities of, for example, the Reichstag and the Imperial 
Electors (1777-79,1,58-106). However, since these other 
institutions formally act not as representatives of the 
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component territorial units of the federation, but as an 
intrinsic parts of the self-regulating imperial authority, 
there is, according to Schlie (1961,54) 
no institutional 'relationship between the 
territorial rulers and the imperial authority 
•.• there is merely a concurrence rather than 
a correspondence of imperial and territorial 
,authority visible, with no collaboration of 
head and member in an organism thereby fused 
into one ••• ,The territories do not in fact 
appear as member states which, by dint of common 
participation in the creation of the Reichstag's 
will, are united into the Reich as a Gesamtstaat 
created by them. Instead, they are mere subordinate 
states ("Unterstaaten") under a superior state ("Oberstaat"), which they have to recognise above 
them and which functions independently of them. 
Schlie also believes that the imperial authority Puetter 
outlines is essentially monistic rather than corporate in its 
structure and thus, as Schlie observes, unlike the modern 
notion of what the central authority of a federal state 
(Bundesstaat) should be.(1961,54) 
However, it is the express intention of this thesis to 
avoid adjudication upon whether the federal isms examined 
conform to some notional, "pure" type (see 1.3. above). 
Instead, a major aim is to identify what different authors 
within the Germanic tradition of federalism have considered 
the constituent units and the purpose of a federation to be. 
On the former issue, we have shown that Puetter envisages 
both interstate and intrastate federations. The first is 
composed of independent states without a common superior, 
while the latter is a union of independent states that are, 
despite their statehood, nonetheless subject to a common 
higher state authority. 
It is now necessary to address the issue of what Puetter 
sees the purpose of these two federations to be. The first, 
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interstate type, has limited purposes. The only specific 
purpose Puetter mentions is defence, though he does state 
that they can also decide to unite in other respects, such as 
regarding coinage (1777-79,1,24f). The purposes Puetter 
ascribes to the intrastate federation are wider. In a general 
sense, one could say that the purpose of the federation is 
the furtherance of general welfare. However, that is not a 
purpose he considers unique to the federation of "states 
composed of states", but one which he applies to all states 
(1777-79,1,319). He stipulates no purposes specific to 
intrastate federations. 
This is not surprising. Inasmuch as Puetter is 
essentially concerned only to describe and characterise the 
German Reich as an historical phenomenon, he is only 
prescriptive in the sense of assuming a continuation of the 
Reich and the rightfulness of the extant authorities' 
creation of law. This is borne out in the final chapter of 
the first volume of Puetter's Beytraege, the principal 
conclusion of which is that "each is to be left his 
properly acquired rights" (ibid,351). This should not, 
however, blind us to the implicit values of Puetter's 
federalism. 
It will be recalled that in addition to identifying the 
content of the tradition of Germanic federalism, this thesis 
is also concerned to illustrate federalism's function as 
ideology. The federalism of Puetter offers no prescriptive 
blueprint of an ideal federation, because for Puetter, the 
ideal is what exists. What Puetter's federalism amounts to is 
an unquestioning presentation of the status quo, which he 
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idealises. This is precisely one of the key characteristics 
of what Epstein (1966,7f) defines as a "status quo 
Conservative". It is therefore appropriate to categorise 
Puetter's federalism as fundamentally an example of status 
quo conservatism. This is of course a position that was 
bound, given the very nature of revolutionary Europe, to 
become untenable. As will be shown in Chapter 3 below, those 
in Germany and Switzerland who opposed the new structures 
imposed by the Napoleonic revolution could not content 
themselves with an uncritical defence of positive law, but 
had to develop alternative prescriptions. 
Puetter is significant in a number of respects. First, he 
was by common consent very influential within the circle of 
those studying the constitution of the Reich, although 
there is some dispute as to how far beyond ,that circle his 
influence extended (Brie,1874,29ff & Schlie,1961,1f). Second, 
he is significant for being precisely what the preceding 
account has already identified, namely, one of a breed of 
legal positivists who antedated, and were bound to be 
replaced by, the revolutionary events of the early 
nineteenth century. Third, the fact that Puetter's theory 
has no eternal or universally ,binding principles allows him 
to argue that law-can be made by extant authorities, albeit 
with due reference back to custom and convention. This 
approach was to be developed by later conservative thinkers 
on the ,one hand as an argument for unconditional obedience to 
the 'state and, on the other hand, by those asserting that 
German law was prior to external, rational, a priori law. 
Fourth, Puetter's historical refutation of the legal 
claims of the primacy in the Reich of Roman over German law 
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(Puetter,1777/78,2,30-179) was to be significant in a similar 
way, helping to pave the way (albeit only via later 
normative modification) for theories of some German 
nationalists. For example, Puetter's concomitant claim that 
the territories of the Reich are the repositories of native 
German law, and especially of the autochthonous principle of 
autonomy, (cited in Schlie, 1961,27f) was later to figure 
strongly in the defence by Romantics and other conservatives 
such as Jarcke (see Chapter 5 below) of the rights of the 
constituent units of a federation. 
2.4. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS: THE FIVE DIMENSIONS OF 
EARLY GERMANIC FEDERALISM 
In 1.3, the specific aim of this chapter was stated as 
being to identify the various types of federation envisaged 
by early Germanic federalism. Two further tasks for this 
thesis were also spelt out. The first is to assess the 
applicability to the West European experience of the 
hypotheses advanced by Livingston and Riker. The second is to 
illustrate the analytical advantages of our distinction 
between federalism and ,federation. This conclusion will deal 
with each of the above aspects in turn. 
The first task of this concluding section is to draw the 
many threads of our elucidation of early Germanic federalism 
together and provide an overview of the types or "dimensions" 
of Germanic federalism up to the end of the eighteenth 
century. To this end, the federal isms discussed in the 
preceding pages have been synthesised .into the synopsis 
provided in Figure 1. As that tabular overview illustrates, 
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Germanic federal isms of the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries were essentially one of five basic types, or 
"dimensions". Three of these dimensions related to intrastate 
federation, while the remaining two concerned federations of 
an interstate variety. 
The first dimension of Germanic federalism, which we have 
labelled "intrastate-corporate", is represented by Althusius, 
whose federalism posits a federation consisting of the 
corporations and estates of the realm. Sovereignty is an 
inalienable attribute of the body politic and the purpose of 
the federation is twofold. The first is the constitutional 
entrenchment of the rights of the corporation. In keeping 
with Althusius' Calvinist precepts, the other purpose is the 
maintenance of true worship. When considering the 
significance of the latter purpose for an overall evaluation 
of Althusius' federalism, it must be remembered that although 
the role of ecclesiastical authority appears excessive from a 
secular, twentieth century viewpoint, this should not deceive 
one into dismissing Althusius's treatise as theological. In 
the context of its own day, the Politics was distinguised by 
virtue of its limitation of sacerdotal authority and its 
insistence upon the independence of a secular political 
realm. Other important features of the Politics include its 
attempt to constitutionalise the corporate mediaeval 
relations. Finally, it is worth reiterating that Althusius 
intended his Politics to be a refutation of the tendency 
towards absolute government, of which Bodin fs perhaps the 
best example. Instead, Althusius stressed the co-operative 
tradition of European thought. It was on the basis of its 
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associational principle ("Genossenschaftsprinzip"), rather 
than upon absolutism, that he wished the German Empire to be 
based. 
The second dimension of Germanic federalism is described 
in Figure 1 as "intrastate-imperial" and Leibniz is the 
author identified with it. Leibniz shared with Althusius a 
belief in the co-operative and accommodative nature of 
politics. However, there are substantial differences between 
the federalism of the two men. These relate to the 
constituent units of the federations they envisage, to the 
purpose of their respective federations and to the location 
within them of sovereignty - or "majesty" as Leibniz termed 
it. The constituent units of Leibniz's federation are not 
corporate, but essentially territorial in nature. The 
federation's purpose is thus not the constitutional 
entrenchment of the rights of corporate units, nor is it the 
promotion of Calvinist "true" worship. Instead, it is the 
resurrection of the Holy Roman Empire. Finally, sovereignty 
in Leibniz's federation is to reside with the Emperor, rather 
than be retained in the body politic, as is the case in the 
federation proposed by Althusius. 
The third dimension of early Germanic federalism also 
concerned intrastate federations based upon territorial units 
and we have termed it "intrastate-territorial" federalism. 
This is the dimension of Germanic federalism represented in 
the seventeenth century by Hugo's system of "double-rule" and 
in the eighteenth by Puetter. The distinctiveness of this 
dimension of Germanic federalism lies in the fact that it 
rests upon the idea of sovereignty being shared between the 
centre and the constituent units, which Hugo considers to be 
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"analogous to states". Hugo's federalism, like that of all 
the other seventeenth century writers we have examined, was 
informed by his perception of the German Empire. Though he 
was out on a limb in his notion of divided sovereignty, the 
dimension of early Germanic federalism which he represents is 
also that which is closest to the subsequent nineteenth and 
twentieth century conceptions of a federal state with 
sovereignty shared between territorial units and the centre. 
As was demonstrated by the presentation of the federalism of 
Puetter, intrastate-territorial federalism had by the end of 
the eighteenth century come to be the dominant paradigm for 
the analysis of the German Empire. 
The fourth dimension of Germanic federalism we have 
identified is not of an intrastate, but of an interstate 
variety. Here we have the classical notion of confederation, 
with the federation being composed of states which unite 
primarily for reasons of security, but retain their 
sovereignty. Although Pufendorf and Grotius have been cited 
, 
as the chief exponents of this dimension, others could be 
included, for this was the dominant paradigm until the 
nineteenth century. As was illustrated above, Montesquieu and 
Rousseau also made references to this dimension. However, 
Rousseau is perhaps best remembered for his contribution to 
the fifth and final dimension of Germanic federalism: the 
interstate-chiliastic, or interstate-universal type. The 
major difference between this type and the preceding one lies 
not in the nature of the constituent units, nor in the 
location of sovereignty, but in the millenarian purpose of 
the federation: namely, universal and perpetual peace. 
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Having identified the five dimensions of early Germanic 
federalism, we can now turn to consider the implications of 
this chapter for the three questions raised in this thesis. 
The first and perhaps the most obvious point is that Germanic 
federalism has always been multidimensional. This disproves 
Livingston's assertion that those who use the term federal 
to refer to unions other than those of a territorial nature 
"have added a meaning that was not there before" (1952,85). 
Second, though Riker's hypothesis about the significance of 
the military dimension as a motivation for those proposing 
federations appears borne out in most of the federal isms 
identified, the religious motivation of Althusius seems to 
constitute an aberrant case. However, we shall return to this 
issue in subsequent chapters. 
Our third overall conclusion relates to the issue of the 
normative nature of federalism and the value ,of an analysis 
which addresses this aspect. There are four points to be 
made. First, the foregoing survey of early Germanic 
federalism confirms our conviction that it is shortsighted to 
denounce the "ideologists of federalism" and to fail to see 
federalism as a useful object of study (see 1.2 above). 
Federalism is inescapably value-laden. The seventeenth 
century exponents of Germanic federalism, for example, were 
concerned not only to analyse the existing German Empire, but 
also resorted to federalism as a means of prescribing or 
promoting what they perceived as improvements. Moreover, the 
chiliastic federal isms of Saint-Pierre, Rousseau and Kant, 
would be totally incomprehensible if one were to disregard 
their normative content. The normative element therefore 
provides an important means of distinguishing between the 
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various types of federation, as demonstrated by a 
consideration of dimensions four and five in Figure 1. It 
also helps us understand the purposes for which reform of 
extant federations is proposed. This will be illustrated 
further in Chapters 3 to 6. 
Second, a consideration of the benefits which exponents 
of federalism hope will accrue from the federations they 
envisage can be instructive in another way. Thus it was 
possible to distinguish between what Montesquieu and Rousseau 
themselves claimed to be the advantages of federation and 
the claims which subsequent authors ascribed to them. 
Third, our focus upon federalism has permitted this 
chapter to identify co-operative, accommodative decision-
making as an important and recurring theme in both Germanic 
federalism and federation [24]. These elements have been 
shown to be almost inextricably linked to the corporate, 
anti-hierarchical tradition of European thought, which is 
itself traceable to feudal notions of an organic commmunity 
with reciprocal obligations' between its parts. This feudal 
tradition should not be dismissed in the manner of Mogi 
(1931, I,329), for it constitutes one of the features which 
distinguishes Germanic federalism from the American variety. 
Furthermore, these ideas were to enjoy a revival in the 
nineteenth century conservative Germanic federalism (see 
Chapters 3 and 5 below). 
The fourth and related point is that although the period 
so far examined has been shown to have witnessed some five 
"dimensions" of federalism, these also contained in 
rudimentary form the seeds of dimensions that were to be 
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developed more fully in later years. One example of such an 
embryonic federalism can be found in the writings of Rousseau 
and of Kant, namely, the idea of a-federation of national 
communities. It flows Quite naturally in Rousseau's writings 
from his community-based philosophy, where the function of 
federation is the promotion of the interests of the community 
or nation (Riley 1973). And although he recongnised the 
importance of the state, Kant also toyed with the concept-of 
a "Voelkerbund" or federation of nations or peoples. Indeed, 
one of the major tasks'of the next chapters of this thesis 
will be to demonstrate the great debt owed to the five 
dimensions already outlined by those dimensions of Germanic 
federalism that were to crystallise in the nineteenth 
century. 
The discussion of-early Germanic federalism is now 
complete. The next task of this thesis is to examine the 
development of Germanic federalism in the early nineteenth 
century. As in this chapter, the development of federalism 
will be elucidated by reference to the practical political 
problems it was designed to resolve. Since one of the most 
pressing problems of the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries stemmed from interstate conflict, it was only to be 
expected that interstate federalism should receive wider 
currency than the intrastate dimensions. All this was to 
change, however, in the nineteenth century, when the focus of 
attention switched to intrastate reorganisation. 
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NOTES FOR CHAPTER 2 
1. The wide range of literature used for this introductory 
overview of political and philisophical developments'during 
the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries includes the following: 
Barraclough (1972); Bluntschli (1867 & 1875); Bonjour/Offler 
(1952); Bruckmueller (1985); Dyson (1980); Evans (1979); 
Gilliard (1955); Goerlich/Romanik (1977); Holborn (1965);Im 
Hof (1981); Institut fuer Oesterreihkunde (1963"& 1969); Kann 
(1974); Kleindel (n.d.); Koller (1970); Krieger (1957); 
Martin/Beguin (1971); Mogi (1931); Nabholz (1916 & 1918); 
Poggi (1978); Puttkamer (1955); Sabine/Thorson (1973); 
Schilfert (1962); Scupin (1965); Schwarber(1935); Steinberg 
(1980); Strauss (1971); Sturmberger (1969); Tenbrock (1969); 
Weinzierl (1963 & 1969) and Winter (1969). 
2. Throughout this chapter, the terms "Germany" or "German" 
will be used to refer to the Holy Roman Empire and not just 
to those states within it which constitute latterday Germany. 
Thus "Germany" should also be understood to encompass modern 
Austria. 
3. For a detailed appreciation of this emerging 
"constitutionalism" see Barraclough (1972,320-53). 
4. The "Landsgemeinde" is an annual open-air meeting of all 
cantonal citizens, at which all cantonal laws have to be 
passed and where members of the "cantonal political executive 
are elected. The tradition dates back centuries, but still 
persists in a few Swiss cantons (Luther,1981). 
5. Examples include Basel in 1691, Glarus 1720 and 1722,' 
Schaffhausen 1790 and 1971, Appenzell Ausserrhoden 1732, Zug 
1732 and 1733, and Freiburg 1781. For details, see Bluntschli (1875,416-47). Bluntschli also describes how. before the 1691 
intervention, the cantonal hierarchies were widely of the 
opinion that the Confederation constituted a relationship 
between governments and that this logically meant that 
citizens had no rights under the federal constitution (437).-
See 6.3.2. below for a discussion of how this was treated in 
the federalism of radical Swiss liberals such as Troxler. 
6. Subsequent quotations are from Carney's 1964 translation. 
Both Carney's translation and Friedrich's (1932) latin 
reprint are based upon the 1614 edition. For secondary 
literature, see their respective introductions, as well as 
Riley's excellent articles (1973 & 1976), Sabine (1973,387-
90), Davis (1978.47-54), Huegelin (1979) and Forsyth (1981, 
74-9). Mogi (1931,I.27-30) also mentions Althusius, albeit 
dismissively. 
7. In this he concurred with Bodin. whom he cited (28). 
8. This aspect of provincial association fits uneasily into 
Althusius's overall structure, since other associations are 
characterised by the accountability of administrators to the 
association whose government they oversee. Perhaps this 
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inconsistency is due to the fact that the province was (cf 
Carney,1964,46,f.n.l) in previous editions merely an 
administrative unit of the commonwealth and only appeared as 
an association in its own right in the 1614 edition. 
9. The family, collegium, city and province are dealt with 
in six chapters. The following thirty one chapters focus upon 
the commonwealth. 
10. However, "One of the estates, or one part of the realm 
can •.• (secede) when the public and manifest welfare'of this 
entire part altogether requires itor when fundamental laws 
••• are not observed by the magistrate, but are obstinately 
and outrageously violated or when the true worship and 
disclosed command of God clearly require that this be done". 
(Carney,1964,191) 
11. As Friedrich points out, (1932,lxxxvii & f.n.3) Althusius 
does not describe associations other than the universal 
association as a "confederation. The view that the relation-
ship between Althusius's lesser and greater associations 
constitutes a federation dates from Gierke (1880). 
12. See Deuerlein (1972,39-41), Mogi (1931,I,340-42), Riley 
(1976) and Davis (1978,62-8) for secondary literature on 
Hugo's 1661 treatise 'entitled Dissertatio de statu regionum 
Germmania. The author was unable to obtain more secondary 
literature on the federalism of Leibniz than that contained 
in Riley's articles (1973b & 1976). For an extract of 
Leibniz's 1670 8edenken welchergestalt Securitas publica und 
Status praesens im Reich auf festen Fuss zu stellen, see 
Puttkamer (1955,43-9). 
13. Hugo Grotius, 1583-1645, esp. De jure belli pacis, 1625. 
Samuel Pufendorf, 1632-1694, esp. De statu imperi Germanici, 
1667. For secondary literature on the former see Sabine (1973,390-98) and on the latter see Forsyth (1981,79-85), 
Riley (1976), Davis (1978,54-62). 
14. cf Forsyth (1981,82-4) on the functions subject to the 
consent of the other parties and regarding the reconciliation 
of the apparently contradictory notions of retention of 
sovereignty and of its use being conditional upon external 
consent. 
15. Much of the material which will be dealt with in this 
section was excellently covered by Forsyth (1981), whose 
analysis we share and do not presume to be able to improve 
upon. However, while his focus was federalism and interstate 
realtions, the remit of this thesis is wider. 
16. Rousseau (1765 & 1172). It is alleged that Rousseau wrote 
more extensively, but that the manuscript was destroyed. 
Rather than speculate upon what might have been said, we 
shall examine what it is known that Rousseau did say. 
17. This is a matter of dispute. See Forsyth (1981,91-4) and 
Windenberger (1900) for the view that federation is congruent 
with Rousseau's overal scheme, and Riley (1973) and Davis 
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(1978,71f,fn 36) for the alternative assertion. 
18. On Rousseau see Watkins (1953); on Saint-Pierre see 
Perkins, (1959) The Moral and Political Philosophy of the 
Abbe de saint-Pierre. Subsequent quotations from Kant's 
Perpetual Peace are taken from the edition introduced and 
edited by Beck, (1957) New York. See also the excellent 
assessment of Rousseau, Saint-Pierre and Kant in Forsyth 
(1981). 
19. These are that "The Civil Constitution of Every State 
Should be Republican" (11-15), "The Law of Nations Shall be 
Founded on a Federation of Free States" (16-20), and "The Law 
of World Citizenship Shall be Limited to Conditions of 
Universal Hospitality" (20-23). 
20. For the text of Rousseau's summary of the Abbe's scheme 
see Forsyth (1981, 87f). 
21'. In this respect, parallels can be drawn with the '1481 
Covenant of Stans, ,(see 2.1. above). 
22. Our discussion of Kant's federalism has been limited to 
what he outlined in Perpetual Peace. For a summary of how his 
ideas changed before and after this text, see Forsyth (1981, 
95-104), who shows Kant discussed'"a cosmopolitical body 
politic under a single ruler", a "Voelkerstaat" , a 
"Voelkerbund" and even a loose "Genossenschaft", whose' 
Congress would have been dissoluble at any time. 
23. See footnote 19. 
24. This was ,especially true as regards the Swiss federation. 
t' '. 
I' 
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CHAPTER 3: GERMANIC FEDERALISM IN REVOLUTIONARY EUROPE 
(1790~-1815 ) 
, , 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
,The preceding chapter identified the five dimensions (1) 
of Germanic federalism during the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries. The aim of this chapter is to extend our 
discussion of the Germanic tradition of ,federalism by an 
examination of its development during the revolutionary 
period ,from the end of the eighteenth century until the 
re-establishment of,the old order through the decisions of 
the Congress of Vienna [2]., As was argued ,in Chapter 1.3. 
above and demonstrated in Chapter 2, federalism is best 
understood in terms of the specific problems to which it has 
proposed federal remedies. Accordingly, the aim of. this 
section is analogous to that of 2.1, namely, to preface the 
subsequent detailed consideration of the.content and purpose 
of ,Germanic, federalism by an overview of the material and 
ideational context of that federalism. 
The experience of. Switzerland and.the states of the 
German, Empire [3] du~ing the period under discussion in this 
chapter were analogous in at least three important ways. 
)' " "\ 
First, the foreign relations of Switzerland and especially 
of the states of the German Empire, were dominated ,for much 
of the period by belligerency with France. Second, a major 
consequence of these wars was in both cases the collapse of 
the ancient. federations of both Switzerland and of Germany 
and their replacement by externally imposed constitutional 
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structures. Third, behind both of the aforementioned factors 
was the contemporary conflict over the Weltanschauung of the 
liberal Enlightenment. The remainder of this introductory 
section will be devoted to briefly illustrating each of these 
three background factors in turn. 
The first·concerns the ongoing military conflict with 
France. Despite its overwhelming support for the Allies, on 
whom France had declared war in 1792, Switzerland initially 
managed to·maintain a semblance of neutrality, which helps 
account for why it was for six years-spared direct 
involvement in the.wars. In February 1798, however, during a 
temporary. lull .in its conflict with the German states as a 
result of the Franco-Austrian Treaty of Campoformido (October 
1797), France found a pretext to invade the Swiss 
Confederation, which collapsed under that onslaught within a 
few weeks. 
In February 1799, France again declared war.on ,Austria 
and its army crossed the Rhine in March 1799. However, the 
French were beaten in a number of battles and driven back 
into Switzerland, on whose soil further battles were fought. 
Shortly after the.fall,of the French Directorate in November 
1799 and Napoleon's assumption of power, France's fortunes 
started to improve again. The Peace of Luneville. (February 
1801) between France and the states of the German Empire was 
very. much to the advantage of the. former and brought about .. 
another temporary peace. Yet in September 1805, France again 
declared war on Austria. France's defeat of Austria at 
Austerlitz on December 2nd 1805 and of Prussia at Jena in 
October 1806 signalled the end of the wars until the 
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so-called ·Wars of Liberation" of 1812/14. 
A second feature shared by Switzerland and the states of 
the. German Empire was the consequential collapse and 
replacement of their former federal political systems. There 
were some differences of detail in how this occurred in 
Germany and Switzerland. First, the demise of the old German 
Empire was rather long and drawn out, while the Swiss 
Confederation collapsed very quickly. Second, while Germany 
as a whole only experienced one new constitution in this 
period, the Swiss were to have seven draft constitutions, of 
which three were implemented (see below). Third. while the 
new German system was a federation, Switzerland experienced 
both federal and unitary constitutions. However, both 
countries were united in the fact that the new constitutions 
were largely imposed by the French. The first case we shall 
outline is that of Germany. 
In March 1792, Emperor Francis II was installed as the 
new Holy Roman Emperor of the German Nation, but this formal 
renewal of the imperial dignity was even then almost 
exclusively a ceremonial statement with little political 
reality. This became even more obvious during the course of 
the wars with France, when numerous states engaged in 
separate and at times secret agreements with Napoleon. Many 
of these were directed against the interests of the German 
Empire, of which those states were nominally still a part. 
For example, as early as August 1796, Prussia decided, after 
a series of defeats of the Imperial armies by the French, to 
ally with France and promised to relinquish control over the 
left bank of the Rhine. Similar separate peace agreements 
with France were signed in 1796 by Wuerttemberg, Baden and 
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Bavaria. In 1797, Austria agreed in the Peace of Leoben of 
April and of Campoformido of October that year to relinquish 
\ 
control of the Austrian Low Countries, Milan, Lombardy and 
the whole of northern Italy. In a secret article, Emperor 
Francis II also agreed to assist France in acquiring the left 
bank of the Rhine. 
The undermining of the German Empire by these partial 
agreements was compounded by the general agreements of 1801 
and 1803 [4J, which concerned the compensation the German 
states were to receive for territories which they had lost as 
a result of French annexation of the left bank of the Rhine. 
In a nutshell, this amounted to permitting them to swallow up 
a large number of ecclesiastical and city states, as well as 
minor territories. This substantially changed the number and 
size of the states constituting the German Empire and thus 
contributed to the latter's further disintegration. 
The Empire was visibly crumbling and any semblance of 
Imperial authority had clearly become a fiction. Indicative 
of the declining significance of that Empire as a political 
entity was the decision on 11 August 1803 by its nominal head 
to supplement his existing titles by that of Emperor of 
Austria. The final blow to the Empire came in Paris on 12 
July 1806, 'when sixteen princes of western and southern 
. . 
Germany signed the "Rhine Act" (Puttkamer,1955,59-62; Behr, 
1808 & 1808a, & Berg 1808) setting up the "Rheinbund" 
(Confederation of the Rhine), of which Napoleon was declared 
Protector. On 1 August, in accordance with Article 3 of the 
treaty (Puttkamer,1955,60), these princes announced their 
secession from the Reich. Thereupon, on 6 August 1806, 
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Emperor Francis II formally recognised the end of the long 
since moribund German Reich by renouncing the imperial 
dignity. The Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation was now 
legally at an end. 
The Rhine Act was a vague and in many respects incomplete 
document (Berg,1808), though it is possible to glean from it 
some of the basic features of the federation it established. 
Article IV of the Rhine Act declared that the states 
composing the federation were completely sovereign. The 
meaning of this was amplified by a subsequent note from 
Napoleon (Berg,1808,4), which stated that their internal 
affairs were a matter neither for the Protector, nor for the 
federation's central legislature. Article IV also provided 
for a Prince (Fuerst-Primas) of the Rheinbund, though in 
view of the fact that the states were sovereign, he was to 
have no power over the members. He was to be appointed by the 
Protector and his prime role was to preside over the 
Rheinbund's Federal Assembly. The latter was established 
under Article VI of the Act for the regulation of the common 
affairs of the Rheinbund. It was located in Frankfurt and 
divided into a monarchical and a princely curia. In the 
absence of stipulations to the contrary, it was assumed 
(Berg,1808,23f) that decisions of the Federal Assembly were 
to be based on majority decisions. All disputes between the 
Rheinbund states were to be decided by the Federal 
Assembly. 
Though Article VII stipulated that the states of the new 
federation were to be independent of every foreign power, the 
Rheinbund in reality signalled the start of a period during 
which much of Germany was to be governed by a foreign 
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imposed constitution. For the real purpose of the Rheinbund 
was of course to provide Napoleon with control over the 
states of western Germany. Under the terms of the Act, the 
rulers of those states were, for example, obliged to 
provide military contingents to the French army and to allow 
France the use of their military fortifications, The defeat 
of Prussia at Jena in October 1806 and the consequent Peace 
of Ti1sit resulted in the extension of the Rheinbund. By 
1808, all German states except Austria, Prussia, Danish 
Holstein and Swedish Pomerania had joined it. By 1811, it 
included four kingdoms, five grand duchies, eleven duchies 
and sixteen principalities. The head of the Confederation 
was Baron Da1berg, whom Napoleon elevated to the title of 
Grand Duke of Frankfurt in 1810 and appointed First Prince 
of the Rheinbund. The Rheinbund lasted de facto until 1813, 
the eve of the Wars of Liberation, though it was not 
formally replaced until after Napoleon's defeat. The 
Rheinbund was eventually superseded by the new "Deutscher 
Bund- (German Confederation) of 39 sovereign German states, 
which came into being via the decisions of the Congress of 
Vienna on 8 June 1815, and 15 May 1820. 
In Switzerland, the collapse of the pre-revolutionary 
order had been much swifter. Moreover, between 1798, when it 
was routed by the French invasion, and its reconstitution in 
1815, Switzerland experienced numerous different 
constitutions, all of which were, to a greater or lesser 
extent, imposed by France [5J. The 1798 constitution 
prescribed by France established Switzerland as a unitary and 
indivisible republic headed by a Directorate of five. It had 
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a ··Senate" composed of four indirectly elected representatives 
. , 
from each canton and a "Great Council" that was initially 
made up of eight members per canton (again indirectly 
elected)," but was later to be based on proportional 
representation. The cantons were mere administrative 
districts, with no legislative or executive institutions and 
no constitutions of their own. Moreover, their boundaries 
. "" , 
could be altered by simple legislation (Ludwig,1911; 
Duersteler,1911). The revised 1802 constitution created a 
siight1y less centralised state of 18 cantons. It had a Diet 
elected indirectly by the population on a proportionate basis 
- . 
and empowered to accept or reject the proposals of the 
Senate, the members of which it appointed. There were between 
~ 
one and three Senators per canton, depending on its size. 
Executive authority resided in a three-man Executive Council 
elected from and by the Senate and joined by five State 
. ,.~ 
Secretaries, who headed the administrative branch. Each 
canton was empowered to 'organise' its own' judicial', 
administrative and educational system, as well as its 
militia. The centre guaranteed these structures. 
, , 
Since neither constitution proved appropriate for 
Switzerland, Napoleon was in 1803 forced to issue the 
so-called "Mediation Constitution". Elevating the previous 
dependencies to the status of full cantons and adding new 
cantons, it made Switzerland a nineteen-canton multilingual 
state [I], which had many similarities with the pre-1798 
system. Article 18 defined Switzerland as a "federation". 
Though not sovereign, the cantons were declared free and 
iridependent and received a large share of their powers back. 
All rights not explicitly granted to the central authority 
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were retained by the cantons, including post, customs and 
coinage. There were many more restrictions on the central 
authority. Thus the Diet of cantonal representatives was 
bound by instructions, but popular civic rights were limited 
to the cantonal level. The new office of Landammann (Swiss 
Head of state and of Government) rotated annually between 
the heads of government of six named cantons. Some aspects 
of the Mediation constitution were more centralised than in 
the old Confede~ation. For example, freedom of movement and 
settlement were guaranteed, as were freedoms of profession, 
trade and traffic •. There was a uniform currency and 
wide-ranging reform of the military. 
Between Napoleon's fall in 1813 and the 1815 Pact, a 
considerable struggle over the future structure of 
switzerland took place between conservative and liberal 
forces (Rappard,1948,31ff). Many of the original thirteen 
cantons wanted the old Confederation re-established, 
including their rights over the previous dependencies. The 
latter were naturally vehemently opposed. After protracted 
negotiations and under the threat of Great Power 
intervention, the nineteen cantons provisionally approved an 
interstate federation, which the Congress of Vienna accepted. 
Given the substantial constitutional change taking place 
in both Germany and Switzerland, it is hardly surprising that 
the structure of the respective states was a major topic of 
debate. Germany's constitutional debate up to 1815 was 
clearly predicated upon trying to understand the nature of 
the Empire and the Rheinbund and seeking to prescribe the 
most appropriate structure for Germany. This largely revolved 
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around clarifying the nature and relative merits of the 
Staatenbund and the Bundesstaat. By contrast, the Swiss 
discussion of this period was faced with the much more 
radical alternatives of a unitary and indivisible republic, 
or a confederation. Another difference is of course the fact 
that while the Swiss debate was always republican, that in 
Germany was overwhelmingly monarchical. 
Despite these differences in the details of the 
constitutions which Switzerland and Germany experienced 
during the Napoleonic period and the concomitant differences 
of emphasis of Germanic federalism within the two countries, 
there is a third and highly significant factor that these 
debates had in common. This is that the philosophical context 
in which these discussions of the most appropriate structure 
for Switzerland and Germany occurred was essentially the same • 
. In order fully to appreciate the nature of the contemporary 
international and domestic political unrest and of the 
various federal prescriptions advanced, it is essential to 
be aware of this ideational context, which constituted a 
conflict between the ideals of the liberal Enlightenment on 
the one hand and the defence of tradition on the other. 
The liberal Enlightenment encompassed a range of beliefs, 
of which the following were some of the most important. 
First, it had a strong belief in the inevitability of 
progress. An example of this idealism is Kant's belief in 
international cosmopolitanism, the gradual and inevitable 
development of society towards greater sociability (see 
G . 
2.3. above). Second, the liberal Enlightenment asserted the 
equality of man. This took two forms: a belief in the moral 
equality of man and a faith in his innate capacity for 
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reason. As a consequence, a third feature of the liberal 
Enlightenment was its demand for political equality. Fourth, 
the Enlightenment was distrustful of traditional structures 
and institutions. This distrust was directed at 
aristocratic political structures and institutions such as 
religion, as well as the veneration for their own sake of 
custom and convention. 
For its part, opposition to the Enlightenment's rational 
natural law theories was initially not very clearly 
articulated and lacked confidence, though it gradually became 
more sophisticated and assertive. Indeed, one of the major 
ideational features of the early nineteenth century is the 
conscious and deliberate development of the ideas of 
conservatism. Its basic principles included first, scepticism 
about the power of human reason and thus about the value of 
universal principles and prescriptive political formulae. 
Second, in their place, it stressed the value of tradition, 
as the embodiment of immemorial custom and thus of a greater 
wisdom that had proved itself by experience. Examples are 
Goerres and Monneron, both of whom were influenced by the 
ideas of Burke. Third, the opponents of the Enlightenment 
asserted the natural temporal inequality of man and stressed 
the inevitability and social utility of hierarchy. Finally, 
they were firmly convinced of the value of religion and 
considered the Enlightenment a bla~phemous denial of Divine 
omnipotence. 
,. 
However, it must be stressed that the general principles 
of both the Enlightenment and of its opponents resulted in 
very different kinds of political prescriptions. On the part 
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of the supporters of the liberal Enlightenment, these ranged 
from the advocacy by some of various forms of Enlightened 
despotism, to the eschewal by others of any central political 
authority. Within this spectrum, the types of political 
system proposed ranged from unitary states to those based 
upon di rect popul ar soverefgrity (e-g. Rousseau). In the 
"middle- of the spectrum were various proposals based upon 
the principles of parliamentary constitutionalism, tailored 
to both republican and monarchical systems. 
. 
The prescriptions of opponents-to the Enlightenment also 
varied considerably. At the level of political theory, there 
were a number of different attempts to counter the 
Enlightenment idea of an eternal and universally applicable 
set of rational postulates that constitute natural law. One 
such response came from legal positivists such as Puetter 
(see Chapter 2 above), who asserted the legitimacy of extant 
structures. This was a tenable conservative position while 
the old political structures were still intact, but was 
obviously of no help once they had been forcibly replaced by 
a Napoleonic system. A second response was the 'development of 
rival natural law theori~s. One example i~' the Divine Right 
theory advanced by Haller (1820-25) (see Chapter 5 below). A 
third development was the emergence of the theories of the' 
historical school, of whom Savigny is perhaps the best known 
exponent. This school asserted the unique nature of national 
history, its cumulative and irreversible character and the 
inability of rational thought to comprhend it 
The period under discussion also saw 'the development of 
Romanticism (eg Goerres and Schleiermacher), as an assertion 
of the value of spontaneity, diversity and the unity of all 
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this in a metaphysical whole, the comprehension of which was 
possible not by reason, but only by intuition and empathy. 
One of the features of this Romanticism is that it saw the 
state in terms of an ethical union of persons of the same 
cultural or national background. In this way, it developed a 
number of conservative and somewhat mystical notions of a 
nation state. Romanticism was also often permeated by 
historicism, with certain of its exponents (eg Goerres, see 
3.2-and 5.2.2. below) advancing theories amounting to 
national historical determinism. Some (e.g. Schleiermacher, 
.' 
1814) were based on an ethical teleology and thus akin in 
some repects to Kantian ideas, while others were to be 
articulated in the form of a conservative nationalism. 
Examples of the latter are Savigny (see Reiss,1955) and 
Goerres (see 3.2 below). However, nationalism was not the 
sole preserve of conservatives. Those supportive of 
Enlightenment ideas also used nationalism (e.g. Fichte) and 
many of them envisaged the nation state in terms of a 
unitary, rational and bureaucratic structure, whilst others 
such as Kant used Enlightenment ideas to advance a 
cosmopolitan internationalism. 
It is worth summarising our basic conclusions about the 
third background factor which this introductory section has 
discussed. First, there were in the period under discussion 
clearly two broad Weltanschauungen, namely, those of 
supporters and of opponents of the liberal Enlightenment. 
Each was characterised by a commitment to certain common 
themes. Second, this common commitment did not prevent either 
group from articulating a variety of political programmes. 
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Third, neither these common Weltanschauungen, nor their more 
specific political programmes resulted in the establishment 
of any firm and lasting political organisations akin to a 
modern political party. Finally, the ideas of the liberal 
Enlightenment and of the opposing conservatives were 
nonetheless crucially important, in the revolutionary 
European period up to 1815, in determining the'nature of the 
political debate in'Germany and Switzerland-and thus also 
the nature of Germanic federalism. 
The veracity of this claim will be demonstrated in the 
following discussion of Germanic federalism in revolutionary 
Napoleonic Europe. There will be an'examination of various 
manifestations of Germanic federalism in both Germany (3.2.) 
and in Switzerland (3.3.). The concluding section of this 
chapter'(3.4.) will summarise the main developments in 
Germanic federalism during this period and will assess their 
significance for this thesis. 
Finally, it is worth noting that there is greater variety 
in the manner in which the federal isms referred to from-this 
point on in the thesis were articulated, than was the case in 
those examples chosen to represent Germanic federalism up to 
and including the 18th century. Many contributors were not 
political theorists of the calibre of" say, Althusius, but 
were ··practitioners". Given the approach of this thesis, such 
examples of federalism are not excluded a priori. Indeed, 
there is a·case for saying that they better demonstrate the 
political salience of federalism than do the more 
contemplative works. 
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3.2. FEDERALISM IN GERMANY UP TO 1815 
This section will outline the discussion of federation 
which took place in Germany during the revolutionary, 
Napoleonic period from the 1790s up to the establishment of 
the 1815 Bund. Among the most important protagonists in this 
debate were: Leist (1803); Zachariae (1804 & 1807); Behr 
(1808 & 1808a); Berg (1808); Fichte (1796,1800,1806,1808 & 
1813); Sch1eiermacher (1814) and Goerres (1814/16), all of 
whom will be considered in the following pages [7]. One 
important aspect over which many of these writers' disagree 
concerns whether the German Empire and the Rheinbund are to 
be classified as composite.states of the Puetter variety, or 
as interstate federations. 
A striking feature of this early nineteenth century 
discussion is the diverse and at times confusing terminology 
employed to denote federations. Among the terms used are: 
Voelkerbund, Staatenbund, Voelkerstaat, Bundesstaat and 
staatenstaat [8]. The following outline of the development of 
Germanic federalism in Germany will illustrate this usage, 
but does not propose to get too involved in the niceties of 
the terminology. Instead, it will focus upon the two main 
aims outlined for this thesis: to identify the types of 
federation proposed, as well as the political purposes of 
those proposals. 
As~demonstratedin the-preceding chapter, Germanic 
federalism had by the end of the eighteenth century witnessed 
the expression of five "dimensions", of which that relating 
to interstate federations had been dominant. However, it was 
also noted (see 2.3. above) that 'in the last Quarter of the 
116 
eighteenth century, Hugo's view that between the unitary, 
sovereign state and the interstate confederation there was an 
alternative type of ' state: an intrastate federation of 
territorial units "analogous to states", experienced-a 
revival through the writings of Puetter (1777-79). ,. 
The abiding influence of Puetter's federalism upon 
conceptions of the nature of the German Empire is visible in 
the'federalism of 'Leist (1803)~ one of his chief disciples. 
Nearly twenty-five years after Puetter's 8eytraege and a mere 
three years before the formal end of the Reich, Leist 
presented an analysis of the latter which in all important 
respects corresponds with that of Puetter, whose influence is 
evident not only from Leist's reference to him as "my great 
and unforgettable teacher" (1803,xi),r but above all from 
Leist's positivist methodology and the characterisation of 
the Empire he offers. For example, Leist (1803,41f) says that: 
The German state consists of numerous-individual 
Laender, of greater or lesser size, which also 
constitute individual states. For this reason" 
state authority is in Germany divided, into the 
state authority over the German Reich as a whole 
•••• ( .•. imperial sovereignty) and that in the 
individual ••• German states and territories 
( ••• Landeshoheit .•• ) ••• the latter is merely 
a subordinate, the former, however, a completely 
independent power. 
He then (1803,42f & 175-226) goes on to argue in a manner 
very similar to that of his "great teacher" that the imperial 
authority is exercised not merely by the Emperor's "personal 
majesty", but in conjunction with the Imperial Estates 
assembled in the Imperial Diet. These Estates are of course 
one and the same as the most powerful German states (1803, 
168-70). Moreover, while Leist (1803,54-6) argues that the 
component states of the Empire are subject to the higher 
117 
positive law of the Empire and reserved imperial rights, the 
latter are very limited (1803,44). 
Like Puetter, whose theory has been shown to be no more 
than a rationalisation of current practice, Leist's account 
of the nature of the imperia1 constitution is passive. For 
example, he merely accepts (1803,150-54 & vi-x) the various 
changes in the Empire brought about by the Reichsdeputations-
hauptausschuss and the Peace of Lunevi11e [9] as an 
expression of the positive law of the Empire. He is, by 
virtue of the proximity of his writings to the final collapse 
of the Reich, one of the last exponents of legal positivism 
to have the opportunity of defending the Reich by using 
status quo conservative federalism. 
Writing the year after Leist, when the effects of the 
Peace of Luneville (see 3.1 above) were perhaps more 
apparent, Zachariae also addresses himself to the question of 
whether the German Empire should be regarded as a composite 
state, or as an interstate federation. He states (1804,43) 
his concern to be to answer the Question by reference to 
political practice, rather than legal theory. According to 
Brie (1874,33), Zachariae was the first directly to contrast 
the terms Voe1kerstaat and Staatenstaat. For Zachariae (1804, 
44), a Voelkerstaat (ie. an intrastate-territorial federation) 
must contain a human being with coercive power to enforce 
common decisions against any internal resistance. On the 
other hand, in an interstate federation (for which he uses 
the terms Voelkerbund or Staatenbund interchangeably) each 
member of the union (Gesellschaftsgenosse) retains the power 
to decide over right and wrong and the application and 
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interpretation of the agreement made. Zachariae argues 
(lB04, 63-6) that the Reich has undergone a transformation 
which started with the Reformation. He concludes (1B04,45f), 
in direct opposition to the dominant view of Puetter, Leist 
and others, that the Reich is not an intrastate, but an 
interstate federation. 
He comes to this conclusion about the "federal state 
system" (1804,56) of the Reich because its constituent states 
retain their sovereignty (1804,48-54). He also notes (1804, 
47f), however, that this German federation is of an unequal 
-nature, ie. there is considerable imbalance in the legal and 
political power of the constituent states. This Staatenbund 
has three purposes: the "political" purpose of internal and 
external security of the German states, the "cosmopolitan" 
purpose of facilitating commerce of Germans amongst 
themselves and with other nations and, third, allowing the 
individual German states to unite in order to pursue matters 
of common interest and benefit that exceed the narrower 
purposes for which the interstate federation was originally 
established (1804,59-62). 
Zachariae was apparently (Brie,1874,35f) [10) also the 
first, in an 1807 essay entitled Public Civil Law Applied to 
the Rhine Federation to contrast directly the terms 
Bundesstaat and Staatenbund, arguing that the distinguishing 
features of the latter include the possibility of its 
dissolution via the dissent of its members and that its right 
of association (Gesellschaftsrecht) is considerably narrower 
in scope than that of a state authority. Without going into 
detail, he cites the United States and Switzerland as true 
examples of states composed of states. It is worth recalling 
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that by the time of this later publication, Germany was 
largely united into the Napoleonic Rheinbund. This helps 
explain Zachariae's reference to the right of members of 
interstate federations to secede, since that is precisely 
what the Rheinbund state had done in 1806 (see 3.1 above). 
To understand his characterisation of Switzerland as an 
intrastate federation, one must also recall that the extant 
Swiss constitution was that of the Mediation (see 3.1 above 
and 3.3 below). 
To summarise: Zachariae's reflections on the-political 
situation of Germany lead him to conceive of two types of 
federation. The first is an intrastate-territorial federation 
(a state composed of states), of which he considers the 
United States and the Swiss Mediation constitution to be 
examples. On the other hand, he claims that neither the old 
Reich, nor the Rheinbund fit that label. Zachariae also 
envisages an interstate confederation for the three purposes 
outlined above, and in which the states all retain their 
sovereignty. The feature distinguishing between intrastate 
and interstate federations is for Zachariae (1804,43f) that 
the former contain a physical supreme sovereign authority 
possessed of coercive power to enforce its rule, while in 
interstate federations, sovereignty remains with the 
constituent states, which cannot be coerced. Zachariae was by 
political persuasion a moderate liberal, as hinted at by his 
statement about the purposes of interstate federation, where 
his reference to the "cosmopolitan" purpose of the state is 
reminiscent of Kant's terminology (see 2.3 above), though 
his 1804 essay is devoid of political partisanship. In his 
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later writings, Zachariae was to be less circumspect in the 
articulation of his political beliefs (1833; see also 
B1untschli,1867,596-605 & 6.2 below). 
The next exponent of federalism we shall examine is Behr 
(1808 & 1808a), whose focus is the by then extant Rheinbund. 
The basic question he is addressing is what the nature of 
this new structure is and how it compares to the defunct 
Empire. Behr shares Puetter's view that the old Reich was a 
single, albeit composite state. However, he is in almost 
. . 
every other respect radically opposed to Puetter and other 
conservatives. This is evident not only from Behr's partisan 
comments {see below), but also from his very methodology. For 
Behr (1808,46) approves of rational natural law and contract 
theories of the state, and by implication opposes the legal 
positivism of the likes of Puetter. Moreover, he explicitly 
(1808,46) rejects conservatives' theories of the state as an 
organism, based as they are upon the assertion of the value 
of tradition and of only gradual change. 
Behr (1808a,26) identifies two broad reasons why states 
might decide to unite. The first is the realisation that it 
is a condition of their persistence as free and independent 
states that they make their rights as states more secure. A 
second reason is to bring about and maintain peace and order 
amongst themselves and a common defence externally. Behr then 
(1808,57-9 & 1808a,26) says that there are two forms which 
their union for these purposes might take. The first is that 
of a composite state, (Voe1kerstaat), where numerous states 
[11J enter into a relationship with a superior, placing 
themselves under its common supreme authority. This .supreme 
authority.constitutes a state power and must thus comprise 
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legislative, executive and judicial authorities. What Behr 
has in mind here is an intrastate federation. Like Zachariae 
and other writers, Behr (1808,60) agrees that for a polity to 
have an overarching state authority, that union has to be 
headed by a single human being. 
The second type of union of states Behr.(1808,57-9) 
envisages is an interstate federation for which, like 
Zachariae, he uses the terms Voe1kerbund and Staatenbund 
synonymously (12). In this latter type of federation, states 
contract mutually to guarantee their freedoms and rights, but 
remain completely independent as regards their internal 
constitutions and administration. Important for Behr's theory 
of interstate federation was .therefore-the absence, at the 
centre of such a federation, of a human being endowed with 
sovereign-power. 
In a second publication (1808a), Behr.deve1ops some of 
his ideas about federations further. He says (1808a,45) that 
though intrastate and interstate federations (Voelkerstaat 
and Voelkerbund) have common aims, they differ substantially 
in the manner in which they-implement those aims. 
-The Voelkerstaat unites;all the peoples it 
encompases by subordinating them into a common 
supreme state authority; the Voe1kerbund ••• 
encompasses its members by the bond of a free 
association: - The Voe1kerstaat abolishes the 
independence of all states united in it, and 
makes them dependent upon a supreme authority: 
the Voelkerbund allows all peoples belonging 
to it to remain numerous single, separate, 
independent and autonomous states: The Voelker-
staat intervenes in the life of its members; 
the Voelkerbund leaves the inner aspect of the 
peoples constituting it completely untouched, 
••• (1808a,45f cf also 26-32) 
In his attempt to discriminate between interstate and 
intrastate federation, Behr (1808a,27f) goes so far to 
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suggest that the constituent states of the latter (ie. of the 
Voe1kerstaat) are mere administrators of the central 
authority's will and have no independent authority. 
On the other hand, Behr makes a number of observations 
which counter the impression he at times gives of the two 
types of federation being so distinct. For example, he tones 
down his earlier (1808,60) insistence on the existence in a 
state (and hence in intrastate federations also) of a human 
being as the central authority (1808a,51-3). Moreover, 8ehr 
(1808a,72-92) also stresses that the central legislatures of 
both intrastate and interstate federations should in key 
respects be structured identically. First, the constituent 
units of both types of federations have to be involved, 
through their ruler or through deputies, in the making by the 
legislature of decisions affecting the general interest for 
which the state was originally set up (1806a,72-4). This is 
defended in the following manner: 
The sale condition for participation in the 
deliberations of the legislative body of a 
Voe1kerstaat and of a Staatenbund ••. is 
being an active and constituent member of the 
former or the latter, ••• (1808a,74) 
Furthermore, Behr (1808a,75) states that there must be equal 
representation of the units, regardless of their differences 
of size and strength. Third, majority votes are to binding 
(1808a,85-9). Finally, he recommends (1808a,89-92) that 
members of the legislatures should be entitled to exercise a 
free vote, not bound to the instruction of their state. 
Behr (1808,59-62 & 1808a,27f) comes to the conclusion that 
the Rheinbund is a Staatenbund, a perfect example of 
interstate federation based on a treaty that regulates the 
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constituent states' external relations, in the interests of 
promoting their freedom and independence, but which leaves 
them sovereign in their internal affairs (1808,42 & 50f). He 
repeatedly stresses (eg.1808,50f;82-87 & 1808~,58-72) that 
Napoleon's role as ·Protector" of the Rheinbund does not make 
him superior to" the princes, for by implication, the latter 
would then not have been sovereign and the Rheinbund would 
have been an intrastate federation. Conversely, Behr (1808, 
59-62 & 1808a,27f) considers the German Reich to' have been an 
intrastate federation, or Voelkerstaat and states that its 
history illustrates the main weakness of the intrastate 
federation, namely; that it is often difficult for its 
central authority to have sufficient strength to~maintain the 
union (1808,57-9). Paradoxically, Behr argues not merely 
that' national unity is impossible in an intrastate federation, 
but also that it is'only possible in an interstate 
federation (1808,30) such as the Rheinbund. In'addition to 
internal and external legal security, the latter fosters 
national unity by promoting the German national spirit. 
The argument behind this assertion is most clearly 
articulated in Behr's later work (1808a,29-32), which 
advancess his theory that an intrastate'federation 1S destined 
to disunity, weakness and eventual collapse. The reason for 
this is its structural predisposition to channel in a 
destrucive direction an"allegedly basic human drive for 
(unlimited) power. Behr's contentiori is as follows: if a new 
intrastate federation is composed of existing states,' the 
power of the new central authority will be resisted by those 
exisiting' states, the administrators of which have grown 
accustomed to the exercise of power. The upshot will be 
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centrifugal dissent (1808a29f). If the intrastate federation 
is composed of a people that was previously neither 
organised in separate states, nor united in any other way, 
the precondition for the central administrators to exercise 
excessive power is already given (1808a,30f). Either way, 
intrastate federation is doomed to failure. By contrast, 
interstate federation alone will work, because it leaves each 
state independent and able to work to maximise its internal 
state power, without fearing attempted external subversion 
(1808a,31f). 
It is now clear why Behr often seeks to exaggerate the 
differences between intrastate and interstate federations. He 
supports the Rheinbund and is concerned to undermine the 
attractiveness of· the alternative·type of federation. To 
understand why, it is necessary to devote some attention to 
the purposes Behr believes the Rheinbund will fulfil. We have 
already noted that Behr ascribes two formal purposes to such 
interstate federations. These relate to legal and military 
security and, to that extent, 8ehr's federalism appears to 
bear out Riker's hypothesis (1964 & 1975, see Chapter 1 
above) of the the importance of-military factors (see Behr, 
1808a,157f also). However, to limit one's consideration to 
these formal purposes of federation is to miss the main point 
of Behr's federalism. 
A number of often emotive passages (e.g.1808,25-30) 
attest to the fact that Behr's analysis of the Rheinbund is 
not a dispassionate account. Behr's dominant motivation is 
not concerned with military security, nor is it to advance an 
academic theory of federation, but-is political. His support 
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for the interstate Rheinbund" federation and his di~missal of 
the intrastate"Reich is based upon his commitment to two 
intimately related ideals. The first we shall mention is that 
of G~rman national'unity. This is apparent in ihe following 
statement: t 
It was not the old imperial constitution itself, 
but the German national character that had become 
old and brittle; •.• the spirit of the German 
nation had remained far behind the spirit of its 
constitution; ••• the original elements of the 
German national character: supreme love of 
liberty, unconditional sacrifice for German 
security, supreme pride in the honour, power and 
fame of the German name ••• gradually atrophied; 
••• Just as regrettable as that death of the 
national character was, so one must be happy 
that the powerful Emperor "of France undertook 
the great task, of which only he was capable, 
of reuniting the divided Germans and thus" 
calling their nationality back to a 
rejunvenated life, ••• (1808,15f) 
Behr (1808,30) asserts that both the structure of-the 
Rheinbund and the 'interest of its Protector (i.e.: Napoleon) 
in its maintenance, guarantee 
that the present, merely federal union will: 
provide its princes of the German nation with 
that which they strived for in vain when they 
were previously united into a single state, 
under a single head; for history proves that 
the German peoples are not destined for absolute 
governmental unity, 
A second "ideal, "or set of ideals, to which Behr is 
committed are those of the liberal Enlightenment, which "he 
hopes will be favoured;by the Rheinbund over those of the 
old, conservative order. Integral to Behr's ideal of a united 
German nation is thus the realisation throughout Germany of 
constitutions based upon principles of the"rational liberal 
Enlightenment (1808a,40). These are to be expressed in a 
variety of political "and economic reforms,' "including 
constitutionalism and separation of powers (1808a,51-5), 
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political equality, civil liberties an enlightened 
bureaucracy (1808a,157f) and free trade (1808a,155). Behr's 
commitments to these ideals are behind his praises of recent 
developments within constituent states of the Rheinbund: 
within most of the states of the federation is 
. manifested an effective and brave reformist . 
spirit, which is transforming their constitu-
tions and their type of administration, pushing 
over what is old and useless, banishing political 
and religious prejudices, killing routine, 
bringing into being systems previously only 
known'in theory, and everywhere erecting new· 
buildings; all this in the visible attempt to 
simplify procedures, to develop the strength of 
the state as much as possible and provide the 
former the necessary latitude, ••• (1808,26) 
Before moving on to 'the next example of Germanic 
federalism in the period up to 1815, we shall summarise our 
conclusions about the federalism of Behr. It will be recalled 
that Behr'sfederations are both composed of states and both 
pursue the same purposes~ which are defined in terms of 
internal and external security and the exercise of the rights 
of states. The main difference between the federations 
relates to the location of sovereignty. In'interstate, 
federations, sovereignty is predictably located in the 
constituent units. 
One significant innovation in Behr's federalism concerns 
the location of sovereignty in intrastate federations. Unlike 
Hugo and Puetter, Behr's intrastate federation is not 
characterised by dual sovereignty. Behr explicitly (1808a,58) 
rejects the notion of divided sovereignty as a contradiction 
in terms. We therefore have- in Behr's federalism the idea of 
an intrastate federation with single, central sovereignty. 
Though the constituent units are still referred to as states 
and are directly represented in the decision-procedure of the 
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centre in the same manner as in interstate federations, they 
are not fully sovereign states, but subordinate territories. 
However, the de facto distinction between this type of 
federation and the interstate federation Behr prefers is not 
as great as it might initially appear. Though Behr (1808a,59) 
insists that if it is to remain an interstate federation, a 
Voelkerbund cannot subject its constituent units to a common 
sovereign power, he says that they can still subordinate 
themselves to a popular will (Vo1kswi11e) based upon reason, 
since obligation to self-imposed laws designed to ensure 
independence is compatible with the sovereignty of 
confederated stateS. What such a popular will would require 
the constituent units of an interstate federation to commit 
themselves to is very wide-ranging and would amount to a very 
centralised federation. It includes the abolition of all 
political inequality, uniform laws, the prescription of 
"dangerous· "fanatical" religion, free trade and the 
uniformity of postage, guilds and of weights and measures 
(1808a,155-8). 
Interestingly, all this is to occur without a supreme 
authority, or even an institutional expression of the popular 
will other than the Diet. 8ehr (1808a,135f) appears to rely 
upon a faith that the very strength and independence which 
the interstate federation gives to its units will be used by 
them in an enlightened and fraternal manner to ensure that 
the states work for the common good. Free trade, for example, 
is stated by 8ehr (1808a,155) to be not a matter of state 
sovereignty, ~ut a matter of freedom and thus subject to the 
international law of reason. Accordingly, the constituent 
states must be obliged to create a law binding upon them all 
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to ensure free trade and commerce. In short, it appears that 
Behr proposes what would be quite a centralised interstate 
federation. His federalism relies heavily for the functioning 
of the interstate federation upon a faith in the development 
of human sociability as a consequence of the replacement of 
traditional structures and the liberation of human reason. 
The parallels between the principles underlying Behr's 
interstate federalism and those of Kant are too obvious to 
miss. 
• 0' 
Where Behr stands in the contemporary ideational conflict 
(see 3.1. above) is clear for all to see. He is for "reason 
before traditi~n" (1808,27), for "true German nationa~ 
unity·, which he considers "can only be the fruit of ~he 
federal bond; the German national character can only be 
recreated through the latter" (1808,28). While the political 
circumstances of 1808 made it easy for Behr to affirm his 
commitment to the Rheinbund federation as a vehicle for the 
implementation of Enlightenment ideals, the predominance of 
those principles made it more difficult for conservative 
, -
. orientated writers to oppose it. One such conservative is 
Berg, whose v1ews are the next subject of this section. 
Berg (1808,1-7) considers states (federal or otherwise) 
and interstate federations to have the purpose of both 
internal and external security, but argues (1808,60-115 & 
189-204) that states are different from interstate unions, in 
that they have the further purpose of mutually guaranteeing 
the rights not only of the subordinate rulers (the princes), 
j 
but also of their subjects. This the Rheinbund fails to do. 
As evidence of this, Berg (1808,4) refers to the terms of the 
129 
Rhine Act and also cites Napoleon's statement that neither 
the Federal Assembly, nor he as the Rheinbund's Protector 
are entitled to intervene in the internal affairs of the 
constitutent states of the Rheinbund. 
The purpose of the central authority of the Rheinbund is, 
like that of all interstate federations, therefore restricted 
to keeping the peace among the federated states and warding 
off external threats (1808,283). In such a federation, the 
constituent states remain sovereign, while, in intrastate 
federations, sovereignty resides with a central authority. 
Berg (1808,7) concludes that the Rheinbund is certainly not 
an intraste, but an interstate federation (not a Bundesstaat, 
but a staatenbund) and cites Zachariae's 1807 essay (see 
above) to support that classification. 
Berg agrees with. Behr and Puetter that the Reich was a 
composite state. The erroneous notion of the sovereignty of 
the central authority itself is, ,he says, ~erely a notion 
stemming from the old imperial constitution (1808,283). 
However, Berg is very different from Behr in that he clearly 
looks forward to a restoration of the old Reich, albeit in a 
newer, stronger form. Thus he agrees (1808,iv) that the old 
Reich constitution was "only appropriate for times of peace", 
but hopes for "the rebirth of the German nation soon". 
Although he explicitly (1800,ivf) aims to keep his political 
views out of the book ,theY,are.visible in his preface, 
where he indirec~ly rejects natural law theories and asserts. 
instead the value of tradition, stating that no laws, however 
bad, should be amended at the cost of injuring traditional 
rights. By implication, parts of the text also argue that 
1 
traditional law will assert itself contrary to the newl~ 
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imposed,positive law. 
In short"we see in Berg the articulation of a federalism 
primarily based upon a descriptive assessment of legal codes 
and practice, but which is very much ill at ease with the new 
federal structure. However, he. is either unwilling, .perhaps 
because. of the political climate in which he is writing, or 
unable, to develop an alternative federalism, which would 
provide a basis for the return of a.strengthened old 
federation comprising the members of the former Reich and 
defending tradition against the principles of the liberal 
Enlightenment. 
50 far, this discussion of Germanic federalism in 
revolutionary Germany has identified federal isms of the 
intrastate-territorial and the interstate-confedera1 
varieties. However, this period also witnessed the expression 
of interstate-chi1iastic federalism. An example of such 
federalism is that of Johnann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814). 
Fichte is not only one of the greatest champions of the 
liberal Enlightenment, but, ,despite his humble. background 
[13], undoubtedly also constitutes one of Germany's greatest 
idealist philosophers. When his first philosophical tract 
appeared anonymously in 1792, it was initially attributed to 
Kant, an event that greatly helped establish Fichte's 
academic reputation. In 1794, Fichte received a chair at 
Jena, where he published numerous works, one of the most 
significant being his Science of Rights (1796a & b), in which 
he advances a rational, natural law philosophy and theory of 
the state. Accusations of atheism forced Fichte to leave 
Jena in 1799. He went to Berlin, where he began to associate 
with Romantics such as 5chleiermacher (see below) and was 
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also influenced by Schelling. In 1805, Fichte became a 
lecturer at Er1angen and five years later was appointed the 
first Rector of the new University of Berlin, where he worked 
until his death in 1814. 
Fichte's philosophy underwent numerous substantial 
revisions, each being accompanied by the publication of a new 
political treatise [14]. Vaughan (1939,2,95) asserts that each 
such political treatises "corresponds, more or less closely, 
to one of the turning points in the great European struggle 
of his day· and concludes that they are "thus a faithful 
record of the mental struggles of his generation". As will be 
shown below, his federalism also reflects that struggle. 
, 
Though it is possible to divide Fichte's intellectual 
development up in various ways [15], there is general 
agreement regarding the broad direction in which his ideas 
were moving. Amongst the most significant features of that 
development are first, Fichte's transformation from an 
extreme individualist advocating a minimal state, to a 
collectivist favouring strong state intervention. Second, 
though Fichte retains a rationalist terminology, he gradually 
becomes an in part mystical German Romantic (Reiss,1955,11-
22). Finally, Fichte moves some way from his initial 
cosmopolitan universalism, towards an emphasis upon German 
nationalism [11]. 
Indeed, his philosophy apart, Fichte is probably most 
readily associated with German nationalism. This reputation 
is largely due to his Addresses to the German Nation (Fichte, 
1808 & 1808a), a compilation of a series of lectures 
delivered at the Berlin Academy of Sciences in the winter of 
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1807 to 1808. Though it has often been claimed (eg.Turnbull's 
introduction to Fichte,1808a,xix) that they were instrumental 
in raising German national consciousness and thus in 
preparing the ground for the German Wars of Liberation, both 
'. . 
their dry academic content and the restricted circle of those 
who had access to them suggest that claim to be rather far 
fetched (Aris,1936,347f). Much more influential were the 
nationalist writings of Goerres (1814/16), as will be 
discussed later in this section. 
Fichte is an extremely complex philosophical and political 
puzzle, verdicts upon whom differ dramatically. While some 
such as Russell (1961,690) accuse him of having "worked out a 
whole philosophy of nationalistic totalitarianism, which had 
great influence in Germany" [17] others (eg.Hertz,1975,48) 
reject the contention that Fichte is a forerunner of later 
German worshipers of state power and see his main interest as 
having been political education. Fichte is cited by some (ego 
Waentig in xiv-xvi of his introduction to Fichte,1800), as 
Germany's first socialist, while others (eg.Reiss,1955) 
attach great significance in the Romantic hue of his later 
writings. Two factors in particular help account for such 
disputes regarding Fichte's political legacy. First, Fichte 
is a prolific writer (Fichte,1845/6), whose opinions undergo 
substantial change over time, as has already been noted. 
Second, his ,writings are often ,extremely abstract. They are 
not only in the tradition of Kantian metaphysical idealism, 
. ' 
but are also some of the most abstract of that tradition. It 
has for example, been alleged (Cairns,1949,502) that Fichte's 
transcendental idealism is so abstract that it makes Kant 
look like an "gross empiricist". In short, the volume, 
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changes within and abstraction of Fichte's writings all 
conspire to provide material of sufficient diversity to 
,-
substantiate a host of different interpretations of his views. 
Though we shall return to this point at the end of our 
exposition of Fichte, it would be both inadvisable and 
inappropriate for this thesis to get involved in such 
disputes. This discussion of Fichte will avoid Fichte's 
philosophy and restrict its attention to establishing the 
nature of Fichte's contribution to the Germanic tradition on 
federalism by means of a discussion of two issues. First, it 
will identif~what type(s) of federation Fichte advocates and 
for what purposes. Second, it will consider the significance 
of Fichte's federalism for the Germanic tradition. 
The first type of federation which Fichte proposes is 
first outlined by him in his Science of Rights (1796a & 
1796b) [18], the aim of which is to identify the steps 
necessary for the rule of reason to be established in the 
world. Having done this in respect of the state, Fichte 
turns, in his "Second Appendix· entitled "International and 
Cosmopolitan Law" (1796a,473-505 & 1796a,366-79) to consider 
how a just peace between states can be created and sustained. 
The opening sentence (1796a,366) reasserts the findings of 
the earlier sections of the Science of Rights that: "each 
individual has the right to compel any other individual he 
". 
meets to enter into a state with him, or to remove himself 
from his sphere of activity··. While Fichte (1796a,366-9) 
concedes that the logical corollary of this proposition is 
the creation of a single world state, he also recognises that 
as a result of geographical factors, several separate states 
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have in fact developed. In order that the citizens of one 
state may interact in peace with those of another, it is 
necessary that their respective governments recognise each 
other, so that they can then enter into an agreement whereby 
they mutually guarantee the security of each others citizens. 
Though Fichte welcomes such agreements, he is concerned 
(1796a,371-6) that they do not provide a guarantee that peace 
will be maintained. Moreover, if it is not, there is no 
reliable way of ensuring that the just cause will triumph in 
an ensuing war. The purpose of the "Second Appendix" is to 
outline the steps that reason dictates in order that the 
victory of right can always"be guaranteed. What"Fichte 
proposes (1796a,376-8) is that the states enter into a "Bund" 
(federation), based upon a mutual undertaking to "destroy 
with untited-force any state,be it in the federation or not, 
which does not recognise the independence of anyone of-us, 
or violates the contract between itself and any of us". 
Fichte proceeds: 
I say the formula of this federation'-(Bund); 
for what we have described would be an 
interstate federation (Voe1kerbund) and not 
a state (Voelkerstaat). This distinction is 
this: the individual can be compelled to enter 
the state, since otherwise a legal relationship 
with him is not possible. But no state can be 
compelled to join this federation (Bund), since 
it can be in a legal relationship even outside 
of it ••••• Hence it is a voluntary union and 
not at all to be founded by force and such a 
union is called a federation (Bund). (1796a,377, 
-emphasis in original) [19]. 
The jurisdiction of this interstate federation extends to 
relations with all states that are either formally members of 
it, or have recognised the independence of one or more of its 
constituent states (1796a,337f). The federation must be armed, 
so that it can enforce its decisions by means of a "war of 
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extermination" (Vernichtun~skrie9) against any·state~condemned 
by 'the federal court' (1796a,378f). Fichte (1796a,379) 
acknowledges that until reason appears "in person on earth, it 
is' not possible to be absolutely sure that unjust decisions 
will not be'reached. However, he believes that the next best 
means of securing the rule of reason between states is the 
federation he has outlined. Fichte concludes that 
As this fede~ation'extends itself and gra~~allY 
embraces the whole earth, perpetual peace will 
come about; the 'only rightful relationship of 
states. For war can, if conducted by states, 
which are judges in their own cases, just as 
easily give victory to injustice as justice. , 
Even when under the'direction of a just federation; 
war still only constitutes a means to an end of 
maintaining peace and not the end itself. 
(1796a,379, .emphasis in original). 
Though in the ·Second Appendix· to his Science of Rights, 
Fichte's federalism understandably addresses only the impact 
on interstate relations which his proposed federation is to 
have, there are a number of other purposes which Fichte _ 
wishes that federation to promote. These purposes can be 
established from both the earlier parts of the Science of 
Rights, as well as from his Closed Commercial State (1800), 
which has been described (Vaughan,1939,118-24) as being 
itself little more than an appendix to the Science of Rights. 
What these two sources demonstrate beyond any doubt is that 
Fichte wishes the internal government of the constituent 
,! 
states of his federation to be in accordance with the 
principles of the liberal Enlightenment. For example, his 
Science of Rights (1796b,237-85) demands representative 
government, liberal constitutionalism, popul,ar sovereignty 
and civil liberties. It also sees the individual very much in 
a social context and ascribes to the state a duty to ensure 
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the welfare of its citizens, above all by means of education 
and social justice. Fichte (1796b,293f) argues, for example, 
that though there must be no idler in a rational state, "the 
poor citizen has an absolute claim to support". This requires 
the state to take an active role in regulating labour and 
prices, as well as in controlling external trade (17906b,311-
17). 
This theme of the positive, interventionist state as a 
means to the rule of reason is developed most fully in 
Fichte's Closed Commercial State, which maintains (1800,3-30) 
that the principle of equality of man means that all men have 
an equal claim to welfare and material security and comfort. 
Accordingly, the people has a right to demand both measures 
which contribute to greater productivity and hence greater 
social utility, as well as measures designed to ensure 
equa1l enjoyment of the wealth generated. The state therefore 
has a duty to regulate the economy so as to maximise welfare 
and to distribute it equally. To this end, and in the 
interests of preventing the wars that results from unequal 
economic relations between states, the state must first close 
itself off from all foreign commerce and form an autarchic 
economic unit. Second (1800,8-27) it must regulte the access 
to and conduct of all professions, so as to ensure the most 
efficient use of labour. Third, it must prevent exploitation 
b~ the control of ,prices (1800,43). Fourth, it must regulate 
incomes (1800,25) so as to ensure equality. Finally, the 
closed commercial state will abolish internationally 
exchangeable curency. Those elements of foreign trade that 
are completely indispensable will be conducted solely by the 
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government and on the basis of barter (1800,27). 
So far, our discussion of Fichte's federalism has shown 
that he envisages a federation composed of sovereign states, 
united for the formal purpose of realising the rule of reason 
in international relations, that is to say, for the 
establishment and maintenance of perpetual world peace. As is 
patently obvious, Fichte's federalism is virtually identical 
with that of Kant (see 2.3 above), as Fichte (1796) himself 
acknowledges in his glowing review of Kant's Perpetual Peace. 
Fichte's federalism thus constitutes an example of what this 
thesis defines as interstate-chiliastic federalism. 
Interestingly, his writings (esp.1796a & 1800) indicate the 
main motivations of his federalism in the period up to 1800 
to be twofold. On the one hand, Fichte is driven by his 
interest in cosmopolitanism, that is to say, in how the rule 
of reason is to established between states. On the other 
hand," Fichte's federalism also demonstrates a close 
relationship to the political disputes of his day. Where he 
stands in those disputes is evident from the fact that the 
constitent states of his proposed federation are to be 
characterised by social and political equality and liberal 
constitutionalism. 
In particular from Prussia's defeat in 1806 and 1807, 
Fichte's attention is directed less at the world stage and 
increasingly at the regional and national stage. In his 
subsequent lectures and writings, nationalism figures 
prominently. This changed concern is also reflected in his 
federalism. However, while his earlier interstate-chi1iastic 
federalism is reasonably clear, the ideas he now articulates 
on the subject of federation are neither clear, nor 
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consistent. They none the less provide some clues as to the 
type of federation Fichte is now considering and the purposes 
he hopes it might facilitate. 
Though there is a possibility that the federation with 
which Fichte is toying might be of an intrastate variety (eg. 
1808a,153f& 1813,569f), the general impression conveyed by 
his later writings (1806,1807,1808 & 1813) is that Fichte is 
considering the merits of interstate confederation (eg.1808a, 
54 & 152-4). However, his writings are unclear on at least 
the following crucial issues. First, the extent of the 
federation is not established unequivocally. Some passages 
appear to suggest that the federation would comprise solely 
the German states, while others suggest that the federation 
might in fact embrace the whole of Europe (1808a,223-47 & 
1813,549). Second, the structures of that federation are not 
spelled out, as is perhaps only to be expected from a 
transcendental idealist such as Fichte, whose main 
concern is not the structure of a state, but that it 
manifests the correct spirit (eg.1808a,146-8). 
Third, there is ambiguity not only over the format, but 
also concerning the purposes of the federation Fichte is now 
considering. Fichte's German nationalism and, for example, 
his reference (eg.1813561-5) to the need for a strong man to 
bring about German unity (Zwingherr zur Deutschheit), clearly 
provide amunition for those who contend that Fichte proposes 
an aggressive, expansionist Germany. We do not share this 
view, however, and concur with the opinion of those (eg. 
Meinecke,1928,93-127) who argue that Fichte remains commited 
to the ultimate goal of a world federation ruled by reason 
139 
and that his German nationalism and his cosmopolitanism are 
reconcilable. As Meinecke (1928,93-127) shows, Fichte (eg. 
1808a,117) sees his German nationalism as the promotion of 
the nation in which reason is most advanced and thus as not 
opposed to the cosmopo1itica1 goal of promoting the rule of 
reason in the world, but as a means to that end. Moreover, 
Fichte explicitly rejects both the unitary Machtstaat (eg. 
1813,552) and aggressive, expansionist nationalism (eg.1806, 
& 1808a,231). 
To conclude, Fichte is significant for this thesis for a 
number of reasons. First, the very language in which he 
expresses his federalism is interesting. It constitutes 
another example of both the idealist medium employed by a not 
inconsiderable part of the Germanic tradition of federalism 
[20] and of its corollary: the view (eg.Fichte,1813,563) that 
the constitutional structure of federation is secondary to 
the ideals it promotes. Second, however, Fichte's transition 
from his early rationalism and individualism to his later 
.-
Romanticism and nationalism are a reflection of both the 
political and philosophical changes occuring in Germany at 
that time (eg.Aris,1939 & Meinecke, 1928) and therefore 
demonstrate that despite its idealist terminology, Fichte's 
federalism must be seen as at least in part politically 
contingent. Third, Fichte's writings show that Kant was not 
the only contributor to the Germanic tradition of federalism 
who proposed interstate-chi1iastic federation. Fourth, Fichte 
appears also to have considered an interstate confederation, 
for Germany, though his views on both its extent and 
structure are ambiguous [21]. 
This brings us to the fifth and final significant feature 
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of Fichte's federalism which will be mentioned here, namely, 
that the very ambiguity of Fichte's federalism allows many 
subsequent exponents of Germanic federalism to avail 
themselves, for often vary different ends, of parts of 
Fichte's federalsim. We shall give five examples. First, 
Fichte's ultimate goal of a world federation governed by 
reason and thereby guaranteeing perpetual peace remains an 
attractive ideal for radical German liberals such as 8ehr 
(see above and 6.2.3. below). Second,inasmuch as Fichte's 
interstate-chiliastic federalism also contains commitmenents 
to, for example, social justice and popular sovereignty (eg. 
esp.1800) and to legal and political equality (eg.1813,550), 
Fichte offers a point of reference for the federalism of 
later radicals such as Struve (see 6.2.3. below). Third, 
idealist radical liberals such as Troxler (see 6.3.3. below) 
are at least as attracted by the strong emphasis in Fichte's 
federalism (eg.1808a,esp.158-204 & 1813,555 & 563) upon the 
primacy of education. 
Fourth, the tension in Fichte's federalism between German 
nationalism and liberalism is to be reflected in the 
writings of numerous liberal exponents of Germanic federalism. 
On example is Fries, whose federalism proposes a German 
federation in which individual liberty is sacrificed to 
German national unity (see 6.2.2. below). Fifth, other 
subsequent exponents of Germanic federalism take Fichte's 
nationalism much further and articulate an expansionist, 
racist nationalism, devoid of any cosmopolitanism. An example 
is the federalism of Goerres (see below and also 5.3.2.). 
Conversely, Heeren's 1817 federalism (see 5.2.3. below) not 
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only articulates Fichte's .vague idea of a German interstate 
confederation much more clearly, but his proposals for German 
self-sacrifice in the interests of peace (see 5.2.3. below) 
take Fichte's cosmopolitanism much further than the latter 
(eg.1808a,226) himself considers acceptable. 
The manner in which these ambigutites, contradictions and 
tensions of Fichte's federalism are refelected in the 
subsequent Germanic tradition of federalism will be 
demonstrated later in this thesis. Our exposition of Fichte's 
federalism being complete, we will now look at the final two 
exponents of Germanic federalism to be considered in this 
section, namely, Schleiermacher and Goerres. Like that of 
Fichte, their federal isms both also contain a mixture of 
rationalism and Romanticism. 
Friedrich Sch1eiermacher (1768-1834) was a Protestant 
theologian and philosopher. He became a preacher in the late 
17908 and after a period as Professor and university chaplain 
at Halle, received a chair at Berlin in 1810, where his 
circle of acquaintances included Fichte (Hertz,1975,43f). 
Schleiermacher was not merely an exponent of German 
Romanticism, with some of the key figures of which he had 
been in contact from the late 1790s, but has in fact been 
described (Reiss,1955,33) as "one of the most profound, but 
also most obscure thinkers of the German Romantic movement". 
Romanticism was then primarily still an ethical and 
philosophical movement. Moreover, as the above discussion of 
Fichte has shown, its ethics shared various aspects of 
idealism with the Enlightenment. It was primarily with the 
start, in the first decade of the nineteenth century, of 
political Romanticism, that many Romantics such as Mueller 
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(1808 & 1819) and Schlegel (Heinecke,1928,62-93) were to 
" 
reject the'Enlightenment altogether and to to advocate for 
Germany a return to medieval structures. Schleiermacher's 
writings, however, were predominantly theological and 
, 
ethical and remained influenced by moderate Enlightenment 
idealism, with which they attempted to synthesise 
Romanticism. 
Host of the contemporary interest in Schleiermacher 
(eg.Gadamer,1960,esp.162-72) relates to his hermeneutics,' 
rather than to his political theory, but 'the concern 'of this 
thesis is limited to the federalism contained in the'latter. 
Though Schleiermacher's federalism is intimately linked to 
his philosophy, it would exceed the scope of this thesis to 
deal with the latter in detail. It will become sufficiently 
apparent from the following account of' his views on the 
nature and purpose of federation. That account will be based 
on the views he expressed in a paper read at the Royal 
Prussian Academy of Sciences on 24 March 1814, ie. on the 
eve of the new German Bund (Schleiermacher,1814 & Reiss,1955, 
173-202).' 
That essay offers an approach to identifying the nature 
of the state and thence to classifying'it. Schleiermacher 
, 
(1814,183) starts with the origin of a state, arguing that 
"The form which a thing shows in its origin is ••• also the 
form in which it continues its existence". However, he does 
not go on to offer a contract theory, ora Divine right' 
theory. Instead, he considers (1814,84) the origin of a state 
to lie in the translation of things previously done 'on 
instinct into matters done "with a view to the needs of the 
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whole". 
In brief, the already existing sentiment and 
activity have been brought together and laid 
down in the law through the arising of the 
state. What existed before is now expressed, 
the unconscious unity and equality of the mass 
transformed into a conscious unity and equality, 
and arising out of this consciousness is the 
essence of the state. 
What this means is that within every individual there is 
a latent consciousness of "the relationship between each 
individual to a definite whole of nature" (ibid). (This 
formulation is typical of Romanticism's belief in man as part 
of a living universe (Reiss,1955,1-43 & Meinecke,1966,62-
161). What Schleiermacher has in mind here is an awareness of 
the distinction between private and public actions. The 
formation of a state is a product of this consciousness. 
These initial states are referred to as states of the lower 
order. Since the development of political consciousness is 
unlikely to take place at the same time throughout a whole 
territory, such states will be small, connecting "hordes", or 
tribes. Such states may well start out as monarchies, since 
consciousness could initially develop in just one person, but 
they could then well alternate between aristocratic and 
democratic structures. 
But in states "which connect a whole people consisting of 
many hordes and nat)onalities into a whole, all that'belongs 
to the state 'will perhaps have to be ~ormed in a different 
way" (1814,188). That different way is federation. Schleier-
macher (1814,190f) believes federations arise in a manner 
analogous 'to how political consciousness initiates the 
formation of a state. That is to say, the politically 
conscious unit extends its rule 'over others, either 
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peacefully or by violence (ibid,190f). 
Unlike in small states of the lower order, in states of a 
higher order, the appropriate political <structure is either 
aristocracy or monarchy, but not democracy (1814,189f & 193). 
These states of a higher order are federations (foederativer 
Staat, 1814,276), whichSch1eiermacher sees as a necessary 
stage into which states of the lower order will pass. But he 
considers states of the higher order also to be limited in 
their capacity to allow political consciousness to dominate-
over private interest. As an example, he cites the 
representative assembly of a federation, which he says will 
still tend to act in the private interests of·' its members, 
rather than in-the supreme interest-of the national whole 
(ibid,195). Moreover, the state of the higher order will sway 
between being a 
state composed of -unequally created and to,a -
certain extent still independent states, or 
instead of such a Bundesstaat, only Staatenbund, 
merely a vague union of numerous states for so 
long as their opinions do not diverge too much; 
(Schleiermacher,1814,276f). 
In other words, Schleiermacher considers both interstate 
and intrastate federations to be states of the higher order 
and both to be marred by structures that foster private 
interests as opposed to the public interest characteristic 
of political consciousness. Both types of federations are but 
transitory stages on the evolution of states to the state of 
the "highest order". The state of the highest order is the 
unitary, monarchical state, uniting the whole of a nation 
(1814,193f). In such a state, there is to be completely 
unfettered rule by a hereditary monarch who will not have any 
private property, for that might prevent him from making 
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decisions in accordance with the interest of the whole 
(Reiss,1955,196-200). 
To sum up, Schleiermacher posits an idealist teleology 
moving the state, understood as an entity defined in terms 
of an ethical consciousness, from the "lower" to the 
"highest" order. In this context, federation constitutes an 
intermediary form: the "state of the higher order". 
- , 
Federation can be either interstate or intrastate. The 
purpose of the federation is to help foster the ethical ideal 
of political consciousness, ie. the subordination of private 
interests over the good of the whole and thus to move man's 
public association on towards the ultimate ideal state. The 
place of federation in this is to be an inevitable, 
intermediary stage through which all states will pass on 
their way towards a unitary nation state, with a monarch who 
'. .' 
assumes a role very akin to that of Plato's philosopher king 
[22). There are of course also parallels with Hegel's ideas 
of the state as the embodiment of the ethical idea. Though 
Schleiermacher was (Bluntschli,1867,610-14) attempting to 
develop an ethical theory of the state and not to get 
involved in partisan political issues, the political effect 
of this kind of federalism was to rationalise a conservative 
Machtstaat. Schleieremacher's theory of the state and his 
consequent view of federation also unfluenced other 
contributors to Germanic federalism, including the 
conservatives Stahl and Bluntschli (see 5.2.3. and 5.3.3. 
below). 
The final exponent of Germanic federalism who will be 
considered here is Johann Joseph von Goerres (1776-1848). He 
has in common with Fichte and Schleiermacher the fact that he 
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is a Romantic,but differs from both in at least three 
fundamental respects. First, Goerres is nota philosopher of 
their calibre, but primarily a political activist. Though 
this makes his federalism less intellectually stimulating, 
that is compensated by its close relationship to the politics 
of its day. Second, while,Schleiermacher is a staunch 
Protestant, Goerres is'a devout Catholic. Third, Goerres' 
federalism during the period covered by this chapter is 
characterised by a much greater-commitment to German 
nationalism than Schleiermacher and a much more politically 
effective commitment than Fichte. 
Though he was a Catholic supporter·of a revival of an 
idealised version of the mediaeval German Reich and later 
came to be regarded by many liberals as the personification 
of reactionary; clerical conservatism, Goerres was not 
unequivocally conservative. -Indeed, in his youth he was as 
ardent an opponent of absolutism and clericalism as he was 
a supporter of the French Revolution, of Kant and Fichte's 
cosmopolitanism, of rational theories of the state and of 
republicanism (Goerres,1854-74; Aris,1936,320-40 & Uhlmann, 
1912,esp.1-16). Goerres' political conversion starts in 1799/ 
1800, when he goes to Paris as a member of a deputation 
demanding the incorporation of the left bank of the Rhine. 
His experiences in Paris lead him to be disenchanted with the 
Revolution and in 1801 result in his withdrawl from public 
life (Uhlmann, 1912,10-16). 
From then until the Wars of Liberation, Goerres comes 
under the influence first of Schelling [23] and then of the 
Heidelberg Romantics (Aris,1936,332-6 & Uhlmann,16-61). 
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Though he always retains his belief in popular'political 
participation and in a range of political liberties, Goerres' 
previous view of history as the march of reason on the earth 
is'replaced by a theory of history which is in some ways akin 
to, albeit much less'refined, than that ofSchleiermacher and 
the later Fichte (eg.1806 & 1808a). Goerres (1814-16 & 
Uhlmann,1912, esp.61-80) now regards world history as~the 
manifestation of the'power of a mystical eternal Law of' 
Nature, which human reason can at best partially intuit, but 
is powerless to resist. Above that mystical force is God, who 
will ensure final retribution. He can of course also ensure 
justice by direct intervention in history; Germany's 
liberation from the French is'cited by Goerres (1814-16;125) 
as an example. 
One consequence of Goerres' mystical Romantic' historicism 
is his view that institutions are legitimate by virtue'of the 
very fact of their longevity. If they were contrary to the 
mystical spirit of history, or to Divine will, they would not 
have survived. As Goerres (1814-16,175) puts it in his 
typically abstract style: : 
All Rightc(Recht) is in God 'and willed by Him and' 
since His willing and will are the same, so the 
Divine will is Right itself and all that is 
rightful in the phenomenal world (Erscheinungen) is 
an image of 'this Divine 'will and He wants nothing 
in history and the state but Right. 
This necessarily impacts upon Goerres' previous view that the 
state is capable of being moulded by means of man's reason. 
Goerres now regards the state as an organic product of 
historical development, whose traditions are to be revered. 
This not only rules out radical reconstruction of states 
according to rational principles, but also requires reverence 
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vis-a-vis ancient institutions such as those charged with the 
dissemination of the Christian (i.e.Catho1ic) faith. One of 
Goerres' proposals is thus the reassertion of ecclesiastical 
power in the form of a revived Papacy [24]. 
Goerres' earlier political commitment to rational 
cosmopolitanism is now also largely abandoned [25]. Instead, 
Goerres becomes one of the most fervent and influential 
spokesmen of German nationalism. His medium is the Rheinischer 
Merkur, a newspaper which he edits from 1814 until its 
closure by the Prussian authorities in 1816 (Goerres,1814-16). 
Described by another great German nationalist of the period 
as "the most celebrated German newspaper of the nineteenth 
century· (Arndt,cited in Krieger,1972,211), it is one of the 
forces most instrumental in raising German national 
consciounsess. Goerres uses it not only to conduct a 
passionate campaign against Napoleon and everything French, 
but also to argue for the federal unification of the whole 
German nation. 
Goerres' contributions to the Rheinischer Merkur thus 
constitute the core of his federalism in the period with 
which this chapter is concerned. Since they furnish a direct 
commentary upon the eventful years of 1814 to 1816, it is not 
surprising that their detailed proposals for the shape of the 
future German federation vary. That these variations are 
usually a direct response to changes in the political 
situation is excellently documented in by Uhlmann (1912,eg.99 
-104) and provides more valuable support for this thesis' 
assertion of the politically contengent nature of (Germanic) 
federalism. 
However, an examination of the Rheinischer Merkur [28] 
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reveals that, notwithstanding the changes mentioned, the main 
lines of Goerres' federalism are quite consistent. The 
following elucidation of that federalism will first outline 
Goerres' argument as to how Germany's history must itself 
determine Germany's future federal structure. Second, it will 
consider the constituent units of Goerres' proposed 
federation. Third, it will discuss the location and 
organisation of sovereignty within that federation. Fourth, 
it will address the purposes Goerres intends his proposed 
federation to promote. Finally, there will be a summary of 
Goerres federalism and an assessment of its significance. 
The main principle underlying Goerres' federalism is that 
the only legitimate and sustainable constitution for Germany 
is one that works with the forces of history, rather than 
against them. Accordingly, he argues (1814-16,eg.107 & 142) 
[27] that only those with a sound understanding of history 
and the mystical forces governing it sou1d be permitted to 
participate in the Congress of Vienna. The extent of Goerres' 
commitment to the notion that the correct solution to the 
question of German reconstruction must be intuited from 
history is evident in his proud boast, at the end of a very 
lengthy article in which he has made detailed suggestions for 
Germany's future federal constitution (1814-16,142), that his 
his own proposals are all merely cribbed from the pages of 
history. 
To understand Goerres' federal proposals, it is therefore 
necessary to establish first what he regards the mystical 
message of history to be. Goerres (1814-16,eg.124f,129,175 & 
181) states that all Germany's problems over the past three 
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centuries derive from the Reformation. As churches freed 
themselves from Papal authority, so temporal rulers freed 
themselves from that of the Emperor. The resulting cleavage 
between Protestant northern and Catholic southern Germany was 
never to bridged. Goerres (1814-16,82,132,177 & 179) ascribes 
the fact the Germany was never reunited to the lack of vision 
of those who drafted the Peace of Westphalia (1648), but' 
above all to the selfish actions of the German princes who, 
in pursuit of their particular interests, often involved 
foreign powers in German affairs in a manner that resulted in 
the national interest being compromised. The eventual 
disastrous outcome (1814-16,125) was the Emperor's abdication 
in 1806. 
Goerres' interpretation of the message of these events for 
the reconstruction of Germany is very interesting (1814-16, 
124f,128-30 & 141). Although his natural predisposition is 
understandably in favour of Catholics, he does not condemn 
the Reformation out of hand in the manner of other Catholic 
conservatives such as Haller or Geiger (see 5.3.2. below). 
The reason for this is that though he too regards the 
Reformation and the divisions which it brought about as in 
many respects undesirable, their very duration means that 
they have to be accepted as a legitimate manifestation of the 
mystical, world-governing spirit. Goerres concludes that 
though the task of the Congress of Vienna is to promote 
German national unity by bridging the division between 
Protestant and Catholic Germany, this must be done not 
against history, but in collaboration with it. Accordingly, 
the basis of the new German constitution can be none other 
than the very division which has for so long shaped German 
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history: the antithesis between Protestant and Catholic 
Germany, as personified in Prussia and Austria respectively. 
In other words, out of the Austro-Prussian polarity, the new 
and higher synthesis of German national unity will be born. 
How Goerres hopes his federation will fulfil this abstract 
goal will now be shown. 
He notes (1814-16,132) that other European countries, 
sensing the need for a strong central authority to ensure 
internal and external security, have established unitary 
states. While recent events clearly demonstrate that Germany 
desperately also needs to be united, Goerres rejects the 
unitary state model, arguing that that such states exhibit an 
unorganic, artifical structure. They are, in his metaphysical 
language, "constructed in the image of dead nature". By 
contrast, he regards Germany's old federation, with its great 
social, political and cultural diversity, to have been imbued 
with "the real living force" which marks it out as superior 
to other states. Accordingly, Goerres (1814-16,76) proposes 
that Germany become not a unitary state, but a "federal 
system" (Foederativsystem). However, it is not to be merely a 
loose "confederation" of states (1814-16,82,104 & 180f) such 
as that of North America, but a single German state, with a 
single sovereign power at its centre. In short, Germany is to 
become not an interstate, but an intrastate federation: a 
Bundesstaat (1814-16,179) or Staatenstaat (cited in Uhlmann, 
1912,87). 
Despite the fact that one of the most persistent features 
of Goerres' federalism is his criticism of the German 
princes' inclination to place their particular interests 
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above the general interest, they are to remain the rulers of 
the constituent units of Goerres' federation. However, he 
insists time and time again (1814-16,eg 82f,104,106 & 138) 
that they are not to be sovereign rulers. They must 
"recognise that they owe to the fatherland the same love, 
loyalty, submission and obedience which they demand from their 
subjects" (1814-16,104). In other words, the princes have to 
subordinate themselves to the central authority. They are to 
relinquish to the centre the conduct of all diplomatic 
relations and support the establishment throughout the 
federation of uniform taxation and judicial systems. They 
must also abolish all internal tolls and tariffs (1814-16, 
eg.76,82f,) and introduce into their domestic constitutions 
systems of popular representation based upon the estates 
(1814-16,eg.104) [28]. 
It is now time to consider the nature of the central 
federal authority Goerres envisages (1814-16,130,132,138, 
175f & 181). He is adamant that the German federation must 
once again be presided over by a sovereign Emperor and that 
that title must be confered on the Habsburg dynasty. He 
defends this demand primarily by reference to Austria's 
history of self-sacrifice for Germany, but it is of course 
not unrelated to its religious affiliation. Though one of the 
recurrent themes of his federalism (1814-16,eg.140f & 181) is 
the need for the German federation to be constructed _ in 
such a manner that it helps heal the rift between Austria and 
Prussia, Goerres is unyielding in the matter of Prussia 
assuming the role of the second power in the federation (1814 
-16,eg.105 & 139f). Apart from making limited concessions to 
it [29], his attempt to placate Prussia's predictable 
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opposition is restricted to repeatedly expressing the hope 
that Prussia will feel honoured to serve at the right hand 
of the new Emperor. 
Alongside the Emperor is also to be a bicameral Imperial 
Diet (1814-16,138-40) [30]. Its lower chamber, like the 
. 
legislatures of all the constituent units of the federation, 
will be elected from and by the estates. This "Imperial 
council" (Reichsrat) is to be a purely deliberative assembly. 
It receives legislative proposals from the Emperor, who has 
the sole right of initiative, and prepares them for the final 
decision of the upper chamber: the "Imperial Diet" or 
"Princely Diet (Reichstag, or Fuerstentag). In the latter, 
all the rulers of the constituent territorial units are to be 
personally represented. They will divide into two coleges, 
one representing the northern (i.e. Protestant) rulers and 
the other the southern (l.e. Catholic) rulers. The former is 
to be chaired by the King of Prussia, and the latter by the 
Archduke of Austria. Between the sittings of the Diet, these 
two persons will combine with the Emperor to constitute the 
executive committee of the Imperial Diet. Unfortunately, 
Goerres fails to explain the voting system of either the 
colleges of the Diet, or the executive committee of the 
Empire. Given his insistence in an earlier section of the 
same article (1814-16,138) that executive authority is to be 
the preserve of the sovereign Emperor, as well as the fact 
that two of the three members of the executive committee are 
to be from the Habsburg dynasty, there is little doubt that 
Goerres intends his federation to favour Austria. 
This brings us to the issue of the purposes which Goerres 
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desires his federation to promote. These include economic 
harmonisation and judicial integration, as well as ensuring 
Germany's territorial integrity and internal and external 
security (1814-16,eg.76 & 82). Another at least as important 
consideration, albeit less material, is fostering'German 
nationa1ism.-It is in this light that one has to understand 
Goerres' rather wide view·(1814-16,eg.82 & 179) as to the 
territorial extent of the proposed German federation. He 
believes that German-speaking Switzerland will definitely be 
included'and would also like to' see Denmark, .Be1gium and the 
Netherlands as members of the federation.' 
The main purpose of that federation is to re-establish the 
Holy Roman Empire (1814-16,eg.181),and with it, a European 
"Christianity". Since'Goerres' proposals clearly imply an 
extension of German territory~'his federalism fits Riker's·· 
category (1964 & 1974, see.1.2 above) of those proposals 
designed for the purposes of· "expansion", even though his 
expansionism is mitigated by remnants of Goerres'erstwhi1e 
cosmopolitanism. The latter is to' some extant reflected in 
the following statement: . - , .~ 
the German Kaiser can and will again become for 
people of this part of the world what the Middle 
Ages expected him to be ••. a Protector 
(Schirmherr) of Christianity, ruling not through 
~ violence, but through justice, not subordinating 
peoples by means of power, but winning them over 
through a harmony deriving from higher Right 
(Recht) and from legality, like the old clerical 
states •••• 
On the other hand, this also demonstrates Goerres' desire for 
the re-establishment of Papal authority~(1814-16,176 & 180f) 
and thus presumably ultimately of catholicity. Thus Goerres 
continues 
The Emperor will then also reassert the rights he 
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used to exercise as Protector of the Church and, 
together with the Pope, will convene the general 
Church Assembly and chair it •••. As the temporal 
, part receives its share, so the spiritual part 
will also re-acquire its rights and the destroyed 
structure of the European constitution will again 
unite and compliment itself. 
To summarise, the constituent units of Goerres' federation 
are to be the German princes, who will exercise territorial 
supremacy, but not be sovereign. Sovereignty is reserved to 
the "majesty" (eg.cited in Uhlmann,1912,105) of the Emperor. 
Goerres proposes popular representation both in the 
constituent units of the federation and at the federal level. 
The main function of that representation is not to establish 
popular sovereignty, but first, to put pressure upon the 
princes to eschew selfish particularism in favour of the 
promotion of German natio~al unity (seee also Goerres,1819, 
116f & Krieger,1975,215). Second, it is to help maintain the 
national spirit among the population. The purposes of the 
proposed federation are clear. It is to ensure the defence of 
Germany, the fostering of the German national spirit and the 
promotion throughout Europe of Christianity. All this is to 
occur under Austrian leadership. In short, Goerres' 
federalism amounts to a prescription of what this thesis has 
classified as an intrastate-imperial federation (see 2.4 
above). 
Goerres' federalism is of interest to this thesis for at 
least four reasons. The first relates to the manner of its 
articulation. It's elaborate historicism and metaphysical 
idealism is typical of the federalism of a substantial 
number of exponents of Germanic federalism, which was also 
predicated upon an idealist or ethical theory of the state. 
Examples include not only Kant (see 2.3 above) and Fichte 
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(see above) but also Fries (see 6.2.2. below) and Troxler 
(see 6.3.3.be10w). Typical of this approach is the fact that, 
despite his concern to prescribe the structures of the future 
German federation, Goerres insists upon relativising their 
importance, repeatedly stressing (1814-16,eg.107 & 142) that 
unless the spiritual conditions are right even the best 
political structures will be of no avail. The success of a 
society will be detemined not by its political structures, 
but by the extent to which the spirit of that society 
conforms to the mystical, world-governing spirit. 
However, it is not merely the idealist manner in which 
Goerres' federalism is expressed that makes it interesting 
for this thesis, but also nature of those ideals themselves. 
A central ideal is that of German nationalism. In true 
Romantic tradition, he sees the nation as an almost biological 
product of the Volk. The latter is itself a reflection of, 
for example, the soil and the climate and finds its expression 
in a common language, culture and destiny (see eg.Schorn, 
1934,109f). The purpose of the German nation being united 
into a federation with a strong central power is to help it 
fulfil that destiny. Only by being a strong state can it-
exercise its legitimate role as the defender and promoter of 
national peculiarities. This requires that the German 
federation have defendable boundaries, which in part explains 
the proposed inclusion of Denmark, Holland and Switzerland. 
Goerres' ideal of German nationalism is, of course, 
qualified by the second major ideal which his federation is 
to help realise: the defence of Christianity. For Goerres, 
promoting the Christian religion and Christian love 
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necessarily requires a revival of the Papacy, whose role in 
the Middle Ages was, as Goerres (1814-16,180) reminds us, 
that of an "Prince of Eternal Peace", arbitrating between 
conflicting states. 
Putting these rather abstract and lofty ideals into a more 
practical political context, a third reason why Goerres' 
federalism is significant for this thesis is the fact that it 
is another good example of the use of Germanic federalism as 
a political ideology. That is not to deny that, it is, as has 
been mentioned above, expansionist. On the contrary, it is 
necessary to go behind the mere fact of expansionism and seek 
to ascertain what purposes that expansionism itself 
promote. When one does that with Goeeres, one finds that his 
federalism offers a curious mix of reactionary conservatism 
and liberal ideas. On the one hand, Goerres is now a believer 
not in republicanism, but in the intrinsic superiority of 
monarchy. He also desires a return to an idealised 
Middle Ages, in which there is not only to be a reincarnation 
of what amounts to the pre-Reformation Holy Roman Empire, but 
also a renewal of Papal authority and a system of estates-
based representation. 
On the other hand, Goerres' federalism contains a number 
of liberal elements. These include his consistent defence 
of constitutionalism by means of popular representation at 
all levels of the state. Indeed, at one stage (1814-16,76), 
he argues for the assembled estates to act as the constituent 
assembly of the new German federation. Furthermore, Goerres' 
(1814-16,105) vision of how his estates system would function 
is characterised by moblility based upon merit and is thus 
unlike that of decidedly reactionary conservatives such as 
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Mueller (1819,44). Finally, Goerres is also a staunch 
supporter of the principle of a militia, which was at that 
time usually asociated with liberals opposed to state 
absolutism. 
A fourth reason why Goerres' Goerres federalism is . 
significant for our exposition of the development of Germanic 
federalism is that it foreshadows a conflict that was to ~. 
dominate German political debate for much of the nineteenth 
century: the conflict between the "grossdeutsch" (Greater' 
Germany) and "kleindeutsch" (Lesser Germany) solutions to the 
problem of how Germany·was ·to be united (see 4.2 below). The 
former solution usually impl ied Austrian and therefore also .:; 
Catholic-conservtive dominance·of Germany, while the 
k1eindeutsch'prescription ascribed the leadership of Germany 
to Protestant Prussia. Writing as a Catholic subject of the. 
Protestant state of Prussia, one of the major considerations 
motivating Goerres~" to prescribe a centralised German' 
federation under Austrian leadership is without doubt the 
advancement of his political, but above all his religious 
interests. Goerres is thus clearly a forerunner ,of those who 
were to argue that only a German federation including the 
whole of Germany, and preferably under Austrian control, was 
appropriate. His proposals in the Merkur were by no means 
the last word on this subject, as is demonstrated below, in 
Part 3 of this thesis (see'esp.5.2 & 6.2 below). 
Before moving on to consider that debate, to which Goeres 
was himself again to contribute (eg.1819,1821 & 1845), it ;s 
necessary to examine the nature of Swiss federalism in the 
period between the collapse of the old Confederation in 1798 
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and the establishment in 1815 of'the Swiss "Federal Pact". 
3.3. FEDERALISM IN SWITZERLAND FROM 1798 TO 1815 
In this period, Swiss federalism was most evident· at the 
times of greatest constitutional change, that .is to say, 
throughout the unpopular Helvetic Republic of 1798 to ,1803, 
and from 1813 to 1815. During the first period,- federalism 
was almost exclusively the preserve of the conservative 
"Federalists", who opposed the liberal "Unitarians". Unlike 
Germany, whose discussion largely revolved around clarifying 
the nature and relative merits of the Staatenbund and .the 
Bundesstaat, the Swiss debate faced the radical alternatives 
of a unitary and indivisible republic, or an interstate 
confederation. Some Federalists desired a return to a,,· 
pre~1798 type federation, with aristocratic governments, but 
the majority were reformist in their outlook. By 1815, 
however,.even erstwhile Unitarians had come to advocate a 
federation and agreed with the conservatives to set up the 
Federal Pact. This volte face might seem surprising, but is 
understandable from a strategic point of view, as will be 
explained below. 
The conflict between Swiss Unitarists and Federalists was 
both one of practical politics and of Weltanschauung: the 
pure ideals of the Enlightenment versus tradition. The 
dogmatic faith of both in the validity of their respective 
viewpoints was absolute. As Wild (1966,22) notes: 
The coupling of political thinking with the 
highest ideals of contemporary philosophy is 
so strong, that decisions for or against the 
Helvetic regime are considered not so much a 
matter of political opinion, but are transferred 
more into a matter of personal ethics - indeed 
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into the question of one's very perceptive 
faculty. 
On one side of this political chasm were those arguing 
for the maintenance within Switzerland of the unitary and 
indivisible republic imposed by the French. Though these 
champions of the new order knew they lacked popular support 
(eg.Kuhn,1800,15), they were convinced that the old confederal 
structure was demonstrably flawed. In particular, they 
stressed three aspects [31]. First, they argued that it had 
proved itself to lack the necessary military strength to' 
maintain Switzerland's external security. Second, they 
advanced an economic argument, pointing to the existence in 
the pre-revolutionary system of a range of restrictions to 
internal trade and commerce. The final and most decisive 
consideration was their political opposition to the former 
system, since it contained various categories of second class 
citizens and of subject territories. Unitarians' political 
objections to'federation are epitomised by Kuhn (1800,11), 
who describes the fight of unitarism versus federalism as the 
most important issue of his day.' He says (1800,12f) that 
there are two groups advocating federation. The first is 
headed by 
all those, who Quite openly enter the lists on 
behalf of the old order of things, and hope to 
use their'lance to win back their lost privileges. 
Fighting alongside them are numerous secret 
fighters for the same cause, but who do not 
parade their intentions in front of them like 
the former group. More skilled in their art and 
their politics, they seek to achieve their goal 
via the detour of an apparently wiser willingness 
to compromise. They speak only of a limited 
federation; .•• To these two subdivisions of the 
one and the same political side, the whole heap 
of animal-like creatures of habit attaches itself. 
They consider only that which has always been the 
same to be just •.. and thier intellectual indolence 
prevents them from conceiving of even the 
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possibility of a better social system than 
existed under the old order of things. 
Kuhn (1800,13) categorises the arguments of this whole group 
as "the federalism of privilege" and says that its leaders 
depend upon their mass following among the uneducated for the 
prospect of a return their previous privileges. 
Kuhn (ibid) identifies a second group of federalists, 
which he describes as "the monster of the federalism of 
demagogy" and which is, he maintains led by anarchists who 
want to topple to topple all order, by "modern barbarians ••. 
wild fanatics ••• who bow before their idol, the masses, in 
the hope of thus acquiring for themselves public office." He 
accuses these "opportunitsts· of a hypocritical use of 
patriotism for their own ends and (1814,14) of "sacrificing 
the purpose of social union, namely, civil liberty, to its 
means: political freedom". In short, federation was for 
Unitarians a mechanism created by the formerly privileged 
aristocratic class for the maintenance of its political 
ascendancy and federalism the rationalisation of those 
hierarchical and unequal relations, based upon the 
manipulation of ignorance. Federation was thus something 
which the forces of reason and light were committed to 
eradicate. This was to be achieved by the unitary state, 
which would ensure that the principle of equality was 
everywhere applied [32]. 
On the other side of the Swiss political divide were the 
Federalists, whose federalism was articulated primarily in 
the form of political pamphlets, rather than abstract theory. 
This is understandable for two reasons. First, federalism was 
originally advanced in the context of a lively political 
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dispute. Even less than in Germany was it intended to inform 
a philosophical debate on the nature of the best state. 
During the first few revolutionary years, no integrated 
theory of federalism existed. (An exception is perhaps 
Monneron, who will be examined below.) Only when it proved 
necessary to defend what had previously been taken for 
granted, did such a theory begin to develop. Second, many 
conservative Federalists were motivated by their very 
objection in principle to what they regarded as the 
excessively abstract argumentation of the Unitarians. The 
former were attempting to assert the importance of criteria 
other than pure reason for the organisation of the state 
[33J. However, though most of these writings were not 
developed as fully-fledged theories of federation, they 
nevertheless contain aspects later to be amongst the most 
important constituent parts of such theories. This process of 
a posteriori rationalisation of pre-existing views into a 
theoretical whole (already demonstrated in 2.3.' above in our 
account of the federalism of Puetter) underlines one of 
the main assertions of this thesis: that federalism is best 
seen as a set of partisan responses to different political 
situations and thus as a set of prescriptions intended to 
further specific interests or values. 
The Federalists were concerned that the unitary Helvetic 
state, based upon the principle of majoritarian democracy, 
constituted an arbitrary and potentially absolutist form of 
rule that threatened minority rights. Moreover, Federalists 
were not slow to point out that although Unitarians claimed 
to base their system upon popular sovereignty, the majority 
of the population in fact opposed it [34J. At its simplest, 
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the core argument of the Federalists was therefore the 
defence of intermediate structures between the individual and 
the state [35). 
Behind these practical political considerations lay 
substantial differences between Federalists' and Unitarians' 
philosophies, which reflect the dominant debate of the time 
(see 3.1 above) and an awareness of which is required for a 
full appreciation of the nature and purpose of federalism in 
switzerland at this time. First, Federalists considered the 
unitarians' view of human nature to be over-optimistic, 
failing to recognise man as he really is, warts and all. Thus 
Hoepfner (1801,159) is full of praise for the healthy 
simplicity of a people not not led astray by too much 
abstract reasoning: 
The people in general and especially our 
people, has its own logic. It rarely if ever 
reasons a priori, that is to say, according 
to abstract principles, but draws all its 
conclusions a posteriori, in accordance with 
its own experience. It says very simply: 
previously things were like this, and now 
they're like this. Previously the situation was· 
good or bearable, now it's bad or unbearable 
without going into detail as to why it is 
now like this and not otherwise. 
Second, there was disagreement over the value of 
political diversity. Unitarians argued that rational man's 
equality overrode the superficial peculiarities of local 
custom, while Federalists saw social and political 
diversities as an expression of the uniqueness of man and 
thus to be valued and preserved. Accordingly, the only 
constitution they considered appropriate was one which 
guaranteed the persistence of the structures which enshrined 
those diversities, namely, the cantons. 
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A third important element in the Federalists' position, 
which was again diametrically opposed to the Unitarians' 
beliefs, concerned the former's assertion of the inherent 
value of structures passed down through history. These were 
held not only truly to reflect local conditions and customs, 
but also to be the embodiment of a wisdom that exceeded the 
abstract reasoning of any given group of men [38]. Mallet du 
Pan (1798, cited in Wild,1966,35) gave the following 
definition of what constituted a legitimate institution: 
Every political institution that does not owe 
its origin to violence, nor to fraud, that has 
in no way usurped native national rights, 
against which neither the people, nor a group " 
of the people have objected and which ••• is 
not imposed either by military force or illegal 
tribunals, which lasts from century to century, 
this institutjon rests on the most legal of 
foundations and deserves public respect. 
Such faith in historical experience over abstract principles 
demanded a return to traditional structures. Since Swiss and 
German tradition could be held to consist in the primacy of 
territorial units of rule, exponents of traditionalism in 
both countries naturally felt fully justified in arguing 
that federation was the only constitutional system that 
agreed with tradition and was thus legitimate for the 
country. 
Given their emphasis upon local factors in determining 
the most appropriate constitution, it is not surprising that 
Swiss Federalists were to turn to the theories of 
Montesquieu. That they were less concerned by his rather 
threadbare federal theory and more by other aspects of his 
writings has already been stated above (Chapter 2). It is now 
clear what these other aspects were and why they were so 
attractive for the conservatives, whose opposition to the 
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dogmatic rationalism of the Unitarians meant that what they 
required was not a rival theory based on rationalism, but an 
assertion of the intrinsic pre-eminence of local variety and 
the importance of intermediate structures. Thus the Swiss 
federalists contended, in language that could have been 
Montesquieu's own, that every law, regardless of how 
rational it might appear, "will always remain unfeasible, 
if one does not take account in its particular application 
of the localities, through which Nature has imprinted its 
irradicable stamp on mankind" (Hoepfner,1801,157). 
That the localities happened in the Swiss case to be the 
cantons and that this led to the advocacy of a federation, 
was merely the product of the accidents of Swiss history. The 
principles which the writings of Montesquieu (and especially 
his 1748 Spirit of the Laws) enshrined, were not necessarily 
restricted to protecting only extant territorial structures 
and the corollary of that, namely, territorial federation, 
but could also be used in the defence of guilds, estates and 
other intermediary structures. [37]. 
Fourth, contrary to the Unitarians, Federalists asserted 
a form of patriotism which disputed the liberal nationalists' 
claim to be the sole guardians of the national spirit. 
Federalists .conceived of patriotism as predicated,upon local 
and cantonal loyalties and felt pride in localism. 
A fifth ,important feature of Swiss federalism in this 
early nineteenth century period was that it was organic, 
positing society asa series of natural communities. The 
cornerstone of society was the family. Thus Monneron (1800, 
26) defines the people as "the nation at the hearth". Larger 
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structures were to be built upon, and in accordance'with,-·the 
image of the family. They were to remain small enough to 
enable one to retain an overview and maintain personal·· 
relationships. Like individuals, they-were also to enjoy full 
sovereignty in their own areas of competence and the whole 
was to be built from the bottom up. Not unexpectedly, 
Rousseau was often used in this conext for the general 
principles he articulated about the primacy of local 
communities·and their unique civilising function [38]. 
Having outlined the major features common to early., 
nineteenth-century Swiss federalism, there now follows a more 
detailed consideration of the writings of one of the 
Federalists already cited, namely Monneron, a French-speaking 
Protestant pastor from Waadt. Monneron's federalism (1800) 
contains the elements just identified as characteristic of ' 
conservative federalism. His scepticism about the existence 
of a wholly rational man is manifested in his assertion 
(1800,75) that,while in theory man should make rational 
political decisions, 
he who-looks at experience and who takes into 
account human passions, is not very content 
with this logic; and moreover, he [i.e. the 
allegedly rational citizen] is full of the 
,principle, the need for good laws, but refuses 
the consequences this demands. [39] 
" , 
Monneron's faith in tradition is also evident. Thus he 
asks rhetorically (1800,18) "Why does one not want to 
recognise that history is an infinitely surer guide than 
theories, and experience a better source of instruction than 
constitutional principles?". He also shares with fellow 
Federalists a rejection of the Unitarians' approach to 
patriotism. For Honneron, proper and natural patriotism is to 
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be found in everyone recognising his own place and the place 
of his neighbour in the social and political whole, and in 
being committed with love and sacrifice to one's own canton. 
"Local structures, individual relations, the conveniences of 
the -individual are surely .•• the surest guarantors of 
patriotism" (1800,132). On the other hand, one should not 
confuse this support for local loyalties with an irrational 
traditionalism. Monneron proposes that cantona~ boundaries 
should be redrawn so that they have the same number of 
inhabitants and that this balance should be recreated every 
fifty years (1800,96 & 117f) [40]. 
Monneron is one of the most profound exponents of Swiss 
federalism in the 1798 to 1803 period, though there has been 
some disagreement about his intentions and significance. Some 
believe him to have been writing in support of an interstate 
federation, while others see the prime significance of his 
work to lie in his advocacy of the application of an 
American-style federal state to Switzerland. A third view is 
that Monneron is advancing nothing less than a new theory of 
the state, aspects of which have much in common with 
contemporary Christian social theory and, in particular, with 
its principle of "subsidiarity" [41]. 
He is singled out here for a number of reasons. First, 
his writings constitute one of the most articulate and well 
developed examples of conservative federalism. While this 
makes him less than typical of the body of conservative 
federalism of his day, that atypicality is more than 
compensated for by the the second reason for his inclusion in 
this thesis. Monneron's writings were very influential; many 
of his arguments were to be articulated and developed further 
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in later conservative federalism. It has also been suggested 
(His,1920,88f) that Napoleon's decision to replace the 
unitary Helvetic Republic by the Mediation was influenced by 
his reading of Monneron • 
Though Monneron's federalism is conservative, the 
political situation of Swiss conservatives during the 
Helvetic Republic means that it cannot be based upon the kind 
of positivism Puetter employed, for that would necessitate an 
acceptance of the extant unitary state. Instead, Monneron's 
federalism is a good example of conservative federalism 
predicated upon an alternative natural law theory to that of 
the liberal" unitarians. For Monneron, all states ought to be 
organised in accordance with the higher values of law, , 
morality-and religion and he ses this as possible only in a 
state created from the bottom up with the building-blocks of 
of citizen, communes, cantons and the republic. The principle 
he seeks to have established regarding the division of 
authority between these levels is (1800,41) that which says 
that higher associations are'only entitled to fulfil those 
duties for which the lesser have proved themselves-'inadequate. 
Indeed, he describes the process by which individual 
families and the ·individual communes came to unite as a 
federalisingprocess (1800,42). This sounds very familiar to 
some'of'the' ideas of Althusius, a correspondence which might 
be related to the-fact that Monneron is aware of the former's 
work, as a reference to it indicates (1800,27). 
Thus Monneron's federalism is advanced not only as an 
instrumental expedient, but as a basic principle of political 
and social organisation, "one of the pillars .•• " on which 
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the state rests (1800,41f). He says 
Some families'live dispersed, within separate 
territories, their mutual needs unite them in 
a common interest, ,this federal process makes 
them into a commune. Certain communes place 
some of their interests together and the federal 
process makes of these a canton. 
He then (1800,42) asks rhetorically:. 
Why stop its benificent march here? Could 
[sic federation] not bring to the higher levels 
of the social order the advantages that the 
primary associations derive from it? May 
familial liberty have no limits other than 
those specified by the commune; may the liberty 
of the commune only be ~onstrained by the 
interest of the canton; finally, may the canton 
only give up that part of its independence which 
the general well-being of the country requires 
it to sacrifice: This, it appears .to me, provides 
the greatest amount of liberty which a wise 
people can desire to posess. 
Monneron is adamant that federation ought not to be 
associated with political reaction, arguing (1800,40)'by 
reference to a range of examples, that it is a proven 
"bastion-of liberty" and a-scourge of tyranny. He (1800,49) 
quotes Montesquieu's assertion that federation-provides a 
means of combining individual and local freedom with national 
security. He is full-of his admiration-of the United States 
experience, though his knowledge thereof appears to be dated 
["2] • 
Monneron's proposed Swiss federation is to have a 
"Council of State" with two deputies per.canton. The Chamber 
is to be presided over in turn by one of two chairmen 
( "landamann" ), elected by the cantons and. Fede ra 1 execut i ve 
authority is to be exercised by senates, though it is not 
clear whether these are to be additional to those that 
already exist in in~the cantons (1800il10-13). He says the 
following· (1800,85) of the division of powers between the 
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centre and the cantons ("provinces"); 
What part ought to be left to the provinces 
in the division of sovereign authority? 
Everything they need in order to successfully 
take care of the details of internal administra-
tion. And the part that ought to be accorded to 
the state? That measure of power appropriate for 
it to fulfill the task entrusted to it: the 
security and the preservation of the whole. The 
latter seeks to ••• avert external dangers; the 
former [ie the powers left to the provinces] 
seek to ensure that the individual does not get 
lost in the multitude, and estab1ises good 
internal order. Their power, determined clearly 
enough by the nature of their functions, ought 
thus to be proportionate to their importance and 
their goal ..• (1800,109) The freedom of a canton 
is limited only by the interest of other cantons, 
that of a commune not by the interest of other 
" communes, that of the individual only by the 
welfare of the whole. 
In short, both the cantons and the centre are to remain 
sovereign. As Monneron (1800113-19) puts it, "I envisage a 
single republic, which is nonetheless federal". What this 
means is considerably more military, political and economic 
centralisation than existed before 1798. Apart from the usual 
powers over peace and war and the monopoly over foreign 
treaties, the central power is to supervise military matters 
via a "chef du departement" and a ,"Commissaire Inspecteur" 
located in each canton. Redrawing cantonal boundaries every 
fifty years is also to be undertaken by the Council of State. 
Monneron also invests the central authority with powers in a 
range of economic matters, including regulating a common 
monetary system, tolls and common weights and measures. 
Finally, he talks about two commissioners being appointed by 
each canton to regulate political rights and duties, albeit 
in an unspecified manner. 
On balance, it appears Monneron is advocating for 
Switzerland an intrastate-territorial federation 
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characterised by what Hugo termed "double rule" (see 2.2. 
above). But Monneron's federalism does more. Federation is 
prescribed not only for the Swiss state, but also (1800,41) 
as a general principle of social and political organisation, 
which he is keen to see adopted in all states. In other 
words, Monneron's federalism envisages not only an intrastate 
-territorial federation, but also sUb-state federations of 
families, and of communes. Finally, Monneron's federalism, 
though conservative, is definitely not reactionary. Instead, 
it is imbued with a moderate form of rationalism and 
Monneron can thus perhaps best be classified as what Epstein 
(1966,7f) refers to as a "reform conservative". 
The last conservative exponent of federalism to be 
examined here is Karl Ludwig Haller, who was a member of a 
previous ruling family of Bernese patricians and has a 
reputation as one of the most strident of reactionaries. His 
later views do indeed deserve this label, but since they were 
articulated most forcefully only after 1815, they will be 
considered in Chapter 5. This section will focus on the 
federalism in Haller's earlier political writings. These do 
not merit the description "reactionary". We shall look at 
three of his works in particular. The first is a draft 
constitution for Berne, published in March 1798 (Hilty, 
1896a), but never implemented, because of the French 
invasion. The second is Haller's 1799 draft Swiss federal 
constitution (Haller,1801,553-84 & Amtliche Sammlung,1892,4, 
1268-81) and the third his 1801 ideas on what - in view of 
the Austrian army's retreat from Switzerland and the 
concomitant consolidation of French rule - was then the most 
appropriate Swiss constitution (Haller,1801,esp.520-43). 
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The significance of the 1798 draft constitution for Berne 
has been claimed to be twofold (Hi1ty,1896a,190f). First, it 
has been described as one of the earliest complete liberal 
draft cantonal constitutions. Second, it has been labelled 
the first ever such draft predicated upon the assumption of a 
Swiss federal state. Its liberality is very qualified. 
Haller's preamble (Hi1ty,1896a,271) states that the 'draft is 
to be subjected to a popular referendum, and speaks about 
"the abolition of all previous privileges of birth, 
inequality of rights and titles denoting these". There are 
some liberal provisions, such as the freedoms of speech and 
the press (Hilty,1896a,273). However, examination of all '259 
articles leaves no doubt that the structures proposed 
restrict political rights to a small and closed group [43]. 
One might conclude that at this stage in the development of 
his political views, Haller is neither a liberal, nor the 
reactionary he is later to become. Since the draft 
constitution amounts to an extension of the political rights 
that currently existed in Berne, one could conclude that 
Haller's proposals are an example of reformist conservatism, 
albeit with a-more pronounced conservative flavour than 
Monneron. 
This is interesting in view of Hilty's second assertion, 
namely that this was the first ever draft cantonal 
constitution predicated upon the assumption of a Swiss 
federal state. Whether it really was the first is beyond our 
ability to judge and ultimately not significant for this 
thesis. However, 'whether it was based upon the>idea of Berne 
being a constituent unit of a Swiss federal state ;s 
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relevant, for if so,, that would mean that a conservative 
. 
federalist was advocating intrastate federation. Article 216 
of the draft (Hi1ty,1896a,336) states the following: 
Conditional upon the will of the majority [sic 
of cantonal p1enipoteniaries'at a National 
Congress] the previous union will be reformed 
more closely and tightly, the previous 
dependencies - in accordance with their own 
wishes - will either be raised to independent 
states~ or joined to adjacent independent-
republics, ••• or else the whole of Switzerland 
will be united into a single republic under its 
own legislative and administrative structures. 
The significance of this article is clear. Haller's draft is 
written on the assumption that Berne is to be a member of a 
Swiss federation. Moreover, he is clearly prepared to 
countenance both an interstate federation and an intrastate 
federation. 
However, the French invasion put paid to both options. By 
1799, the situation has changed again, with French forces 
seemingly facing defeat by conservative Austria. Haller 
thereupon unites with other conservatives to compile a rough 
first draft of a Swiss federal constitution [44]. In the 
introduction, Haller says the draft is based upon a 
widespread desire for the recreation of separate cantons 
with their own constitutions. On the other hand, the old 
Confederation's lack of an effective central authority, means 
that its external unity had been nominal rather than real. 
The majority could not force decisions and even unanimous 
decisions, were not implementable. Haller (1799,1269) 
concludes that all insightful Swiss statesmen recognise it 
to be necessary 
that in the likely event of its reconstruction, . 
this old confederation (Staatenbund) would have 
to be bound together somewhat more firmly .•. and 
thus a more-or-1ess permanent confedera1 Federal 
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Council be set up to represent the whole of Swit-
zerland externally, to guarantee every part of 
Switzerland the advantages of the common union, 
to maintain justice between all internally, to 
defend the right of all against outsiders, to 
conduct the forces of the whole federation at 
times of internal danger or external attack, and 
even in normal times to execute the common will, 
and pursue common advantages. 
Haller's 1799 draft therefore relates in the main to the 
composition, organisation and functioning of the proposed 
central authority (the Federal Councilor "Bundes-Rath"). It 
is to comprise 17 cantonal deputies elected by and from 
cantonal governments, with one each for all 13 former cantons 
and for St. Gallen, Wallis and Graubuenden - which are to be 
invited to join'the confederation as full members - and one 
shared between Sie1, Geneva, and Neuchatel and elected by 
them in rotation. The co-dominions are not to be raised to 
cantonal status, but become subject territories of the whole 
federation. Federal Council deputies' term of office is 
normally for life, but they may, at cantonal discretion, be 
appointed for a fixed term, or recalled. 
The Federal Council appoints four standing committes, one 
each for the foreign, military, domestic and economic 
affairs. It also elects from its midst a President for life. 
He appoints a Secretary of State, who then proposes for the 
President's ratification four Under-Secretaries of State, who 
will each administer a standing committee. Reports are 
required from the latter prior to any important decisions. 
"Since the creation of the Federal Council is in no way 
meant to impinge upon the separate existence, constitution 
and government of the cantons, •.• its powers are to be 
limited ... " (1799,1271). They include first, the conduct of 
only those aspects of foreign affairs that are common to all 
175 
cantons, such as the negotiation of treaties and alliances 
and declaration and conduct of war; second, protecting the 
constitution and government of each canton and intervening 
militarily in their support only when so requested by them; 
third, arbitration between cantons; fourth, administration of 
the co-dominions and of common confederal property, and 
fifth, the creation, supervision and supply of a confederal 
army. Haller (1799,1271f) says that in the promotion of the 
general welfare of the federation, the Federal Council may 
legislate on other matters such as ending barriers to the 
transport of foodstuffs, promoting intercantonal co-operation 
in police and judicial affairs, introducing common coinage, 
weights and measures, but stresses that all such legislation 
requires the consent of the relevant cantons (1799,1271f). 
The cantons are thus to remain sovereign and may only be 
coerced to fulfil their federal constitutional obligations in 
times of external threat to the federation. Otherwise, the 
final sanction available to the Federal Council is limited 
to expulsion (1799,1275f). The centre's fiscal powers remain 
limited; cantons determine the size of their own financial 
contributions (1799,1276ff). Constitutional revision may be 
debated only every 25 years and required a 2/3 majority 
(1799,1281). 
What Haller's proposals amount to is an interstate 
federation of sovereign territorial units for the limited 
common purposes of external and internal protection. Overall, 
the plan is clearly designed to resurrect, in modified form, 
the conservative cantonal political structures of the 
pre-179B system though it does contain a few proposals for 
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modest liberalisation.In"this 1799 draft,-Haller-is one of 
the first writers of the Helvetic Republic to criticise the 
shortcomings of the old Confederation and to argue for a 
closer union of the cantons to enable the federation to 
fulfil its purpose. However, there is no evidence that Haller 
is still prepared to countenance what a year earlier his draft 
constitution for Berne had considered possibile, namely, a 
Swiss intrastate federation. 
Yet two years later, with Austria defeated by France, 
Haller recognises the need to come to terms with the likely 
persistence of a united Switzerland, arguing that one has to 
"accept that conditions are no longer the same •.• and 
proceed on the basis of the possible and what exits" '(1801 
523f). What this means is another radical shift in Haller's 
federalism~ He now (1801,523) speaks not of a constitution, 
but of a "Peace Treaty". This covers three broad areas, 
dealt with in three "articles": the structure and function of 
central and cantonal government; the internal cantonal 
political structures; and policy areas. We shall take these 
in turn. 
While in 1799 he argued for Swiss political reconstruction 
via the cantonal governments, the first "article" of Haller's 
Peace Treaty (1801,538f) now allocates this task to the-
central power. Nor is this purely a procedural nicety, for 
There is to be or remain in Switzerland only 
one supreme government and none other that is 
completely independent; it will exculsively 
administer all common matters, and even more 
matters are to be entrusted to it than is 
appropriate in the spirit of the old Confede-
ration, or in the nature of a strict union of 
free states; In the interests "of peace~ 
that is essential (1801,~24) 
The supreme government ... , as it were the 
sovereign for the whole of Switzerland, could 
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••• proceed from the current government; when 
'it is at last better composed,' has expanded to 
include more members, drafted its own constitution 
and reserved to itself certain taxes or incomes, 
it would, under a President, constitute the first 
Swiss Council of State. (1801,527) 
In other words, 'Switzerland is no long~r to be an interstate 
federation.' Central government powers are no longer to be 
limited to foreign relations and internal security and 
arbitration. 
It can, without misgivings, be given other powers 
such as, for example, coinage, exclusive powers 
over conscription, public monopolies, the setting-
up of institutions for general welfare, ... and 
more powers of coercion over the cantons (1801,541f) 
Of the the cantons themselves, Haller (1801,526) now says: 
each canton receives back, even if not sovereignty, 
at least its own existence and a constitution 
appropriate to its own needs and commensurate 
with its customs, as well as its own property, 
incomes and rights. Thereby it constitutes a part 
of the whole, but also a whole in itself and can 
pursue its own welfare on the basis of its own 
judgement. 
Largely under the rubric of the second "article" of the 
Peace Treaty, Haller (1801,530-5, b'ut cf 526f also) makes a 
number of suggestions about the'interna1 political structure 
and operation of the cantons. What these amount to (Haller, 
1801,530f) is an appeal to the central government for'a 
just and tolerable accommodation between the very 
numerous old ruling class and those who have now 
achieved power ... [sic The latter] have retained 
their claims - if not for sovereignty - at least 
for existence and private property. Without a just 
settlement, they are bound to remain sworn enemies 
of the new system ' 
There follows (1801,532f) a rationalisation of why the 
previous ruling class be entrusted with ruling the cantons 
under the new system and an offer to co-opt into the ruling 
class all those previously excluded, but who have demonstrated 
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their abilities. He also (1801,534) calls for restoration to 
the cities of their "rightful property, lands and incomes, 
even where these lie beyond the city walls", or at worst 
compensation. In "article three" Haller ,(1801,535-8) makes 
further suggestions, which amount to an appeal to defend or 
restore the rights of the propertied classes. Despite this 
wealth of suggestions and tough sounding statements, it is 
clear that Haller realises that conservatives"are in no 
position to determine even the internal\political structures 
of the cantons. Lest anyone should be left in any doubt, he 
makes plain that the status he is proposing for the canton is 
very different from that which he advocated in 1799. Their 
constitutions, "which would now be merely a type of 
provincial constitution" would have to be sumitted to'central 
government for ratification (1801,539). 
So in 1801, under the pressure of circumstances, Haller's 
federalism advocates the construction of a much more tightly 
united Switzerland than in 1799. The codominions are given 
independent cantonal status, though cantons are no longer 
sovereign states. The central authority is entitled to use 
coercion to force cantons to fulfil their obligations, and 
also has much wider fiscal powers. There are a number of 
aspects that remain uncertain. For example, Haller (1801,541) 
leaves open the question of how and indeed of whether cantons 
are formally represented in the centre. 
He tentatively proposes (1801,527-30) that the new state 
be called "Switzerland" or the "Republic of Switzerland", but 
finds it difficult to come to any conclusion about the nature 
of the governmental system he has outlined. He says (1801, 
529) that it would be neither a federal system - since it is 
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not composed of independent states - nor a unitary system. He 
concludes that Switzerland would merely become "that which 
under present circumstances is possible and desirable, 
namely, endowed with a simple, natural order. which unites 
all parts for communal purposes under a single head". Yet 
in a footnote (1801,529f) he goes on to say: 
Inasmuch as one understands a federal system 
. to mean simply diversity and appropriate 
differences, this exists in all states and is 
for all that compatible with reasonable unity, 
whether it goes under the title federation 
(Bund) or supreme authority (Oberherrschaft). 
the essential difference between supporters 
of the so-called unitary system and the 
so-called federal system (Verbuendungssystem) 
lies merely in the fact that the former proceed 
from the assumption of •. : the exisiting unity 
and thereafter permit the cantons certain rights, 
while the latter group proceed from the pre-
existence of the separate parts and then concede, 
certain rights to the general government in order 
to enable an appropriate unity of the whole. 
Since we are talking here just about a matter of 
degree and preambles are in the final analysis· 
irrelevant, one can see that freedom ••. would 
be accomplishable if one engaged in realities 
more and argued with words less. 
< 
Though Haller (1801,529,) is obviously reluctant to 
conceive of unions other than the interstate variety as 
federations and thus hestitates to term the system he has 
outlined a federation, his proposals would have created an 
intrastate, territorial federation such as emerged in 1803 
with the Mediation. Perhaps the extant conflict between 
Federalists and Unitarians was yet too severe for him fully 
to accept the concept of a possible mid-way solution between 
a federation of sovereign states and the unitary state. 
However. in practice that is precisely what he had advocated. 
Paradoxically, the later arch reactionary was in 1801 
articulating a federalism that was very similar to the 
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compromise formula of the Mediation. 
The sharp political cleavage during the Helvetic Republic 
between Federalists and outright Unitarians was considerably 
attenuated during the Mediation, which both sides regarded as 
an advance, only to flare up again in 1813. Interestingly, 
both groups now availed themselves of federalism. While this 
was to be expected from the conservatives, it is worth noting 
that the tenor of that federalism had altered. It was now 
increasingly less rational and more outspokenly conservative, 
or even reactionary. This change was to become more 
pronounced in the 1815 to 1848 period - and especially after 
1830 - as conservatism came to be politically on the 
defensive (see Chapter 5 below). 
The final task of this section will be to examine the 
, . 
paradoxical conversion of erstwhile Unitarians to federalism. 
Foremost amongst the reasons for this were the political 
exigencies the liberal unitarians faced. The Mediation had 
re-established cantonal autonomy and elevated to the status 
of full cantons previous dependencies su~h as Aargau and 
Waadt, which had come to be in the vanguard of Swiss 
liberalism. Some Unitarians therefore came to value cantonal 
independence, since this provided them with a political base 
from which to realise their liberal aspirations [45). 
The downfall of Napoleon brought about two threats to the 
liberals. First, they increasingly saw themselves dependent 
upon the good will of the victorious allies, whose opposition 
to the rationalist principles of the liberal Enlightenment 
was beyond doubt. A second but similar threat came from the 
more self-confident Swiss conservatives, many of whom began 
to call for a return to the pre-1798 conditions. The demand 
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by Berne for the re-establishment not only of its old 
aristocratic constitution, but also of its rights over its 
previous dependencies of Aargau and Waadt, was the catalyst 
for a new constitutional struggle. Aargau and Waadt liberals 
were naturally vehemently opposed to losing their newfound 
cantonal status and with it the liberal political and social 
rights they had managed to establish. 
Accordingly, the real issue underlying the constitutional 
debates of 1813-15 was, as Nabholz (1918,22f) states, 
primarily whether aristocratic and unequal structures of the 
pre-revolutionary system should be restored, or the liberal 
advances retained. The various constitutional prescriptions 
have to be seen as means to these rival ends. That liberal 
nationalists changed from being outright opponents of even 
intrastate federation, to advocates of the establishment of 
the interstate federation of 1815, is therefore not the 
contradiction it seems, but is the direct consequence of 
their radically altered political situation and thus also 
their political strategy. 
As Wild (1966,62f) concludes, though the Federal Pact has 
often been presented as a bulwark of conservatism, it was at 
the time seen as a compromise; the goals of both the liberals 
and the conservatives appeared to be best achieved by means 
of such a federation. Thus for their part, the conservatives 
achieved the restoration of old cantonal and aristocratic 
rights, albeit at the cost of recognising the principle of 
the equality of the territorial units of the federation. The 
advantage of the Federal Pact for the previous subject 
territories was that it gave them the status of full members 
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of the Confederation, which meant that their internal 
political independence was now just as much guaranteed as 
that of the conservative cantons. Despite being primarily 
liberal cantons, these ex-dependencies were from 1815 
therefore just as entitled as the conservative cantons to 
maintain their political principles and practices. Though the 
cost of these new-found rights was that the liberals had to 
give up their demands for immediate liberalisation of the 
whole country, they were in due course able to use their 
cantonal strongholds as bases from which to launch the 
liberal "Regeneration" (see Chapters 4.2 and 6 below). It can 
thus be argued that in the long run, the post-1815 Swiss 
federation proved to be strategically less advantageous for 
the philosophically perhaps more committed conservatives, 
than for the liberals, whose commitment to federation was, at 
least initially, opportunist. 
Since the liberals' conversion to federalism was 
principally based on tactical considerations and many 
retained their faith in the desirability of the unitary state 
as an ideal, it is hardly surprising that they were even less 
inclined than the conservatives to develop integrated 
theories in support of federation. Nor, since the Helvetic 
Republic was associated in the public mind with invasion, 
defeat and occupation by foreign armies, was there open 
advocacy of a return to a unitary system. Most liberals now 
limited their demands to a call for a return to the 
Mediation and greater centralisation was now proposed mainly 
in terms of its advantages for warding off external threats 
[41]. Though liberalism was undeniably on the defensive, a 
small proportion of the liberal federalism of this period 
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was still quite outspokenly liberal. One of the best 
examples is an 1814 essay by Escher and Usteri (47J. 
The pamphlet is directed at the victorious Allied 
governments, and particularily at the German states and 
constitutes an attempt to influence their deliberations about 
the future shape of the Swiss federation. Escher and Usteri 
argue that it is in the long-term interests of the Allies to 
ensure that the Swiss federation not be composed, as Swiss 
conservative federalists wish, of aristocratically governed 
units. They contend that the majority of the people is for 
democratic structures and would, if Austria were to force 
the re-establishment of the pre-1798 aristocratic order, in 
due course mobilise against it. The Swiss would then 
naturally be driven into the arms of the French. In short, 
their argument (1814,11) is that only by ensuring that 
Switzerland receives a constitution corresponding to the 
liberal wishes of the Swiss people can stability be 
guaranteed . 
Escher and Usteri (1814,12) propose a federation largely 
similar to the "Bundesstaat" set up by the Act of Mediation. 
They wish to return to its political equality and democratic 
structures, but advocate certain constitutional ammendments. 
At the federal level, the government is to be equipped with 
sufficient military and diplomatic powers to enable it 
effectively to implement a policy of armed neutrality. There 
is also to be an extension of fiscal powers, in view of the 
need to finance the (unspecified) greater range of policies 
required of the federation as a whole. The pamphlet (1814,12-
14) asserts that it is in the national interest for 
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cantonal constitutions to be obliged to conform to certain 
common constitutional principles such as political equality 
and popular government, though there is recognition of the 
utility of differences in the detailed provisions of each 
constitution, in order to permit the reflection of cantonal 
peculiarities. 
Escher and Usteri (1814,7f & 14f) also address the issue 
of the place which Switzerland should assume in the new 
European states system to be established. They stress the 
importance of Switzerland's pursuit of a policy of armed 
neutrality, but interestingly also introduce the idea of 
Switzerland joining a federation with Germany. The nature of 
that federation in not fully developed. There is a proposal 
that switzerland unite its military strength with the German 
Staatenbund, which might amount to not much more than a 
military alliance. However, there is then (1814,15) talk of a 
"free ••• union of the strong ••• Swiss Confederation with 
the German Bundesstaat". The reasons advanced for the federal 
union include that it would allow Switzerland to return to 
its Noriginal fatherland" (1814,14). However, it is difficult 
to judge from the pamphlet whether the proposal was meant 
seriously, or is an example of a deferential attitude to the 
German members of the Allied powers, with a view to enhancing 
the prospects of the decision regarding the future Swiss 
constitution being favourable to the ideas of the authors. 
To sum up, Escher and Usteri's federalism envisages 
switzerland as an intrastate federation of the existing 
cantonal units, possibly as part of a greater German 
interstate federation. The proposers are clearly motivated by 
nationalism, as well as by a commitment to liberalism. Thus 
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the appeal starts with a quote accusing counterrevolution of 
constituting a narrow, base approach which puts family or 
guild prerogatives before municipal interests, places city 
interests prior to those of the canton and neglects to take 
into account the honour and well-being of the fatherland 
and the essential sense of patriotic community (1814,title 
page). The pamphlet's commitments to political equality, 
popular and constitutional government (1814,14) and its 
affirmation of the principle of no taxation without 
representation (1814,10) all indicate that its federalism is 
motivated by a desire to promote political liberalism. 
Escher and Usteri's willingness to be candid about their 
liberal aspirations makes their federalism different from 
that of most of their liberal contemporaries. Most liberal 
federalism was much more disingenuous. A good example is that 
of Rengger, previously one of the most radical of Unitarians 
and the holder of high public office in the Helvetic 
Republic. His pamphlet was motivated by his opposition to 
Berne's demands for the restoration of its rule over Aargau 
and Thurgau, and most of it is in devoted to this dispute 
(1814,15-55). Not surprisingly, Rengger concludes that these 
cantons should not resume the status of Bernese dependencies. 
Rengger's federalism is arguably at least as significant 
for what it does not say about the purpose of the Swiss 
federation - namely the preservation of liberal cantons - as 
for the arguments it actually advances (1814,3-15). He states 
(1814,4) that though the impending Great Powers' guarantee of 
Switzerland might appear to make a stronger central government 
unnecessary, it is shortsighted to base a constitution on 
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external guarantees. He considers it to be in both Swiss and 
Allied interest that the new constitution provide for greater 
Swiss unity and strength. Rengger (1814,6) says that the 
essential purpose of federation is external defence and the 
prime arguments he advances for more centralisation are thus 
of a military nature. He calls for greater central powers in 
military and foreign affairs and argues the logical corollary 
of this to be greater financial resources for the centre. To 
achieve this, he proposes (1814,7-9) that coinage and postage 
become federal matters. 
Rengger (1814,5 & 12) advocates the construction of a 
federation broadly similar to that of the Mediation and in 
any event no more centralised than the United States. The 
Diet is to remain the federation's legislative body and the 
executive is to be located in a Federal Council elected in 
rotation by the cantons. One of the few occasions on which 
Rengger allows his liberal political convictions to become 
visible is when he opposes Diet instruction voting (1814,9f) 
on the grounds that this prevents free deabte and hence 
militates against the most rational decision being reached. 
Aware that any centralisation will be resisted by the 
small, conservative cantons, he argues that they will not 
suffer from greater centralisation, but will in fact benefit 
disproportionally. Accordingly, he asserts (1814,9) that 
Whatever the boundaries of the federal authority 
might be, it must be independent regarding all 
matters within that boundary and what it decides 
must be binding for the cantons and not require 
their assent. The cantons must relinquish a part 
of their sovereignty in order to exercise the rest 
more securely. 
It is clear from the pamphlet that Rengger is not too 
optimistic about the conservative cantons accepting his 
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proposals for a more centralised federation. Accordingly, he 
. 
argues (1814,15) that the worst solution would be a mixed 
constitution (i.e. one which tried to accommodate both 
interstate and intrastate structures) and so if there is no 
agreement on establishing wh~t he'co~sidersan adequate 
federal power, Rengger prefers the Swiss to revert to "pure 
,-:;. 
federal ism" [sic federation], where II ••• every canton remains 
in full possession of its autonomy. Then at least some ••. 
will be able to conduct a wise ••• administration; .•. ". The 
weaker central authority would be located in the hands of a 
single directoral canton (1814,16), and in times of danger, 
the common fatherland would have to rely upon the "benevolent 
protection" of a "higher destiny" (1Sj4,15). 
In short, Rengger would prefer to see Switzerland as an 
intrastate federation of territorial units with liberal 
constitutions and pursuing liberal policies. However, 
recognising that this is an unrealistic ~spiration in the 
existing political climate, he restricts himself to calling 
for greater centralisation for military reasons and 'does not 
make any stipulations about liberal constitutionalism and· 
popular political rights, though his commitment to these is 
implicit in his attack upon conservative and aristocratic 
Berne. Indeed, Rengger argues that if it proves impossible to 
have the kind of minimal intrastate federation he has 
outlined, it would be best to revert to an interstate 
federation. The reasons for this are clear, for he is keen 
that the few liberal cantons, not be faced with a strong 
conservative federal authority which can inter.vene to .stop 
cantonal liberalisation. 
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Like Rengger, most liberals were less concerned with the 
structures of the new Bund, than with the preservation of the 
new cantons and political and social rights. They would have 
preferred the latter to have been guaranteed for all Swiss in 
, 
the context of a nation-state. However, this never looked 
likely to be forthcoming. Moreover, had a single Swiss state 
based upon popular sovereig'nty been established at that time, 
the likelihood is that it would have returned a conservative 
central government. This explains why liberals not only 
advocated federation, but why the federation they sought was 
to guarantee the most extensive cantonal rights of se1f-
determination regarding internal matters. 
, . 
, Since the Federal Pact provided for precisely such 
cantonal sovereignty over internal matters, whilst extending 
. . 
military centralisation, it is obvious why some conservatives 
could regard the Pact as a capitulation in favour of the 
liberals. Nonetheless, this provides an interesting paradox, 
since' at the very beginning of the century, it was 1 ibera1 
unitarians such as Kuhn (1800) who had held federation to be 
a betrayal of their cause to the advantage of conservative 
forces. However, to pursue this further at this point would 
be to venture into'the material of Chapter 5, before which 
this thesis must still summarise 'the developments in Germanic 
federalism up to the Congress of Vienna. 
3.4. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In Chapter 1, it was stated that the prime aim of this 
chapter was to identify the dimensions of Germanic federalism 
articulated during the revolutionary Napoleonic period, but 
189 
that it would also be concerned to illustrate the political 
uses made of that federalism. Having completed our analysis 
of Germanic federalism from the 1790s until 1815, the 
intention in these concluding remarks is twofold. First, we 
shall summarise our findings regarding the nature of Germanic 
federalism in the period under discussion. Second. we shall 
emphasise its political usage. 
When considering the findings of this chapter regarding 
the nature of Germanic federalism from the 1790s until 1815, 
three aspects will be mentioned. These are first, the types, 
or "dimensions· of federalism it contained, second, the 
manner in which they were articulated and third, how the 
various contributors to Germanic federalism distinguished 
between federations. 
As regards the first of these factors, the preceding 
account has shown that from the 1790s to 1815, four of the 
five dimensions previously identified in this thesis as 
constituting the tradition of early Germanic federalism (see 
Figure 1 above) were articulated. Of these, the intrastate-
confederal type was discussed most frequently. Given the 
nature of the pre-1798 Swiss federation and the Mediation 
constitution, as well as of the Reich and the Rheinbund, it 
is hardly surprising that all the federal isms covered 
included references to confederation. Despite the at times 
confusing variety of terminology used in the literature, this 
chapter has been able to show that intrastate-territorial 
federation was also widely mentioned. With the exception of 
Swiss Unitar;sts such as Kuhn and possibly Fichte, all the 
federal isms we have examined conceived of intrastate-
territorial federation. On the other hand, though they too 
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continued to be articulated, the remaining two types of 
federation were not widely referred to. The federalism we 
have termed intrastate-imperial was predictably not advanced 
in republican Switzerland, but in only in Germany (eg. 
Goerres). Finally interstate-chiliastic federalism was also 
present, as the writings of Fichte and 8ehr indicate. 
The second aspect of Germanic federalism during the 
revolutionary Napoleonic period which these concluding 
comments will address concerns the manner in which it was 
expressed. As has been shown in considerable detail, Germanic 
federalism was articulated in a wide range of different 
registers and at different intellectual levels. Amongst the 
liberals who referred to federation, the language employed 
ranges from the legalistic pragmatism of Zachariae, through 
the guarded, almost disingenuous, federalism of Rengger, to 
to the polemic opposition to federation by Swiss Unitarians 
such as Kuhn and the transcendental idealism of Fichte. For 
their part, conservatives also varied considerably in the 
manner in which they expressed their federalism. The 
positivism of Leist defends·the status quo in a federalism 
characterised by a dry, measured legalism. Meanwhile, 
reactionary conservatives such as Goerres put forward their 
federalism in an emotive and mystical Romantic historicism 
which frequently defies comprehension. On the other hand, 
Monneron articulates his federalism in the moderately 
rational language of a reformist conservative. 
Federalism was utilised in both countries for the 
, 
classification of previous and extant federations, as well as 
for the prescription of new federations. Before looking at 
191 
the latter aspect, this summary of the findings of this 
chapter concerning Germanic federalism will conclude by 
recalling the manner in which the exponents of Germanic 
federalism distinguished between the different types of 
federation they considered [48). 
In Germany and as in Switzerland, the main focus of the 
empirical debate was of course the political structures of 
their respective federations, which changed considerably 
during the relevant period. With the notable exception of 
Zachariae, who held the Reich to have been merely an 
interstate confederation, most students of German imperial 
law (Brie,1874,28ff) adopted Puetter's classification (as 
repeated by Leist), to the effect that the Reich was an 
intrastate federation. Almost all serious students of the 
Rheinbund quickly concluded that the latter was unquestionably 
an interstate confederation. In Switzerland, there was little 
doubt about the nature of either the pre-17gB confederation, 
or the unitary Helvetic Republic, though there were debates 
over the nature of the intrastate federation established by 
the Mediation constitution. 
In view of this shared background of rapid change between 
interstate and intrastate federation, it is not surprising 
that both the attempts by Germanic federalism to classify 
federations, and the disputes as to the nature of the most 
appropriate federation centred on the distinction between 
interstate confederations and intrastate-territorial 
federations. Though there are some differences in how this 
was done by German and Swiss federal isms (49), the criteria 
employed were analagous. They related in the main to three 
issues. 
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One important issue was the extent of the central 
authority's power. The exercise by the central authority of 
coercion against the constitutent units of the federation was 
widely considered characteristic of both simple states and 
intrastate federations, but incompatible with interstate 
federation. However, there was some disagreement as to 
whether intrastate federations could legitimately interfere 
in the internal affairs of their constituent territorial 
units of rule. A second issue was the nature of the central 
federal authority. Germany's monarchical tradition caused 
some German exponents of federalism to argue that where 
central authority was embodied in a human being, the union 
was a state, federal or otherwise. By contrast, interstate 
federations were deemed to be distinguished by the absence 
of such a person. In republican Switzerland, this second 
issue was reflected in, for example, the discussion on 
whether the central authority was permanent, or (as in the 
case of the Vorort), rotated. 
The third major criterion used by Germanic federalism to 
distinguish between interstate and intrastate federations 
related to their formal purposes. Most writers agreed that 
the formal purposes of interstate federations were limited to 
security from external threat. However, there was disagreement 
over the purposes of intrastate federations as compared to 
simple states. The latter were held to have the extensive 
purpose of guaranteeing all internal rights, including those 
of both individual subjects and of corporate actors. Attempts 
to apply this principle to intrastate federations naturally 
led to the above mentioned issue of the permissable extent of 
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central authority intervention in constitutent states of such 
federations. This chapter has also shown that national unity 
increasingly came to be seen as an important purpose of 
federation. While Behr argues that this can only be achieved 
through an interstate federation, that was not a widely held 
opinion. Indeed, national unity was increasingly held to 
require at the very least an intrastate federation. This 
view, visible in the federalism of Schleiermacher and 
defended most vehemently by Goerres, was to become ever more 
important during 1815 to 1850, as will be demonstrated in 
Part 3 of this thesis. 
This brings us to the second of the matters to be covered 
in this concluding section: the political use made of 
federalism. Chapter 1 outlined the hypothesis of Riker (1964 
& 1975) regarding the allegedly universal applicability of 
"military· and "expansionist" considerations as the prime 
motivations for federation. As has just been conceded in 
these concluding remarks, during the period covered by this 
chapter, most German and Swiss writers on confederation 
argued that its formal purpose was indeed limited to external 
security. It therefore appears that the first part of Riker's 
hypotheses is valid, at least as regards the formal purposes 
of confederations. Moreover, this chapter has also identified 
federal isms (e9 that of Goerres) which were motivated, at 
least in part, by expansionism. 
On the other hand, however, one of the major findings of 
this chapter's detailed consideration of the substance and 
motivations of Germanic federalism up to 1815 has been that 
behind its various Swiss and German manifestations were 
objectives additional to the aims formally ascribed to the 
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relevant federations. Moreover, that examination demonstrates 
beyond any doubt that while military or security 
considerations were often a factor, they did not always apply 
and were certainly not the prime motivation of Germanic 
federal isms. Instead, this chapter has shown that the 
federal isms must be understood as contributions to political 
debates. They were used in those debates to advance political 
causes. At times, those political causes related to, for 
example, political institutions or political rights, at other 
times, they concerned religious. or socio-economic ends. The 
consistent factor, however, is that the form and substance of 
the various federal isms were designed to promote a political 
cause. Put another way, federalism was used as a poltical 
ideology. The political and instrumental nature of federalism 
is indicated not least by three factors: the language in 
which it was spelled out, the nature of the federations it 
proposed and the tactical shifts in those proposals. 
Let us take these factors in turn. Sections 3.2 and 3.3 
of this chapter showed that the very language employed by an 
early nineteenth century Germanic federalism usually clearly 
signalled where it stood in the contemporary philosophical 
and political dispute between revolutionary ideas of 
universal natural rights and the equality of man on the one 
hand and the conservative values of tradition and hierarchy 
on the other. In Switzerland, the prime role which federalism 
initially assumed was that of countering the notion that pure 
reason was the most appropriate principle for the 
organisation of political life. In place of the logical 
corollary of this viewpoint, namely, that there ought to be 
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uniform subordination to the will of the majority, Swiss 
conservatives used federalism as part of their assertion of 
the imperfection of man and the value of tradition, diversity 
and of intermediate structures between the individual and a 
potentially absolutist majoritarian will. By contrast, from 
the very start of the period under discussion, federalism 
was used in Germany by both the parties to the philosophical 
debate. For example, in his Science of Rights, Fichte 
advances an interstate-chiliastic federation as a means of 
achieving the rule of reason in the world, while Goerres uses 
a federalism laced with a mystical historicism to argue that 
man is incapable of recreating society by dint of his reason 
and should instead rely upon tradition and intuition. Even in 
cases such as those of Goerres and Fichte, however, where 
Germanic federalism was articulated in the most abstract 
terms, one should not be led to the conclusion that pure and 
politically disinterested philosophical considerations were 
the most important factor underlying federalism. Instead, the 
language of the federal isms is a best understood as an 
indicator of political interests. 
The second factor of the federal isms covered that 
suggests their political use is the nature of the proposed 
federations themselves. Some of the federal isms we have 
covered are manifestly intended to promote one or other of 
the political visions of the time. For example, Fichte's 
interstate-chiliastic federalism is as undeniably designed to 
realise in its various component states the principles of the 
liberal Enlightenment, as the federalism of Goerres is 
intended to counter them. There are other federal isms, of 
course, which appear prima facie not to be politically 
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motivated, since the formal purposes they ascribe to their 
proposed federations appear to be apolitical. However, 
detailed investigation shows that those federations are also 
intended to realise the type of society that corresponds to 
the political preferences of the writer. Examples include the 
liberal federalism of Behr in Germany and the conservative 
federalism of Haller in Switzerland. 
, 
. . 
The third factor that demonstrates the political usage of 
federalism is the way in which some of its exponents change 
their prescriptions for reasons that can only be explained by 
reference to considerations of political strategy. This has 
been demonstrated by reference to both conservatives and 
liberals. Germanic federalism was used in Switzerland and in 
Germany by all three types of conservative identified by 
Epstein (1966,7-11): defenders of the status quo, reformist 
and reactionary. An example of the use of federalism by the 
first type would be the positivist approach of Leist. However, 
positivism was as inappropriate for German conservatives 
after 1806, as it was for Swiss conservatives during the 
He1vetic Republic, since in both cases, positive law did not 
accord with their interests. In view of the dominance in the 
He1vetic Republic of rationalism, it was reformist 
conservatism, which adopted at least some of the assumptions 
of the new order, that stood the best chance of political 
acceptance in Switzerland. The federalism of Monneron is 
perhaps the best example of this genre. The stridently 
reactionary conservatism evident in Haller's later federalism 
(see 5.3.2. below) was not pronounced in Switzerland during 
the 1798-1815 period. Even Haller himself was willing to make 
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concessions then. 
In Germany also, there were some conservatives (eg. 
SChleiermacher) imbued with a rationalist streak, but others 
(eg.Berg) whoe were at a loss concerning what to prescibe for 
Germany. On the other hand, among reactionary conservative 
elements of German Romanticism there were those such as 
Goerres who reponded by articulating an alternative political 
theory, which called for a return to mediaeval values through 
an intrastate-imperial federation modelled upon the 
pre-Reformation Holy Roman Empire. 
OT the three conservative uses OT Tedera1ism mentioned 
(ie reactionary, status quo and reformist), the reactionary 
conservatism evinced in the writings of Goerres and the 
later Haller was to become the most important during the 
next thirty years, and especially after 1830, when both in 
Germany and Switzerland conservatives gradually came to 
replace liberal nationalists on the political defensive. That 
is not to say that status QUO and reformist conservatism were 
not also to be important. As will be shown in Chapter 5 
below, they were important both in Switzerland and in the 
in the German Bund. 
The clearest example provided by this chapter of the 
instrumental use of federalism in the period up to 1815 
relates to the case of the Swiss liberals [50]. It will be 
recalled that though at the beginning of century, federation 
had been an anathema for them, by 1815 they had come to 
support it. As was shown in section 3.3. above, That volte 
face was intimately linked to their political situation. 
Though their change of heart was in part a product of 
reflection and inner conversion (Wild, 1966,55), it was 
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mainly due to the fact that during the ten year Mediation, 
they had, as rulers of the more liberal cantons, come to 
a 
appreciate the politicl utility of federation. The strategic 
A 
advantage for those liberal cantons of having cantonal' 
rights of political self-determination enshrined in the 
1815 Federal Pact did not escape them. During the life of the 
Federal Pact (1815-1848) Swiss liberal federalism was to 
change from the rudimentary, opportunist type of the early 
part of the century. It gradually developed in a way that has 
allowed subsequent analyses to present liberalism and 
federation as inherently related. That is of course ironic, 
if one recalls the commitment of both Swiss and German 
liberal nationalists to the ideal of a unitary state. 
Alternatively, if one keeps in mind the party-political 
dimension, and analyses federalism as political ideology, it 
is less surprising. It then becomes clear that federalism is 
used for strategic reasons. As will be shown in Part 3, when 
liberalism gained the upper hand in Germany Switzerland, it 
was to become one of the greatest champions of federation. 
'This concluding section has now fulfiled its two· self-
appointed tasks. It has first summarised the findings of 
this chapter regarding the nature of the Germanic tradition 
of federalism during the 1790s to 1815 and has shown that 
Germanic federalism was .in' part the product of its 
philosophical milieu. From the 1790s to 1815, Germany and 
Switzerland were the crucible of radically opposed 
philosophies and this was inevitably reflected in Germanic 
federalism. Despite the in part genuine philosophical 
commitments of its expositors, hawver, the prime significance 
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of this ideational context for Germanic federalism is that 
it provided useful languages in which to rationalise the 
political advantages being sought by federalism. This leads 
us to the second point this conclusion has emphasised, 
namely, that federalism has to be regarded as the product 
primarily of its material, political environment, in which 
it played the role of a political ideology. Moreover, It has 
also been shown that the operation of the extant federations 
- be it the Reich or the Rheinbund in Germany, or the 
Mediation or the Federal Pact in Switzerland - itself 
influenced attitudes to federation, and one can thus see that 
the relationship between federalism and federation is not one 
in which one determines the other, but is symbiotic. 
Having established these points, this chapter allows the 
thesis to shift its focus to a detailed discusssion of that 
relationship, by an examination, in Part 3 of this thesis, of 
the interaction of federalism and federation in Germany and 
switzerland-between 1815 and 1850. 
NOTES FOR CHAPTER 3 
1. These were: intrastate-corporate, intrastate-imperial and 
intrastate-territorial federalism, as well as interstate-
confederal and interstate-chiliastic, or interstate-universal 
federalism. 
2. While the end of this revolutionary period can be dated 
reasonably precisely as 1815, its beginning is less easily 
determined. This helps explain why there is some overlap 
between the period covered in this chapter and the last. For 
example, Chapter 2 has already covered the 1795 federalism of 
Kant. However, such overlaps merely aid our presentation and 
in no way undermine the arguments presented in this chapter. 
Among the texts found most useful for section 3.1 of this 
chapter were the following: Aris (1936); Barraclough (1972); 
Bluntschli (1867 & 1875); Bonjour (1939 & 1948); Bonjour/ 
Offler/Potter (1952); Bruckmueller, (1985); Duersteler 
(1911); Epstein (1966); Fehr (1939); Fleiner (1898,1916 & 
1918); Frei (1964); Gasser (1947); Gassner (1926); Gilliard 
(1955); Goerlich/Romanik (1977); Hertz (1975); Hilty (1896 & 
1896a); His (1920); Holborn (1965); 1m Hof (1981); Jaggi 
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(1948); Huber (1965); Institut fuer Oesterreichkunde (1963 
&1969); Kann (1974) Kleindel (n.d.); Krieger (1957); Lauber 
(1910); Ludwig (1911); Macartney (1969 & "1978); Meinecke 
(1928); Nabholz (1918); Nawiasky (1937); Poggi (1978); 
Rappard (1941 & 1948); Reiss (1955); Schefold (1966); 
Stettler (1847); Streisand (1961); Tripp (1940); Troxler 
(1838); Weiss (1984); Wild (1966) and Wolf (1925). 
3. As was the case in Chapter 2, we will again be using the 
terms -German" and "Germany" to refer to the German Empire 
and hence this should be taken to include the territories of 
latterday Austria. 
4. These were the Peace of Luneville of 1801, initially 
between France and Austria, but later also signed by the 
states of the German Empire, and the decisions made by the 
1803 Reichsdeputationshauptausschuss (Main Committee of the 
Imperial Deputies) about how the agreed restructuring of much 
of the territory of Western Germany was to occur. 
5. These were: the "First Helvetic Constitution" of 1798 to 
1800, the "Second Helvetic Constitution" of July to September 
1802 and the "Mediation Constitution" of 1803. The latter 
lasted until Napoleon's fall in- 1813 and was formally 
replaced in 1815 by the "Federal Pact"", negotiated via the 
Congress of Vienna. It is worth noting that the constitutions 
between 1798 and 1803 were never fully effective, since Swiss 
territory saw a number of hostilities in this period. For the 
texts of the constitutions that were implemented, as well as 
the official proposals that remained in draft form, see 
Troxler (1838). 
6. The new cantons were Aargua, Thurgau, Waadt, Ticino, 
Graubuenden and St.Gallen. For details of the 1803 
constitution see Rappard (1948,23-32). 
7. There were of course many other exponents of Germanic 
federalism during this period, including Adam Mueller (1809) 
and Gentz (Puttkamer,1955,68-70), but it is not our intention 
to even attempt to provide an exhaustive account. For brief 
overviews of the contributors of this period, see Brie (1874, 
esp.32-41), Deuerlein (1972,66-70), Puttkammer (1955,59-84) 
and Mogi (1931,1,343-52), though the latter largely repeats 
Brie. 
8. See Brie(1874,32ff,) who says that the term "Voe1kerbund" 
was first-used by Kant, and "Voe1kerstaat" and "Staatenbund" 
first used by Zachariae (1804), while "Bundesstaat" came into 
use after the Rheinbund was set up. 
9. See 3.1 above and footnote 4 also. 
10. As far as the author is aware, Zachariae's 1807 
publication has not been translated. Not being conversent 
with Latin, the author has had to rely upon Brie's brief 
discussion of the text (1874,36). 
11. He uses the term "Voelker". Many authors of this period 
used the terms "Staat" and ·Volk"" as though they were 
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synohymous. 
12. It is worthy of note that Behr does use the term 
Bundesstaat, which was later to become the concept used 
nearly universally within the German-speaking world to denote 
an interstate-territorial federation. However, he uses it not 
to refer to a federation as such, but merely to betoken the 
constituent states of the Rheinbund (eg 75). 
13. Fichte's father was a ribbon weaver and Fichte owed his 
education to the philanthropy of a local aristocrat. For 
biographical information on Fichte, see for example Adamson 
(1908,8-104). The following account of Fichte's federalism 
is based upon a reading of the following primary sources: 
Fichte, 1796a; 1796b; 1800; 1806; 1807; 1808; 1808a and 1813, 
as well as of the following secondary sources: Adamson (1908); 
Aris (1936,106-35 & 345-60) Bluntschli (1867,349-87); Cairns 
(1949,464-502); Hertz (1975,esp.43-9); Meinecke (1928,93-127); 
Reiss (1955,esp.11-22) Russell (1961) and Vaughan (1939,94-
143). 
14. These are listed and discussed by Vaughan (1939,94f) and 
include his Science of Rights (1796 & 1796a), a natural law 
theory of the state which marks the first triumph of Napoleon 
Napoleon in Italy. A second treatise is his Closed Commericial 
State (1800), which is a plea for an autarchic German state 
and was written prior to the Continental Blockade. A third 
is Fichte's Addresses to the German Nation (1808 & 1808a), 
which presaged Germany's national uprising. All three are 
referred to in the following discussion. 
15. Aris (1965,108f) identifies four phases in the development 
of Fichte's views on the state. The first lasts from 1789 to 
1896 and is characterised by his extreme individualism and 
his support of rational natural law theories. The period from 
1796 to 1799 is held by Aris to be one of change, when Fichte 
publishes a major treatise on natural law (Fichte,1796 & 
1796a), which is predicated upon Kantian natural law ideas, 
but also starts to move away from Kant. The third period 
(1799-1806) is dominated by his commitment to the idea of a 
planned, socialist society an an autarchic state. Fichte's 
liberalism and individualism decline in favour of greater 
emphasis upon collectivism. The final phase Aris identifies 
is that from 1806 to 1814, the focus of which is nationalism 
and state glorification. Nonetheless, Fichte still retains a 
commitment to individual freedom and to cosmopolitanism. For 
an alternative division, see Vaughan (1939,94f). 
16. As will be argued below, Fichte's nationalism and 
cosmopolitanism are not necessarily as incompatible as might 
be assumed (Meinecke, 1928,93-127). See for example Fichte 
1806 & 1808 for an illustration of the links between the two. 
17. For another example of this view, see Vaughan (1939,141f). 
18. There are numerous disparities between some of the 
English translations of the crucial sections on federation. 
In particular, there are differences regarding the 
terminology employed to describe the federation (compare 
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Reiss,1955,73-84 & Fichte,1796b,473-89). Accordingly, this 
thesis has referred back to a German edition (Fichte,1796a). 
19. As Fichte's English translator notes at this point 
(Fichte,1796a,486), it is inconsistent of Fichte to assert 
that states cannot be compelled to join. In reality, 
membership would be made compulsory. 
20. Other examples include not only Kant (see 2.3 above), but 
also Sch1eiermacher and Goerres (see below), as well as 
Stahl (see 5.2.3. below) and Troxler (see 6.3.3. below). 
21. Fichte's last written reflections upon Germany's 
constitutional future (1813) contain in embryonic form an 
argument for a Prussian-led solution to what was to become 
known as the -German problem" (1813,eg.530 & 554). His 
arguments against Austrian leadership include its religion, 
dynastic interests and political conservatism (1813,555 & 
567). 
22. It is perhaps no coincidence that one of Schleiermacher's 
contributions to German political thought was the translation 
of Plato's Republic. 
23. Though the point of departure for the transcendental 
idealism of Schelling (1775-1854) was the rational idealism 
of Fichte and Kant, it developed into a mystical Romanticism. 
Among the main ideas of Schelling's extremely abstract 
philosophy are (Watson,1892) first, the rejection of 
-theoretical reason" in favour of the value of "practical 
reason" and sensation. Second is the belief ,that the best way 
to understand the state is as an organism. Third, and linked 
to this, is adoption of a teleological approach to world 
development. Fourth, Schelling points to the principle of 
polarity as the force which ensures progression towards 
mankind's te1os. . 
All these-notions are to be found in Goerres' writings. Thus 
he too believes in the importance of sensation and intutition 
and regards the state as an organism moving in tune with the 
mystical plan of Nature. Finally, he sees Austro-Prussian 
polarity as a force moving Germany to a higher stage of 
development. Schellings's transcendental idealism influenced 
a number of exponents of German federalism, including both 
liberals such as Troxler (see 6.3.3. below) and conservatives 
like Stahl (see 5.2.3. below). On Schelling, see Bluntschli 
(1867,540-44), Reiss (1955) and Watson (1892). 
24. In the period covered by this chapter, Goerres is still 
for reconciliation between Catholics and Protestants, as is 
evident from the following discussion of the federalism he 
articulates in the Rheinischer Merkur. However, he later 
becomes a strident defender of the Catholic cause (see 5.2.2. 
below). 
25. Goerres' earlier rational cosmopolitanism still (1814-
16) finds expression in his commitment to a tolerant Europe, 
embracing both Christian confessions (see below), though it 
is eventually to be replaced by a commitment to Catholic 
ultramontanism (see Goerres,1854-74). 
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26. From the articles known to have been written by Goerres, 
the following have been selected to .illustrate his federalism: 
Germany's Demands, Nr.76,23 June 1814,lf; To Germany's 
Princes and Peoples, Nr.82,5 July 1814,1-3, & Nr.83,7July 
1814,1-3; The Future German Constitution, (written together 
with Stein) Nr.104,18 Aug.1814,1-3, Nr.105,20 Aug.1814,1-3, 
Nr.106, 22, Aug.1814,lf & Nr.107,24 Aug.1814,lf; Austria, 
Prussia and Bavaria, Nr.124,27 Sep.1814,1-3, Nr.12S.29 Sep. 
1814,lf, Nr.128,5 Oct.1814,lf, Nr129,7 Oct.1814,1-3, Nr.130, 
9 Oct.1814,lf, Nr.132,13 Oct.1814,1-3, Nr.133,15 Oct.1814,lf, 
Nr.138,25 Oct.1814,lf, Nr.139,27 Oct.1814,lf, Nr.140,29 Oct. 
1814,lf & Nr.142,2 Nov.1814,lf. See also The Kaiser and the 
Reich. A Dialogue, (written together with Jakob Grimm) ppl-4 
in each of issues Nr.175-81 incl., i.e. of 8,10,12,14,16,18 
& 20 Jan.1815.). Many of 'these articles are reprinted in Ouch 
(1921,I). Not all the articles in the Rheinischer Merkur are 
attributed. For information on the (presumed) authorship of 
all the articles, see Goerres (1814-16,Vol.6,23-60). 
27. Since we have utilised a reprint of all the issues of the 
Rheinischer Merkur (Goerres,1814-16) in which there is no 
pagination, this and subsequent annotations refer to issue, 
rather than page numbers. 
28. Goerres (1814-16,105f) proposes a rather idiosyncratic 
tripartite estates structure which he erroneously claims to 
have constituted the basis of the mediaeval system. The first 
of his three estates is the "Teaching Estate" (Lehrstand), 
within which clerics have an especially important role to 
play, to which end they are to receive back the economic 
independence they lost during the Napoeonic period. The 
second estate is the "Defensive Estate" (Wehrstand), 
traditionally led by the aristocracy. The third estate is 
that of the'common people: the "Provisioning Estate" 
(Naehrstand). It is to be subdivied into the agrarian, 
artisan and trading estate. Unlike Adam Mueller's estate 
theory (1819,44) that of Goerres allows for movement between 
the estates on the basis of merit (see Goerres,1819 also). 
29. For example, in what is virtually a throwaway remark, 
Goerres (1814-16,140) suggests that the King Prussia would 
assume the role of Commander in Chief (Feldherr) of the 
Imperial Army, while the Archduke of Austria would, as 
Imperial Treasurer, be in control of the Empire's finaces. 
30. Goerres' prescriptions as to the organisation of the 
federal authority changed somewhat as the political situation 
changed (Uh 1 mann, 1912). For , ' deta il s of other centra 1 
institutions proposed by Goerres, see Uhlmann (1912,119-23). 
31. This summarises the material in Hilty (1896), Wild (1966, 
esp.14ff) and Lauber (1910,esp.11-19). 
32. However, not all supporters of a unitary state structure 
for switzerland were opposed to federation in principle. For 
example, Glayre recognised that a federation could be useful 
in guaranteeing the persistence of small states, as well as 
the rights of the individual within it. However, he felt that 
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federation was inappropriatefo~ a country as small as 
Switzerland. He proposed that it should instead be applied to 
large states (cited in Wild,1966,18). No doubt Kuhn (1800) 
would have dismissed G1ayre as advocating either the . 
"federalism of privilege" or the "federalism of demagogy". 
" . 
33. However, the federalism of the He1vetic was, as we shall 
show below, overwhelmingly not reactionari1y anti-
rationalist. Instead, it was mostly concerned tO,moderate 
what it perceived as the excesses of the Unitarians, while 
remaining firmly committed to the use of reason. Wild (1966, 
3Sf) argues that "the real strength and distinctiveness of 
Helvetic federalism lies in its rational construction and 
delineation of the different legal and functional areas 
(Rechts- und Machtbereiche) in the state. The commitment to 
tradition and custom is secondary; one is by nature a 
rationalist .•• we thus want ••• to distinguish between. 
federalism and pure.reaction, which did exist, but was barely 
published. Federal ideas lacking in substance were infrequent 
••• H. He also contends (ibid,39) that "The participation of 
the Federalists in the creation of a new constitution can be 
explained only by the primacy of the rational spirit." 
34. Such appeals by the Federalists to popular sentiment were 
in turn of course one reason why Kuhn (1800,13) referred to 
"the federalism of privilege and •.. of demagogy". 
35. For this reason, Wild (1966,37) concludes that in this 
period, "the real liberal principles were preserved by the 
Federalists. For not only did the key Unitarians have no 
understanding for the ancient Swiss conception of freedom, 
but their political system lacked any institutional guarantee 
of a private sphere for the individual". 
36. This traditionalism clearly had. its parallels within the 
Anglo-Saxon world in the writings of people such as Hume and 
Burke. In the German tradition, part of this brand of 
conservatism was - through the influence of thinkers such as 
Mueller and Gentz - to develop into the Romantic / historical 
movement, key parts of which were to become irrational, or 
flavoured by the ideas of catholic social theory. 
37. These ideas were also used after the establishment of the 
Swiss federal state of 1848 and the Second Empire as a 
justification for establishing federations to.defend the 
corporate interests of the Church and other groupings within 
the relevant states. See, for example, Segesser (1862,1865, 
1872 & 1875) and Frantz (1879). Unfortunately, however, this 
period lies outside .that covered by this thesis. 
38. Cited in Wild,(1966,27). Other Federalists (eg.Lerber, 
1800) also used Rousseau. The extent to which Rousseau's 
works could be used by opposing groups as a source of 
legitimation of their viewpoints is .evidentfrom the fact 
that the liberal nationalists also used him. In particular, 
they emphasised Rousseau's principle of the jnalienable 
rights of popular sovereignty. However, they went beyond 
Rousseau in developing this into a theory of representative 
democracy. On the role of the ideas of Montesquieu and 
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Rousseau, see Fleiner(1916) Schwarber(1935) and Wild(1966). 
39. Interestingly, Monneron (1800,73f) quotes Hume in support 
of his belief that one should be sceptical of human reason. 
40. Wild concludes that some Federalists were only slightly 
behind the Unitarians in their new division of the cantons. 
41. These three views are expressed by Lauber (1910,17), 
Rappard (1941,61f) and Gasser (1948,9f) respectively. See 
Wild (1966,27ff) also. 
42. Although writing in 1800, Monneron refers to the. 
redundant Articles of Confederation, rather than to the 
Federal Constitution (1800,97,fn.b). 
43. Thus Article 11 (Hilty,1896a,179f) specifies a number of 
franchise restrictions for the election of even the electoral 
college that will select the parliamentarians. Persons under 
21, those without the citizenship of a relevant Bernese 
commune, the illiterate, those who have not successfully 
completed their schooling and - most important - those who 
have not not made a one-off payment of £100 to state coffers, 
are all excluded from the vote. Moreover, (Hilty,1896a,284f, 
Art.40) only those members of the electoral college may be 
nominated for election to the legislature itself who posess 
property to the value of £10,000. 
44. For details about the considerations behind this draft, 
see Haller (1801,350-419). 
45. Indeed, the threat the regenerated cantons perceived from 
their conservative confederates led to.the establishment in 
1832 of the "Concordat of the Seven", in which the 
regenerated cantons of Zuerich, Berne, Luzern, Solothurn, 
St.Gallen, Aargau and Thurgau undertook to defend their 
common liberal gains. (See Chapters 4 & 6.3 below.) 
46. Nabholz (1918,24f) states that "Even the most consistent 
Unitarian spoke only carefully and in general terms of a 
tightening of the bond uniting the cantons •.• " and the 
possibility of joint regulation of internal cantonal matters 
was not even hinted at. 
47. The pamphlet was originally published anonymously, though 
its authorship has since (Guggenbuhl,1931 ,129-32) been 
established as having consisted of Escher and Uster;, a 
Zuerich liberal who had served as a member of the Helvetic 
Republic government. With the advent of the Mediation, Usteri 
withdrew to pursue his political ideals at the cantonal 
level. See Guggenbuhl (1931) for how Usteri came to accept 
and work within the Mediation system. He remained influential 
in Zuerich politics right up to his death in 1831. Through 
his editorship of national newspapers, he was a significant 
force in federal politics also. During the Restoration, he 
was noted for his opposition to federal intervention to limit 
cantonal regeneration, as well as to censorship and 
radicalism (Guggenbuhl,1931,261-8 & 203f resp.). 
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48. The following brief summary is limited to the 
differentiation between federations on the basis of arguments 
predicated upon the latter's constituent units, the location 
within them of sovereignty, or their formal purpose. It will 
be recalled that these are the criteria used by this thesis 
to differentiate between the dimensions of Germanic 
federalism. The polemical arguments of those such as Kuhn 
(1800) and the mysticism of Goerres are not included here. 
That should not be taken to imply that we are dismissing 
those arguments in the manner of those whom we have 
criticised for rejecting federalism as irrelevant ideology 
(see 1.2 above). Indeed, we believe that such federalisms 
are both interesting and important. However, what they tell 
us relates more to the motivations of their expositors and 
that is a topic which will be dealt with later in this· 
conclusion. 
49. One example is that Swiss federal isms were, on the whole, 
less abstract than those of their German counterparts. 
Second, Switzerland's republican history meant that, unlike 
in Germany, considerations of the role in federations of a 
monarchy did not arise. (The former distinction does of 
course not mean that Swiss manifestations of Germanic 
federalism are any less interesting for this thesis, or that 
they were any less politically salient. On the contrary, one 
could argue that they were more closely linked to the 
political process than the federalism of some of their 
metaphysical German counterparts.) 
50. After-completion of this chapter, the author has come 
across an essay written by Behr in 1814, which suggests he 
too changed his 'federalism 'out of considerations of political 
strategy. Though he had previously (Behr,1808 & 1808a) 
insisted upon confederation as the only acceptable federation 
for Germany, he now (1814) appears to advocate what amounts 
to an intrastate federation. As is shown in Chapter 6 below, 
during the Restoration, Behr is again a supporter of 
confederation, since he hopes that a confederal Germany will 
afford his native and relatively liberal Bavaria some 
protection 'against against the conservative-dominated centre. 
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PART 3: GERMANIC FEDERALISM FROM 1815-1850 
CHAPTER 4: THE BACKGROUND TO GERMANIC FEDERALISM 
FROM 1815-1850 
4.1. 'INTRODUCTION 
In Chapter 2, this thesis identified the substance and 
motivating considerations of the five dimensions of early 
Germanic federalism. Chapter 3 then illustrated the use of 
federalism in the revolutionary period from the end of the 
eighteenth century until the restoration of Europe via the 
Congress of Vienna. Among the conclusions of that chapter 
were first, that the federal isms articulated did not add to 
the existing five dimensions, but offered a variety of 
considerations of the detailed structuring of those types of 
federation. Second, we saw that this was a period in which 
one can identify more or less distinct We1tanschauungen, and 
that federalism was not exclusive to anyone of them. Third, 
however, it is clear from our analysis of the period up to 
1815 that the ideational groupings we identified did not have 
corresponding political organisations. In short, there were 
as yet no structures which one could consider akin to modern 
political parties. 
The focus of Part 3 of this thesis is Germanic federalism 
within the German [1] and Swiss federations of 1815 to . 
1848/50 [21. Part 3 will attempt further to address the two 
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major aims of ·this thesis (see 1.3 above). It may be recalled 
that one of its objectives is to identify the types of 
federation proposed within the tradition of Germanic 
federalism. Accordingly, Part 3 of this thesis will attempt 
to establish whether these were, like in the period covered 
in Chapter 3, within the dimensions already outlined (see 
2.4. above), or whether there were any new dimensions of 
Germanic federalism. 
The second aim of this thesis is to illustrate the 
utility for an understanding of the dynamics of federations 
of the analytical approach advanced in this thesis, namely, 
the examination of the interaction of federalism and 
federation. In this latter endeavour, we will be considerably 
assisted by the fact that the period under consideration 
witnessed the emergence of groupings which, though not yet 
political parties in the modern sense of the term, 
nonetheless in part constituted loosely organised groupings 
for the promotion of political ends. This will facilitate our 
analysis of the role of federalism as a political ideology, 
that is to say, as a u ••• a belief system that explains and 
justifies a preferred political order for society, either 
existing or proposed, and offers a strategy •.• for its 
attainment", (Christenson,et.al.,1972,5). 
Before embarking on this analysis of Germanic federalism 
as ideology - which Bell (1962,400) describes as "the 
conversion of ideas into social levers" - it is necessary to 
provide a brief comparison of some of the most significant 
background factors to the nature and role of Germanic 
\ , 
federalism between 1815 and 1850. This will be done in 4.2 •• 
Thereafter, 4.3. will outline the manner in which Part 3 of 
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this thesis proposes to examine Germanic federalism. 
4.2. THE BACKGROUND FACTORS 
In many respects, the context in which federalism was to 
develop during 1815 to 1850 was broadly similar in Germany 
and Switzerland [3]. First, both countries were vulnerable to 
foreign interference, as the genesis of their constitutions 
itself testifies. The European Great Powers, which were the 
architects of the post-Napoleonic -Metternich system", were 
especially concerned to ensure that Germany did not become a 
centralised state, with the potential to destabilise the 
European balance of power. For its part, Switzerland's very 
independence and neutrality were largely a gift of the 
Congress of Vienna, the members of which wished to keep the 
strategically located Alpine country from becoming too 
dependent on anyone Power. They kept a close watch on 
domestic political developments, a supervision to which many 
patriotic Swiss objected, considering it to be unwarranted 
external interference in the nation's right to determine its 
own destiny. It can be argued that in 1847/48 Switzerland was 
only able to reform its federal constitution without foreign 
interference because of its good fortune that at this time 
the Great Powers were otherwise occupied with their own 
domestic unrest arising out of the 1848 revolutions [4]. 
A further example of the extent of foreign influence upon 
Germany and Switzerland is that both federations contained 
territorial units subject to foreign rulers. In Germany, this 
included Hannover, ruled by the King of England until 1837 
and Holstein, subject to the Danish Crown until as late as 
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1864. The existence in republican Switzerland of the Prussian 
principality of Neuchatel constituted a running sore until 
1848, when a republican coup d'etat within that canton ended 
its link with the foreign monarch. 
A second characteristic common to Germany and Switzerland 
during 1815 to 1850 is that they had federal constitutions 
providing for only very limited centralisation. The German 
Federal Act, largely the work of Austria and Prussia, was 
signed in June 1815 and set up the "Deutscher Bund" (German 
Confederation), which replaced the previous plethora of 
principalities with a mere thirty-nine states. (Strictly 
speaking, the Bund originally contained only thirty eight 
states, Hesse-Homburg not joining until 1817.) Soon after the 
Bund came into operation, suggestions that Germany was to 
take the form of a tight federation were proved false. The 
Bund was patently a loose, interstate union of states. The 
Act stated that defending the independence of the member 
units was one of the main aims of the federation. The powers 
of the constituent sovereign territorial units were therefore 
largely unrestricted by the centre. For example, the Act made 
no provision for individual rights at the national level, but 
stipulated in Clause 13 that constituent states were to grant 
such rights as part of a representation based upon estates. 
However, this clause was never enforced. It was left to the 
discretion of the local rulers, which of course meant that 
only in a few states were any representative constitutions 
introduced and many of those were primarily a facade. 
Central authority resided in a "Bundestag" modelled on the 
Rheinbund and which was was, like the Swiss Diet, little more 
than a congress of ambassadors. The full Bundestag met very 
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infrequently (a mere sixteen times during the lifetime of the 
Bund), partly as a result of the fact that the Act required 
unanimity for any constitutional change and a two thirds 
majority for many other matters. Instead, decisions were made 
by an Inner Council, comprising one vote for the eleven 
largest states and a total of six for the remaining twenty 
seven states. Here, decisions were made by simple majorities, 
but because of their relative size, Austria and Prussia were 
able to exercise a degree of control far greater than might 
be inferred from the single Inner Council vote they each had. 
Attempts at strengthening the federal authority, for example 
by adding to it a Federal Court, all failed in the face of 
. states' opposition. 
The Swiss Federal Pact, which came into force on 7 August 
1815, also established a loose, interstate confederation. 
Three new cantons having been added, the Confederation now 
comprised twenty full and four half cantons [5]. There was no 
central authority other than the Diet, which alternated its 
venue biennialy between three directora1 cantons, and in 
, 
which cantons were represented equally, by members bound to 
cantona1 instructions. For all important decisions, 
unanimity was required. Between sittings of the Diet, 
Confederation business was, 1ike_ before 1798, conducted by 
the government of the canton hosting the Diet. This was by 
means of the "Staatsrat" (Council of State) manned by 
magistrates and officials solely ,from the directora1 canton. 
The Diet was entitled to arbitrate between disputing cantons 
and to ratify their external treaties. Intercantonal treaties 
detrimental to other cantons' interests were forbidden. It 
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was in the area of military matters that the powers of the 
central Swiss authority were greatest. Only here had the 
centralization introduced under the Napoleonic constitutions 
of 1798 to 1803 been retained and even extended. 
This brings us to a third similarity between Germany and 
Switzerland, namely, wtdespread and persistent concern about 
the federations' capacity to respond to external military 
threats. Despite the fact that both federations had 
introduced greater military powers for their respective 
central authorities, there remained constant disputes over 
the size, training, and Tinance OT constituent units' 
military contingents, as well as over how the ultimate 
military command of the army was to be organised. In the 
absence of a resolution of these disputes and in view of the 
two countries' experiences during the preceding decades, 
concern about the ability to resist attack is understandable. 
These fears were compounded by a number of new crises, such 
as switzerland and Germany~ fear of foreign interference in 
. . 
the wake of the 1830 Paris revolution and the 1840 crisis 
on the German Rhine. However, there was in both countries a 
further dimension to the debate about the military role of 
the centre, namely, the issue of central military intervention 
in the affairs of the constituent members of the federation. 
Broadly speaking, the Swiss conclusion was that any such 
intervention must be severely restricted, though views about 
the right or duty of the centre to intervene were very much 
dependent upon the extent to which proposed intervention 
would lead to a strengthening of the comentator's political 
bedfellows in the relevant canton. Accoringly, when in 1831 
the Swiss Diet decided to initiate central intervention to 
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stop the regeneration process in the cantons of Basel and 
Schwyz, the simmering conflict between liberals and 
conservatives was ignited and the issue of federal reform 
henceforth burned brightly. 
In Germany, the 1819 Teplitz Punctuation between Austria 
and Prussia provided the basis for federal intervention to 
suppress.liberal change in the constituent states of the 
Bund. The outcome were the notorious "Carlsbad Decrees", 
passed unanimously by the Federal Diet in September 1919 
(Buessem, 1874). Their immediate cause were the activities of 
the so-called "Burschenschaften" (German students' 
association) [8]. However, their real purpose was to prevent 
the more general spread of liberal and nationalist ideas. 
This goal was to be obtained by granting the central 
authority of the Bund unprecedented powers of intervention in 
the domestic affairs of its constituent states. This included 
muzzling the liberal press and the right of the Bund to armed 
intervention in support of state governments faced with 
popular insurrection. Not surprisingly, the Carlsbad Decrees 
caused considerable resentment among nationalists and 
liberals and impacted upon their federalism, as will be 
demonstrated in section 6.2 below (by reference, for example, 
to the writings of Behr (1820». 
Fourth, not only were Germany and Switzerland both 
experiencing a process of gradual industrialisation, but this 
process was in both countries faced by similar structural 
impediments arising from the nature of their federal 
organisation. The growth of economic activity and the greater 
volume of traffic increasingly led to demands for a lessening 
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of restrictions to trade. However, in both the Bund and the 
Swiss Confederation, economic matters were even less well 
co-ordinated than military matters. 
Nominally, both federal authorities were constitutionally 
obliged to promote free trade within their respective 
federations, although the extent of their formal duties 
varied. For example, Clause 19 of of the Federal Act obliged 
the German Federal Diet to develop a common policy on intra-
German trade and navigation, while Article 11 of the Swiss 
Federal Pact stipulated that there was to be free transit of 
goods throughout the Swiss Confederation and outlawed all 
tolls or restrictions other than those designed to prevent 
abuses of free trade. However in both countries, matters were 
left to the constituent units to implement. Neither 
federation made many concessions to economic harmonisation, 
let alone promoted single internal markets. In both, there 
were countless protectionist internal tariffs levied by 
member states, as well as restrictive guild privileges and 
other obstacles to free trade. Neither Germany nor Switzerland 
had a common monetary system, nor common weights and measures. 
The restrictions to trade permitted by the constitutions' 
weak provisions and by the federal authorities' failure to 
implement the provisions that they did contain, were a 
widespread bone of contention, especially amongst the rising 
entrepeneurial class. In the absence of central action, 
Germany witnessed the formation of many local customs unions 
in the 1820s, notably those of Prussia and between Baden and 
Wurttemberg in 1828. There were numerous attempts at 
establishing a federation-wide customs union before the 
Zollverein (German Customs Union) was eventually set up in 
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1834. Its initial eighteen signatory states were gradually 
joined by most of the other constituent states of the German 
Bund. In Switzerland, however, there was no comparable 
breakthrough for the 1ibera1isation of internal trade [71. 
to 
A fifth background feature common German and Swiss 
. ~ 
federalism concerns the considerable salience in both 
countries of confessional matters. In Switzerland, the 
Regeneration had started as a non-denominational movement 
for political and constitutional reform. Yet since the 
overwhelming majority of regenerated cantons were urban and 
above all Protestant, while the conservative cantons tended 
to be rural and Catholic, the Regeneration quickly became a 
religious as well as a political movement, with theological 
argumentation becoming entangled in the debate over reform 
or maintenance of the Pact. This clearly impinged upon the 
nature of Germanic federalism in Switzerland, where Catholic 
principles later became "interwoven with conservative 
federalism, as our discussion of Geiger (1823-39) in 5.5.2. 
below demonstrates. However, that is not to say that 
federalism was not used by Protestant Swiss conservatives; 
B1untschli is one such example (see 5.3.3. below). 
Religious considerations also impacted upon federalism in 
Germany. Like in Switzerland, this related on the one hand to 
the manner in which federal isms were articulated. As the 
writings of Stahl and Goerres demonstrate (see 5.2. below), 
in Germany, both Protestants and Catholics utilised religious 
argumentation in their federal isms. On the other hand, 
religion was relevant not only in terms of the manner in 
which Germanic federalism was expressed in Germany, but was 
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a significant motivating factor. This has already been 
illustrated by reference to Goerres (see 3.2 above), who 
will again figure in chapter 5 (see 5.2.3. below). However, 
it was not just German conservatives, but also, for example, 
Swiss liberals like Troxler whose federalism was motivated 
by considerations of the role of religion in the state. Like 
in Switzerland, religious and political 
considerations also overlapped in Germany; Austria was 
perceived as the bastion of both Catholicism and 
conservatism, whilst for many moderate liberals, Prussia 
constituted not only a Protestant state, but also one from 
which constitutional reform might reasonably be expected. 
This conflict became especially acute from 1849 onwards, when 
the two sides' differing views as to the resolution of the 
German problem were a major factor in nearly causing all-out 
war between Austria and Prussia. 
So far, we have identified the following five features as 
I 
common to the context of Germanic federalism during 1815 to 
1850: vu1nerab1i1ty to foreign interference; extant federal 
constitutions characterised above all by very limited 
powers for the central authority; concern about the 
federations' military capabilities; structural constraints to 
the development of free trade; and finally, the importance of 
religion for the form and substance of Germanic federalism. 
These five factors helped shape the nature of the structures 
proposed by Germanic federalism during 1815 to 1850 . 
. , 
However, the concern of this thesis is not limited to 
establishing the structures of the federations proposed by 
" Germanic federalism. A crucial consideration is the wider 
political purpose of those federations. Accordingly, it is 
217 
essential to a full understanding of the development of 
Germanic federalism to demonstrate its relationship to the 
the main political thinking of its day. Our sixth and final 
point of similarity in the background to Germanic federalism 
between 1815 and 1850 therefore concerns the existence and 
interaction, in both Germany and Switzerland, of the same 
three major political principles. These were conservatism, 
liberalism and nationalism. Important as these movements were 
in helping shape Germanic federalism, it would exceed the 
scope of this introductory section - and indeed of the thesis 
- to provide more than a brief overview of their role and 
complex interaction in Germany and Switzerland. The two 
following chapters will, however, illustrate the ways in 
which they influenced Germanic federalism. 
There were two quite distinct phases in the political 
development of Germany and Switzerland between 1815 and 1850 
and thus in the fortunes of conservatism, liberalism and 
nationalism. The first lasted until 1830 and has traditionally 
been designated the "Restoration". This label derives from 
the title of a reactionary six volume work by von Haller 
(1820-25), which will be discussed in Chapter 5 below, and 
indicates the predominace of the forces of the conservative 
"Metternich system". After the 1830 revolutions, when 
conservatism began to be openly challenged by liberalism and 
nationalism, there began a lively public debate about the 
relative merits of preserving the status quo on the one hand 
and liberal and nationalist change on the other. This second 
period lasted from 1830 to 1848 and is known in Switzerland 
as the "Regeneration" and in Germany as the "Vormaerz" (ie. 
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the period before the March 1848 revolutions). For the sake 
of clarity, the term used in this thesis to denote the 1830 
to 1848 period in both countries will be "Regeneration". 
Although conservatives dominated the Restoration, it 
would be"wrong to assume that they were enthusiastic 
supporters, or the liberals unequivocal opponents, of the 
German and Swiss federations. Both systems were compromises 
and as such offered mixed blessings. Thus conservatives saw 
the new federations as the embodiment of the defeat of the 
Napoleonic system and of the forces of revolution which they 
associated with it, but were nonetheless concerned about 
other aspects. Above all, they felt that the new federations 
sanctioned the loss of some of their ancient privileges and 
were still dangerously vulnerable to ungodly revolutionary 
ideas. 
In view of this qualified support for the existing 
federations, it is not surprising that many conservatives 
were not predisposed to offer a philosophical defence of the 
extant situation. Moreover, in the first fifteen years of the 
post-Naploeonic period, many felt it largely unnecessary to 
do so. In Switzerland and Germany, conservative predominance 
during the Restoration was due not so much to its universal 
political appeal, as to the fact that most manifestations of 
liberalism and nationalism were strictly suppressed by means 
such as censorship, secret police activity and the Carlsbad 
Decrees (1819). 
Despite the dominance of conservatism during the 
Restoration, conservatives therefore often lacked a clear and 
cohesive political doctrine. Where conservative ideas were 
articulated, they often amounted to the mere rationalization 
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of existing authority relations by a variety of means. For 
example, in some quarters, this took the form of Romanticism 
such as Mueller's (1819) idealisation of medieval structures, 
whilst in others, positivism or historicism were used (eg. 
< 
Savigny). Extant authority was sometimes also still justified 
by reference to Divine Right (ego by Haller). It was only 
during the Regeneration, when conservatism came to be on the 
political defence, that a constitutional conservatism willing 
to accept representative structures started to emerge (eg the 
still rather conservative ideas of Stahl and the more liberal 
ideas of 81untschli). However, conservatives generally 
remained the most outspoken defenders of the sovereignty of 
constituent territorial units of federations, for they feared 
that any diminution of that sovereignty would make them more 
vulnerable to the forces of revolution. 
The position of liberals and liberalism between 1815 and 
1850 can perhaps be best illustrated by reference to 
Switzerland, where they were stronger. Swiss liberals 
initially gave grudging support to the Federal Pact. On the 
one hand, they objected that the liberal advances of 1798 to 
1815 - including political unity, universal political rights, 
freedoms of trade, profession and of settlement - had been 
rescinded and a loose confederation with many aristocratically 
ruled cantons resurrected. On the other hand, however, a 
loose federal structure amounted to a de facto concession to 
liberalism. It permitted liberal cantons to organise their 
internal politics in accordance with their own principles, 
free from any threat of intervention by a federal government 
that would, in view of the conservative majority in the 
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country, have been inclined to oppose such developments. In 
the Restoration, Swiss liberals were therefore overall 
supporters of interstate federation with a weak central 
authority. 
The above mentioned active suppression of liberalism also 
helps explain why the arguments of those few liberals 
calling for. a more centralised federation before 1830 were 
predominantly limited to the "safe" demand for greater 
federal powers in military matters. However, such military 
union as was achieved was felt by liberals to be no 
substitute for economic and political union [8]. Once the 
Regeneration began, there were many more calls not only for 
central governmant action to liberalise the terms of trade 
(see above), but also for political liberalisation. Indeed, 
after 1830, political and constitutional reform became the 
prime focus of liberal criticism in both countries. For an 
understanding of the development of Germanic federalism, the 
demands of this second, political strand of liberalism are 
very important. They included constitutionalism, enhancing 
individual political rights (albeit often only those of an 
educated or propertied elite), establishing the rule of law 
and equality under it, as well as free speech and freedom of 
the press. 
Because of the relative autonomy of the constituent units 
of both federations and the overall strength of conservatism, 
liberal efforts were initially largely confined to the local 
level. In both countries, some progress was made here, though 
in Germany this was largely confined to Bavaria (initially) 
and to south-western states such as Baden and Wuerttemberg. 
In north German states and in Austria, political liberalism 
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was very weak. It was much more successful in Switzerland, 
where, prompted by the Paris revolution of July 1830, many 
cantons revised their constitutions to introduce popular 
sovereignty and the separation of powers. As these 
"regenerated" cantons became more numerous, their previous 
opposition to central interference in internal cantonal 
affairs - an opposition essential if they were to maintain 
their reforms against the more numerous conservative cantons 
- was replaced by a desire to convert the latter. Regenerated 
cantons therefore began to advocate more central interference, 
along the lines of guaranteeing all Swiss the popular rights 
now granted to their own citizens. Simi1ari1y, German 
liberals also came to advance more rights of central 
government intervention to ensure legal equality and popular 
political rights in the constituent units of the federation. 
In short, liberals increasingly came to advocate intrastate 
federation, or even a unitary state. 
Throughout the 18305 and 18405 liberal demands for reform 
in economic, political and security matters increased in both 
Germany and Switzerland. Indeed, the 1830s and 18405 saw ever 
more voices raised in favour of constitutionalism and 
national unity. These pressures and the revolutions of 1848 
led to further liberal concessions in a number of German 
states, though most were subsequently rescinded. They also 
led to the emergence of a significant new brand of 
liberalism, namely, a radical liberalism, distinguished from 
the previous variety above all by its unequivocal commitment 
to popular sovereignty. (The Radicals could be described as 
"Democrats" (Zachariae,1833,15f). However, this thesis will 
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adhere to their contemporaneous designation.) Moderate 
liberalism, otherwise known as "tradititonal", "historical", 
or -theoretical" liberalism, also espoused popular political 
rights, but was much more elitist in its de facto 
aspirations than the later radicals, who were much less 
prepared to compromise and were not constrained by the 
feeling that they had to act within the law. Leading Radicals 
include Troxler and Fazy in Switzerland (see 6.3.3. below) 
and Hecker and Struve in Germany (see 6.2.3. below) 
This bifurcation of liberalism points to a difficulty in 
analysing political developments during 1815 to 1850, namely, 
that the lines of demarcation between the various political 
groupings are not as clear cut as they might appear in a 
summary as necessarily brief as that presented here. 
Moreover, there were divisions not only at the liberal end of 
the political spectrum, but also amongst conservatives. As 
mentioned above, some such as Haller could be described as 
reactionary, whilst others such as Bluntschli (see 5.2.2. and 
5.2.3. below respectively) were willing to countenance reform. 
This factionalisation, and in particular the existence of 
"moderate" liberals and reformist conservatives, makes the 
boundary between liberalism and conservatism rather fluid. 
Indeed, Switzerland, saw the establishment of an identifiable 
political grouping that consciously sought to straddle the 
two main political camps. This was the so-called "juste-
milieu", the federalism of which will be examined in Chapter 
5.3.3. below. 
The fluidity of political categories is even more 
pronounced in the case of the third of the political 
movements that we have argued to be highly significant for 
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the background to Germanic federalism, namely, nationalism. 
Within both Germany and Switzerland, the common dangers and 
sufferings of 1798 to 1815 had helped to foster a sense of 
national solidarity. Moreover, external threats continued 
throughout the Restoration and Regeneration (see point three 
above), thus further promoting nationalism. 
In both countries, nationalism was initially something of 
an artificial creation, some of the prime articulators of 
which were the liberal intelligentsia and the student 
fraternities. In Switzerland a leading role was played by the 
middle class "Helvetic Society", in which some of the most 
important exponents of federalism played leading roles. 
Examples include Troxler, Pfyffer, Munziger and Zschokke [9]. 
In Germany, an analogous role was played by the nationalist 
Burschenschaften, whose leading activists included both 
liberals such as Gagern and Behr, as well as conservatives 
such as Stahl (see 6.2 and 5.2 below). It was, however, not 
until this theme was taken up by the host of primarily 
sporting and cultural associations which sprang up in both 
countries, that nationalism began to be very widely 
popularised. Relevant associations include the German 
"Turnverein" (Gymnastic Society) of Jahn, and the Swiss 
"Schuetenzverein" (Riflemens' Society) and "Saengerverein" 
(Choral Society). 
However, neither German nor Swiss nationalism was ever the 
sole preserve of liberals. This has already been amply 
demonstrated in 3.3 above, where the nationalism of not only 
Fichte, but also of Goerres was discussed. From the very 
outset, therefore, there were a number of conservative 
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varieties of nationalism. In Germany, for example, parts of 
the Romantic movement espoused a cosmopolitan form of 
nationalism (Meinecke,1928), while later conservative 
nationalism was to become more_assertive and even 
xenophobic (eg Goerres, as discussed in 5.2.3. below). In 
addition, there was of course the persistent problem of how 
the various non-German nationalities were to be catered for. 
This was to become an even more acute problem in post-1866· 
Austria, where'some proposed multinational federation as an 
appropriate remedy [10]. In Switzerland, nationalism was used 
by conservatives primarily in defence of cantonal sovereignty. 
In other words, nationalism had both conservative and liberal 
exponents, as well as local, pan-Germanic, European and 
cosmopolitan variants. 
As far as the development of Germanic federalism is 
concerned, however, nationalism was significant in four main 
ways, as will be shown in Chapters 5 and 6. First, many 
liberal exponents of Germanic federalism used nationalism in 
support of a federal nation state. Examples include Gagern in 
Germany and Pfyffer in Switzerland. A second use was by those 
for whom nationalism betokened loyalty to the units of an 
intrastate federation of nation states. Though such exponents 
of federalism were primarily conservatives such as Rossi, 
there were liberal federalists who shared this view. One 
example is the Swiss Cherbuliez. A third use of nationalism 
was is exemplified in the later writings of Goerres (1819 & 
1821), who utilised it in his expansionist, racist 
xenophobia. A third and less common use of nationalism was 
by those exponents of Germanic federalism such as the 
reformist conservative Heeren, whose commitment to the 
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promotion of a specific national identity was articulated in 
the context of a universalism reminiscent of the early Fichte 
(see Chapter 3.2 above). 
This introduction has up to now concerned itself only with 
similarities in the background to Germanic federalism in 
Germany and Switzerland. However, there were also significant 
differences, an awareness of which helps to explain why the 
role of federalism in Switzerland and Germany was to differ 
in the period under discussion. First, while the debate on 
reform of the German federation was predominantly predicated 
upon the assumption that Germany would remain a monarchy, the 
swiss debate was always republican. 
Second, while debate over reform of the German Bund was 
greatly influenced by a history characterised by the loosely 
constituted Reich and Rheinbund structures, the Swiss debate 
after 1815 was greatly influenced by the experience of the 
centralised Helvetic and Mediation constitutions, which gave 
the more radical reformers a direct example of what a 
centralised, liberal state might look like. Conversely. this 
" 
hardened the resolve of conservatives to oppose any such 
development (11]. 
A final and critical difference between Switzerland and 
Germany concerns the outcome of their respective attempts to 
establish new federations based on liberal constitutionalism. 
In Germany, the accumulated social, economic and political 
pressures of the 1830s and 1840s resulted in the outbreak in 
March 1848 of a series of popular uprisings. These 
(Stadelmann,1975) started in the relatively liberal south-
western states such as Baden and Wuerttemberg and spread 
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northwards and eastwards. So great did the threat to the 
established political structures appear, that numerous German 
rulers, including the King of Prussian and the Emperor of 
Austria, felt obliged to make numerous political concessions. 
The Carlsbad censorship laws were repealed and there were 
promises of reforms in the spirit of liberal constitutionalism, 
including universal suffrage and increased parliamentary 
powers. 
Most significant for this thesis are the changes that were 
promised in the nature of the German federation. On 21 March 
1848, no less a figure than Friedrich Wilhelm IV of Prussia 
promised that Prussia would take a lead in transforming the 
German ·Staatenbund" into to a "8undesstaat". Ten days later, 
the German "Vorparlament" (Pre-Parliament) met in Frankfurt 
under the chairmanship of Heinrich von Gagern. In the 
Frankfurt Paulskirche on 18 May 1848, it convened the 
the "Nationalversammlung" (National Assembly), which was 
charged with the task of drafting a new German federal 
constitution. 
In the many months during which it debated, the situation 
gradually changed back in favour of the conservative forces, 
with both Austria and Prussia reasserting the power of their 
respective crowns. Moreover, the rivalry between these two 
German superpowers intensified, with the result that one of 
the main bones of contention within the Assembly was whether 
the proposed new federation was to include the whole of 
Germany (the so-called "grossdeutsch" solution, or whether it 
was to exclude Austria (the so-called "kleindeutsch" 
solution) (12]. The final decision was made easier by the 
fact that on 4 March 1849, Emperor Franz-Joseph of Austria 
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promulgated a new, centralised constitution for his Empire 
and ordered troops to disperse the Austrian Imperial Diet, 
which at its meeting in Krems had proposed a federal 
constitution for Austria. For the majority of the members of 
the National Assembly, the Austrian Emperor's actions 
effectivley ruled Austria out of the German federation. 
On 28 March 1849, the National Assembly debates resulted 
in the passing of a new federal constitution for Germany 
[13]. Its main provisions were as follows. First, Germany was 
to be a constitutional monarchy. Second, it was to have a 
bicammeral par1 iament ("Reichstag"), the upper house of which 
was to be a House of states ("Staatenhaus"), in which the 39 
constituent states of the German federation were to be 
represented in rough proportion to their population (Para.87). 
Thus Prussia was to have 40 representatives, while small city 
states such as Bremen were to have merely one representative 
[14]. Half the members of the Staatenhaus were to be 
appointed by the governments of the states and half were to 
be elected by state legislatures and all were to serve for 
six years (Paras.87-9). The lower chamber was a "Vo1kskammer" 
(People's Chamber), that was to have budgetary powers (Para. 
103) and to which reprsentatives were to be popularly elected 
for a three year period. The intention was that the elections 
be on the basis of universal suffrage, though the precise 
details were left for subsequent regulation (Paras.93 &94). 
Third, the federation was to be headed by an elected, 
hereditary "Emperor of the Germans· (Paras.68-70). He was to 
be a constitutional ruler, whose powers were limited to a 
suspensive veto, which he could only exercise three times 
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on a given issue (Para.101). Fourth, the imperial ministers 
were to be reponsible to the Reichstag (Para.121-122). Fifth, 
the federal state was quite prescriptive in a range of areas. 
For example, it established a lengthy catalogue of civic 
freedoms, including due process, religious tolerance, 
freedoms of speech, assembly, petition and the press (Paras 
130-89). The federal authority also had powers of taxation 
and established a common currency, weights and measures, as 
well as provisions for a free internal market (Paras 20-67). 
For many, the crucial stipulation was that federal law breaks 
land law (Para.193). Finally, the constitution passed by the 
National Assembly established a "Reichsgericht" (Imperial 
Court), the powers of which included deciding disputes 
between the imperial and state governments regarding their 
respective competences (Paras.125-9). 
This elaborate constitution was to no avail, however. 
Friedrich Wilhelm IV refused the offer of the imperial crown 
and by early summer the National Assembly was in a state of 
disarray. On 18 June 1848 it came to an ignoble end, when 
troops expelled the remaining members. 
Austro-Prussian rivaly, which had for some time been a 
major factor militating against German unity, was further 
exacerbated by Prussia's decision in May 1849 to revive 
Heinrich von Gagern's kleindeutsch plan, albeit in a 
conservative spirit. It did so by means of the "Three Kings' 
League- ("Dreikoenigsbuendniss") of 26 May 1849, which 
initially included just Saxony and Hannover, but whose 
membership was open to all other German states bar Austria. 
The League convened the Gotha Conference of 28 June 1849, 
from which the "Union Plan" emerged. The three major changes 
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which the latter proposed to the National Assembly's federal 
constitution were as follows (Stahl,1849a). First, Friedrch 
Wilhelm IV was to exercise the executive power of the 
federation as the "Reichsvorstand" (Imperial Directorate), in 
which capacity he was to be armed against the decisions of 
the Reichstag with an absolute veto. Second, the lower 
chamber of the Reichstag was to be elected not by popular 
sovereignty, but by a system of three-class suffrage such as 
was eventually adopted in the Second Reich. Third, there was 
to be a seven-man Fuerstenkollegium, (Princely Collegium) led 
by Prussia, in which six other rulers of the constituent 
states of the federation were to share central legislative 
authority with the Reichsvorstand. 
The Union Plan was approved in March 1850 by the largely 
conservative Erfurt Parliament and have thus come to be known 
as the "Erfurt Plan". Prussia clung to the latter until 
November 1850 when, in face of the threat of all-out war with 
Austria, it gave way and signed the Olmuetz Punctuation. This 
led to the Dresden Conference of December 1850 to March 1851, 
which removed reform of the German federation off the 
immediate governmental agenda, restored the pre-1848 German 
Bund and meant the end of German liberals' hopes of 
constitutional reform. 
In switzerland, the attempts from 1830 to 1848 at 
constitutional reform were, as indicated above, argued by 
Catholics to bean attack upon their religion. It is "thus 
not surprising that they met with implacable opposition by 
the rural, conservative, Catholic cantons. For example, the 
1832 "Rossi Pact", the proposals of which have many 
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similarities with the structure of the post-1848 federal 
state, was rejected out of hand by conservative cantons, not 
that that cooled the ardour of liberals, who kept the topic 
of reform of the Pact on the Diet agenda. 
For their part; Catholic conservatives responded to the 
liberal cantons' establishment in 1832 of the "Concordat of 
the Seven" by forming their own defensive league (the League 
of Sarnen). Liberal Aargau's 1841 abolition of its monastries 
and the raids in 1844 and 1845 by ,gangs of radicals of the 
territories of their Catholic confederate.cantons (the 
so-called "Fre;scharenzuege") merely provoked the Catholics 
more •. Luzern's invitation to the Jesuits to undertake an 
educative role in the·canton and the 1845 establishment of 
the ~SonderbundN among the Catholics provided.the 
legitimation for .the liberals to issue an ultimatum and, 
eventually, for the outbreak of the·short civil war of 1847, 
which finally ,resolved the issue of federal reform in favour 
of liberal and radical nationalists. In short, while 
liberalism failed ;n Germany, it succeeded in Switzerland. In 
that it determined the constitutional and political context 
of Germany and Switzerland, this distinction was to be of 
considerable significance for the subsequent development of 
federalism in those countries. 
4.3. SUMMARY AND STRATEGY 
The preceding section of this chapter has provided a 
comparison of the most important background factors of the 
German and Swiss federations between 1815 and 1850. The task 
of this final section is to outline how this thesis intends 
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to move from identifying the context of Germanic federalism 
to an examination of its content and development during this 
period. 
As was mentioned above, the dominant political, factor in 
both Germany and, Switzerland was the conflict between liberal 
and conservative perspectives of man and society. Not 
", :'. 
surprisingly, this was reflected in views about how the 
respective federations should be organised and both groups 
thus utilised federalism. The ~hird major political force of 
this period, namely, nationalism, was also utilised by both 
groups. 
During 1815 to 1850, there were the beginnings of the 
political organisation of the Weltanschauungen identified in 
Chapter 3 above. This fact is reflected in the structure 
adopted for our presentation of Germanic federalism between 
1815 and 1850. In order to provide the clearest overview of 
the development of Germanic federalism in these two countries 
between 1815 and 1850, it has been decided to organise that 
presentation on the basis of the political families that 
. ' 
availed themselves of federalism. The advantage of such a 
presentation is its enhanced comparative structure, as well 
as the fact that it helps highlight the ideological nature of 
.federalism. 
Accordingly, Chapter Swill illustrate the manner in which 
German and Swiss conservatives used Germanic federalism, 
while Chapter 6 will be devoted to an elucidation of the 
use of federalism by German and Swiss liberals. In view of 
the fact that Swiss federalism has received even poorer 
coverage in the Anglo-Saxon literature than German federalism, 
both chapters 5 and 6 will pay special attention to 
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illustrating the development of Germanic federalism in 
switzerland, though this will not involve any neglect of 
similar developments in Germany. 
After a short introduction, Chapter 5 will initially 
analyse how German conservatives used federalism. Section 
5.2.2. will consider the federalism of reactionary German 
conservatives, while 5.2.3. will be devoted to that of status 
quo and reformist German conservatives. Thereafter, 5.3. will 
offer an examination of the federalism of conservatives in 
Switzerland. The utilisation of federalism by reactionary 
Swiss conservatives will be examined first. In 5.3.3., the 
focus of attention will be the Swiss reformist conservative 
-juste-milieu·, the federalism of which was intended to 
provide what they considered to be a just compromise 
between the demands of conservative and liberal extremists. 
Chapter 6 is devoted to illustrating the use between 1815 
and 1850 of Germanic federalism by liberals. First, the case 
of the federalism of moderate and radical German liberals 
will be considered. The presentation in Chapter 6.3. of the 
federalism of the two main strands of Swiss liberalism in the 
pre-1848 period will also be undertaken under the rubrics of 
moderate and radical liberalism. At the end of both Chapter 
5 and Chapter 6, there will be a summary of the material 
considered, in which the opportunity to compare and contrast 
the use of Germanic federalism within the two countries will 
be taken. 
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NOTES FOR CHAPTER 4 
1. Since the separation of Austria from the German Bund did 
not take place until after the period covered by this 
chapter, -Germany· will again be taken to include latterday 
Austria. 
2. A case could be made for ending the period to be covered 
in Part 3 of this thesis in 1848, since that year marks the 
year of revolutions throughout Germany and the introduction 
in switzerland of a new federal constitution. However, eit has 
been decided to include the period up to 1850, since this 
enables the thesis to address not only the federalism that 
preceded the 1848 revolutions in Germany, but also the use 
made of federalism in the two crucial years of 1848 to 1850, 
when the promise of 1848 was finally dashed by the return to 
the old German Bund. 
3. An extensive range of-sources was used for this section, 
including the following: Barraclough (1972); Baumgartner 
(1853/4); Blackbourn/Eley (1984); Bluntschli (1875); Bonjour 
(1939 & 1948); Bonjour et.al (1952); Bruckmueller (1985); 
Buessem (1874); Carr (1972); Duerrenmatt (1948); Duersteler 
(1911); Fleiner (1898,1901,1916 & 1918); Frei (1964); Gass 
(1922); Gassner (1926); Gilliard (1977); Goerlich/Romanik 
(1977); Gruner e(1956,1956a,1957 & 1977); Gruner/Haeberli 
(1955); Gutknecht (1917); Hertz (1975); His (1920 & 1920-38); 
Holborn (1965); Huber (1965); Hunziker (1970); 1m Hof (1981); 
Institut fuer Oesterreichkunde (1963 &'1969); Jaggi (1948); 
Kann (1974); Kleindel (n.d.); Krieger (1957); Lauber (1910); 
Ludwig (1911); Macartney (1969 & 1978); Mann (1958); Mannheim 
(1986); Martin/Beguin (1971); Meinecke (1928); Nabholz 
(1918); Poggi (1978); Puttkamer (1955); Radvany (1971); 
Rappard (1948); Schefold (1966); Schuster (1980); Stadelmann 
(1975); Steinberg (1980); Streiff (1931); Tenbrock (1969); 
Thomson (1966); Tripp (1940); Troxler (1838); Voegelin (1952); 
Weinzierl (1963 & 1969); Wild (1966) and Winter (1969). 
4. On foreign powers' interest and participation in Swiss 
political changes up to 1848, see especially Streiff (1931) 
and Voegelin (1952). 
5. The new full members of the Swiss federation were the 
French-speaking cantons of Neuchatel and Wallis (which 
because of its mountain passes Napoleon had incorporated 
into France in 1810), and Geneva. 
6. The Burschenschaften's Wartburg Festival of October 1817 
was held to celebrate the tercentenary of the Lutheran 
Reformation and the fourth anniversary of the Battle of 
Leipzig. The Festival was designed to revitalise German 
nationalism and to promote German national unity. Though most 
of the Festival was a solemn occasion, it closed with the 
burning by radical students from Jena of anti-national and 
reactionary books. Despite the fact that the immediate 
significance of these events was not great, they contributed 
to conservative mistrust of German nationalism and to the 
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1819 Carlsbad Decrees. 
7. For the importance and formative influence of economic 
interests in nineteenth century Switzerland, see Gruner(1956 
& 1956a), or Masnata-Rubatte1 (1978). For similar 
considerations regarding Germany and Austria, see for example 
Blackbourn/Eley (1984) and Bruckmueller (1985) respectively. 
8. As Chapters 5 & 6 will show, whilst military considerations 
were one factor motivating federalism, they were by no means 
the only consideration. Moreover, the examination of Germanic 
federalism between 1815 to 1850 will further underscore the 
conclusion of Part 2 that political motivations were more 
important, thus again disproving Riker's (1964 & 1975) 
hypothesis about the primacy of military considerations (see 
1.2 above). 
9. Re: Troxler, see Troxler, (1822,3), re: Pfyffer and 
Munziger see Baumgartner (1853/4,1,168f). Munziger was also a 
member of the 1832 Rossi Commission (Acte Federa1,1832,61), 
for details of the federalism of which see Chapter 5.3.3. 
below. On the development of Swiss nationalism, see Flach 
(1916), Frei (1964) and Hunziker (1970). 
10. Unfortunately, the time limits of this thesis mean that 
this very interesting example of federalism lies beyond our 
remit. It will only be alluded to briefly in Chapter 7. See 
for example Fischhof (1869), Thun (1875) and Renner (1899 & 
1902). 
11. The conflict in Switzerland between the hardening liberal 
and conservative blocks was in some respects analogous, 
albeit cearly not identical, to the Austro-Prussian rivalry 
in the German Bund. First, like the Austrians and Prussians, 
the liberals and conservatives had initially agreed on the 
new federation and had co-opereted in its running. Second, 
the increasing conflict between the Swiss conservatives and 
liberals on the one hand and between Austria and Prussia on 
the other constituted one of the main obstacles to federal 
reform. The respective weak central authorities were in no 
position to counter the division of both federations into two 
opposing camps. This was so advanced in Switzerland, that 
both regenerated and conservative cantons found it necessary 
to create extra-constitutional alliances with like-minded 
confederate cantons in order to provide the common security 
which the Pact failed to give them. 
12. The terms "kleindeutsch" and "grossdeutsch" may be 
translated as Lesser Germany and Greater Germany respectively. 
They denote the labels applied to two opposing proposals 
concerning the extent which the revised German federation 
should take. Broadly speaking, the former designation refered 
to proposals which excluded Austrian membership and were 
often predicated upon Prussian dominance. On the other hand, 
those advocating a "Grossdeutschland" solution were in favour 
of Austrian membership. Sometimes, this meant Austrian 
preponderance, as in the case of the March 1849 proposals of 
the Austrian Minister-President and Foreign Minister: Field 
Marshall Schwarzenberg. He proposed (Carr,1972,57) that the 
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newly centralised Austrian Empire of 38 million persons unite 
into a confederation with the German Imperial Confederation 
of some 32 million persons. This union between the 
kleindeutsch German confederation and the Austrian Empire was 
to be headed by a seven man directory, the leadership of 
which was to alternate between Prussia and Austria. There was 
also to be a Chamber of Estates, in which Austria would have 
38 and Prussia only 32 seats. Predictably, Prussia was not 
impressed with the proposal. 
13. We' can only discuss its broad outline here. For the text 
of the constitution, see Schuster,(1980,29-56). 
14 There was provision for Austria to have 38 representatives, 
but in view of the fact that it was unlikely to participate, 
those seats were redistributed to the remaining states, 
pending Austria's participation. 
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CHAPTER 5: CONSERVATIVE GERMANIC FEDERALISM 
FROM 1815-1850 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter is concerned with the use of federalism by 
German and Swiss conservatives during the 1815 to 1850 
period. As has already been stated in Chapter 4, though there 
were at this time as yet no political parties in the modern 
sense, the various political doctrines that together 
comprised conservatism were sufficiently distinct for their 
proponents to be an identifiable, albeit not necessarily 
organised, set of political groupings. Within that spectrum 
of conservative political thought, it is possible to identify, 
on the basis of their responses to the challenges to the 
established regimes, three categories of conservatives. These 
are (Epstein,1966,7-11) reactionary, status quo and reformist 
conservatives. 
Since as has been argued above (see Chapter 1.3), 
federalism is also best understood as a response to a set of 
specific problems at a given point in time, Epstein's 
classification offers a useful strategy for the presentation 
of conservative federal isms. Accordingly, the structure of 
this chapter reflects Epstein's distinction. It will look 
first (5.2.2. and 5.3.2.) at the federalism of reactionary 
conservatives who responded to the challenge to established 
regimes by utilising federalism in their demand for the 
re-restablishment of an idealised past. Thereafter (5.2.3. 
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& 5.3.3.), the chapter will examine the federalism of the two 
remaining types of conservatism. The first are those of 
status QU~ conservatives whose response to threats to the 
established order included the use of federalism to 
legitimate the existing political regimes. Finally, this 
chapter will look at examples,of reform conservat~ves who 
used federalism,in their attempt to accommodate as many of 
the demands for progressive reform as they thought compatible 
with their underlying conservative principles [1]. 
The Germanic federalism of German and Swiss conservatives 
, , 
will be discussed consecutively. The advantage of dealing 
with German and Swiss conservative federal isms in this way is 
, 
that it facilitates the elucidation of , the development.of the 
specific domestic, political debates of which their various 
federalisms,constituted a part. That is not to deny that some 
conservative exponents of Germanic federalism (e.g. Haller, 
Jarcke and.Bluntschli) made a ,sizeable impact in more than 
one, German-speaking country. Indeed, that cross-border 
influence helps underscore the contention of this thesis that 
these countries share,a common tradition of federalism. 
However, in order to avoid duplication, such federal isms will 
be considered only once and their impact elsewhere will be 
indicated. by cross-references. 
,Chapter 4.further explained that since the Anglo-Saxon 
literature has neglected Swiss federalism even more than that 
of Germany. Part 3 of , this thesis will pay special ,attention 
to the development of Germanic federalism in Switzerland. 
Combined with the fact that the federal isms of Haller and of 
Bluntschli will, in order to avoid the the kind of duplicaion 
just mentioned, be considered in the section on Switzerland, 
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this chapter will refer to more examples of Swiss, rather 
than German conservative federalism. 
Nonetheless, coverage of the latter will still be more 
than adequate to fulfil the main aims of Chapter 5 of this 
thesis. It will be recalled (see Chapter 1.3 above) that 
these are firstly to demonstrate the multidimensionality of 
the Germanic tradition of federalism and thus to disprove 
Livingston's (1952) assertion about the nature of federalism. 
Second, it is intended that Chapter 5 illlustrate, by 
reference to the earliest antecedents of modern conservative 
political parties, the use within existing federations of 
federalism as a political ideology. In this latter endeavour, 
the validity of the Riker hypotheses (1964 & 1975) regarding 
the allegedly universal relevance of his "military· and, ~ 
"expansionist" conditions (Chapter 1.2 above) will be tested. 
5.2. CONSERVATIVE GERMANIC FEDERALISM IN GERMANY 
5.2.1. INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 3 amply demonstrated that during the revolutionary 
Napoleonic period, federalism was widely used, for the 
defence and or promotion of their political interests, by 
reactionary, status quo and reformist conservatives (Epstein, 
1966,7-11).' The aim of section 5.2~ of this thesis is to 
illustrate how all three types of German conservative 
continued to use federalism as a political ideology during 
the period from 1815 to 1850. To this end, the types of . 
federation proposed by a selection of exponents of 
conservative Germanic federalism will be identified, as will 
the purposes which they hoped that those federations would 
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realise. 
The following subsection will consider the use of 
federalism by reactionary German conservatives by reference 
to the'writings of Jarcke and Goerres. In section 5.2.3., the 
focus will switch to the federalism of status quo and 
reformist German conservatives. Stahl will be used as an 
example of the former, while Heeren will be used to 
illustrate the federalism of the latter. 
5.2.2. THE FEDERALISM OF REACTIONARY GERMAN CONSERVATIVES 
The most influential reactionary German conservative of 
the Restoration was undoubtedly (Fleiner,1916,12) Karl Ludwig 
Haller, after whose Restoration of Political Science (Haller, 
1816/20) the whole 1815 to 1830 period was named. Haller's 
greatest political influence was exercised not in his native 
Switzerland, but in Germany (Meinecke,1928,223-77). Yet since 
Haller's earlier contributions to Germanic federalism took 
place in Switzerland and were discussed in that context in 
Chapter 3.3. above, it is proposed that the federalism which 
Haller articulated during the period with which this chapter 
is concerned will be covered not here, but in the section of 
this chapter which deals with the federalism of reactionary 
Swiss conservatives (see 5.3.2. below). 
The first reactionary German conservative who will be 
covered in this subsection is the criminologist and publicist, 
Karl Ernst Jarcke (1801-1852), who was influential not only 
as a writer and academic, but also politically. The latter 
influence was exercised first within the Berlin conservative 
circle surrounding Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm of Prussia, 
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(where Haller too was a significant force) and then in Vienna, 
where in 1832 Jarcke was appointed to succeed Gentz at the 
head of the Austrian Imperial Chancellery. Jarcke has been 
described as "Haller's most devoted disciple" (Hertz,1975, 
206) and there is no doubt that Jarcke held him in high 
esteem. For example, he says of Haller that by defending 
private freedom against absolutism, ..••• of all the writers 
that have ever lived, it is perhaps above all he he who has 
understood the spirit and character of German freedom most 
profoundly and consistently" (1839,I,133f). 
One of the main vehicles used by Jarcke in his attempt to 
popularise the reactionary views of the Haller school was the 
catholic-conservative Berliner Politisches Wochenblatt, which 
he founded in 1831 for the express purpose of using it as an 
anti-revolutionary weapon (Jarcke,1839,I,1-3) [2]. Jarcke was 
the Wochenblatt's first editor and a regular contributor to 
it throughout the 1830s. Many of those contributions were 
subsequently published as a collection of essays and it is 
upon that collecti~n (Jarcke,1839) that the following 
discussion of Jarcke's views as to the nature and purpose of 
the German federation will be based. 
A self-confessed counter-revolutionary (e.g.1839,I,1-30), 
Jarcke shares Haller's opposition to natural law and social 
contract theories of the state, which he considers 
incompatible with the sanctity and inviolability of legality 
(i.e. of established property rights) and thus as harbingers 
of revolution and absolutism [3], Instead, Jarcke (1839,111, 
37-55) identifies three basic types of state: patrimonial, 
theocratic and military, arguing that all three derive from 
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the original familial state. He further contends that they 
owe their development to and are characterised by, rule of 
the strongest and service by the weaker. Of the three basic 
types of rule, he considers the patrimonial type to be the 
most natural and durable. 
Despite the obvious similarities which this theory 
exhibits with that of Haller (see 5.3.2. below), to which 
Jarcke frequently acknowledges his debt (e.g.1839,II,212f, & 
111,413), examination of Jarcke's contributions to the 
Wochenblatt (1839,I-III) shows that Jarcke differs from 
Haller in at least two important respects. First, Jarcke 
contends that revolution and absolutism are the ungodly fruit 
of Greco-Roman paganism, transmitted to the present day via 
Aristotle (1839, 11I,32f) and concludes that while the 
historical school and Haller's Divine right theory have 
brought welcome advances for the theory of the state, even 
greater emphasis must be placed upon religion, if revolution 
and absolutism are to be successfully countered (e.g.1839,1, 
106f & 111,20-31) [4]. Futhermore, he not only maintains that 
Divine will alone constitutes the basis of all positive 
rights and political obligation, but also appears to accept 
biblical teachings literally (e.g.1839,1,20f; & 111,35-41) [5]. 
Second, Jarcke places less emphasis than Haller upon the 
unrestricted right of the strongest to impose his will and 
more emphasis upon the principle of the legal autonomy of 
self-governing corporations (e.g.1839,I1I,39f & 1,138-43). 
Indeed, one of the most characteristic features of Jarcke's 
theory of the state is his vision of the state as consisting 
of the exisiting property rights of individuals and 
corporations and of self-government (e.g.1839,I,75;II,281-312 
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& 111,382f). For Jarcke, autonomy constitutes the core 
element of the Christian-Germanic state tradition (e.g.1839, 
I,131 & I1I,382f). Thus he asserts that "for all Germanic 
peoples, freedom consists primarily of autonomy within a 
certain sphere" (1839,I,117) • 
• Jarcke (e.g.1839,1,14-30; 63-81 & 114-31) considers this 
autonomy to be subject to a twofold threat. On the one hand, 
it is under attack from natural law theorists and liberal 
constitutionalists, who use appeals to nationalism, state 
interests, popular sovereignty, or social welfare to claim 
for the state a right to restrict, or even abolish, individual 
r 
and corporate freedoms. On the other hand, Jarcke also argues 
that autonomy is threatened by rulers' personal desires for 
self-aggrandisement. Though Jarcke tries to defend him from 
the accusation of being absolutist (1839,1,133f), it is clear 
that Haller logically must come into the second category of 
persons whom Jarcke alleges threaten autonomy. This is 
evident from his explicit refutation of those such as Filmer 
who use patriarchy to argue for statist absolutism (e.g.1839, 
1II,39). 
Having summarised Jarcke's theory of the state and 
highlighted those aspects that are distinct from that of his 
fellow reactionary, Haller, it is time to consider in more 
detail Jarcke's use of federalism. In accordance with the 
declared aim of this thesis, we shall seek to establish what 
type(s) of federation Jarcke envisages, as well as the 
purposes he uses federalism to realise. As is the case with 
the post-1815 writings of Haller (see 5.3.2. below), Jarcke 
does not offer detailed reflections on the structure and 
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functioning of federations, but his writings do afford. 
interesting insights into the political purposes which many 
reactionary conservatives wished the German Bund to promote. 
Despite his emphasis upon a hierarchical and patrimonial 
theory of the state, Jarcke (1839,III,56f) concedes that 
there can be what he refers to as "special circumstances", 
where there is an equality of power between two or more 
patrimonial rulers. Neither being able to overawe the other, 
they will contract to collaborate in ruling and to offer each 
other mutual assistance (1839,III,56f). The resulting 
structure is a federation ("8und"), a form of division of 
rule between numerous members with equal rights. In order to 
distinguish federations from what he considers the more 
natural and viable form of rule, namely, hierarchical 
monarchies, Jarcke (1839,32-64) also refers to them as 
"associations" (Gesellschaft, or Gemeinschaft), or as 
"republics" and stresses that they are both an exceptional 
and, by virtue of their likely instability, inferior form of 
rule. In support of this argument, he quotes Haller's 
contention that association "is the source of all strfie" 
(cited in Jarcke, 1939,1II,60). 
Applying this approach to the German Bund, Jarcke argues 
that, after the interregnum of foreign domination, the 
several rulers of the German territorial states were in a 
situation of equality of power and none felt inclined either 
to sacrifice that power, or to take on the burden of a 
powerless crown. The German states therefore had no option 
but to unite into a federation of equa) sovereign units. In 
short, Jarcke regards post-1815 Germany as an interstate 
confederation, created in the final analysis not by free 
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human contract (for that would be to accept a contractualist 
view of the state), but by necessity (1839,III,56f). The 
federation is composed of autonomous territorial units, in 
most of which, rule is based upon land ownership sanctioned 
by Divine will (1839,111,32-64 & ibid,93-105). 
Inasmuch as Jarcke emphasises a corporate structure to his 
state, there are superficial similarities between his theory 
and that of Althusius, and one might be tempted to conclude 
that Jarcke also conceives of an intrastate-corporate 
federation. However, closer inspection shows this not to be 
the case. First, Jarcke does not propose that the autonomous 
corporations unite as the component parts of a federation, 
with the central authority being subject to the collective 
sovereignty of the former. It is not the internally 
hierarchical corportaions, but the territorial units in which 
they are located that Jarcke sees as the members of the 
federation. Second, though Jarcke at times uses the word 
"republic· to describe the federation, this is meant to 
denote merely the equality of the members and thus to 
differentiate it from a hierarchical system of rule. It 
should not be taken to imply any commitment by Jarcke to 
popular participation in the federation, let alone to popular 
sovereignty. This is evident from his statement that the 
units of federations are not be the peoples, but freely 
contracting territorial rulers (1839,111,378-410). It will be 
recalled that by contrast, Althusian federalism is very much 
predicated upon the sovereignty of the body politic (see 2.2. 
above). 
Having established that Jarcke regards the German Bund as 
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constituting what this thesis has defined as an interstate-
confederal type of union, the next task is to consider the 
political purposes which he hopes that federation will 
promote. One could take as a starting point for answering 
that question, Jarcke's assertion (1839,111,62) that the 
German Bund owes its creation to a perceived need for common 
defence against external threat. It ;s necessary, however, 
to go further and to ask what it is that he wishes the German 
Bund to defend. The answer is simple: Jarcke thinks the prime 
purpose of the federation is the defence of what he terms 
"legitimacy·, by which he means the protection of established 
individual and corporate rights of property. 
Jarcke does consider the possibility that self-seeking 
rulers can threaten those rights and thus argues for the 
establishment, within each component unit of the federation, 
of constitutions based upon estate representation, so as to 
ensure that they have as little central legislation and as 
much decentralised autonomous administration as possible 
(1839,111,281-312). However, his paramount concern is defence 
against the threat which he feels is posed by liberals' 
appeals to popular sovereignty and equality. 
As was explained above (see Chapter 4.2.), two of the most 
important constitutional commitments of the German Bund were 
to the institutution in each member state of constitutions 
based upon representation by the estates, as well as its 
formal commitment (reinforced informally by the "Metternich 
system") to the defence of property and traditional rights. 
One might therefore presume that Jarcke's federalism is 
merely a rationalization of the existing federal structure 
and is thus an example not of reactionary, but of status quo 
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conservatism. Viewed in this light, the Divine authority 
which he alleges the patrimonial rulers of the territorial 
states of the German Bund possess amounts to little more than 
a legitimation of the principles of the exisiting federation. 
However, Jarcke is not a status quo, but a reactionary 
conservative. Though his federalism supports it, his ideal is 
not the existing German Bund. He sees even Restoration Germany 
as dangerously vulnerable to liberal constitutionalism and 
thus as prone to statist absolutism. In an attempt to counter 
such perceived threats, Jarcke (1839,I,61-3) advocates much 
stricter censorship than even he believes is likely to be 
introduced. However, the main strategy of his federalism is 
to defend the interstate-confederal German Bund. He does this 
not out of any real commitment to confederation for Germany. 
As will be recalled, Jarcke argues that such federations 
emerge as historical necessities, but, unlike hierarchical 
monarchies, are not even durable, let alone desirable. In 
other words, the German interstate confederation is for 
Jarcke purely a means to an end. He believes that while it 
lasts, it offers opportunities for the feudal social, economic 
and political structures he desires to be established within 
it. 
The long-term ideal behind Jarcke's federalism is a return 
to the pre-Reformation Holy Roman Empire, which he considers 
(1839,III,61f) to have been a state, under the ultimate 
authority of its imperial ruler. What Jarcke wishes to see 
"restored" in Germany is therefore a state comprising a 
sovereign central imperial authority and numerous primarily 
monarchical constituent units that enjoy territorial 
247 
supremacy, but are none the less subordinate to the 
sovereignty of the Emperor. Though Jarcke does not say so 
explicitly [6], it is probable that he wishes to see a 
restoration of the Habsburg dynas~y to the imperial throne 
and of a strong role for the Catholic Church. This is hinted 
at in his assertion in an 1835 essay (Jarcke,1839,I,373f), 
that the old, theocratically-based German Reich destroyed by 
the Reformation was "the most noble rule in the whole of 
Christendom and the most sublime idea which history has ever 
produced". Moreover, as was mentioned above, Jarcke was a 
Catholic who in 1832 left Protestant Berlin for Vienna, where 
he was appointed to head the Austrian Imperial Chancellery. 
Regretably, Jarcke's discussion in his Mixed Writings of 
the nature of his ideal German Empire is rather vague. 
Accordingly, though his ideal Reich sounds remarkably similar 
to that of Leibniz and Goerres (see 2.3 & 3.2 above resp.), 
it is not possible to be certain whether Jarcke regards that 
Reich as a simple state, or as what this thesis (see 2.4 
above) has classified as an intrastate-imperial federation. 
What is certain, however, is that Jarcke provides a good 
illustration of how some reactionary German conservatives 
used federalism in an instrumental fashion, as a means of 
moving towards their reactionary ideal. 
The next exponent of Germanic federalism to be considered 
in this section is the enigmatic Goerres, whose federalism 
during the Congress of Vienna (Goerres,1814-16) was discussed 
in Chapter 3.2 above. There is some dispute about whether it 
is appropriate to designate him a reactionary conservative 
[7]. It will be recalled that although Goerres was a commited 
liberal revolutionary in his early life, by the end of the 
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Napoleonic period he has become a Romantic German nationalist. 
During the period with which this chapter is concerned, 
Goerres becomes what Aris (1936,320) describes as "perhaps 
the most outstanding representative of Catholic political 
thought in Germany". By 1827, when he takes takes a chair of 
history at Munich, Goerres' orientation has long since become 
markedly clerical-conservative. He is a contributor to a 
number of Catholic-conservative journals and the leading 
light in the Munich "Eos Circle", whose demand is the 
independence of the Catholic Church from the state (and above 
all from Protestant states), as well as the subordination of 
all temporal authority under that of the (Catholic) Church. 
In response to the 1837 "Cologne Conflict" regarding the 
status of the Catholic church in Protestant Prussia, Goerres 
publishes Athanasius, which is directed against Prussia's 
policies of state secularisation (Huber,1965,107-26). From 
this time on, Goerres is seen by all progressive elements as 
the leading German spokesman of an ultramontane and intolerant 
political Catholicism (Goerres,1854-74). 
It is not Goerres' Catholicism per se that have inclined 
this thesis to include him under the rubric of reactionary 
German conservatism. Instead, it it the political uses he 
makes of that Catholicism, especially his desire to return 
Germany to an idealised past. That is not to deny that 
Goerres retains a few vaguely liberal sympathies. Example are 
his enduring commitment to popular representation and his 
opposition to unearned privilege (eg.1819,100). However, the 
overwhelming thrust of his writings (Goerres,1854-74; Schorn, 
1934) is that of a reactionary conservtive. 
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At the time of the Congress of Vienna, Goerres (1814-16, 
see 3.2 above) proposes a German intrastate-imperial 
federation. By means of an accommodation of Protestant 
Prussia and Catholic Austria under the leadership of the 
latter, the federation is to bring about a synthesis that 
will restore what Goerres holds to be the ancient powers of 
not only the German Kaiser, but also of the estates and the 
Papacy. The Federal Act of 1815 was of course to cruely 
disappoint Goerres' hopes. In the last few months of 1815, 
Goerres uses the Rheinischer Merkur (Goerres,1814-16) to 
express his deep disappointment at the loose nature of the 
German Bund and bitterly accuses the German princes and 
Prussia in particular, of a selfish refusal to make 
sacrifices for the German cause. On 3 January 1816, Prussia 
responds by prohibiting further publication of the Merkur. 
Our concern here is Goerres' subsequent contribution to 
Germanic federalism. It stared some three years later, in a 
book entitled Germany and the Revolution (Goerres,1819), 
where he again attacks Prussian policies regarding German 
unity and spells out his view that German national unity 
cannot long be postponed by the puny resistance of the German 
princes. Friedrich Wilhelm Ill's response to this renewed 
attack on Prussia is to issue a warrant for Goerres' 
arrest, which he only avoids by fleeing to Strassbourg and 
to Switzerland. In 1821, Goerres publishes a similar book 
under the title Europe and the Revoultion, but thereafter 
devotes himself primarily to ecclesiastical matters, though 
there are some interesting comments on federation to be 
found in his 1845 essay on The Moral of the Events in 
Switzerland (Goerres,1854-74,9, 257-76). The following 
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exposition of Goerres' federalism in the period after 1815 
will be based upon the three sources just identified. 
Goerres' Germany and the Revolution (1819) was written in 
direct response to the Carlsbad Decrees of that year (see 4.2. 
above), which had justified their clamp down on expressions 
of liberalism and nationalism by alleging that Germany.was 
the target of a revolutionary conspiracy. Though Goerres 
(1819,89-97) rejects this allegation and claims the German 
princes are overreacting, heis·(1819,47) scathing about the 
"pale colourless generality" of the Federal Act produced by 
the Congress of Vienna and says of the latter that 
it was to summon a Diet in which it is not 
the majority of votes that count, but where 
. decisions can only be made unanimously. A pure 
democracy, the Demos of which comprises the 
courts of the various opinions, interests and 
power relationships; a central authority which 
stands not above, but below the encompassed 
parts; an executive authority that ;s powerless 
and, because it cannot act against those who do 
not concur, is not in a position to bring about 
anything at all, since it will never be able to 
get a dissenting voice to agree; a legislative 
. authority which may never define its own competence, 
and a judicial authority which nobody is constrained 
to obey, in which all of the policies of the 
authorities are eternally sought by means of an 
interminable diplomacy, but are never found ..• 
Goerres patently shares the nationalist frustration of the 
Burschenschaften (i.e. the immediate targets of the Carlsbad 
Decrees). He too sees the German interstate confederation as 
a betrayal on the part of the people in whom Germany nad 
placed great hope for the creation of national. unity. As he 
puts it himself (1819,40), if there is a conspiracy, then 
it is one which 
the times of unrelenting arbitrariness, the. 
mechanisms of dead structures and the senseless, 
despotic maxims of· governments have caused to be . 
hatched against them by incensed nationalism, 
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betrayedhopes,£mistreated pride and a life of 
oppression. 
Goerres responds to his disappointment in Germany's human 
masters by retreating 'into his mystical historicism. There 
are, he asserts (1819,97-99), mighty forces of nature 
inexorably propelling Germany towards rejuvenation through 
greater national unity. Goerresregards the. German Bund as an 
attempt to stop these forces and insists that, try as they 
might, the governments will not succeed. He warns (1819,101) 
that if they persist in their opposition to these elemental 
forces, the German governments will not only inevitably lose 
the struggle, but will also cause the change to be a violent 
revolution. Its outcome will be to wipe away all Germany's 
dynasties, break all church institutions, eradicate the 
aristocracy, introduce a republican constitution and then 
. . 
overthrow the whole rotten European state structure. The 
revolution of the title of Goerres' book ;s therefore not a 
product of human conspiracy, but a revolution which the 
, r 
world governing spirit of history will bring about if'the 
governments do not bow to it. This Romantic notion of an 
omnipotent world spirit determining mankind's destiny is of 
course already in evidence in Goerres' earlier federalism 
(1814-16, see 3.2. above). 
The manner in which Goerres articulates his federalism in 
1819 is also similar to that in the Rheinischer Merkur, 
though his Romantic mysticism is if anything even more 
pronounced (1819,eg.39f & 98f). For example, he says (1819, 
97) that the nation is pressing towards unity and that this 
pressure is like the growth of a tree and the blowing of the 
wind; no human efforts can stop its advance. Continuing with 
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the former image, Goerres (1819,98) says: 
a heavenly bolt of lightning has struck the German 
oak; its crown has become a spindly nest, only 
the roots in the soil and the core of the trunk 
continue to green strongly and forcefully, and 
must throw out new shoots aloft ..• This is why 
the who1e'of German history has for over three 
hundred years been about withering and aridness; 
that is why all our institutions extend only naked 
and withered branches into society; that is why 
all things formal are decayed, rotten, weather-' 
beaten and decomposed; that is why a spirit of 
putrefaction stalks our state structure; as in'a11 
ruins, one can hear, on the walls and foundations, 
a Quiet rustling, as though the teeth of Time were 
gnawing at the ~tucture. 
Goerres (1819.98) describes the mystical world spirit in 
language that virtually defies comprehension, let alone 
translation, and concludes that it is the ideas emanating 
from this spirit which hold states together and inspire them 
(literally: "give them their souls"). How this happens is 
beyond even Goerres' ability to fathom. He merely notes 
(1819,99) that in times of of great transition such as that 
presently facing Germany. 
shafts of lightning crack through society and 
inflame all heads like a contagion; one does not 
know how this inflammation is spread, whether 
through inhalation, through some medium that 
unites everyone. be it linguistic, pictoral, or 
. some other secret empathy? in short,"all people 
suddenly become of one mind. 
Goerres (1819,102-6) believes that Germany's mediaeval 
society had a commendable unity of structure and purpose and 
identifies (1819,106-31) three of its features as having been 
especially significant in fostering this unity and the great 
cultural and scientific life which he maintains distinguished 
that period. The first is the division of authority between 
the secular. imperial realm and the spiritual, ecclesiastical 
realm, with the latter being prior to the former. The second 
feature relates to the roles of, and relative importance 
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ascribed to, the monarchical and republican principles. 
Though Goerres defends the notion of a balance between them, 
he clearly regards the former as superior. This is evident 
from the fact that he perceives the institutions he values 
most, namely, the imperial dignity and the Catholic Church, 
as having been the purest repositories of the hierarchical 
monarchical principle. This leads to the third feature that 
Goerres deems to have been highly significant for the success 
of mediaeval society: the assumption by the Catholic Church 
of the leading role in the crucial spiritual realm. 
Given th~se views, Goerres' prescription for contemporary 
Germany is predictable. It corresponds in all essentials with 
that he articulated during the deliberations of the Congress 
of Vienna (Goerres,1814-16, see 3.2 above) and it is therefore 
not necessary to go into it in detail here. In brief, Goerres 
wishes to see Germany become an intrastate-imperial 
federation, in the form of a reconstituted Holy Roman Empire. 
There is to be a bicameral federal assembly, comprising an 
estates-based and a princely chamber. Since the Catholic 
Church has continued to exhibit the greatest spiritual 
purity, it will assume the leadership role in the spiritual 
dimension and Protestantism will, it appears, have to 
accommodate itself to this. Secular and ecclesisatica1 
authority are to be exercised by the Emperor and the Pope 
respectively, but with the latter de facto superior. 
Goerres is convinced that this intrastate-imperial 
federation will be brought about by the elemental forces 
described earlier, notwithstanding the possible resistance of 
the German princes. For example, he states (1819,97) that one 
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consequence of the above mentioned mystical contagion will be 
that the local assemblies of estates will assert themselves 
nationally and establish a popular representation alongside 
the Bundestag. In due course, the need for the unity provided 
by a head will become evident and the imperial dignity will 
come back into its own (1819,97). Goerres would of course 
prefer the co-operation of the princes and his book 
constitutes a call for them to recognise this force and to 
respond by establishing the necessary national unity before 
it is imposed upon them, or they are all wiped away before 
it. 
In his Europe and the Revolution (1821), which is also 
articulated in an emotive, mystical and often religious 
style, Goerres applies essentially the same argument to the 
European level. He again (1821,eg.279f) alleges that there 
are mystical and irresistable forces at work, to which 
European governments must accommodate themselves. If they do 
not, the consequences will be disastrous (1821,eg.273-80). He 
repeats his attack on the German interstate federation (1821, 
eg.258-61), which he considers wholly insufficient for 
Germany's needs and thus a betrayal of the national cause. It 
has, he maintains (1821,261), made Germany a "diplomatic 
fiction ft • He again (1821,eg.284) stresses the need for 
estates-based representation both locally and at the centre 
of the Holy Roman Empire, whose revival he seeks. Finally, 
Goerres (1821,eg.268) is even more insistent about the 
primacy of Catholicism over Protestantism. 
To summarise, Goerres' 1819 and 1821 contributions to 
Germanic federalism both demonstrate first, his complete 
rejection of interstate confederation for Germany. Unlike 
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Jarcke, Goerres does not consider it to offer a basis upon 
which his reactionary ideal might gradually be built. Second, 
they confirm Goerres' commitment to an intrastate-imperial 
federation as the ideal German constitution. Third, Goerres' 
contributions to Germanic federalism illustrate not only the 
fact that some reactionary Romantic German conservatives used 
intrastate-imperial federalism to promote their political 
ends, but also the distinctive and often inscrutable language 
in which that federalism was articulated. Behind that language 
lies a fourth aspect of Goerres' federalism that deserves to 
be stressed: his idealism. Goerres is another example of that 
group of contributors to Germanic federalism whose federalism 
is couched in an idealist philosophy. Other examples include 
Kant and Fichte (see 3.2. above), as well as Stahl, Fries and 
Troxler (see 5.3.2., 6.2.2. & 6.3.3. below resp.). One 
consequence of such idealist philosophies is a belief that 
the essence of the federations being discusssed lies not in 
structures and institutions, but in the ideals they embody. 
This explains why Goerres frequently (eg,1819,131f & 1821,132 
-6,270 & 284) expresses scepticism in the power of structures 
and prefers to place his faith instead in two related 
elements. The first is his mystical world spirit and the 
second is religion. 
This brings us to a final and important point about 
Goerres' post-1815 federalism. In Chapter 3.2., it was shown 
how Goerres, who had started out as a supporter of the French 
Revolution, had by 1815 largely become a mystical Romantic 
conservative, whose federalism was informed by an expansionist 
German nationalism and a desire for the influence of the 
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Catholic Church to be extended. None the less, his articles 
in the Rheinischer Merkur still contain both traces of his 
earlier cosmopolitanism and a degree of tolerance vis-a-vis 
Protestantism. After the establishment of the German Bund, 
even these mitigating elements decline. Especially from the 
1820s onwards, Goerres becomes increasingly intolerant. This 
is not only reflected in the books in which Goerres 
articulates his post-1815 federalism, but actually leads to 
changes in emphasis regarding the purposes for which Goerres 
uses federalism. This is most evident in how Goerres now 
approaches the two main goals of his earlier federalism: 
nationalism and catholicity. 
The nationalism of Goerres' post-1815 federalism is much 
more xenophobic. In Europe and the Revolution (1821,256), for 
example, he speaks of the "animalistic" Russians as "Slavs 
and slaves". German external security will, he assures his 
readers (1821,251f), be guaranteed by 
a cordon of colonisation, running from the Baltic 
to the Black Sea,- and by locating a warrior caste 
exactly according to the principles of feudalism, just as'was organised by the former settlements of 
the Cossacks in the Ukraine. 
This would keep such lesser races at bay from the German 
nation, which in 1838 (Histor;sch-polit;sche Blaetter, cited 
in Schorn,1934,115), Goerres refers to as being rooted in the 
soil tilled by its ancestors and having not only remained 
independent, but having also kept its blood pure. In sum ,it 
becomes increasingly obvious that a major motivation behind 
Goerres' later federalism is racist nationalism and crude 
expansionism. It is thus provides an excellent example of 
where both the military and the expansionist condition 
posited by Riker (1964 & 1975) apply. However, it ;s also 
257 
necessary to ask what the purposes of that expansionism 
include. As will now be shown, they relate in the main to his 
political Catholicism. 
The second area in which Goerres' increasing intolerance 
impacts upon the federalism he articulates between 1815 and 
1848 is that related to his ever more radical ultramontanism. 
Indeed, it is now no longer nationalism that constitutes the 
prime concern of Goerres' life, but catholicity. Consequently, 
his interest in federation is now also restricted solely to 
its significance for catholicity. Goerres' preoccupation with 
how federations impact upon the confessional dimension is 
very well documented in a little known essay from 1845. That 
essay sets itself the task of identifying the moral of recent 
events in Switzerland, where, under the leadership of Bernese 
radicals, bands composed largely of Protestant radical 
liberals (the so-called Freischaarenzuege, see 4.2 above), 
have invaded Catholic-conservative Luzern with the intention 
of overthrowing its government and forcing the expulsion of 
the Jesuit order. 
Goerres"essay is not only replete with"religious'imagery 
(eg.1845,260f), but is also uncompromisingly hostile to 
Protestantism. Thus unlike in 1814 (Goerres,1814-16,eg.124f), 
when he argues that the-Reformation was a necessary and 
legitimate stage in the historical development of 
Christianity, Goerres now (1845,258) unequivocally condemns 
the Reformation and the Protestantism which caused it as the 
very source of revolution, radicalism and absolutism. When he 
later,·{1845,273) calls for accommodation between Catholicism 
and Protestantism, that appeal is therefore not very' 
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convincing. However, the best evidence for the fact that 
Goerres is now only interested in federation when it impinges 
upon religious matters is his enthusiastic endorsement of a 
speech by Schleuniger, a Swiss parliamentarian from the 
canton of Aarau opposed to the Freischaarenzuege, around 
whose comments the whole of Goerres' essay revolves. 
In admonition of the radicals' activities, Schleuniger 
states (Goerres,1845,261) that "confessionality, cantonality 
and federation" are the ethical principles of Swiss history. 
Goerres approves of these sentiments, but contends (1845,262) 
that the actual ethical law of contemporary Switzerland has 
recently been shown to be "no confessionality, no cantonality, 
no federation, other than through the majority in the hands 
of the strong!" The Freischaarenzuge's principles he 
describes (1845,263) as 
no federation, if it stands in our way, the 
majority of the sovereign people is to be the 
federal government (Bundesherr); no confessionality, 
down with the Church, it is to be torn down and 
its millions are to join the others we have 
already taken possession of; finally, no 
cantonality; the borders of Bern are in future 
to be the borders of Switzerland. 
Moreover, Goerres (1845,264) accuses the Swiss federal 
authorites of having washed their hands of the Catholic 
cantons, despite being aware of the latter's innocence. He 
attributes this to the desire of the Protestant-dominated 
Vorort (the directoral canton temporarily in charge of the 
federal government) to allow the Freischaarenzuege to bring 
about a Protestant hegemony in Switzerland. 
Goerres sees this issue not only as the crucial issue of 
the Swiss Eidgenossenschaft, but also as highly relevant to-
the exisiting German confederation. That is in fact the major 
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"moral" which his review of Swiss events identifies. 'It is 
evident from Goerres' claim that the desire to use federation 
to attack catholicism is to be found in Germany also, 
where it appears that similar calculations are 
quietly being made. Indeed, it appears as though 
the pressing conditions revealing themselves in 
Switzerland are a mere dageurreotype of ours. 
Confessionality, independence of the members of 
the federation, both recognised in complete 
parity, are the ethical law of contemporary Reich 
history; they agreed this between themselves in 
Vienna at the Congress, and Germany put up with 
it. There are now, it appears, those amongst us 
who, like Bern and its associates, would like get 
at our cantonality, and to this end use 
confessionality as a handy pretext; and there 
are again others who, like the Protestant radicals 
amongst the Freischaaren, throw up cantonality, in 
order to overthrow confessionality. 
In short, Goerres' prime goal is no longer nationalism, 
but catholicity. His interest in and assessment of the 
workings of the extant Swiss and German federations are 
related exclusively to the extent to which those federations 
affect the position of catholicism. Though his ultimate goal 
remains a return Europe to the twin rule of imperium and 
sacerdotium (see Chapter 2 above) in a German intrastate-
imperial federation, his order of priorities clearly places 
confessionality before cantonality and federation and regards 
the two latter primarily as vehicles for the former. 
Our consideration of the federalism of German reactionary 
conservatives is now complete. Before proceeding to examine 
that of status quo and reformist German conservatives, there 
will be a brief summary of the findings of this section. 
Though is only to be expected that persons who reject the 
notion that man is intellectually capable of producing social 
and political blueprints for and ideal society would not map 
out in great detail the federations which they wish to see, 
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there are still a number of interesting points that emerge 
from the above discussion of the federalism of Jarcke and 
Goerres. First, it has been demonstrated that they both 
conceive of interstate-confederal federations. While neither 
Jarcke nor Goerres see a German confederation as their ideal, 
they differ considerably, however, as to whether it is to be 
condemned out of hand, or regarded as a means to their 
reactionary ideal. The former view is espoused by Goerres, 
the latter by Jarcke. 
Second, the ideal of both reactionary German conservatives 
considered here is the creation of a German Empire, in the 
mould of the Holy Roman Empire. Yet while Goerres clearly 
perceives that Empire to be an intrastate-imperial 
federation, Jarcke's writings are not sufficiently precise to 
allow one to say for certain whether he regards his ideal 
Empire as a federation, or as a single state. Third, the 
federalism of both Jarcke and Goerres is clearly related to 
the promotion of their political (including social and 
religious) ends. Though there are differences of emphasis 
between them, there is no doubt that their federalism is 
designed to bring about a conservative, feudal social and 
political structure and to promote the position of 
Catholicism. In addition, Goerres' federalism is in part 
motivated by an expansionist German nationalism. 
Finally, the federal isms of Jarcke and Goerres have in 
common the advocacy of what came to be known as the 
grossdeutsch solution to the German problem (see 4.2 above). 
That is to say, they used federalism as a means of moving 
towards their ideal German state, which was to include all 
the states of the German Bund. Moreover, conservative 
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Austria was to assume the leadership role within that 
federation. It is perhaps no coincidence that Jarcke and 
Goerres were devout Catholics and looked to the Habsburg 
Empire to guarantee the interests of Catholicism, as well as 
those of their reactionary political conservatism. -
In, both repects,-the aims of their federalisms were often 
very different from those of status quo and reformist German 
conservtives, whose federalism is the topic of the next 
section of this chapter. 
5.2.3. THE FEDERALISM OF STATUS QUO AND REFORMIST GERMAN 
CONSERVATIVES 
This section will discuss the substance and motivations of 
the federalism of German status quo and reformist 
conservatives by reference to the contributions to the 
Germanic tradition of federalism made by Stahl (1845,1849, 
1849a,1850 & 1856/6) and Heeren (1817) respectively. 
Friedrich Julius Stahl (1802-1861) [8] was born in, 
catholic Bavaria of a Jewish family and initially received a 
rabbinical education. In 1819, .however, asa result of the 
influence of a group of immigrant north German Protestants, 
Stahl became a devout convert to the Lutheran faith. As a 
student at Wuerzburg, Stahl was a prominent Burschenschaftler 
and developed into an ardent, conservative German 
nationalist, motivated by the ideal of a Germano-Christian 
state (Masur,1930,56) [9]. While studying .at Heidelberg in 
1821, Stahl first_encountered Zachariae's defence of the 
monarchical principle [10] J a principle that was to become an 
enduring core of Stahl's own political theory. Heidelberg 
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also brought Stahl into contact with the Romantics and 
Savigny's historical school, from whom Stahl was, however, 
later to distance himself, since he felt they lacked an 
emphasis upon religious matters (Masur,1930,99f). 
In the 1830s, Stahl developed his own political theory, 
which he published in his Philosophy of Right, the two parts 
of the first edition of which appeared in 1830 and 1837 
(Stahl,1854/6). Described by Bluntschli (1867,631) as being 
flawed and yet "epoch-making in Political Science", it posits 
the state as a "sittliches Reich" (ethical commonwealth), the 
authority of which derives not from rational natural law and 
popular sovereignty, or from the Law of Nature, but from the 
fact that it is a direct manifestation of God's grace (see 
below). On the strength of that treatise, Stahl entered an 
academic career, in the early stages of which he held chairs 
in jurisprudence at Wuerzburg and at Erlangen, which Masur 
(1930,62) describes as the "spiritual home of Protestant 
Franconia N • The Philosophy of Right also brought Stahl to the 
attention of Friedrich Wilhelm IV of Prussia, who in 1840 
called him to a chair at Berlin. 
The move to Berlin constitutes something of a watershed in 
Stahl's life. Previously, Stahl's significance lay primarily 
in the realm of political theory, rather than in that of 
political practice [11]. Stahl's career throughout the late 
18405 and the 1850s, however, is characterised by his 
energetic and high level political involvement'in the struggle 
against liberalism and radicalism, which experienced their 
high-water mark in 1848 (see Chapter 4.2 above). Stahl was 
active both in the Prussian First Chamber, to which 
Friedrich Wilhelm IV had appointed him for life 1849 and in 
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the 1850 Erfurt Parliament. He became the "intellectual head 
of the conservative party in Prussia during the 40s and 50s" 
and the -most outspoken fighter for the conservative idea" 
(H.Schmidt, 1914,2 & 5). Stahl gradually took over from 
Haller as the theoretician to whom conservative German 
monarchs looked for a legitimation of their rule [12]. His 
political views exercised considerable influence not only 
upon Friedreich Wilhelm IV and through him on Prussian 
politics (eg.Meinecke, 1928,263-86), but also (eg.H.Schmidt, 
1914) upon the shape which the Bismarckian Second Reich 
subsequently took. 
The Second Reich lies outside the scope of this thesis, 
however, the focus of which is limited to the development of 
Germanic federalism up to 1850. An understanding of the 
contribution which Stahl's participation in the debate on the 
future political structure of Germany made to Germanic 
federalism necessitates at least a broad understanding of 
both his political philosophy and his general theory of the 
state [13], a brief summary of which will now be given. 
Stahl (1854/6,IIi,viii-x) contends that for a century and 
a half, authority has been widely held to derive from human 
will and contract and concludes (1854/6,IIi,viii) that "the 
core of the whole approach to which this modern rational-
pantheistic philosophy belongs is the denial of the living 
God". He argues (1854/6,IIi,xviiif) that modern philosophy 
"must recognise the simple fact that God created the world in 
accordance with His free will ... " and that "human reason is 
merely one valuable science among others and not the master 
science above all other sciences". Stahl (1854/6,IIi,xxxi) 
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perceives a fundamental struggle "between Christianity and 
the de-Christianisation of the civilised world" and calls for 
a reassertion of the importance of Divine revelation, order 
and providence as superior to human will and contract. He 
maintains (1854/6,IIii,229) that "The conservative principle 
rests upon the true ethical spirit, namely, upon submision to 
higher Divine Providence, ••• while radicalism rests upon 
presumption". 
Thus while Stahl has in common with status QUO conservatives 
such as Puetter and Leist (see 2.3 and 3.2 above) a dislike 
of liberal theories of the state and a desire to provide a 
philosophy which legitimates the status quo, unlike them, 
Stahl's theory is not predicated upon a glorification of 
positive law as such. Indeed, his lengthy review of the 
history ,of political thought (1854/6,1) differentiates between 
empirical and ethical theories of the state [14] and concludes 
that the former are inferior. Stahl explicitly (e9.1854/6, 
IIi,x; IIii,1-203 & 143-51) rejects rational, or contract 
theories of the state, such as those of Kant and Fichte [15], 
as well as the patrimonial theories of reactionary 
conservatives such as Haller, whom he accuses (1854/6,I1ii, 
5-20; 119-28; 133; 141-3 & 1845,iv-x) of being blind to the 
ethical purpose of the state and falsely regarding it as an 
institution for rule by a prince in his personal interest. 
Instead, Stahl asserts the sole valid theory of the state to 
be an ethical theory based upon Christianity. 
In short, while he believes in the value of positive law, 
Stahl (1854/6,eg.IIi,218) considers it to be binding not by 
virtue of the mere fact that it is law, but because it is 
largely the product of "the ideas and demands of the Divine 
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world order-, that is to say, of Providence. Stahl insists 
that he is not arguing for the dependence of positive law 
upon Nature (as Haller appears to), or upon a higher rational 
law (as is the case with Kant and Fichte), but merely (1854/6, 
11;,218) that Divine will provides the basis of positive law, 
and the yardstick in accordance with which it is to be 
judged. It is also important to note that while Stahl asserts 
that the state has a Divine foundation, he is careful 
(e.g.1854/6,llii,116-9) to make it clear that he does not 
. 
mean that the state is the direct product of God, nor that 
instructions issued by state authorities are themselves 
Divine. While a state instruction which is contrary to God's 
commandments does not cease to be legal, since the state 
remains the source of legality, it is not morally binding. 
Accordingly, Stahl's theory provides for freedom of the 
person - as when he states (1854/6,IIii,181-3) that God has 
given man complete freedom as to whether or not to follow His 
moral commandments. In practice, however, his commitment to 
the principles of the Lutheran faith means that in cases of 
conflict between the individual and the state, Stahl's 
prescription (eg.1854/6,llii,Ch19) amounts to passive 
obedience. 
Having given a brief outline of Stahl's philosophy, the 
two main ways in which it is reflected in his general theory 
of state will be highlighted. These relate on the one hand to 
the purposes which he argues that the state is to promote and 
on the other hand, to how it is to be structured. 
Unlike Haller (see 3.3 above and 5.3.2. below), Stahl (eg. 
1854/6,11ii,49-63 & 229) distinguishes clearly between the 
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private and the public domain (and thus between civil and 
political rights). The concerns of the private realm are 
temporal, or bodily needs, while the concern ,of the public 
realm relates to man's higher, spiritual, or ethical ends. For 
Stahl (1854/6,IIii,131f), the state is therefore "a collection 
of persons united under a sovereign rule for the purpose of 
promoting a sittliches Reich (ethical commonwealth)" and has 
a threefold purpose: "human welfare, the realisation of the 
extent of creative and productive ideas and the rule of 
sanctity and justice" [18). However, Stahl insists (1854/6, 
1Iii,151-61) that the state is entitled to interefere only in 
the communal, as opposed to the private, spheres of human 
life. 
Stahl's notion of a sittliches Reich is central to an 
understanding of both the purpose and the structure which his 
general theory of the state prescribes. Thus he' says (1854/6, 
IIii,2f) that the sittliches Reich' implies 
the necessity of an authority completely superior 
to mankind, i.e. the appeal to obedience and 
respect, which is to be granted not merely to the 
law, but to a real power external to man: the 
authorities (state power) (The principle of 
legitimacy as opposed to that of popular 
-sovereignty), and at the same time ". also 
constitutes the limit to this authority, i.e, the 
necessity of state law passed down through history 
and superior to the prince and the people and 
alterable only in accordance with its own terms 
(the true constitutional principle), and finally, 
'the recognition of the nation (the obedient) as 
an ethical community, free by virtue of being 
-subordinate to the law, as the expression and 
demand of their own ethical nature. 
Stahl (eg.1854/6,IIii,xxvii), believes a sittliches Reich 
requires the state to be organised in accordance with two 
central principles. The first is that of a monarchy based 
upon Divine grace. He refers to this as the "principle of 
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legitimacy". Stahl argues (1854/6,IIii,211-18) not only that 
monarchy is preferable to other types of political system, 
because they all require sovereignty to be exercised by an 
"artifical- structure (1854/6,IIii,211), but also (1854/6, 
IIii,243-52 & 332f) that the best form of monarchy is the 
hereditary variety in which the king is completely sovereign; 
that is to say, where he exercises both legislative and 
executive authority independently. Stahl (1854/6IIii,288-94; 
320-33 & 1845) dismisses liberal constitutionalism on the 
grounds that by elevating the constitution above the crown, 
it undermines the principle of a Divine monarchy [17]. 
That brings us to the second organisational principle of 
the sittliches Reich. Stahl (e.g.1854/6,I,289) predictably 
rejects liberalism and its notion of popular sovereignty as 
revolutionary [18]. While he agrees with the principle of 
representation, what he proposes (eg.1845 & 1854/6,IIii, Chs. 
8f) is an assembly which would de facto be structured on the ' 
basis of the estates. Among his justifications for this are 
his assertion (1854/6,IIIii,317-33; 1945.iv & 1850,viif) that 
such a system represents the people as it really is, namely, 
as organised around the estates and not as the atomised mass 
which he accuses the liberal constitutional principle of 
assuming. Though Stahl is not very specific about the 
details, it is clear that the estates are to have the right 
of consultation and of approval of only certain limited 
catergories of legislation (1854/6,IIii,193), since the 
principle of a independent sovereignty of the monarch must be 
maintained [19]. 
So far, this discussion of Stahl has outlined his 
political philosophy and his general theory of the state, as 
268 
they were articulated in his writings up to the mid-1840s. It 
has been shown that Stahl's method of legitimising the German 
status quo is based upon refuting liberals' and radicals' 
demands for parliamentary constitutionalism, political 
equality and popular sovereignty by means of an assertion of 
the Divine foundation of the state and of the monarchical 
principle. 
It is now time to move to a consideration of what Stahl's 
writings up to the mid-1840s reveal about his federalism. 
Stahl (eg.1845,1 & 43f) points out that the declared prime 
purpose of the German Sund is the preservation of the 
monarchical principle. He claims (eg.1845,34-41) that the 
latter is the foundation stone of German constitutional law 
and of German political wisdom and must (eg.1845,2-11) be 
defended against the parliamentary principle. He believes 
(e.g.1845,iiif & 1f) that the monarchical principle is 
incompatible with the principles of popular sovereignty and 
separation of powers, which inevitably lead to party rule 
and, ultimately, to the de facto abdication of the monarch 
and the establishment of a republic. Not surprisingly, Stahl 
ad~ocates the maintenance of the existing rules of the German 
Sund, as a means of ensuring that such "revolutionary" 
principles are not realised. In short, Stahl regards the 
German Bund as an interstate-confederation, the contracting 
parties to which are not the peoples, but their sovereign 
territorial rulers. Moreover, its prime purpose is for him 
the defence of the existing monarchical systems of rule and 
the avoidance of moves towards liberal constitutionalism and 
popular sovereignty. 
269 
Up to the late 1840s, Stahl is thus a status quo 
conservative, whose main concern lies in the provision of an 
alternative philosophical legitimation of the monarchical 
structures existing within the states of the German Bund. His 
interest in that confederation is limited to passive support 
of it as the the best guarantor of the monarchical status quo. 
The position of a status quo conservative is always 
precarious, however. As Epstein (1966,8) points out: 
The main difficulty confronting the Status Quo 
Conservative is the fundamental hopelessness of 
his over-all goal - hopeless because of the 
ever-changing nature of the status guo he seeks 
to defend. 
Stahl becomes acutely aware of this problem in March 1848, 
when widespread popular uprisings foreshadow radical changes 
in German politics. On the one hand, there is the almost 
universally expected transformation of the German federation 
from an interstate to an intrastate union. Since Stahl has 
retained his youthful commitment to German nationalism, he 
welcomes that prospective change, as well as Friedrich 
Wilhelm IV's public promise to playa leading role in it 
(H.Schmidt,1914,30f). But there is a second, and from Stahl's 
perspective highly undesirable, major change which the events 
of 1848 appear to portend. It is clear from the revolutionary 
nature of the 1848 uprisings and from the National Assembly 
which they spawned, that the demands for reform threaten also 
to replace the German monarchies with republics. The liberal 
constitutionalism and popular sovereignty which Stahl has 
argued against for two decades seems about to descend upon 
him. 
Faced with this apparently irresistable radical threat to 
to the status quo and thus to his elaborate theory of the 
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state, Stahl's initial resoponse is to despair (H.Schmidt, 
1914,20f). Yet by the summer of 1848, he starts to engage in 
the federal debate himself, in order to minimise change and 
defend his cherished twin principles of monarchical authority 
and largely symbolic, estates-based representation. Thus 
while federation received scant attention in Stahl's earlier 
writings, from 1848 to 1850 (Stahl,1849,1849a & 1850), it 
becomes their central concern. It cannot be the task of this 
thesis to chart every twist and turn in what was a detailed 
and ongoing debate. Instead, it is intended to illustrate 
Stahl's contribution to Germanic federalism by focussing 
first upon the federalism he articulated in the summer of 
1848 (Stahl,1849 & H.Schmidt,1914,20-6) and then upon that 
which he set out in the summer of 1849 (Stahl,1849a). 
The first occasion after the revolutions of March 1848 
that Stahl puts pen to paper on the future structure of the 
German federation is in a series of five articles published 
in the conservative newspaper: Die neue Preussische Zeitung 
(or Kreuzzeitung) [20] during July to September 1848. While 
he approves of the intention to convert the German Bund into 
a Bundesstaat [21], Stahl opposes many of the proposals being 
discussed at the National Assembly. Among the points he makes 
(Stahl,1849 & H.Schmidt,1914,20-26) are first, that the new 
federal constitution must have the consent of the German 
princes. Second, he says that until such time as it is agreed 
to, Prussia must retain its sovereignty. Third, Stahl 
maintains that Prussia must insist first, on the abandonment 
of what Stahl regards as the excessive centralisation being 
mooted by the National Assembly in favour of the guaranteed 
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independence of the German states and second, upon Prussia 
receivin! an appropriate share of the power of the proposed 
central authority. Stahl's fourth general point in response 
. . 
to the National Assembly's debates is his rejection of 
representation in the upper federal chamber being based upon 
the states as states, which he considers to be not in keeping 
with the monarchical nature of most of the constituent units 
of the German federation. Finally, Stahl concludes that by 
virtue of the relative size of its non-German population, 
Austria is unsuited to be a member of a German Bundesstaat. 
In the Kruezzeitung articles, which were published as a 
collection of essays in December 1848 (Stahl,1849), Stahl ;s 
using federalism as a weapon of political defence. He is 
defending both the particular interests of Prussia and also 
the monarchical principle against the demands of liberal 
constitutionalists. H.Schmidt (1914,19) implies that Stahl's 
lack of "preconceived ideas as to the future state structure" 
is a reflection of his willingness to consider change. That 
is to neglect the fact that Stahl's contributions in the 
summer of 1848 to the debate on Germany's future are taking 
place in the context of a grave threat to the political cause 
with which Stahl identifies and that it is this which induces 
his federalism to be primarily reactive, or defensive. In 
short, Stahl must be seen as a status quo conservative, whose 
status QUo is rapidly sinking and who ;s therefore doing his 
best to salvage of it what he can. Though the federalism 
Stahl articulates in the summer of 1848 hints at some of the 
main features of his views on the best federation for 
Germany, it is primarily concerned with the demerits of the 
discussions in the National Assembly and does not amount to 
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a federal prescription or theory in its own right. 
By the summer of 1849, the political situation is very 
different and as a consequence, so is Stahl's federalism. 
Towards the end of 1848, both the Austrian and Prussian crown 
had successfully reasserted their domestic authority and the 
liberal concessions made earlier that year were rescinded. 
The newfound strength of the German governments caused the 
position of the National Assembly to weaken. Stahl's personal 
situation had also changed; with his appointment in January 
1849 by Friedrich Wilhelm IV to the new Prussian upper 
chamber, Stahl had acquired a political platform from which 
to air his federalism (see Stahl,1850 & H.Schmidt,1914,esp.26 
-31). When the National Assembly collapses in the spring of 
1849, Stahl supports Friedrich Wilhelm's decision to sieze 
the initiative in the matter of German federal reform and in 
June, he publishes what has been described (H.Schmidt,1914, 
31) as a "brilliantly written essay" that forms "the pinnacle 
of Stahl's participation in the task of German unification". 
That essay (Stahl,1849a) constitutes the second and final 
example of Stahl's federalism of 1848-50 that will be 
considered here. 
Its main purpose is to offer a critical comparative 
analysis of the National Assembly's constitution and the 
Union Plan of the Three Kings' League. Their main features 
were outlined above and it is not our intention to recount 
Stahl's detailed discussion of them here [22]. It is not they 
and Stahl's predictable preference for the Union Plan (albeit 
I 
with modifications) that make Stahl's Reichsverfassung (1849a) 
fascinating for this thesis. Instead, it is the fact that it 
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offers not only a clear picture of Stahl's general views as 
to the nature and function of federation, but also a good 
illustration of his use of federalism to promote his 
political goals. The following discussion the federalism 
contained in Stahl's Reichsverfassung will address three 
issues. The first is the types of federation Stahl envisages; 
the second relates to the contours of the federation he 
proposes for Germany. Finally, the ways in which that 
federalism relates to promoting Stahl's political goals will 
be considered, that is to say, how Stahl uses federalism as a 
political ideology. 
Stahl (1849a,77-9) accepts the distinction between simple 
and composite states and applies the label "Staatenstaat" to 
the latter category, which he says comprises two types of 
federation: the ·"Staatenbund" and the "Bundesstaat". Stahl 
then proceeds to distinguishe between them in a routine 
manner. In a Staatenbund, sovereignty is located in the 
constituent members of the federation, and the rulings of the 
central authority are therefore binding only insofar as'they 
are promulgated by those constituent units themselves. The 
reason for this is that the Staatenbund is an interstate 
confederation; it is based purely upon a contract, or 
alliance, between separate states. Failure of the latter to 
conform with the r~lings of its central authority and even 
seccession are thus merely breaches of contract. 
In a Bundesstaat, by contrast; sovereignty is located in 
the centre, which directly applies its binding rulings upon 
the peoples of the'individual constituent states of the 
federation. Though the constituent governments of the 
Bundesstaat have a considerable' sphere of independence, it 'is 
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the centre that is the supreme power in the federation.'The 
Bundesstaat is an intrastate federation that provides a'real 
"union N or "unity· of states. Accordingly, disobedience of 
its commands and secession both constitute rebellion. 
So far, Stahl's general classification of federations is 
quite conventional. The Bundesstaatand Staatenbund which he' 
identifies correspond to the federations which this thesis 
has termed interstate-confederal and intrastate-territorial. 
It is with the next step of'its argument that, Stahl's 
federalism begins'to become distinctive. Tucked away in a . 
footnote (1849a,79), Stahl makes the crucial statement that 
It is not of the essence of a'Bundesstaat that the' 
sovereign people of the whole territory act as its 
constituent body and are institutionalised within 
it. That certainly happened in North America, yet 
not in consequence of it being a Bundesstaat, but 
in consequence of its democratic constitution ... 
and it can therefore have no relevance for a 
Bundesstaat without a democratic constitution .••. 
Equally unrelated to the essence a Bundesstaat ;s 
its governmental structure; in republics as well as 
in monarchies, government can be with or without 
popular representation. 
This aside is they key to a full understanding of Stahl's 
Rei chsverfassung , which might otherwise appear to be a rather 
disjointed essay. It amounts to a subdivision of the 
category of eundesstaat into its republican and monarchical 
variants and is a direct response to German liberals such as 
those in the National Assembly, who contend that popular 
representation and constitutionalism are intrinsic to the 
Bundesstaat and thus interpret the undertakings by the King 
of Prussia and others to make Germany into a Bundesstaat as 
commitments to establishing a German federation characterised 
by liberal constitutionalism and popular representation [23]. 
Stahl's insistence that the monarchical and republican types 
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of Bundesstaat are distinct and irreconcilable constitutes 
one of the main themes of his essay, which may be summarised 
as an attack upon the National Assembly's deliberate mixing 
of the two principles, as well as upon the failure of the 
Three Kings' League to disentangle them adequately [24]. 
Having established how Stahl classifies federations, it is 
time to consider what type of federation he wishes Germany to 
adopt. He states (1849a,11) that "The abandoned Bundestag 
must be replaced; the undertaking to move from a Staatenbund 
to a Bundesstaat must be honoured". A major factor inclining 
him to this'view is his long held commitment to the "noble 
and well founded desire of the German peoples for national 
unity·· (1849a,3). However, Stahl also maintains (1849a,12) 
that "It would be a disservice to German unity if one were to 
wish to bring it about through the sacrifice of Germany's 
monarchical foundations·'. Of the two types of Bundesstaat he 
has identified, Stahl therefore predictably wishes to see 
Germany opt for the monarchical type. 
Stahl is a political realist and his essay therefore 
frequently limits its proposals regarding the structure of a 
German monarchical Bundesstaat to what Stahl believes to be 
politically feasible. None the less, it is possible to glean 
from Stahl's Reichsverfassung the main contours of the 
Bundesstaat he would wish to see established. It is to 
comprise all the member states of the German Bund (1849a,29), 
with the exception of Austria, which is at best to have a 
confederal relationship with the Bundesstaat as a whole 
(1849a,85-93). (The reasons Stahl offers are Austria's 
centralised internal constitution of March 1849 and its 
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non-German interests.) Prussia is to exercise a dominant role 
(1849a,eg.30f), with the King of Prussia assuming the title 
of "Kaiser- and Prussia also having a large representation 
in the Reichstag (federal parliament). 
In the latter, the constituent states of the Bundesstaat 
are to be represented in proportion to their size (1849a,29f), 
though Stahl (1849a,25) agrees that many of them are too 
small to be viable and proposes voluntary fusion between 
their ruling dynasties. Moreover (1849a,28f), their rulers 
are to be members of the Reichstag in their capacity as 
princes, which he defends by stating that "though the prince 
represents the state, the state in no way represents the 
prince". When the latter are not present, their votes will 
therefore be cast by ambassadors bound to their prince's 
instructions. This "Fuerstentag" (Princely Chamber) will 
share legislative authority with the Kaiser, who will retain 
a right of absolute veto, as well as exclusive executive 
authority (1849a,32-41). Though Stahl's preference (1849a,25) 
is for a unicameral Reichstag, with popular representation 
at the federal level limited to meetings of ad hoc committees 
of the various constituent units' chambers of estates, he 
concedes (1849a,26) that political pressure might require a 
second, popular chamber. If it does, he would prefer a 
system of representation based upon the estates, but should 
there have to be direct popular elections to it, he would 
accept (1849a,30) the Union Plan's proposal for a three-class 
franchise based on property as a necessary evil. 
In sum, Stahl's federalism of 1849 proposes a Bundesstaat, 
in which all republican and liberal constitutional elements 
envisaged by the National Assembly constitution and the Union 
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Plan are deleted. The monarchical principle dominates in both 
the constituent units of the federation and in the central 
authority. Though the federation contains a Kaiser, he does 
not exercise sovereignty alone, but in conjuntion with the 
German princes. Accordingly, Stahl's monarchical Bundesstaat 
does not correspond to what this thesis has termed an 
intrastate-imperial federation. Instead, it is a variation on 
the theme of intrastate-territorial federation. The eminently 
political motives of Stahl's proposed Bundesstaat are made 
abundantly clear in the following assertion (1849a,41): "The 
task of the present day is not democracy, but the protection 
of monarchy, order and civilisation, of the true national 
power against democracy" 
Though Stahl's 1849 federalism proposes unification of the 
German nation into a single state by means of a monarchical 
Bundesstaat, it is-not federation itself, nor even German 
national unity which Stahl is primarily seeking to bring 
about. It is instead "what he refers to as a "Reich", that is 
to say, a state characterised by the pursuit of an "ethical 
commonwealth" (sittliches Reich) [25]. This is evident in 
Stahl's defense of his monarchical Bundesstaat by alleging 
(1984a,9) that a republican type would deprive the German 
state of its ethical basis (which, it will be recalled from 
the above discussion of Stahl's general theory of the state, 
Stahl argues can only be provided by a Divine monarchy). He 
says (1849a,20) of the republican federation of the United 
States that it is based primarily 
upon material interests ... Americans lack . 
nationality and the prime purpose of their 
federation is to provide 'welfare assurance'. 
Germany ... has a profound need to be a nation and 
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therefore also to have institutions in which the 
ethical spirit ••• of the nation are manifested. 
stahl rejects the notion that Bundesstaat and Reich are 
the same (1849a,79) and distinguishes them as follows 
(1849a,81): 
•.• the 'Reich' is the form of original and 
complete unity (to be distinguished from 
uniformity), according to which the states were 
from the outset one and in no respect able to be 
have a reserved abo1ute independence outside the 
unity. By contrast, the,Bundesstaatis the form of 
union (to be distinguished from mere alliance), 
which none the less still only derives solely from 
originally separate states, which then still 
maintain a sphere of separateness and absolute· 
independence. The former is therefore the more 
appropriate form for numerous states of a single 
nation, the latter is more natural for states of 
different nationalities and with originally separate 
histories, or which were initially subjected to a 
foreign power, on tearing themselves free found 
themselves isolated and only then came together to 
a whole (in America, Switzerland, Netherlands). 
(1849a,81; see 1849a,24 also) 
Put simply, though Stahl proposes federation as a means to 
national unification, he does not wish the result of that 
unification to be federation, whether interstate or 
intrastate, but a sittliches Reich. Philosophical 
justifications aside, what this amounts to is extending to 
the whole German state the Prussian monarchical status QUO of 
a Divine monarchical authority unhindered by "artifical" 
mechanisms such as a parliament. That will eventually make 
Germany into a unitary state, presided over by the 
Hohenzollern dynasty. 
To conclude, our discussion of the federalism of 
Friedrich Stahl has shown that in the period up to the late 
1840s, Stahl's focus is directed primarily at the internal 
political structures of the constituent member states of the 
German Bund, for the legitimation of the monarchical 
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principle of which he develops an elaborate political theory 
(1845 & 1854/6). At this time, Stahl's interest in federation 
is limited to an uncritical acceptance of the interstate-
confederal status quo, as a buffer against the threats posed 
to monarchy by liberal constitutionalism and political 
radicalism. 
In 1848, however, when these latter forces appear to have 
assumed the upper hand and are poised to impose on the German 
states a federal structure that would fatally undermine 
Stahl's cherished monarchical principle, he becomes much more 
interested in federation. Initially, Stahl's federalism 
(1849) is primarily orientated to mitigating the republican 
threat. By the summer of 1849, however, with the forces of 
conservatism reviving, Stahl's federalism becomes more 
assertive. He now (1849a) proposes an intrastate-territorial 
federation for Germany. But even this monarchical Bundesstaat 
has to be seen as a means to the end of promoting monarchical 
rule. Stahl is using federalism as a means of not only 
reasserting the power of a unitary and conservative Prussian 
monarchical state, but of extending that principle to the 
whole of "Kleindeutschland", which is in the end also to 
become a unitary monarchy under Prussian hegemony. 
There are at least five reasons why Stahl's federalism is 
significant for this thesis. First, though it is predicated 
upon an often rather abstract, idealist philosophy akin to 
that used to articulate the federalism of, for example, Kant, 
Fichte, Goerres, Fries and Troxler (see 2.4., 3.2. and 5.2.2. 
above & 6.2.2. and 6.3.3. below resp.), it is also 
characterised in its later phase by considerable political 
pragmatism. It thus produces federal proposals that are not, 
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like those of some other idealist theorists mentioned, 
largely impractical. The second and related point is that 
Stahl's federalism is demonstrably contingent upon the 
political situation in which Stahl finds himself. The manner 
in which his federalism adapts continus to legitimate a 
changing status QOU is a good illustration of the use by a 
status quo German conservative of federalism as a political 
ideology. Third, the distinction which Stahl introduces 
between the monarchical and republican subtypes of intrastate 
-territorial federation constitutes an interesting and 
influential contribution to Germanic federalism. Though Stahl 
was initially regarded by many reactionary conservatives such 
as those of the Haller school as dangerously liberal (Jarcke, 
1839,111,177-95; Meinecke, 1928,244f & Masur,1930,247), both 
his general theory of the state and his federalism provided 
a modernised legitimation of the conservative cause in 
Germany. Of the significance of the former, H.Schmidt (1914, 
2) writes that Stahl's 
main contribution to his party consists in his .having 
overcome its absolutist and ... feudal tendencies 
and led it to the legal foundation of constitutional 
monarchy ... and thus having made resilient for the 
struggle against revolution and democratic forces. 
Similari1y, one of Stahl's main contributions to Germanic 
federalism was to provide a non-feudal rationalisation of 
monarchical intrastate federation, which later proved to be 
very useful in the legitimation of the monarchical federation 
which Germany adopted in the constitution of the Second 
Reich. Indeed, and this is the final point, Stahl was not 
only a political thinker. but a political activist. His 
federalism is interesting not merely in its own right. but 
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also for the political impact which its author had. His 
ideas on federation were influential not least in the Erfurt 
Parliament, the federal proposals of which show a remarkable 
similarity to the structure of the federation of the Second 
Reich [28). 
So far, this chapter has considered the use of federalism 
by reactionary and status quo German conservatives. The 
remainder of this section will be devoted to an elucidation 
of that of the reformist conservative: Arnold Heeren (1760-
1842) [21]. 
Unlike younger conservatives such as Mueller (1779-1829) 
(28) and Jarcke (1801-1852), Heeren's formative experience was 
not Germany's national humiliation at the hands of Napoleon 
and the subsequent German Wars of Liberation, but the French 
Revolution and the- late nineteenth century Enlightenment. It 
is from these latter sources that he acquired his universalist 
perspective on history and it is they that help account for 
what marks Heeren out as a reform conservative: his 
willingness to countenance the idea of progress by means of 
gradual political and economic reform [29]. That moderately 
enlightened attitude informed his academic work at Goettingen, 
where, after his appointment in 1801 to a chair of history, 
Heeren's research on the impact of economic forces upon 
historical development was influenced by the ideas of Adam 
Smith and Montesquieu. Heeren's reformist predisposition is 
also visible in'the text which will be used to illustrate his 
federalism, namely, an essay written to coincide with the 
inaugural meeting of the new German 8undestag: The German 
8und in its relationship to the European states system 
(Heeren, 1817). 
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The first issue to be addressed in this evaluation of 
Heeren's federalism is the type of federation he prescribes 
for Germany. He says (1817,437f) that although the internal 
structures of post-1815 Germany are not yet clear, it must 
unite to constitute a single external actor, while preserving 
~ , . 
the independence and inviolabilty of its units and a federal 
("foederativer") character. Despite the fact that when 
speaking both of the German Bund and of the old Reich, Heeren 
uses the terms Staatensystem, Staatenbund, Bundesstaat and 
Bund interchangeably [30], it is clear that the type of 
federation he envisages for Germany is what this thesis has 
classified as an interstate confederation. This is suggested 
in his description (1817,454f) of the German Bund as comprising 
sovereign states constituting a collective power 
-("Gesammtmacht") in their external relations, but 
appearing independent in respect of their internal 
administration, except as regards self-imposed 
limitations. 
Any uncertainty which the terminological imprecision of his 
original essay might have left regarding the nature of the 
federation he proposes for Germany is clarified in an 1821 
postcript (1817,452-7), where Heeren states that the 
underlying reason for popular discontent with the German Bund 
lies ••• in the general public's false impression 
of the nature of the Bund and of the Bundestag 
which represents it. Instead of regarding the Bund 
as what it is, as what at the opening of the 
Bundestag it immediately declared itself to be, 
namely, as a union of states (Staatenverein), one 
wished to see in it that which it was not and which, 
because of the nature of the given circumstances, 
it could neither be nor become: a state. This 
misconception was facilitated by the comparisons 
which were implicitly made between the Bund and North 
America, between the Congress, which operates with 
its own sovereignty (Vollmacht) and the Bundestag, 
which acts in accordance with the instructions of··its 
members. The Bund and the Bundestag should instead 
.have been compared with Switzerland and the Swiss 
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Diet. (1817,453) 
Having clarified the nature of the federation which Heeren 
prescribes for Germany, it remains for us to establish the 
purposes he wishes it to fulfil. The goal which Heeren sets 
himself in his essay (1817,428) is to spell out the nature 
and purpose of the German Bund by reference to its role 
within the European states system and it is thus Heeren's 
geo-political arguments that will be considered first. 
In Heeren's opinion (1817,430f), there are only two 
possible future configurations to the European states system. 
The first is characterised by a predominant state, as existed 
in the Napoleonic "universal monarchy". Heeren argues (1817, 
433f) that this is of proven undesirability and that the only 
alternative is to predicate the European states system upon 
the freedom and independence of its constituent states. This 
requires the the assertion of the principles of legality, 
lawful dynasties and rightful ownership and it alone will 
ensure European peace, order and stability. 
Heeren contends (1817,430f) that in view of its position 
at the geographical centre of Europe, the structure of 
Germany is of vital importance not only for Germany, but also 
for Europe as a whole. He asks rhetorically whether Germany 
would, 
if it were a large monarchy with strict political 
unity, ••• long be'able to resist the temptation of 
acquiring for itself the European pre-eminence which 
its position and its powers would appear to entitle 
it to ? 
He maintains (1817,431f) that after the 1648 Peace of 
Westphalia, the old Reich was an interstate confederation 
which, despite all its acknowledged defects, ensured not only 
the freedom of the German states, but was the crucial element 
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ensuring European stability. Accordingly, he argues (1817, 
428) that the external function which the German federation 
should perform is clear and undeniable. It must provide the 
stabilising core of the European states system. To do so, the 
the new German Bund must retain the interstate-confederal 
structure of the old Reich, albeit without an Emperor. It is 
this perception of the crucial geo-political role of a German 
interstate federation which motivates Heeren (1817,429) to 
assert that the German Bund 
is intimately in agreement with the general and 
particular interests of Europe and is a necessary 
constituent part of its system of states. 
In sum, only the maintenance of the freedom and independence 
of the German states can guarantee Germany's peace and 
security and with it, that of Europe as a whole. 
A second element motivating Heeren's federalism is his 
German nationalism. This is expressed, for example (1817,447-
9) in his wish for the German Bund to be expanded to embrace 
other states of "German descent", including the Netherlands 
and switzerland [31], as well as in his suggestion that 
because of its purely German character, Prussia is due to 
playa leading role in the Bund. Yet it must be stressed that 
Heeren's naticnalism is not xenophobic, but is based upon an 
enlightened, cosmopolitan perspective. For example (1817, 
433f), his desired expansion of the federation is to be 
conditional upon the consent of the prospective new members 
and he also makes a point of rejecting national chauvenism. 
Related to the geo-political and nationalist considerations 
underpinning his federalism and further evidence of his 
universalism. are Heeren's views on the security, or military 
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aspects of the German federation. 
On the one hand, Heeren (1817.441f & 449-51) is very 
concerned that the constitution of the German Bund does not 
provide for the degree of military centralisation which he 
believes to be necessary. He therefore calls (1817.450f) for 
greater symbolic unity by means such as a common German flag 
and German uniform, as well (1817,439-44) as for military 
decision-making to be more centralised and for greater 
restrictions to be placed upon the rights of member states of 
the federation to conduct their own foreign policies. On the 
other hand, however, central to Heeren's federalism is his 
insistence (1817.432f) that an interstate confederation can 
by its very nature neither wish, nor be an a position to be 
able, to launch an offensive war. Instead, it is structurally 
predisposed to a defensive military posture. Accordingly, 
the military role of the interstate confederation 
which Heeren prescirbes for Germany is limited to that of 
defence. 
This aspect of Heeren's federalism is doubly significant. 
First, it demonstrates the cosmopolitan nature of his 
nationalism; though he regards Germany as having an important 
important civilising mission to play in the world, the 
federation he prescribes for it requires Germany voluntarily 
to renounce its potential strength as a unitary state in 
order to avoid wars of territorial aggrandisement [32]. 
Second, Heeren's emphasis upon the non-expansionist and 
purely defensive nature of interstate confederation is of 
course also highly significant in terms of this thesis' aim 
of evaluating Riker's (1964 & 1975) hypothesis that the prime 
purpose of all federations is military expansion. Our 
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examination of Heeren's federalism again demonstrates Riker's 
argument to be flawed. 
Though Heeren concludes that he is "justified'in refering 
to the German Bund as the freedom state (Friedensstaat) of 
Europe." (1817,433), that should not, however, lead one to 
conclude that Heeren' is advocating 'an interstate-chiliastic 
federation. He'explicitlystates (1817,435) that he is not 
thinking of federation as a means to perpetual peace. His 
federation is not to be pacifist, or even neutral, but is to 
have" the aim of opposing "all provokers of unrest and 
overthrowers of states" (1817,435). 
This brings us to a 'fourth important aspect of Heeen's 
federalism: its political aspirations for the German' 
federation. In common with reactionary and status quo 
conservatives, Heeren's' federalism contains a denunciation of 
all revolution, which he describes (1817,434) as "an 
abomination",' as well'as the hope that the German Bund be the 
champion of "the sanctity of property recognised as rightful" 
(1817,427). However, his federalism differs from theirs' by 
virtue of its more favourable orientation to political 
reform. This is evident, for example, in his assertion (1817, 
438-440) of the merits of political diversity. He states that 
although there is a predominance within the German Bund of 
the monarchical principle, the 'existence of other types of 
political structure is both legitimate and economically and 
politically "desirable; Indeed, he refers (1817,439) to the 
free cities as "glowing jewels in the German federal . 
necklace" and praises them for preserving the spirit of, 
republicanism which, unlike Stahl, he believes does not 
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threaten monarchical institutions in the slightest. Heeren 
also accepts (1817.455) that much has yet to be done to 
implement Article 13 of the Federal Pact, which envisages 
estates based constitutions in all the member states of the 
federation and expresses the hope that this will be 
facilitated by the retention of the principle of the freedom 
of the press, which is also enshrined in the Federal Act 
(1817.440) 
Heeren's desire that the German federation accept gradual 
reform is also to be seen in his comments on economic 
matters. For example, in his 1821 postscript (1817.455f), he 
concedes that least progress has been made in respect of the 
the harmonisation of trade proposd in Article 19 of the 
Federal Pact. Though he takes the opportunity to take a swipe 
at the proposals of List and others for a protectionist 
German customs union, it is significant,that Heeren describes 
greater economic harmonisation as desirable. 
To summarise, Heeren's federalism proposes for Germany an 
interstate confederation of sovereign territorial states. 
Like most of the federal isms considered in this thesis, that 
of Heeren also asserts that one of the most important 
functions of the proposed federation is the maintenance of 
security. Thus in the aforementioned postscript, Heeren 
states (1817.457) that the two main purposes of the German 
Bund are the maintenance of strict legality (Meines festen 
Rechtszustandes-) internally and of external security. Taking 
such assertions at face value might lead one to concur with 
Riker (1964 & 1975) not only that security considerations are 
common and indeed paramount for all federal isms, but perhaps 
also even with his assertion that the desire to participate 
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in territorial aggrandisement is a second common factor. 
However, as this thesis has shown time and time again, in 
order to gain a full understanding of the political 
aspirations motivating federal prescriptions, it is necessary 
to probe more deeply. 
In the case of Heeren, this strategy has again been shown 
to be fruitful. Unlike Haller and Jarcke, who believe the 
equality of power implicit in an interstate confederation to 
be "the source of all strife" (Haller cited in Jarcke,1839, 
111,60, see 5.2.2. above), Heeren contends that it is the 
very guarantor of peace and stability in Europe. Again 
~ contrary to reactionary conservatives such as Jarcke and even 
status quo conservatives such as Stahl, Heeren does not 
insist upon the necessity of either an overarching monarch, 
or even of monarchy as the basis of rule within each member 
state of the federation. Instead, he envisages the federation 
as a healthy mixture of monarchical and republican states. 
Furthermore, Heeren's federalism rejects offensive wars. 
Finally, while Heeren's federation is to be "a new pillar of 
the restored order" and "a member of the Holy Alliance" 
(1817,435), Heeren is neither a reactionary, nor a status quo 
conservative; his federalism contains the commitment to 
gradual political and economic reform so typical (Epstein, 
1966,8-10) of a reform conservative. 
Our review of the utilisation of Germanic federalism by 
German conservatives is now complete. Before moving on to 
consider the contribution to Germanic federalism of Swiss 
conservatives, there will be a brief summary of the main 
findings of section 5.2. of this thesis by reference to four 
289 
~sues. These are first, the dimensions of Germanic 
I federalism envisaged by German conservatives during 1815 to 
1850; second, the manner in which that federalism was 
articulated; third, the types of federation actually 
prescribed for Germany; and finally, the purposes behind 
those prescriptions. 
This section has shown that German conservatives utilised 
three of the five dimensions of Germanic federalism 
identified in this thesis (see 1.4 above): the intrastate-
imperial, intrastate-territorial and interstate-confederal 
types. Confederation was recognised by all the exponents of 
conservative Germanic federalism discussed, though they 
differed over its desirability, as will be explained shortly. 
The intrastate-imperial type was referred to solely by 
reactionary conservatives (Goerres and possibly Jarcke). 
Meanwhile, Stahl was an expositor of intrastate-territorial 
federation (Bundesstat), to the debate on which his insistence 
on distinguishing between republican and monarchical subtypes 
added an interesting new development. 
The manner in which German conservatives articualted their 
federalism differs substantially. At the one extreme there is 
the mystical Romanticism of Goerres, while at the other there 
is the measured, pragmatic approach of Heeren. Stahl 
constitutes and interesting mixture. Though he subscribes 
to a very abstract, idealist philosophy, his later federalism 
also demonstrates an ability to be very realistic and 
practical in his demands. A feature of many, though not all, 
of the conservative Germanic federal isms considered here is 
their use of religious argumentation. 
Third, German conservatives differed regarding the type of 
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federation they prescribed for Germany. While Goerres called 
for the establishment of an intrastate-imperial federation 
and condemned confederation utterly, Jarcke accepted the 
German confederation, as did the early Stahl. Of all the 
conservative federal isms considered in this section, that of 
Heeren is the only one that perceived confederation as not 
only acceptable, but as highly desirable. By contrast, a 
German confederation was for both Jarcke and Stahl a 
temporary means to an end. When it no longer served that 
end, Stahl abandoned it in favour of his Bundesstaat. 
This brings us to the fourth and final of our concluding 
remarks on this section, namely, to the purposes for which 
the German conservatives utilised federalism. Many of their 
arguments for federation include references to the need to 
ensure Germany's external security. Moreover, there were also 
also some German conservatives who hoped that federation 
would facilitate territorial expansion. This was the 
certainly the case in the racial nationalism of Goerres' 
later federalism. It is also to be found in Stahl's desire 
for an expansion of Prussian power. There is thus no doubt 
that in the case of some German conservative federal isms, not 
only Riker's (1964 & 1975) military, but also his expansion 
condition apply. It would have been surprising had there not 
been such cases. However, Riker it is wrong to assert that 
his military and expansionist conditions are universally 
applicable. 
This is demonstrated most clearly in the federalism of 
Arnold Heeren, who proposes a German confederation as an act 
of voluntary renunciation by Germany of its potential for 
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expansionsim in the interests'of European peace. Moreover, as 
our above discussion has also shown, even where the other 
federal isms covered referred to defence. or even to 
expansion, one needs to go futher and ask what it is'that is 
to be defended, or expanded. When one one asks this question, 
one invariably establishes that the prime motivation of all" 
the 'federal isms covered here is'the promotion of their 
political ends. In other words, German conservatives used 
federalism to propose federal' s~ructures which they hoped 
woul d defend them against the thr.eats, as they saw them, of 
liberalism. Those threats included irreligiosity. attacks 
on social and political hierarchy~~ liberal constitutionalism, 
and demands for popular 'sovereignty. ' 
Differences in their federal proposals were in the main a 
consequence of their perception of, the gravity of the threat 
to the established order, as well as of the best means to 
respond to' it. As has been shown espec; all y clear 1 y ; n the 
case of Stahl, the type of federation which German 
conservatives proposed was vulnerable to change, as the 
relevant exponent of conserv~tive Germanic federalism's 
evaluation of the strategy most appropriate to the given 
political situation changed. In short, federalism was 
demonstrably 'used as a political 'ideology. 
5.3. CONSERVATIVE GERMANIC FEDERALISM IN SWITZERLAND 
5.3.1. INTRODUCTION 
There were two broad types of conservative federalism in 
switzerland during 1815 to 1848. One was motivated by a 
reactionary conservatism, while the other was more reformist 
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in its orientation. Unlike in the 1798 to 1815 period, Swiss 
conservative federalism of the Restoration and Regeneration 
produced very few federal blueprints. The reasons for this 
are obvious. Under Napoleonic rule, conservatives had had to 
outline the contours of what were proposals for an 
alternative political system, while for most of the lifetime 
of the Federal Pact, they were concerned to preserve the main 
features of the existing interstate federation, especially 
cantonal sovereignty, which allowed them to retain their 
conservative social, economic and political structures. 
Though from 1815 to 1848, Swiss conservative federal isms 
therefore offer few if any new ideas about the structures of 
federations' central authorities, they are nonetheless 
interesting to this thesis for two reasons. The first relates 
to the manner in which they articulated their support of 
federation. When one compares Swiss conservative federal isms 
. ~ " 
of 1815 to 1848 to those of the 1798 to 1815 period, one 
notices a marked difference in the types of argumentation 
they entertained. In the earlier period, Swiss conservative 
federalism had been primarily based upon reason and had been 
largely reformist (see 3.3. above). During 1815 to 1848, it 
contained more reactionary brands, at times coloured by 
romantic-historicism, or by theological considerations (or a 
combination of both), and exhibiting a clear predisposition 
for a type of hierarchical patrimonial;sm framed in a 
conscious desire to return to the "traditional" values of the 
Middle Ages. The reasons for this change include the fact 
that whereas during the 1798 to 1815 period, the ideas of the 
Enlightenment were dominant, after 1815, the "Metternich 
system- allowed conservatism to reassert itself politically 
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and philosophically. 
A, second reason why Swiss conservative federal isms of the 
Restoration and Regeneration period are interesting for this 
thesis relates to how and why they were employed. It is, for 
example, interesting to note that though both reactionary and 
reformist Swiss 'conservative federal isms predominantly 
supported confederation for Switzerland, there was at least 
one notable exception (Bontemps,Maillardoz, 1830). That 
exception, which will be considered below, supports the view 
that the type of federation which Swiss conservatives 
proposed for Switzerland was largely a consequence of 
considerations of political strategy. That is to say, swiss 
conservative federalism of 1815 to 1848 was again used as a 
political ideology. 
Our examination of Swiss conservative federalism between 
1815 and 1848 will first give some examples of reactionary 
conservative federalism, before moving on to reformist 
federalism. Though there were notable exceptions, reactionary 
conservatism was by its very nature disinclined to advance 
sophisticated theories and this characteristic was behind the 
decision to include in our illustration of reactionary 
conservative federalism the ideas of one such polemicist, 
namely, Franz Geiger. A second reactionary conservative 
federalism we shall include is that contained in the later 
ideas of von Haller. The justification for this includes the 
greater insights his more theoretical writings offer into the 
purposes for which many of the staunchest conservatives 
wished the extant Swiss interstate federation to be preserved, 
as well as his great influence throughout Europe, and 
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especially in the other German states. Finally, our survey 
of reactionary conservatve federalism will look at the 1830 
plan of a group of young conservative Swiss army officers, 
which was almost unique among conservative Swiss federalism 
during the Federal Pact, in that it advocated a centralised 
federal state. 
Conservative Swiss federalism during the~1815 to 1848 
period was of course not solely reactionary. There was also 
the reformist conservatism of the "juste-milieu", which 
attempted to find a type of federation between the interstate 
-confederal variety defended by most conservatives, and the 
centralised intrastate-territorial federation advanced by 
many of the liberals. The federalism of the juste-milieu was 
articulated in two ways. On the one hand it was expressed' 
"officially" in the 1832 report of the Diet's commission into 
federal reform, and on the other hand there were- "unofficial" 
manifestations. The consideration of both these types of 
reformist conservative federalism will be held over until 
5.3.3., where they will be examined by reference to the 
federalism of the the Ross; Commission and of leading 
reformist conservative, Zuerich-born Johann Caspar Bluntschli, 
respectively. 
5.3.2. THE FEDERALISM OF REACTIONARY SWISS CONSERVATIVES 
The immediate task is to discuss, in the following order, 
the reactionary conservative federal isms of Haller, the Swiss 
army officers and Geiger. Haller's earlier writings were 
examined in Chapter 3 above. As was demonstrated there, Haller 
had in 1798 been prepared to accept intrastate federation 
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for Switzerland, but was in 1799 one of the first to make 
detailed proposals for the re-est~blishment of a Swiss 
interstate federation. By 1801, he came, albeit somewhat 
grudgingly, again to advocate an intrastate-territorial 
federation. 
By the end of the Napoleonic period, and especially once 
the Restoration proper had set in, Haller felt free to assert 
a much more reactionary political philosophy. He had in part 
been moulded by six years (1800-6) spent in Austrian state 
service,in the deeply conservative environment of Vienna, 
where many Romantics such as Adam Mueller (1809 & 1819) also 
obtained their political inspiraiion. Haller wai himself 
later to exert his greatest influence in Prussia, where he 
had the ear of some of the most influential people, including 
Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm (later Friedrich Wilhelm IV), 
Hardenberg and the young Bismarck. Indeed, Haller has been 
described as the most influential of all counter-revolutionary 
writers of the German-speaking world (Fleiner,1916,12) [33]. 
The importance of his later federalism is to be found less 
in what he has to say about the structures of the Swiss 
federation, than the purposes which he believes it should 
serve. In this, he had much in common with other Catholic 
conservative federalists in Germany (Meinecke,1928,223-77). 
His views about the Swiss federation were inextricably linked 
to his patrimonial theory of the state, elements of which 
were already visible in his earlier writings (e9 1801,164ff 
& 350-419). However, they were most exhaustively articulated 
in his six volume Restoration of Political Science (Haller, 
1820-25), the first edition of which appeared from 1816 to 
1820 • 
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The first, introductory, volume of that work contains an 
attack upon rational natural law theories, his most scathing 
remarks being reserved for social contract theorists such as 
Rousseau, arguing that their notion of the pre-state contract 
is both fallacious (1,278-94) and responsible for all the 
revolutionary ills of modern times (1,23-36 & 223-78). 
In the place of these theories, Haller offers an 
alternative, conservative natural law theory based upon 
Divinely ordained human inequality (1,337ff). Natural 
superiority is the basis of all rule and need is the basis of 
all dependence. The strongest's superior skills make him the 
best able to provide what subordinates lack, and the latter 
are psychologically predisposed to rally around a strong man. 
Moreover, a strong man is more content and less likely to 
misuse his superiority when he is in his natural condition of 
ruling. Accordingly, rule by the strongest is mutually 
advantageous (1,355-87). The only right that is, or has ever 
been, natural and legitimate is thus the right of the 
stronger to realise his superior skills. 
Like Rousseau, Haller too argues for a return to nature, 
but his natural condition inevitably means unequal relations 
of property (understood in the widest sense). These form the 
basis for a natural and hence intrinsically legitimate series 
of hierarchical relationships of power and dependence. If 
society is to be based upon this natural law, as he argues it 
must for it to be both just and lasting, it has to comprise a 
series of such relationships of SUbordination, such as those 
between fathers and children, masters and their apprentices, 
and lords and their vassals. Indeed, Haller considers the 
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short life span of the revolutionary system and its replace-
ment by the Restoration to be evidence that unlike the latter, 
the former was not in accordance with nature (295-336). 
Haller's state of nature has therefore never completely 
ceased to exist (1,340f). Modern society continues to be no 
more than the cUlmination of centuries of private contracts 
between the strong and their subordinates, expanding the rule 
of the latter from small scale land ownership (2,33-60 & 3, 
156-77) to rule over the modern state. The state is no more 
than a closed, self-sufficient human association of 
independent relationships of service and sociabilily. It is 
different from the associations formed by those private 
contracts merely by virtue of the independence of the ruler 
and has no purpose beyond those of the associations it 
embraces (463-72). That is not to say that those associations 
are sovereign. Sovereignty is reserved for the ruler. who has 
the Divine good fortune ("fortuna") of being the only person 
responsible to nobody but God (1,482-93 & 2,64-9) 
Haller rejects the classification of states into 
monarchies, aristocracies and democracies (1,495-503),arguing 
that there are but two main types: patrimonial principalities 
- which includes princely, monarchical, military and clerical 
rule - and republics (1,494). He considers the latter 
inferior, but otherwise little different from the 
principalities. In particular, rule in Haller's republics is 
not predicated upon popular sovereignty (6,215-45), but upon 
reserving decision-making powers to a relatively small and 
closed group of the wealthiest burghers (6,328-44). It 
follows that neither here nor in principalities are there any 
universal, inalienable natural political rights. What 
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political rights there are accrue solely through might, or 
through participation in socio-economic corporations. 
Superficially, it might appear that relatively little of 
the 3,000 or so sides of Haller's wide-ranging magnum opus 
WqS written with the Swiss federation in mind, but if one 
looks at his pamphlets on Swiss politics, there is no doubt 
that its principles were intended to be applied to his native 
federation. We shall illustrate this with two publications. 
The first is an 1814 pamphlet entitled What are relationships 
of subordination? (Unterthanenverhae1tnisse), which 
articulates most of the core ideas of his Restoration in a 
mere 30 sides. Thus Haller states that the notion of 
political rights is an eighteenth century product,' 
purposely designed to "make servants into masters ... and 
masters into servants In reality, 
a political right is nothing more than a municipal 
'or communal right ... not a right which belongs to 
every man, but an acquired right, which only accrues 
to those who are from the relevant city or commune, 
or are taken up into it ... Nobody is excluded from 
the possibility of acquiring political rights, but 
they are not naturally possessed.(1814,9) 
Haller uses these ideas to argue for cantonal sovereignty and 
for the previous dependencies to be returned to their 
"rightful" cantonal owners (1814,10f). 
In another pamphlet, Haller applies his general theory to 
the current debate on proposed reform of the Federal Pact 
(1833). It opposes all proposed centralisation of the 
federation and is particu1ari1y scathing about the concept of 
a Bundesstaat, which it regards as a hypocritical smokescreen 
masking the "revolutionaries'" attempts to establish a strong 
central government in order to subjugate the cantons and to 
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expropriate their rights (1833,6&14). He defends cantonal 
sovereign rights and argues for their expansion to include 
many previously held property rights. 
But he goes even further. The pamphlet's main purpose is 
to argue for the establishment among Catholic, conservative 
cantons of a separate all iance ("Bund"). He makes a number of 
proposals for its name: The Just, The Creators of Justice, 
The Swiss Goodfellows, The Friends of Justice or The 
Protectors of all Property (1833,9). The main aim of the 
alliance is 
resisting all evil [sic ie the reform proposals of 
the Liberals) .... and •.• honouring and observing 
all religion, defending against all encroachments 
the rights, freedoms, goods and property of the 
Catholic Church, of ecclesiastical and temporal 
corporations,'of city, rural and mountain communities, 
as well as the freedom of private property (1833,9). 
This means, in addition to the abovementioned rejection of 
the 'proposed federal state, opposing any further diminution 
of city rights and privileges, any new taxes or military 
expenditure, as well as a range of economic, legal, land 
reform, religious, and education policies (1833,14ff), But 
Above all, one has to start with religion, ;e the 
recognition of a supreme power and a supreme law -
binding on all men ..• But since religion cannot be 
spread without the ministry of the ... Catholic 
Church ..• (1833,20) 
defence of the latter must be a priority. 
When undertaking an appraisal of Haller's federalism during 
the lifetime of the Federal Pact, one cannot fail to note how 
different it is from that which he espoused previously, It is 
clearly far removed from the reformist conservatism evident 
in his 1798 draft constitution for Berne [34]. It is equally 
distinct from the federalism articulated by Haller in 1801, 
when he was prepared to accept for Switzerland a centralised, 
300 
intrastate-territorial federation of non-sovereign cantons. 
Instead, Haller's later federalism posits an interstate 
confederation of sovereign territorial units of rule. The 
central authority's powers, rights and privileges are very 
much second to those of the cantons. The central authority is 
restricted to external defence and internal security, and in 
the exercise of those functions may not coerce the 
constituent units, which retain the right to secede. The 
federation's real purpose is to maintain or re-establish the 
social, economic and political structures upon which cantonal 
rule is based. Those structures relate to what Haller refers 
to as the cantons' legitimate property rights. Since he is 
here using the term Hproperty" in a very wide sense, to 
include rights over the fruits of God-given superiority over 
others, the structures he is defending are any resulting from 
rule by the strongest. In short, Haller's is a reactionary 
form of conservatism, whose prime concern is protecting and 
promoting hierarchical, aristocratically ruled territories, 
where popular political rights and privileges derive solely 
from membership of mediaeval type corporations. Although he 
was himself not a Romantic, some of the organic and 
staendische (estates) elements of Romanticism are clearly 
visible in Haller's later federalism. Inasmuch as he also 
refers to the rights and privileges of mediaveal type 
corporations, one can also detect echoes of'Althusius and a 
foreshadowing of later Catholic social theory [35]. 
Moving from an assessment of tHe content of Haller's 
federalism to a consideration of its political significance, 
there are at least three points to be made. First, though 
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Haller was more reactionary than many of his'conservative 
contemporaries, many of the ideas he articulated were common 
currency in Swiss and German conservative federalism, as our 
later discussion of Geiger illustrates (36]. Second, Haller's 
1833 proposal for Catholics to unite in an anti-liberal, 
defensive league was representative not only of the thinking 
of other conservatives, but mirrored in political practice. 
Precisely such a union (the "League of Sarnen") had been 
secretly set up by conservative Catholic cantons the 
previous October. Moreover, though that"alliance was soon 
dissolved, ,another conservative defensive union, namely, the 
Sonderbund was founded in 1845. ,The Liberals' and Radicals' 
opposition to this later alliance-was to be a significant 
factor in bringing about the 1847 civil war, which resulted 
in the Liberals' victory and the 'founding in 1848 of an 
intrastate Swiss federation. 
Third, Haller's attempts to justify his,theory by 
reference to matters Divine is interesting. Though he uses 
both the notion of Divinely ordained human inequality, and 
the idea that, in the final analysis, the rights of subjects 
against despotic rulers are limited to exile or prayer,(1820, 
1,410-43) it would·be wrong to regard Haller's work as 
motivated by fundamentally religious considerations. 
Meinecke was right'when he wrote that: 
Haller praised the fortune of the old rulers' 
possession of personal power and wealth in plain 
and simple language. A materialist and egotistical 
thread runs throughout his theory, and even where 
it calls upon the support of God and matters Divine, 
this occurs without any mysticism and even without 
any inner religiosity, but merely in that self-
righteous tone that sees private property and the 
world order that contains it as a revelation of 
Divine providence and blessing .... He was merely 
opening the floodgates for a cult of power, for a ' 
302 
pure ido1isation of success and the road from him to 
the theory of the fight for survival and the ... 
selection of the fittest is not long .•.• his 
practical goals were to fight the power of the 
revolutionary forces and justify and restore the 
power of the old patrimonial state. That is why 
he also used ••. God not only to sanction power as 
such, but also to provide the necessary restraints 
to its activity •.. (1928,224f) 
Nonetheless, Haller's use of religious rationalisations is 
significant for two reasons. First, it is symptomatic of a 
problem faced by many conservatives of the period. They 
opposed what they regarded as the liberals' unfounded claims 
that human beings naturally had certain minimal political 
rights. However, merely to assert the alleged benefits of the 
existing forms of aristocratic rule in the conservative 
cantons was patently inadequate to ensure that the lower 
classes remained immune from the revolutionary ideas of 
popular sovereignty and the equality of man. Haller's 
federalism is an example of how some conservatives fought the 
claims of one natural law theory with those of another. 
Regeneration conservatives' alternative supreme law was of 
course their hierarchical interpretation of Christian 
teachings. 
Second, prior to Haller, the struggle in Regeneration 
Switzerland between conservative interstate and liberal 
intrastate federalism was largely devoid of religious 
argumentation. Such argumentation had been used during the 
Restoration, as our accounts of Haller and of Geiger (see 
below) show. However, Haller was one of the first to use such 
argumentation during the Regeneration. His federalism is thus 
one of the earliest examples of the religiously flavoured 
federalism that was to become dominant from the late 1830s 
onwards, 'as conservatives feeling increasingly under threat 
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were instrumental in helping it to assume a dominant role in 
the dispute over the future of the Swiss federation." By the 
1840s, it had become inextricably bound up in that debate. 
The next example of conservative Swiss federalism which we 
shall examine in this section is that pub1ished"anonymous1y 
in November 1830 by a group of French-speaking Swiss army 
officers, foremost amongst whom were the two aristocrats: 
Phillip von Mail1ardoz of Freiburg and August von Bontemps of 
Geneva. They had been employed in Paris by Charles X, after 
whose fall they and all other Swiss soldiers were summarily 
dismissed. Rappard explains the reason for their decision to 
submit a petition and draft constitution as follows: 
They felt that ... (sic their summary dismissal] 
was a personal and a national insult and their 
motivation for writing ••. was therefore to propose 
a radical strengthening of "the federal power and 
thus an increase in Switzerland's status. (Rappard, 
1941,72) 
Their. federal ism was articulated in two documents. The 
first was a petition addressed to all cantonal governments 
and the second a detailed "draft constitution. The former was 
reprinted in full in the Journal de Geneve (Bontemps/ 
Maillardoz,1830), but the draft constitution is no 'o~ger 
obtainable [37], a possible reason for which will be revealed 
shortly. The unavailability of the draft constitution makes 
it necessary to rely upon references in three secondary 
sources. Two of these are contemporaneous, namely a pamphlet 
entitled: "Observations on the changes demanded to the 
Swiss Federal Pact", (Fazy-Pasteur,1831,15ff) and the 
contemporary history of Baumgartner, a leading Libera', who 
was one of the main architects of the 1848 constitution 
(Baumgartner,1853/4,1,162ff). The third and most fascinating 
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source ;s Rappard (1941,71ff). 
Together, these sources give a fairly clear picture of the 
main features of the proposal. The purpose of the federation 
is visible from the petition, where the officers argue that 
the real motive of [sic the Regeneration's] •.. 
burning desire to overturn what went before can 
be found in the horror inspired in all good Swiss 
citizens by the idea of a constitution imposed 
from abroad. 
But in the middle of this effervescence a still 
more noble cry must make itself heard .... the 
call to all cantons to not merely revise their 
internal organisation, but also to found .•• a 
Swiss government, •.. strong enough •.• for our 
independence to be no longer a problem; for our 
neutrality not to be the plaything of several 
ambitions .•. (Bontemps/Maillardoz,1830,214) 
The draft constitution which the officers went on to 
publish envisages the Swiss cantons united in an intrastate-
territorial federation of the Swiss, with a Diet elected by 
the cantons in rough proportion to their population. Each 
full canton is to have at least two representatives. Luzern, 
St.Gallen and the Tessin are to have three, Zurich, Waadt 
and Aargua four and the most populous (Berne) are to have 
seven representatives (Fazy-Pasteur, 1831 ,15) 
The cantons are to submit to the Diet a list of candidates 
for the office of Swiss President, who will then be elected 
by the Diet. Voting in four geographical blocks, (north, 
south, west and centre) the cantons are to elect four 
"Landammanns", who are presumably to act as members of the 
federal executive. Henceforth, Diet members are to be freed 
from binding cantonal instructions when voting on any matter 
concerning the general welfare of Switzerland. (ibid,15f) 
Baumgartner (1853/4,1,163) says that the proposals were 
badly received in western and eastern Switzerland and offers 
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three reasons for this. The first is that they were drafted 
by Swiss who were in foreign service and were unfamiliar with 
the political situation in Switzerland. Second, even those 
favourably disposed to the idea of greater centralisation 
suspected that what the officers really had in mind was at 
best to establish in Switzerland a degree of central 
military control similar to that experienced in the United 
States under Washington and Franklyn, or at worst a 
centralised military dictatorship. These fears were nourished 
by the petition's emphasis upon the value of the American 
example: 
A government similar to that of the United States 
of America suits our ancient Confederation as well 
as the young and wise republic; modify, delete, add 
whatever lines you will to that federal constitution, 
but give us that strength which can be borne only of 
the 'most intimate union •• ; 
(Bontemps/Maillardoz,1830,214) 
The third reason Baumgartner gives for the failure of the 
proposal to meet with popular support is that there was in 
any event considerable objection to simply copying foreign 
examples. 
To summarise, the petition and draft constitution of 
Bontemps and Maillardoz advocates an intrastate-territorial 
federation. Sovereignty is to be located not in the 
territorial units (the cantons), but in the centre. The 
purpose of the federation is above all to strengthen 
switzerland internally and thereby in its external dealings. 
The significance of the conservative army officers' proposal 
is first, that while most Swiss conservatives proposed 
interstate confederation, theirs is a rare example of 
conservative advocacy of intrastate-territorial federation. 
Second, it shows that reference to the American example was 
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not the preserve of liberals, though as Rappard notes, "the 
conservative Swiss officers were attracted to the American 
constitution by th~ very feature (ie a strong President) 
which most displeased •.• " the radicals (1941,78) Third, it 
forcefully underlines the contingent, instrumental nature of 
federalism. This is well illustrated in Rappard's fascinating 
account of the background to the proposal and to the 
subsequent loss of all traces to it. Based upon detailed 
academic detective work in a number of archives, Rappard's 
hypothesis is that: 
the adaptation to Swiss conditions of American 
constitutional principles shortly became one of 
the main planks of the Swiss radical extremists, 
..• [therefore1 the officers deliberately destroyed 
all traces of their previous pamphlet. (1941,76f) 
The final exponent of reactionary conservatism we shall 
consider is Franz Geiger, who was a Catholic priest from 
Luzern, where he also worked as a professor of Dogmatics and 
Ecclesiastical History. Geiger's willingness to articulate 
his decidedly conservative views in the form of clerically 
flavoured polemics made him the epitome of all that liberals 
loved to hate. For his part, Geiger appears to take great 
pleasure in venting his spleen on all who supported what he 
describes as "the new paganism" (1823-39,1,423) of the 
Enlightenment. 
His eschwa1 of rationalism, combined with the often 
unstructured and emotive style of his writings, makes it 
difficult to present a systematic summary of Geiger's views. 
The following attempt to do so is based upon his above 
mentioned eight volume collected works (1823-39). Much of the 
material they contain is of an exclusively theological nature 
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and irrel'evant for the purposes of this thesis. Moreover, the 
more political material does not contain Geiger's views on 
the swiss federation in the form of a concise, single text. 
To ascertain those views, it is necessary to piece his 
ideas together from a number of his political essays [38). 
An examination of the latter shows that Geiger's political 
convictions and hence his view of the purpose of the Swiss 
federation, rest upon two propositions. The first amounts to 
a defence of social hierarchy by reference to patriarchy. The 
arguments Geiger uses in this respect are similar in many 
ways to those advanced by Haller (see above) and it will 
therefore suffice to cite a few examples. Thus Geiger argues 
(1823-39,1,427f) that the state of nature is characterised by 
isolated, familial units, each governed by their pater 
familias. Only with the emergence of strong men (Kraftmaenner) 
are these united into a people under one rule. Moreover, 
patriarchal rule is a permanent feature of human existence. 
All societies are inevitably characterised by relationships 
of patriarchal superiority and subordination. Patriarchal ism 
persists into the present day, by virtue of both rightful 
inheritance and the ubiquity of natural inequality. Geiger 
(1823-39,1,431f & 6,247f) considers the success of "agitators" 
calling for popular sovereignty in arousing an essentially 
passive mass into political action to be a demonstration of, 
their superior skills, but equally concludes that claims of 
popular sovereignty have no legitimate basis and do not 
correspond with human nature. 
Furthermore, Geiger argues that hierarchical relations 
are mutually beneficial. Geiger also alleges that the denial 
of such natural and mutually beneficial hierarchy is one of 
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the prime factors that contribute to the generation of 
revolution (1823-39,1-32). 
So far, our summary of Geiger's social and political views 
suggests that they were virtually identical with those of 
Haller and it is not surprising that like Haller, Geiger 
should be a staunch opponent of liberal political structures. 
However, there are at least two important differences between 
Haller and Geiger. The first relates to the manner of their 
writings. While Haller articulates his position within an 
analytical structure, the consistency of which compares 
favourably with that of the most rigid rationalist, Geiger 
opts for a populist, polemical style. However, the second, 
and more important difference between Haller and Geiger lies 
in the nature of- the second and more fundamental principle 
which determines Geiger's views on politics, namely, his 
uncritical acceptance of biblical teachings,- and above all, 
of the theory that all authority derives from God. 
While Haller also utilises the principle of Divine Right, 
we have seen above that the theological component of Haller's 
writings are neither essential to his theory, nor necessarily 
even to be taken seriously. By contrast, there is no doubt 
that considerations of a theological nature constitute a far 
more crucial and sincere element of Geiger's theory. Geiger's 
approach to social and political affairs is not primarily 
rooted, as is the case with Haller, in a theory of the rule 
of the strongest, but in a theory based upon the biblical 
assertion of the Divine legitimation of authority. This can 
be illustrated in Geiger's defence of patriarchy. First, 
Geiger traces the source of paternal authority back to the 
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authority given to Adam by God (1823-39,1,437). Second, he 
argues that superior power is everywhere to be understood not 
only in terms of physical superiority but, more importantly, 
in terms of a moral authority that originates from God. Thus 
he states that ..... all superiority is ordained by God and 
superiors are ministers of God." (1823-39,1, 424). It is this 
argument that underlies his rejection of the theory of 
popular sovereignty. 
I cannot comprehend how Christians, who recognise 
the Bible as a Divine book and its statements as 
the statements of the Holy Spirit, can advance the 
statement [sic that all power emanates from the 
people], or subscribe to it, since the Bible ... 
asserts the opposite so clearly. (1823-39,1,423). 
It is also used to advocate obedience to existing 
authorities. For example, Geiger states that 
If the rulers are true Christians, they will 
regard themselves as ministers of God and rule 
only in the spirit of their Master. If the people 
is truly Christian, it will regard its rulers as 
representatives of God, as God's ambassadors and 
obey them lovingly, that is to say freely, for it 
will then really be obeying God and no longer a 
human being. (1823-39,6,251). 
Third, Geiger not only frequently uses biblical scripture to 
defend his arguments, but also appears to interpret the Bible 
literally. This is evident for example in his reference to 
the Genesis stories about Adam and Eve, Nimrod and others as 
though they were literal truths (1823-39,1,427-29). Fourth, 
Geiger supports the rights and privileges of the Catholic 
Church, which he defends among other things by reference to 
the traditional idea of the Pope being the direct descendant 
of Saint Peter. The corollary of all this is the need to 
defend, in the face of the pressures of the blasphemous 
Enlightenment and dissident Protestantantism, political 
structures that will promote not only Christianity, but 
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catholicity. 
This leads to Geiger's vigorous support of cantonal 
sovereignty and thus of interstate federation, on the 
assumption that a more centralised system (federal or 
otherwise) would threaten political and thereby above all 
moral interference in the activities of the more righteous 
Catholic conservative cantons by Protestantism and or the 
Godless liberals. Only in an interstate federation with 
cantonal sovereignty will the small, Catholic cantons and 
their religious and moral values be defended. In short, 
Geiger sees in interstate federation a mechanism for the 
defence of the small, conservative cantons, and thereby of a 
social hierarchy in which the Catholic Church plays a 
significant role. Though he also justifies his advocacy of an 
interstate Swiss federation by reference to patriarchy, his 
more fundamental considerations are of a religious and 
confessional nature. 
Though the eight volumes of Geiger's collected works 
attest to the fact that he was a more prolific writer than 
most of his fellow reactionary conservatives, Geiger remains 
quite representative of them. First, the broad thrust of his 
argument ;s typical in most respects of much of the 
reactionary conservative argumentation that appeared during 
this period in, for example, the Swiss print media. This is 
borne out in the analysis of contemporary conservative 
newspapers by Wild, (1966,esp.57-66,82-90 & 142-185) who 
identifies a number of their recurrent themes. These include 
the assertion, in opposition to the Enlightenment's 
principles of the equality of man, of natural sin and human 
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inequality. They also include a defence of moral values and 
religion in general and the rights of the Catholic Church in 
particular. The principle of interstate federation is 
supported as a means of ensuring cantonal sovereignty and 
thus the defence of the small conservative cantons against 
the threat of the immoral liberals (Wild,1966 & Gassner,1926, 
esp.46-66). 
Second, despite their sheer volume, Geiger's writings 
remain a typically unsophisticated example of what Wild 
(1966,57) refers to as an "emotional reaction" based upon 
"alarm at the rising Zeitgeist ideology". That Geiger's 
writings do not produce a closely-argued, theoretical defence 
of the principles of interstate federation is hardly 
surprising. First, they are not intended as part of a 
scholarly debate, but are part of an often religiously, if 
not confessionally based, vehemently anti-rationalist 
polemic. Second, and perhaps more important, one of the main 
motivations of radical conservatives such as Geiger was 
opposition to the very notion of social and political 
blueprints, which were regarded as typical of the despised 
rationalism of the Enlightenment. 
Our above discussion has shown that reactionary Swiss 
federalism was predominantly concerned to defend the existing 
interstate federation. In particular, the concern was to 
ensure that its constituent units' sovereign rights in 
religious and political matters were not undermined by what 
was regarded as the immorality of the principles of the pagan 
Enlightenment. As we have seen, this position was in the main 
defended by reference to patriarchal'arguments justifying the 
rule of the 'strongest and to Divine right "theories. (The 
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exception to this was the federalism of Bon temps and' 
Maillardoz in 1830.) While the more intellectual defence 
offered by Haller contained both these notions, ,the latter 
idea was merely a means of legitimating the former, which was 
not conditional 'upon ,it. However, the more populist ideas of 
Geiger, which were particularly widespread amongst the 
generally more conservative Catholic Swiss, were very much 
rooted in a genuinely religious conviction. 
From the late 1830s, and especially after the Catholic 
Church came under direct attack from the liberals [39], 
Geiger's theological and clerical 'brand of reactionary 
conservatism became even more widespread. Not surprisingly, 
such views about the nature and purpose of the Swiss 
federation were completely irreconcilable with the views of 
even "moderate" liberal rationalists. 
Some conservatives consciously attempted to find a 
compromise formula between-the uncompromising reactionary 
conservatives on the one hand and the radical liberals on the 
other. The fact that they were to be unsuccessful in this 
endeavour and in the political conflict over the form the 
Swiss federation should take (which was eventually to be 
resolved by civil) war does not detract from the inherent 
interest of their ideas. It is the federalism of this group 
of reformist Swiss conservatives which constitutes the focus 
of the next section of this thesis. 
5.3.3. THE FEDERALISM OF THE SWISS JUSTE-MILIEU 
The label "juste-milieu" denotes a loose grouping of Swiss 
of similar political persuasion, which emerged in various 
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cantons at the beginning of the 1830s in opposition to what 
it regarded as the increasingly uncompromising nature of the 
debate about political reform. Although it was never 
numerous, or politically very influential, there are at least 
three reasons why the juste-milieu is interesting for this 
thesis. First, it was attempting to find a federal formula 
that offered a mid-way solution between the competing claims 
of (radical) liberalism and (reactionary) conservatism. 
Second, though the juste-milieu was not very successful in 
the unofficial political debate, it did exert a dominant 
influence in the 1832 official attempt at federal reform, 
namely, in the Diet commission which produced an ill-fated 
draft constitution bearing the name of its rapportuer: the 
"Rossi Pact-. Rossi and many of the core group of the 
Commission, were firm believers in the juste-milieu's 
approach (Baumgartner, 1853/4,I,350-67). Finally, the 
juste-milieu is a precursor of a significant post-1848 brand 
of conservative (40] Germanic federalism, namely, that which 
accepts the basic features of liberal constitutionalism and 
seeks to defend conservative values within, rather than 
against, that system. The following presentation of the 
federalism of the juste-milieu will concentrate upon two 
examples. The first is the official contribution of the 
Rossi Commission and the second is that of Bluntschli [41], 
the juste-milieu's political leader. 
In July 1832, the Swiss Diet set up a commission to draft 
proposals for the reform of the Federal Pact. Its fifteen 
members were divided equally between those favouring 
wide-ranging reform, those largely for the extant system and 
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those in favour of a juste-milieu (Baumgartner,1853/4,I,351f). 
The latter group was to be the most influential and included 
the Commission's rapporteur: Pellegrino Rossi. It is 
therefore with some justification that the proposals of the 
Commission came to be regarded as an example of the 
federalism of the juste-milieu. The Commission itself has 
since been identified as the "Rossi Commission", in 
acknowledgement of the decisive role which Rossi played 
within it and the masterly way in which his accompanying 
report articulated the ideas and motivation of the 
Commission's dominant group. 
An examination of the federalism articulated in the 
Commission's draft constitution (Acte Federal,1832) -and in. 
the accompanying report (Rossi,1832) is indispensable to an 
understanding of Swiss federalism'from 1832 to 1848. First, 
despite the fact that the Rossi Pact was not accepted, it 
constitutes the only example of official Swiss federalism 
during the 1815 to 1848 period. Second, it is, as we have 
argued-above, a good example of the federalism of the 
juste-milieu. Third, without an awareness of the provisions 
and rationale of the Rossi Pact, it·is difficult to 
understand the subsequent Swiss debate on federation, much 
of which was, at least initially, addressed to those 
proposals. 
Rossi considers "federation" to denote both interstate and 
intrastate unions. At times, he uses the term "confederation" 
to denote the general category of federation, at others to 
denote the interstate variety. He is using the term in the 
latter, general sense, when he offers the following 
definition of federation: 
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.•• an intermediary type of state between absolute 
independence of several political units and their 
complete fusion into one and the same sovereignty. 
Confederation starts as soon as some part of the 
sovereignty of each is placed in common; it finishes 
when this common part includes everything without 
exception and the individual sovereigns are absorbed 
by a new and greater political unit. In this latter 
case, it is possible to still have distinct and 
particular administrative units; there is (sic 
however] no sovereignty other than the general 
sovereignty. (1832,7f) 
He proceeds (1832,8) to argue that between "these two 
extremes of isolation and fusion", there is a spectrum of 
federal systems. In other words, federation denotes those 
forms of state association that lie between a unitary state 
on the one hand and the complete separateness of the states 
on the other. He acknowledges that, since this suggests that 
federations differ from one another purely in the detail of 
their division of rights between the central and local 
power, it would appear rather difficult to find any 
guidelines to establish at what point on the spectrum the new 
Swiss federation should be located. However, he argues that 
the problem is not as difficult as it first appears, since 
the spectrum is itself divided into two categories. 
In the middle of the spectrum there is a state of affairs 
characterised by a rough balance between the powers of the 
central and local authorities. What Rossi has in mind here 
appears to be a notional state of co-ordinacy. He proceeds to 
argue that on the one side of this notional mid-point are 
federations governed by the principle of local sovereignty, 
while on the other, that of central authority pertains. In 
the former category. the centre ;s derivative of the 
localities, its rights being delegated by the latter. As 
Rossi (1832,9f) says: 
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• 
the distinctive idea, the dominant principle •.• 
is that of local sovereignty. By virtue of its 
limited rights, restricted competences, and the 
influence which every individual state still retains 
even over general affairs, the central power 
constitutes a power deriving its origin and its 
strength only from the individual sovereignties. 
The idea·of its rights is associated with the 
delegation to it of the rights of others. In the 
hypothetical situation of a total dissolution of 
the Confederation, those parts of local sovereignty 
entrusted to the hands of the central power would, 
as it were, each return to its own country and the 
latter would revert to being politically as 
independent as they started. 
In the second category, the dominant principle is that of 
, .-
a general, national sovereignty and the localities derive 
their rights as a concession from the whole to the parts. 
if the sovereignty of each state, reduced to small 
dimensions, retains scarcely any direct influence 
over general affairs, the principle strongly 
,associated with this state of affairs is ... 
different ••. The dominant principle is then that 
of a general, national sovereignty; the idea of 
delegation disappears; another is substituted: that 
of a concession made by the whole to the individual 
states •••• in this case, it ;s the latter who 
appear to derive all their power and rights from 
the central sovereignty. In conceiving the hypothesis 
of· a rupture of the system, it would be easier to 
imagine the idea of a complete absorption by the 
centre of all that which is dispersed in the 
individual sovereignties, rather than the return 
-to the periphery of the rights ·of the centre. In the 
first case, the principle of the rupture of the 
system recalls the idea-of fusion; in the second, 
that of isolation. (1832,10f, emphasis in original) 
While Rossi (1832,12) respects those who sincerely believe 
that the unitary ("fusion") system is preferable to the 
federal, he gives two reasons why a unitary form is 
impossible for switzerland. First, he argues that it is not 
in accordance with "the facts of Switzerland". What he maens 
are its diversity and its history. The sole unitary period in 
Swiss history was the Helvetic Republic, the excessive 
centralisation, weak popular origin, misfortunes and short 
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duration of which prevented it from acquiring a hold on 
popular imagination sufficient to overcome cantonal 
sentiment. p6p~lar Swiss feeling is thus against a unitary 
structure. Second, Rossi states that to propose a unitary 
si~ucture would contravene the Commission's terms of 
reference, namely, not to abolish, but to revise the federal 
system. 
The question which the Commission has addressed is 
'therefore which of the two types of federation within the 
federal spectrum the proposed Swiss federation is to be; 
whether it ought to be an interstate federation, governed by 
the principle of cantonal sovereignty, or an intrastate 
federation, where the principle of central sovereignty 
pertains. Rossi (1832,22) is unequivocal: 
In a word, we think that the Swiss Confederation 
ought to remain in the first of the two categories 
of confederations that,wehave indicated, by 
approaching the second only as far as is possible 
without changing its nature. 
The arguments he advances in favour of, this proposition 
(1832,12-22), are of three types. His first argument is based 
upon the, need for a constitution to reflect the nature and 
history of the country to which it is to be applied. He sees 
two dominant principles is Swiss history. The first is 
cantonal loyalty, the second is Swiss nationalism. The latter 
has for centuries held Switzerland together, despite its 
political, religious and material interests. 
It is thus in effect a secret strength, a moral 
cement which nothing is able to destroy, neither 
the misfortunes of the day, nor the folly of man. 
This then is the national principle .... The 
feeling of Swiss nationality is so to say our 
poetry, our ideal. It can lift up the imagination, 
enf1ame the heart: at grand occasions, at crises 
of the fatherland, ..• But in the realities of 
ordinary life, in day to day application, why hide 
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it? cantonal sentiments retain their preponderance. 
(1832,19f) 
Though he acknowledges that there have recently been advances 
for the principle of Swiss nationalism and greater concern 
for the fate of the common fatherland, the dominant principle 
remains that of cantonal sovereignty. Put another way, 
cantonal nationalism remains stronger than Swiss nationalism. 
Accordingly, 
We have respected the principle of cantonal 
sovereignty, we have assigned it to the position 
that it is assigned by the majority of Swiss, but 
we have at the same time "not been afraid to demand 
of it more than one concession. We do not speak of 
sacrifices, for we have not asked for more than 
which appears to us indispensable for the good of 
all, for the security and progress of that common 
fatherland, without which our cantonal sovereignties 
would be no more than misery and illusion. (1832,22) 
Rossi's second argument is an assertion of the political 
necessity of compromise. This is typical of the juste-milieu 
and is set out clearly in the opening pages of the report 
(1832,4-7) where he states that the Commission's work was 
directed at producing a compromise, rather than a federal 
structure based upon abstract principles. Even if some 
cantons are willing to give up local sovereignty in favour of 
greater centralisation, others are not. He hopes that the 
first group will content itself with a little less 
centralisation than it wants and the second with a little 
more than it would like. "The only means of success consists 
in not fully satisfying anyone" (1832,12). He considers it 
illusory to expect a constitution not based predominantly 
upon cantonal sovereignty to be accepted. However, he also 
argues (1832,15) that constitutional structures should not 
slavishly conform to particular interests, for 
if customs greatly influence the law, the law for 
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its part is not without influence on customs. It 
would be just as irrational to violently drive the 
law against the current of opinions, as it would be 
cowardly and imprudent to let it drift after that 
current. 
He says that he does not doubt that the cantons want to 
retain their sovereignty as the basis of the system, but at 
the same time they do not intend to refuse all subsequent 
concessions to central authority. This is clear from the fact 
that they set up the Commission, the aim of which is not to 
remain with the status quo, "nor to weaken further the 
federal authority, but to strengthen it. Revising the Pact 
means nothing less than that the federal law ought to be 
strengthened. And from where could that increased strength 
come, but from cantonal sovereignty?" (1832,16) [42]. Though 
the Diet vote was not unanimous, the Diet recognised the need 
for more centralisation in setting up the Commission. 
One therefore recognised that the cantons would, 
sooner or later, be called upon to make some 
sacrifice to the common fatherland, to put some 
more besides in the common core, to be recompensed 
later by interest and prosperity, by national 
strength and dignity" ••• [sic this] is also 
the expression of a rather general feeling, a 
national need. (1832,16f) 
How the ideas motivating the federalism of the Rossi 
commission found expression in the actual framing of the 
draft constitution is clear from Rossi's detailed commentary 
upon the draft constitution (1832,23-115), as well as from a 
reading of the draft itself (Acte Federal,1832). We shall not 
provide a detailed account of the 120 articles, but will 
identify a number of the main features of the proposal, 
selected both for their intrinsic significance for reformist 
conservative federalism, as well as for their novelty, and 
their influence upon subsequent Swiss federalism. They were, 
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for example, to become the subject of heated polemics from 
those such as Troxler (1833,a-e) who had very different 
conceptions of how the federation should be constructed (see 
6.3.3. below). 
The Rossi Pact was endeavouring to offer a compromise 
between the demands of cantonal and national sentiment. 
However, in view of its above mentioned opinion about their 
relative strength, the "compromise" was always intended to 
favour the cantonal over the national principle. This becomes 
very clear when one examines the military, economic and 
political reforms proposed. The greatest concessions to the 
centre were made in military matters, where the federal 
authority was to assume a much greater role in the training, 
organisation, and equipment of the army (Rossi,1832,62-77). 
In the area of the economy (ibid,32-42), there was to be some 
economic harmonisation, with a single internal market, a 
single monetary system and uniform weights and measures. The 
concessions made to the central authority included federal 
control of postage, customs. and the gunpowder monopoly. On 
the other hand, the cantons were to retain three quarters of 
the profit of the postal system and the right to levy their 
own tolls and consumption tax, subject to the proviso that 
they would not be used in a protectionist manner. Moreover, 
the federation was not to be permitted to raise loans. 
The limited nature of the concessions to the federal 
authority - and by implication to the national as opposed to 
the cantonal principle - are most obvious in their political 
provisions. A first example concerns popular political 
rights, where the Rossi Pact proposed that all Swiss be 
allowed free residence throughout the Confederation (Article 
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36). However, this did not include the freedom of exercising 
political rights in a canton other than that in which the 
individual had been naturalised, and naturalisation was left 
entirely to cantonal discretion. Popular political rights at 
the federal level were limited to a right of petition 
(Article 37), the institution of a federal popular chamber 
having been dismissed, largely on grounds of cost (Rossi, 
1832,84). Meaningful political rights were therefore confined 
to the cantonal level. yet even here, Rossi's proposals were 
were very limited. In order not to be perceived as interfering 
in cantonal sovereignty, Rossi did not insist upon cantonal 
provisions of freedoms of the press, speech, assembly or of 
association. The federation was to ratify cantonal 
constitutions and to set conditions for the granting of a 
guarantee (Article 6), but they were very limited conditions. 
These were that they not contain any provisions contrary to 
the Pact, that they provide mechanisms for legal reform of 
cantonal constitutions and finally, "that they guarantee the 
exercise of political rights according to representative or 
direct democratic structures" (Acte Federal,1832,7). 
A second example of how the political proposals of the 
Rossi Pact defended the cantonal principle against that of 
liberal nationalism concerns how he dealt with the thorny and 
highly topical issues raised by the very existence of a 
federal guarantee of cantonal constitutions. Article 1 
declared cantons sovereign and Article 5 guaranteed their 
territory, sovereignty, independence, public order, 
constitutions and governmental and popular rights (Acte 
Federal,1832,5f). However, if these guarantees were to be 
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meaningful, it was necessary to establish when and how the 
federation was to be entitled to engage in armed intervention 
in their support. This was of crucial political significance, 
since those liberals calling for federal reform in the 
direction of greater centralisation largely did so because 
they wished to see federal intervention against cantonal 
governments refusing demands for popular sovereignty, whilst 
those conservatives against greater centralisation were 
equally vehemently of the opinion that the federation was not 
entitled to intervene in the relations between cantonal 
governments and their people, except where called upon by such 
governments for assistance. 
Rossi outlines two ways in which such federal intervention 
could be initiated. First, it can be initiated by a formal 
request by the relevant cantonal government. However, there 
is also provision for uninvited intervention in cases where 
it is deemed that the cantonal government ;s hindered from 
making a formal request. While Rossi argues that the terms of 
Article 5 mean that intervention will be to protect the 
rights of both the cantonal governments and their peoples 
(1832,57f), and thus presents his proposals as offering a 
compromise, it is clear that they could satisfy neither 
party. For the conservatives, they constituted unwarranted 
interference in their cantonal sovereignty, while liberals 
feared that together they amounted to a charter for federal 
governmental intervention in support of despotic, possibly 
even already popularly deposed, cantonal governments. This 
was one of the major objections of radical liberals such as 
Troxler (1833a-e, see 6.3.3. below). 
The third area of political provisions where Rossi's bias 
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to the cantonal rather than the liberal national principle 
concerns his proposed institutional reforms at the federal 
level. First, he proposes changes in the composition of the 
federal executive, with the State Council of the old Vorort 
system giving way to a five-man Federal Council, comprising 
four Federal Counsellors, each responsible for an area of 
policy (foreign, military, economic and home affairs) and a 
"Landamann of Switzerland", who will chair both the Federal 
Council and the Diet. However, these changes do not really 
amount to much of a concession by the cantons, since the 
election of the former is reserved to the Diet, while the 
cantonal legislatures themselves elect the Landamannn. 
Second, Rossi proposes reforms in the Diet's voting 
procedures. Articles 56-64 (Acte Federal,1832,36-40) spell 
out three categories of legislation, to which a variety of 
voting procedures apply. The significant novelties are that 
deputies are no longer to be always bound to cantonal 
instructions, and the extension of majority voting at the 
expense of the requirement for unanimity. This latter 
innovation is especially true as regards constitutional 
amendments, which are henceforth to be passed by a 
two-thirds majority (Article 117,Acte Federal,1832,59). On 
the other hand, these changes should not blind one to the 
retention of a number of provisions that ensure that cantonal 
interests are not adversely affected. First, he retains the 
principle of equal representation of unequal units and 
rejects a second, popular chamber. Second, in all important 
matters, either Diet deputies continue to be bound by 
cantonal instructions, or their decisions are to be subject 
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to cantonal ratification. 
The third example of institutional reform that does not 
greatly interfere with cantonal sovereignty is Rossi's 
proposal for the introduction a judicial body at the federal 
level: the Federal Court. It is to adjudicate upon civil 
disputes between the Federal Council and the cantons, as well 
as hear cases of high treason and mutiny against the 
federation and of impeachment of federal officials. However, 
the judges are to be elected by the cantons and the Court 
will only be entitled to hear cases of dispute between the 
Federal Council and one or more cantons if those cases have 
been referred to it by the Diet. 
To summarise, Rossi's federalism is predicated upon two of 
the core ideas of reformist conservatism. First, 
accommodation with modern ideas is not rejected out of hand, 
as it is by reactionary conservatives. Instead, reform is 
,> ' 
seen as a necessary compromise. To refuse to entertain reform 
is to store up greater troubles for the future. Accordingly, 
political structures should contain channels for the gradual 
realisation of legitimate demands for change. A second core 
idea is the notion that reform must be based not upon 
abstract and allegedly universal principles, but upon the 
peculiar circumstances of the relevant country. These include 
its historical tradition, as well as the current balance of 
social, economic and political forces. For the Commission's 
deliberations, this meant in particular the need to reflect 
the extant balance of the two dominant rival political 
loyalties: the cantonal and the national. It also meant 
taking into account the economic pressures for change. The 
implications of these two core reformist conservative ideas 
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for the federalism of the Rossi Commission are clear. The 
appropriateness of a particular federal structure is wholly 
contingent upon the circumstances in which it is proposed 
that it be applied. Federation is a means to the end of 
accommodating "legitimate" demands for change, not an end in 
itself. The Commission conceives the genus "federation" to 
include both interstate and intrastate varieties. In its 
considered opinion, the former is more in keeping with the 
accommodation of the demands for legitimate change on the one 
hand and the interests of those concerned to preserve the 
status quo on the other. 
Moving from the official articulation of the federalism of 
the juste-milieu to its no less interesting unofficial 
manifestations, we shall outline the ideas of Johann Caspar 
Bluntschli. Born in Zuerich in 1808, Bluntschli was on the 
one hand a distinguished academic, successively holding 
chairs of constitutional law at Zuerich, Munich and 
Heidelberg. He was in the tradition of the historical school 
and corrresponded with its most distinguished exponent: 
Savigny (81untschli,1884,I). 8luntschli published well over 100 
books and articles and was also a contributor to newspapers, 
being a regular correspondent to the German AUQsburger 
Allgemeine Zeitung from 1834 and a "decisive influence" on 
the "8eobachter der oestlichen Schweiz" from the early 18408 
(;bid,193 & 275f). 
8luntschli was on the other hand also an active 
politician. He was the founder and for many years also the 
leader, of the Zuerich "Moderates", a political manifestation 
of the juste-milieu (Bluntschli,1B32). He served first as a 
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member of the Zuerich legislature and then, after the 
conservative coup of 1839, as a member of its government from 
1839 to 1845, where he chaired the Home Affairs Committe. 
Zuerich was one of Switzerland's three "directoral cantons", 
which took turns in staffing the Swiss "State Council", the 
executive committe which conducted the Confederation's 
business between sittings of the Diet. As a member of the 
State Council, Bluntschli was also involved in confederal 
politics at the highest level (ibid,240ff). In December 1844, 
he'stood as his party's candidate for the post of Mayor of 
Zuerich. Had he not lost by a mere two votes, he would 
automatically have also become chairman of the State Council. 
Instead, he was elected to serve as President of Zuerich's 
legislature. However, that did not correspond with his 
ambitions to promote at the federal level the juste-milieu's 
politics of moderation and he therefore retired from his 
offices a few months later, eventually leaving to start a new 
life in Germany in 1848 (ibid,363-76). 
Until 1848, Bluntschli's contribution to Germanic 
federalism took place in and with reference to, his native 
Switzerland. Thereafter, he was active politically and 
academically in his adopted Germany. The following summary of 
8luntschli's federalism during his Swiss phase will mainly be 
based upon a review of the relevant volume of his memoirs 
(1884,1) and on two of his publications: his 1831 essay "The 
Yolk and sovereignty regarded in general and with particular 
reference to Swiss conditions. For educated persons.", and 
his 1847 pamphlet "Voice of a Swiss concerning and supporting 
the federal reform". 
The 1831 essay provides valuable insights into 
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8luntschli's general political views and how these affected 
his perception of the nature of federation and its function 
in Switzerland. The essay was written with the prime purpose 
of refuting Liberals' and Radicals' claims that sovereignty 
resides with the people and that the Swiss state should be 
amended accordingly. It also opposes hierarchical 
conservatism such as that espoused by Haller. It sees 
radicalism and reactionary conservatism as linked to democracy 
and aristocracy respectively. 8luntschli (1831,viii) states: 
"I consider both forms of state to be no longer appropriate 
for the spirit of our time (Zeitgeist), and declare myself to 
be decisively for a third form, different from them both". 
Since federation is for 8luntschli an interstate union, it 
is necessary first to comprehend his view as to the origins 
and nature of states, for it is upon this that his conception 
of the nature and role of federation is based, as we shall 
demonstrate. For Bluntschli, the Yolk is the core element for 
an understanding of the nature of the state. However, he 
explicitly rejects (1831,iv) the notion of popular 
sovereignty, which he describes as a foreign (ie.French) 
input that has been repudiated by "sounder German science". 
The first part of the pamphlet (1831,2-33) is devoted to 
demonstratin9. that there is a distinction between the Yolk 
and sovereignty. It is only after this has been done, that 
8luntschli moves on to apply these principles to his analysis 
of the Swiss cantons (1831,33-110) and then to the nature of 
the Swiss federation and the issue of its reform (1831, 
111-26). 
For 8luntschli (1831,2f), the concept of Yolk refers to 
328 
a socio-cultural phenomenon comprising more than just a group 
of individuals united for instrumental purposes. Instead 
(1831,S), it denotes "a mass of people which naturally 
belongs together" by virtue of its "Volkscharacter", i.e. its 
common customs mores, and so on. The Yolk includes men, 
women and children. "When the Yolk becomes conscious of 
belonging together, when it realises that it is a whole, then 
it will also express this consciousness and ••• form a 
state." (1831,8). In doing so, the Yolk is expressing its 
identity as more than just a group of individuals, but as a 
higher level of being ("eine Person hoeherer Art") (1831,3). 
Since this self-conscious Yolk is now an organic person, it 
. 
has to have a body (1831!11). Bluntschli's id~a of an organic 
Yolk, whose common identity and consequent institution of a 
state demonstrates its higher level of development, has 
similarities with Schleiermacher's notions, (see 3.2. above) 
a debt indicated by his approving reference (1831,28) to 
the latter's 1814 text. 
The state itself has a living organism comprising its 
different constitutent parts. In what is a rather circular 
argument, Bluntschli contends that the very interrelatedness 
of the various parts of the state machine demonstrate an 
inner essence. This is the Yolk (1831,10). As states are but 
reflections of the Yolk and the latter is always different, 
states will also all be different. The corollary of this is 
that there is "no constitution that solves all problems" 
(1831,12). Constitutions should not be constructed according 
to universal principles, but should be judged on the extent 
to which they conform to the nature of the Volk. Here we see 
a form of argumentation typical of a conservative, historical 
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approach, which sees the development of states an an organic 
process, in which past traditions are and should always be, 
reflected in extant constitutional practice. Bluntschli's 
position is thus not that different from many of the rational 
Swiss conservative federalists examined in 3.3. above. 
Being an organic entity deciding to form a state, the Yolk 
has a state will (Staatswille), which must be articulated and 
implemented. Bluntschli (1831,14) defines the body that does 
this as the sovereign. However, it is clear that since it 
embraces all men, women and children exhibiting the 
Volkscharacter, the Yolk as -such can never be assembled as a 
whole in anything other than the smallest and most primitive 
of states. Accordingly, it can never be sovereign itself. The 
Staatswille is expressed by an organ of the Yolk, namely, 
the state. It is therefore the state that is sovereign. 
However, the members of the state do not cease to be members 
of the Yolk. The latter term covers both the rulers and the 
ruled (1831,20). For not only does the whole Yolk not rule, 
but it does not even elect the rulers, since women and 
children, for example, are excluded from this process and yet 
are patently part of the Yolk (1831,72f). Bluntschli (1831, 
74f) does not object to the assertion that sovereignty 
proceeds from, or rests upon, the Volk, as all law and power 
is an expression of the Volk, but finds it a confusion to 
speak of popular sovereignty. 
However, Bluntschli (1831,21-4) rejects contract theory's 
assertion that sovereignty is transferred from rulers to 
ruled. 
Neither state nor sovereignty rest upon contract, 
but upon natural necessity (Naturnotwendigkeit). 
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The sovereign is whosoever is recognised by the' 
Yolk as such and possesses and uses the highest 
state power, regardless of how he came to it. 
(1831,24). 
Bluntschli goes on (1831,25) to argue that the German 
tradition has been for the strongest to rule and for those 
rulers to be most respected who had least need of election. 
The similarities with Haller's position (see 5.3.2. above) 
are self-evident. However, Bluntschli is not a reactionary, 
but a reformist conservative. This is illustrated by his 
acceptance that there are a variety of ways for a sovereign 
to be recognised and by his argument that revolution brings 
about undesirable events, though it is in principle but an 
expression of the pathology of the relevant body politic. In 
short, Bluntschli is not advocating rule by the strongest 
per se, but is adopting a fatalistic approach to the nature 
of a regime and its change, while at the same time arguing 
that gradual change, in keeping with the naturally slow 
evolution of an organism, is best. 
Indeed, this rejection of radical change is one of the 
hallmarks of the juste-milieu. On the other hand, the juste-
milieu contends that it is also wrong to hold up natural 
change. The responsibility for revolutionary change is also 
attributed to those who resist change for too long, thereby 
ensuring that when it eventually does come, it will be 
unhealthily radical (Bluntschli,1831,93-5). 
Having outlined his theory of the state, Bluntschli (1831, 
33-110) devotes quite a large portion of his 1831 essay to a 
critical evaluation of the cantonal political systems in the 
light of that theory. He distinguishes two types: democratic 
and representative. Under the former rubric he includes the 
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six cantons in which the approval of legislation is reserved 
to an open-air assembly of all citizens (the so-called 
"Landsgemeinde"). In a nutshell, his contention is that this 
system is appropriate only for states at a low level of 
development, where lack of differentiation and of education 
means that there is a fair amount of de facto equality 
within the population. However, such a system would be 
wholly inadequate for a state at a higher level of cultural 
existence, where greater education means greater disparities 
of wealth, education and so on. 
He also criticises the political structures of democratic 
cantons as having a tendency to concentrate power in the 
hands of the government, since it alone deliberates and 
frames legislation, as well as for its vulnerability to the 
tyranny of the masses. Also very significant for Bluntschli's 
disapproval of the democratic form of government is his 
contention that the masses are in general unaware of the 
nature of the conflict between the roles of subject and of 
sovereign lawmaker. They are even less likely to be able to 
deal with this conflict than the educated classes, being less 
inclined to subordinate their personal interests to those of 
the whole, as the role of a sovereign requires. 
By contrast, Bluntschli (1831,59) is full of praise for 
representative government, which he describes as "one of the 
greatest phenomena of the modern world", attributing it to 
the Germanic spirit, Germanic freedom and Germanic Reason. 
His discussion of representative cantons (1831,59-110) is 
both lengthy and detailed. For our purposes, it will suffice 
to note the general points being made, since of interest for 
this thesis are only those aspects that assist an 
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understanding of how Bluntschli justifies his proposed 
federation. 
First, Bluntschli (1831,60) argues that the representative 
form of state can be either monarchical or republican. What 
makes representative systems distinct is that in them it is 
not individuals, nor the masses, that rule, but one or more 
bodies or assemblies. The latter either legislate themselves, 
if they are the sovereign, or advise the actual sovereign. 
(1831,60f). The advantages of this form of state include the 
fact that they provide for reasoned discussion and for the 
representation of all interests (1831,61f). 
Of crucial importance is the composition of such bodies, 
since their task is to make reasoned decisions, corresponding 
not with the members' private interests, but with those of 
the organic whole (1831,62-6). What is required is for the 
selection criterion to emphasise education, since educated 
people offer three characteristics vital for the correct 
, 
functioning of the representative state system. These are 
their substantive understanding, their awareness of the 
nature of the role required of a person making decisions as a 
member of the sovereign body, rather than as a private 
individual, and the moral strength to subordinate their 
personal interests in the required manner (1831,62). The 
nature of the system for the selection of representatives 
should be determined by such considerations. There are 
basically two systems of selection: birth or election. which 
represent the principles of stability and change respectively. 
Among the possible electoral criteria is the principle of 
population size. He argues that although this aspect must be 
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considered, only the rawest of state forms would employ it as 
the sole or even the dominant principle. First, the principle 
of education ought to be included. Bluntschli acknowledges 
that it is difficult to assess the extent of a person's 
education or culture (Bildung), but argues that one way of 
ensuring greater representation of the educated is to give 
disproportionately heavy weighting to the votes of 
city-dwellers, since it is universally acknowledged that it 
is in cities that the level of culture is highest. Moreover, 
he advocates (1831,79f) that the sovereign authority' have the 
right to elect a limited number of its members itself. 
An additional criterion is wealth, which can be measured 
either on the basis of land ownership or property in general. 
The former promotes the element of stability, the latter is a 
dynamic element. Another principle is that of representation 
on the basis of estates, although it is not employed in 
Switzerland. In short, Bluntschli's opinion on the best form 
of selection is governed by the typical juste-milieu desire 
to find what is considered an appropriate balance between 
change and continuity. 
There are two more points which Bluntschli (1831,83-92) 
makes about representative systems that deserve to be 
mentioned, as they also impact upon his federalism. The first 
is his view as to how the state will (Staatsw;lle) comes 
about. He argues that this is a product both of the direct 
electoral system outlined above and of certain other factors. 
The latter include personal reflection by the representatives, 
free speech both within and without the assembly by both 
representatives and the general population, a popular right 
of petition and finally, the frank and unhindered exchange 
334 
of ideas in the debates of the sovereign body. In short, 
Bluntschli is placing his faith in the ability of the liberal 
principle of free speech to result in decisions by the 
sovereign that are not solely in the interest of its 
individual members, but in that of the organic whole. 
The final principle we shall mention is the requirement 
of mechanisms for constitutional change (1831,92-111). This 
derives logically from his earlier comments about the need 
for measured change, as opposed to precipitous change on the 
one hand, and the ultimately equally destructive repression 
of change on the other. While he accepts (1831,102) that 
popular ratification of constitutional change has a useful 
legitimising function, Bluntschl; (1831,104) insists that 
since such ratification could only be conducted by the 
enfranchised citizens, it is better to stick to the principle 
that decisions are made by the sovereign. To do anything 
else would, he asserts (1831,104), be a regression of the 
culture of the state. 
Bluntschli's federalism follows on logically from his 
theory of the state. First, he argues (1831,35) that at the 
federal level, there exists a new and greater state, a 
"Gesammtstaat". As a state, it has a sovereign, namely, the 
Diet. However, he insists that the cantons alone are 
true states. The Diet's sovereignty is restricted to a few 
matters over which it ;s sovereign merely because they have 
been transferred to it from and by the cantons. 
Interestingly, 8luntschli is here departing from his 
earlier contention that sovereignty cannot be transferred by 
a contractual process. Though he fails to make this explicit, 
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his argument appears to rest upon the view that the cantonal 
states are derivations of their individual Volkscharacter and 
thus legitimate expressions of the several state wills. By 
contrast, the sense of national Swiss identity has certainly 
grown in recent years, but is as yet not such as to warrant 
the creation of a state will that overrules that of the 
individual cantons. "If Voelker are organic by nature .•. they 
will retain their particular personality in their external 
manifestations as states." The federal authority is thus not 
really sovereign, though it does exercise sovereignty in 
individual areas of policy (above all foreign policy), in 
respect of which the cantons have to subordinate themselves 
to its will. 
Surprisingly, Bluntschli (1831,112) claims that the Swiss 
federation is not a Staatenbund, but a Bundesstaat. He 
concedes that this cannot be sustained by reference to 
positive law. Instead, he supports his argument by pointing 
(1831,113) to the increase in the sense of a common Swiss 
identity: 
The feeling of a common national association 
(Nationalverband) embracing all Swiss, the 
consciousness of a common fatherland, has long 
been much livelier and more developed than the 
federal constitution's structure shows. 
and arguing that it is for the federal structure to make up 
this deficit between the popular sentiment and positive law. 
This gap ;s the result at least in part of the 1798 invasion 
and subsequent repressive measures stopping the realisation 
of national aspirations. These demands have now been 
frustrated for so long that the pent-up pressures have 
resulted in calls for unconstitutional and illegal change. It 
;s therefore necessary to undertake reform forthwith, so that 
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such excessive change is avoided. 
We see here a further interesting aspect of Bluntschli's 
federalism. namely, the use of the principle of nationalism 
at two levels: both the Volkscharacter upon which he sets so 
much store and the national identity which he identifies as a 
growing force, are expressions of nationalism. It is obvious 
that as yet, (1831) Bluntschli considers cantonal nationalism 
to be prior to an overarching Swiss nationalism. However, 
inasmuch as he gives qualified recognition to the existence 
and legitimate demands of a federation-wide nationalism, and 
argues that the structure of the federation should be amended 
in response to Swiss nationalism, he is clearly attributing 
to nationalism an important role in determining the nature of 
federal relationships. 
"Bluntschli goes on to argue that as the Swiss federation 
is based upon the respresentative'and not the democratic 
principle, reform.should·be predicated,upon the latter. He 
therefore applies.to the federa1 level the principles of 
representative states which he has already outlined. First, 
the composition of the sovereign - in this case the Diet -
must be governed by the principle of enabling it to act in 
the .interests 'of the whole, rather than in the interests of 
its constituent members. Accordingly, he argues that since 
the whole is not the canton but a growing sense of VOlk, the 
Diet must give greater weight to the principle of population 
size. That is to say. cantonal representation in the Diet 
must reflect relative. cantonal size. more (1831,116f). Second, 
the deliberations of the sovereign must be organised so as to 
permit the will of the organic whole ("the national will") to 
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take precedence' over those local wills of the cantons. He 
concludes (1831,118) from this that at least in matters of 
common interest. deputies must be free of binding cantonal 
instructions. 
However, these centralising proposals are limited by 
Bluntschli's view (1831,121) of the state as a dependent 
variable, a natural necessity which ought not to be organised 
around abstract and allegedly universal principles: 
Although I concede that states of a higher order 
require a single organism ... Switzerland must 
never become such a state, because its inner 
peculiarity, which is essentially predicated upon 
'the diversity of its parts, resists such unity. The 
Unnatural is never desirable. Only that which is 
appropriate to nature and its structures may be the 
goal of a reasonable will. 
What this amounts to is a rejection of the logical corollary 
of Schleiermacher's views (1814, see 3.2 above) about the 
natural progression of states from those of the lowest order, 
through those of a higher order, to that of the highest 
order, namely, the unitary state. Bluntschli is, after all, 
a reformist conservative. He believes that the structure of 
a state should not be governed by universal principles, but 
should be a reflection of that organism's unique character 
and history. This historicism also means that there is no 
pure federal form to which Switzerland need conform. 
Accordingly, if there is a principle to be discerned behind 
the specific proposals he proceeds to make about which 
matters cantons should transfer to the central authority -
the organisation of military command, military provisioning, 
internal trade and commerce, a federal university, a federal 
supreme criminal court and so on - it is the principle of 
self-defined moderation. Thus, for reasons which derive not 
338 
from any clear principles, but from his subjective judgement, 
it appears to Bluntschli (1831,125) that those advocating any 
Diet powers concerning cantonal constitutions "go too far". 
Finally, in order to ensure that after these changes have 
been implemented, the federation continues to be in tune with 
the Volk, there must be a more flexible mechanism for 
constitutional reform. 
The contingent nature of Bluntschli's federalism is clear 
when one"considers the development of his ideas during the 
period up to 1848, as is shown in his memoirs (1884,I,437ff) 
and his 1847 pamphlet suggesting how the federation might be 
restructured in the light of the defeat of the conservatives 
in the civil war of that year. In the hope that there might 
yet be a role for the juste-milieu as an arbitrator or 
conciliator in the dispute between liberals and conservatives 
(Bluntschli,1884,I,437f) Bluntschli set to work in 1847 on 
further proposals for a restructuring of the Swiss ,federation. 
He now (Bluntschli,1884,437) describes the extant 
federation as a Staatenbund and describes this as consistent 
with the nature of the federation as a union of independent 
republics. His prime criticism of its structure relates not 
to the equal representation of unequal units, but to the 
composition of the Diet's executive committee: the State 
Council. He argues that it should not be composed solely of 
the chief magistrates and officials of the directoral canton. 
Instead, he proposes the revival of the Mediation office of 
a Swiss Landamann, elected annually by the Diet. He would 
chair the State Council, membership of which would ,be 
extended'to include two representatives of the directoral 
canton, two of each of the other two directoral cantons and a 
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total of six from the remaining cantons. This idea is of 
course consistent with Bluntschli's argument that a sovereign 
body should be composed in such a way as to militate against 
it deciding in favour of sectional interets. 
However, shortly after the 1847 civil war he writes in his 
diary (Bluntschli,1884,I,443): 
Old Switzerland is now definitely behind us. "Let 
the dead bury their dead." The only path left for 
me now is to surrender to the new times and, through 
creative work, rescue what can be rescued ..•. Until 
now I have tried to delay the revolution, always 
hoping to be able to intervene in a reformist ... 
manner when radicalism had been rejected. The 
absolutism of the so-called conservatives made this 
impossible. Now liberalsim will have to emerge from 
radicalism. 
What is now called for is a revision of hi~ mos~ recent 
proposals for federal reform. The reason he gives for this 
shows how far Bluntschli considers:constitutions to have no 
spec; a 1 status, bei n9 merely 1 aws' 1 ike any others (1831,97) 
and thus subject to the requirement that they reflect the 
state will of the Volk. For Bluntschli argues that the civil 
war that has just taken place has' shown canton~al nationalism 
to' have become m~uch weaker than Swi ss nat i ona 1 ism' ( 1847,6 & 
1884,I,442-444). Accordingly. he argues (1847,8) that the 
constitution should be amended to reflect this. He now (1847, 
11-16) adopts the proposal for separate and independent 
chambers to reflect the state wills of both the several 
cantonal nationalisms and of the overarching Swiss nation. 
Cantonal nationalism is to be ~epr~sented in the Diet, 
which is to retain equ'al cantonal 'representation, with 
deputies bound to cantonal instructions. The popular chamber 
(the "Great Council of'Switzerland") is to have the right 
to initiate bills and to deliberate them first, but the 
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definitive vote on them is left to the Diet. It seems that 
Bluntschli is advocating a negative veto for the Great 
Council, in that the Diet will not be able to pass legislation 
defeated by the former. However his comments (1847,13 & 1Sf) 
are rather unclear and it is possible that he conceives the 
Great Council's role as being limited to the application of 
moral pressure on the Diet. He is rather hesitant about the 
value of a rigid stipulation of federal and cantonal 
competences, for he feels that this will not successfully 
accommodate change. Instead, he proposes (1847,15) that any 
matters deemed federal by a three-quarters majority in the 
popular chamber, followed by a simple majority in the Diet, 
will automatically become federal. He (1847,15) considers 
this a flexible principle, which can also be used to restore 
to the cantons increased powers in the (unlikely) event of 
cantonal nationalism again becoming relatively stronger than 
Swiss nationalism. Though Bluntsch1i (1847,16) argues that 
his proposals amount not to u a patchwork job, but a new 
construction-, it is clear'that they are permeated by his 
guiding principle of as much reform as is necessary and which 
is in agreement with the underlying principle of reflecting 
the state will of the organic Volk. 
So what B1untschli is advocating is a form of interstate 
federation, with very circumscribed areas of sovereignty for 
the federal authority. The constituent units of the 
federation are the sovereign cantons, which constitute tribes 
(parts) of an overarching Volk, which he does not define more 
closely. The structures of the federation are to be such as 
to ensure the dominance of the intellect and science (-des 
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Gedankens und der Wissenschaft-) (1832,417). An important 
means to this end are electoral laws that restrict political 
power to the educated and propertied classes. His proposed 
federation is thus to be seen as a counter to the extant 
pressures for popular sovereignty from Liberals and Radicals, 
while at the same time attempting to make sufficient 
concessions to their demands so as to prevent revolution. 
, 
However, it is clearly predicated upon an elitist and in 
parts corporate form of political representation. Thus he 
argues (1831,vii) that political equality a nonsense, for he 
cannot accept that all, even the least educated, are equally 
able to understand right and wrong and issues such as the 
separation of powers. Similarily, he supports greater 
representation of the educated and wealthy classes. 
This is of course but one of a number of concessions to 
conservatives. These include (Bluntschli,1884,I,210ff) the 
insistence upon cantonal sovereignty, particularly as regards 
confessional matters, and the defence of religious faith and 
religious authority. However, it must be recalled that in 
this aspect Bluntschli is, as an active Protestant, far 
removed from the position of radical Catholic conservatives, 
whom he regards (B1untschli,1884,1,383) as ultramontanists 
lacking loyalty to Switzerland. He feels (1884,1,380) that if 
their aspirations were successful, they would "lead society 
back to the barbarism of the Middle Ages-. Typical of the 
juste-milieu is his assertion (1884,1,384) that the two 
extremes of radicalism and reactionary conservatism have 
much in common. Thus he states that: 
While the omnipotence of an idolised state is the 
ultimate goal of radicalism, the omnipotence of 
hierarchy is the ultimate goal of ultramontanism 
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••• The one is essentia11y'revo1utionary, the other 
essentially reactionary. 
In short, Bluntschli's federalism is a clear example of 
reformist conservatism and has many similarities with that 
advanced by Rossi. Neither offers a blueprint for a federation 
based upon one or more universal principles. Both reject the 
notion that states ought to be constructed in such a 
rationalist, ahistorical manner. They see the constituent 
units of federations as organisms, whose diverse structures 
derive from the natural diversity of their repsective 
nationalisms (Volkscharacter). The purpose of the Swiss 
federation is to protect and promote these national spirits, 
while providing structures that accommodate legitimate demands 
for gradual reform. However, a rival nationalism based upon 
the common identity of all the units of the federation has 
emerged. This is a natural development and as such deserves 
to find expression in the constitutional structures of the 
federation. The purpose of the federation has now changed to 
that of maintaining a balance between the aspirations of the 
local and federal nationalisms. The nature of this balance is 
to be determined not by abstract principles, but by the 
development of the popular sentiments themselves. 
Though both Bluntschli and Rossi insist that Switzerland 
must never become a unitary state it is clear that neither 
are able to offer much comfort to those who feared that this 
was but a slippery slope that would lead to an ever decreasing 
cantonal role. For both their federal isms are, in the final 
analysis, predicated upon an almost passive reflection of 
changes in popular identity. Since that changed identity ;s 
not only of a cultural nature, but includes changed political 
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aspirations, it is clear that the. federalism of Swiss 
reformist conservatism offers little resistance to the 
increasingly popular liberal ideas. 
Swiss reformist conservatism has little to offer by way 
of a realistic alternative philosophy, or an alternative 
vision, for the Swiss federation, its prime message being, 
an exhortation to moderation and compromise. Despite some 
local exceptions, (notably the Zuerich. "putsch" of 1839 and 
its.domination of that canton's government under Bluntschli 
for the next five years), the juste-milieu also lacks 
political success. It u1timate1y.proves unable to hold up the 
rising tide of conflict between the liberal and conservative 
camps. 
5.4. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
.In Chapter 1, the main aim of Part 3 of this thesis was 
stated to be ,-the analysis of the use by the earliest 
antecedents of modern political parties of federalism as a 
political ideology to rationalise and to promote their 
existing political interests within extant federations" (p43 
above) •. According1y, the main focus of these concluding 
remarks will be the findings of thi~ chapter regarding the 
use by German and Swiss conservatives of federalism as .a· 
political ideology. Before launching into that exercise, 
however, there will be a brief recapitulation of the 
dimensions of federalism discussed by German and Swiss 
conservatives during the period covered by. this chapter, as 
well as of the manner in which that federalism was 
articulated. 
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During 1815 to 1850, German and Swiss conservatives 
advanced no new dimensions of Germanic federalism. Instead, 
their federalism centred around three of the five dimensions 
of Germanic federalism previously identified in this thesis 
(see Figure 1 above). All the conservative federal isms to 
which this chapter has referred spoke about confederation 
and most of them also discussed intrastate-territorial 
federation. Though Stahl made an interesting distinction 
between the monarchical and the republican Bundesstaat, this 
did not amount to a new dimension of federalism, but merely a 
subdivision of intrastate-territorial federation. The 
political motivations behind Stahl's distinction will be 
referred to below. Finally, conservative Germanic federalism 
contained intrastate-imperial federalism, which was used most 
persistently by Goerres and possibly also envisaged by 
Jarcke. 
As in the revolutionary Napoleonic period (see Chapter 3 
above), conservative federalism was again articulated in a 
wide range of registers and in the context of differing 
conceptual frameworks. It included, for example, Geiger's 
polemicism and the often impenetrable, mystical Romanticism 
of Goerres on the one hand, as well as Stahl's at times 
abstract, idealist teleology. At both these extremes, the 
details of the precise workings of federations were usually 
submerged under either emotivism, or metaphysics. Between 
those extremes, however, were the legalistic federalism of 
Rossi in switzerland and the pragmatic, but none the less 
cosmopolitan federalism of Heeren in Germany, both of which 
were concerned to describe the mechanics of federation in 
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greater details than many other of their conservative 
," 
counterparts. Moreover, while the federal isms of both Stahl 
and Bluntschli were sometimes expressed in an academic 
register and contained facscinating insights into how the two 
men thought federations should be structured, at other times, 
their federalism was articulated in a manner that reflected 
the fact that they were both also political activists. 
Notwithstanding this great variety in the language it 
used, conservative Germanic federal isms contained at least 
three recurrent themes. The first and from an Anglo-Saxon 
perspective one of the most distinctive, is theological 
argumentation, though as has been noted, the extent to which 
such language should be taken to indicate sincere religious 
commitment varies. In the case of Haller, for example, it has 
been suggested that his appeals to theological justifications 
for patriarchy lacked sincerity. Whilst some of the 
theological language came from Protestants (eg. the Lutheran 
views of Stahl), the majority of those who availed themselves 
of such language were from the Catholic camp. Examples 
include Jarcke, Geiger, Haller and Goerres •. A second theme, 
albeit not universal, was nationalism. This appeared in 
various manifestations in the federalism of, for example, 
Goerres, Stahl, Bluntschli and Rossi. Unlike the federalisms 
of most liberals of the period (see Chapter 6 below), 
conservatives did not always use nationalism to argue for 
greater centralisation (eg.Rossi). A third and universal 
theme of conservative Germanic federalism was opposition to 
revolution, as well as to radical social, economic and 
political change. 
This brings us to the major topic of these concluding 
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remarks, namely, the role of conservative Germanic federalism 
as political ideology. This issue will be considered by 
c' 
reference to two aspects. The first is the nature of the 
federations proposed (to be distinguished from those merely 
identified). Second, we shall then review the evidence this 
chapter has presented in support of the contention that those 
federal isms are best understood in terms of their role in 
their respective domestic political debates. 
Not only were three dimensions of Germanic federalism 
',;:-
articulated, but all three types of federation were 
prescribed by at least one of the exponents of Germanic 
, > 
federalism considered in this chapter. Interstate 
confederation was prescribed for Switzerland by Rossi and by 
the early Bluntsch1i, while Jarcke, Heeren and the early 
Stahl all supported the idea of a German confederation. On 
the other hand, both in Switzerland (eg.Bluntschl;) and in 
Germany (eg.Stahl), some conservatives came to support 
intrastate-territorial federation. Finally, Goerres retained 
his commitment to the notion that Germany sould revert to an 
intrastate-imperial federation. 
The aim of this chapter was not limited, however, to 
" identifying merely the types of federation envisaged and 
. 
prescribed. It was also our intention to investigate the 
motivations that led to those prescriptions and to establish 
the accuracy of Riker's assertion (1964 & 1975) that the 
factors motivating all federations were considerations of a 
military and an expansionist nature. There is clear evidence 
that this applies to some reactionary conservatives. For 
example, one of the main motivations of Goerres' federalism 
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was shown to be his concern for military security, especially 
vis-a-vis Russia. To this end, his proposed federation was to 
adopt what amounts to an expansionst policy, with a cordon 
sanitaire of colonised states between it and Russia. 
Similarily, it can be argued that Stahl's advocacy in his 
later federalism of a k1eindeutsch, monarchical Bundesstaat 
under Prussian leadership is tantamount to a' legitimation 
of Prussian expansionism. This chapter has also shown that 
behind the conservative federalism of the Swiss army officers 
Bontemps and Mai1lardoz there were also considerations of 
external military security, albeit no intention to engage in 
expansionism. It must therefore be conceded that Riker's 
first, ·military· condition does apply to a number of the 
conservative Germanic federal isms considered in this chapter. 
Moreover, in the case of two of the federal isms that have 
been discussed, his expansion condition can also be said to 
have applied. 
On the other hand, however, the very detailed examination 
in this chapter of the content and motivations of 
conservative Germanic federal isms disproves Riker's assertion 
that both his conditions apply universally. This chapter's 
evidence demonstrates conclusively that considerations of 
external security and expansion were at best only one of a 
number of factors motivating federal isms and not necessarily 
the most weighty. Indeed, in the one case where external 
military security did constitute the central concern, 
namely, in the federalism of Heeren, federation was proposed 
as a gesture of German renunciation of potential expansionism 
in the interests of European peace. 
One of the major findings of this chapter is that the 
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federal isms discussed cannot be fully understood unless one 
recognises that they were advanced as part of a domestic 
political debate, in which their purpose was to defend or 
promote the conservative political causes. In short, 
federalism has to be seen as a political ideology. In Chapter 
3, it was argued by reference to Germanic federalism between 
the 1790s and 1815 (see 3.4 above) that amongst the factors 
that illustrated the ideological nature of Germanic 
federalism particularily well were its language, the 
federations it proposed and the tactical shifts in those 
proposals. All three factors apply to conservative Germanic 
federalism between 1815 and 1850. 
The first of these has already been mentioned above. It 
is clear that polemical. or emotive conservative federal isms 
such as those advanced by the likes of Geiger or Goerres 
allow no room for doubt as to the political goals being 
pursued. On the other hand, the Lutheran Quietism evident in 
Stahl's theological argumentation in support of monarchy by 
Divine grace, as well as 8luntschli's academic refutation of 
the principle of popular sovereignty are both certain 
indicators of their authors' desire to resist the demands of 
liberal constitutionalism and popular sovereignty. 
Such political motivations are evident not only in the 
language and conceptual approaches of the conservative 
federal isms discussed, but also in their proposed federations. 
In some cases (eg.Goerres), such motivations are spelled out 
by the protagonists themselves. In other cases, it is 
necessary to under~ake a more detailed investigation into 
the social, economic and political structures which are to 
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pertain in the relevant federation. That is an investigation 
which this chapter has painstakingly undertaken in almost all 
the federal isms discussed. The inescapable conclusion of that 
examination is that federations were proposed as a means to 
the realisation of the, albeit differently understood, 
political causes of conservatism. Variations between the 
exponents of conservative Germanic federalism as to the type 
of federation that should be implemented are to be explained 
by two factos. The first is their perception of the threat to 
conservative values and the second relates to their evaluation 
of the most appropriate strategy to counter such threats. 
This is clearly visible if one reads the, as it were, 
small print of the various federal isms. It reveals that in 
Germany, for example, the proposed federations were in some 
cases (eg.Stah1) intended to advance a Prussian-dominated, 
Kleindeutschland, and in others (e.g. Goerres), it was a 
Grossdeutsch1and that as to emerge. The small print of the 
federalism used by some (eg.Jarcke) points to a desire to 
promote a mediaeval type social and economic system, while 
that of others (e.g.Heeren) was to permit a moderate degree 
of political pluralism. Similarily, some of the federations 
proposed by Swiss conservative federalism (e.g.Haller) were 
designed to provide the framework for a patriarchal society, 
while that of others (eg.Bluntschli) was meant to take the 
sting out of demands for radical change by conceding limited 
reform. 
However, there is a second type of variation between 
federal prescriptions which provides even better evidence of 
the politically contingent nature of federalism: changes over 
time in the type of federation proposed by a single exponent 
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of Germanic federalism. The prime examples cited in this 
chapter are the federalisms of Stahl and of Bluntschli. It 
will be recalled that Stahl initially gave uncritical 
support to the confederal German Bund, since he perceived it 
to be the best guarantor of unchecked monarchical rule. Yet 
during the revolutions of 1848-50, he became a supporter of 
intrastate-territorial federation. As was shown in 3.2.3. 
above, Stahl's insistence upon both the generic distinction 
between the republican and monarchical types of Bundesstaat 
and upon Germany adopting the latter can only be understood 
if one recognises his federalism as a means to the end of 
preserving and promoting the monarchical political system. 
The fact that he first supported confederation, but by 1849 
had come to be an advocate of intrastate-territorial 
federation is a reflection of his altered assessment of the 
type of federation most conducive to achieving his political 
ends. Although Bluntschli's political goal was not unchecked 
monarchy, the shifts in his federalism are also indictive of 
tactical considerations. 
To conclude, this chapter has shown that federalism was 
used by reactionary, status quo and reformist conservatives 
in both Switzerland and Germany. Moreover, it demonstrated 
that though in some cases the motivations of those federal isms 
included military and even expansionist considerations, 
federalism was undeniably primarily utilised by Swiss and 
German conservatives in their respective domestic political 
debates and as a vehicle for the rationalisation and 
promotion of their political goals. In short, it was used 
as a political ideology. 
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The factors influencing the nature of that federalism were 
" , 
in part a shared ideational background. Thus it ha~ been 
shown that individual thinkers or political philosophies 
exercised an influence on exponents of conservative Germanic 
federalism in both countries. Examples include Schelling and 
Schleiermacher, to whom both Stahl and Bluntsch1i refer, as 
well as the values of political Catholicism (eg. Goerres and 
Geiger). On the other hand, however, there was also a 
considerable interpenetration of conservative Germanic 
federalism. This chapter has demonstrated that, for example, 
Haller was influential in Switzerland, Prussia and Austria; 
, , 
that his disciple, 'Jarcke, was also influential in Prussia 
and Austria; ,that Bluntschli was politically and academically 
active both in Switzerland and, after 1848, in southern 
Germany; and finally, that Goerres' 'federalism was informed 
not only by German, but also by Swiss experience. 
As significant as these factors are in demonstrating the 
existence of a common tradition of Germanic federalism (see 
Chapter 7 below), the main emphasis of this chapter has been 
upon the relationship between federalism and the political 
process. It has shown many of the federal isms covered to have 
been very relevant politically. Examples include the' 
federalism of Rossi, which despite its failure to get 
accepted in 1832, none the less exercised a poweful influence 
upon the shape of the Swiss federation of 1848. Another 
example is Stahl, whose proposed monarchical Bundesstaat 
bears many resemblances to the federation of the Second Reich 
(1871). 
However, the relevance of this chapter's discussion of 
federalism as a political ideology is not limited to its 
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subsequent impact, howver great that might have been. Since 
A 
the political debates to which those federal isms contributed 
took place within extant federations, the preceding analysis 
has also provided an illustration of the interaction of 
federalism and federation. The goal of the second chapter of 
Part 3 of this thesis is to examine that process with 
reference to the federal isms of German and Swiss liberals. 
NOTES FOR CHAPTER 5 
1.'As Epstein himself concedes (1966,7), the three classes of 
conservatives he identifies are ideal types and "real 
conservatives ••• are frequently mixed breeds that do not 
conform to these stereotypes". The same clearly applies to 
the conservatives covered in this thesis. However, the role 
of Epstein's classification in this thesis is merely that of 
a heuristic tool. Uncertainties over the precise political 
classification of some of the conservative exponents of 
Germanic federalism covered in this thesis do not detract 
from the latter's main concern, which is to identify not the 
different political groupings, but the different types of 
federalism proposed within the Germanic tradition and to 
demonstrate their use as political ideology. 
2. The Wochenblatt appeared from 1831 to 1841. For an 
interesting discussion of its content and relationship to 
Haller's theory, see Meinecke (1928,239-61). From 1838, Jarcke 
co-edited the equally conservative Historisch-politische 
Blaetter. Of the numerous other reactionary contributors to 
the Wochenblatt, one of the most colourful was the historian 
Heinrich Leo (1799-1878), who wrote in it that "It is better 
that a hundred of the common rabble should perish than one 
man who is noble by birth or intellect." (cited in Hertz, 
1975,211). See also Leo's "physiology" of the state, (Leo, 
1833) and B1untsch1i's comments on his theory (1867,625-30). 
3. See for example his 1834 essays Natural law and history 
(Jarcke,1839,III,1-19) and The natural law theory of the state 
(ibid, 20-31), as well as his 1836 essay entitled The origin 
of the state in Nature (ibid,32-64), and his Political 
Equality of 1832 (ibid,126-40). 
4. For a discussion on the limited religious commitment 
behind Haller's appeal to Divine right, see Meinecke (1928, 
224f) as refered to in 5.3.2. below. 
5. This he has in common with one of the Swiss reactionary 
conservatives discussed in 5.3.2. below, namely, Geiger 
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(1823-39), as well as with the later Goerres (eg.1821) (see 
below). 
6. Jarcke certainly does not make this clear in his Mixed 
writings (1839,1-11), though it may well be that he is more 
explicit elsewhere. However, this thesis does not claim to 
provide an exhaustive account of the federalism of the 
authors it has elected to cover and has therefore not 
attempted to examine all his writings. 
7. The thrust of Aris' (1936,320-40) conclusion on Goerres' 
political writings up to the 1820s is that he constitutes a 
very much compromised liberal. By contrast, Bluntschli's 
history of political thought (1867,506-14), which provides a 
very brief assessment of the whole of Goerres writings, deals 
with Goerres in a chapter entitled "The Catholicising 
Politics of Reaction and Restoration", in which Bona1d, De 
Maistre, Haller and Adam Mueller also figure. Though bearing 
in mind the caveat in footnote 1 of this chapter, this thesis 
takes the view, for reasons that will now be outlined, that 
Goerres is best regarded as a reactionary conservative. See 
the selection of Goerres' writings in Schorn (1934). 
8. The following discussion of Stahl is based upon five 
primary and six secondary sources. The former are the third 
edition of Stahl's philosophical magnun opus: The Philosophy 
of Right, which first appeared in 1830 and 1837 (Stahl,1854, 
/6); his The Monarchical Principle (Stah1,1845) and three 
collections of speeches whose subject matter is the 1848-50 
proposals for the reform of the German state (Stahl,1849, 
1849a & 1850). The secondary sources are B1untschli (1867,630 
-50), Hertz (1975, 208f), Masur (1930), Meinecke (1928,263-70 
& 514-20), H. Schmidt (1914) and W.Schmidt (1910). The 
following biographical material is taken largely from Masur 
(1930) • 
9. See Masur,(1930,eg.29f & 47-50), who speaks of a "glowing 
speech on Germany's unity and freedom" which Stahl made in 
1820 and notes that enthusiasm for German nationalism was 
shown by students of all political persuasions. In addition 
to liberal nationalists like Gagern (see 6.2.2. below), there 
were those such as Heinrich Leo, whose youthful liberalism 
was later to be transformed into rectionary conservatism (see 
Leo,1833). Masur also argues that although Stahl was 
influenced by radical liberals such as Behr (see 3.2. above 
and 6.2.3. below), he never had a liberal phase. For an 
excellent account of the later development of Stahl's ideas 
regarding the German nation state, see H.Schmidt (1914). 
10. Masur (1930,54) states that Zacharaiae "must be seen not 
merely as the precursor of the monarchical-constitutional 
principle that Stahl was later to develop. but without doubt 
as his teacher and educator" On Zachariae's moderate 
liberalism, see 3.2. above and 6.2.2. below. 
11. Two caveats have to be mentioned here. First, Stahl's 
theories had in the 1830s already begun to be utilised 
politically by-conservative German monarchs for the 
legitimation of their rule. For example, after the 1830 
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revolution, Stahl's ideas were used by King Ludwig of 
Bavaria against the claims of Bavarian liberals such as Behr 
(Masur,1930,168f). Second, this royal approval of Stahl's 
work was not unconnected to his election in 1837 by the city 
of Erlangen to serve in the Bavarian Diet. 
12. For a fascinating account of how this transpired, see W. 
Schmidt (1910). Also relevant are the comments in Meinecke 
(1928,263-86). 
13. Stahl's theological and metaphysical political-philosophy 
is articulated most fully in his Philosophy'of Right (Stahl, 
1854/6, esp 1). His general theory of the state is also to be 
found in that text (1854/6,esp.lli & IIii), but also in his 
The Monarchical Principle (Stahl,1845). It is from these two 
sources that the following summary derives. 
14. When asserting his views as to the ethical nature of the 
state (1854/6,11ii,131-61) Stahl cites Schelling approvingly. 
On Schelling, see Watson (1892)~footnote 23 of Chapter 3 
above. Interestingly, Schelling was to influence both 
conservative thinkers such as Stahl and radicals like the 
Troxler. On the latter, see Chapter 6.3.3 below, including 
footnote 22. ' " 
15. Thus Stahl at,one point (1854/6,IIii,170f) approvingly 
refers to Sch1eiermacher's assertion that the state develops 
naturally, i.e. not as a result of human deliberation or 
volition. On Sch1eiermacher, see 3.2. above. 
16. Like Althusius (see 2.2 above) Stahl (1854/6,11ii,146) 
also explains the purposes of the state by reference to the 
two tables of the Decalogue, which the state is to "preserve 
and avenge". 
17. On the other hand, Stahl (1854/6,Ilii,243-252) concedes 
that although he is king by the ·Christian principle of 
Divine grace-, the monarch has to act within the positive 
law. He is not an absolute monarch, but by God's grace a 
servant of the ethical commonwealth. The latter remains 
above him. As mentioned above, however, this should not be 
taken to imply that Stahl advocates the right of popular 
resistance. Instead, his argument (eg.1854/6,IIii,Ch.19) 
amounts to the need to suffer bad kings. 
18. See also Stahl,1850,v-xvi. On the other hand, Stahl also 
rejects the ideas of the Haller school regarding estate 
structures as outmoded and inappropriate for modern needs 
(eg.1845,iv-xvi & 1850,v-xvi).-
19. The fullest exposition of Stahl's views concerning the 
relationship that ought to exist between the monarch and the 
respresentativeassemb1y is to be found in his The Monarchical 
Principle (1845) and in his "Revolution and the constitutional 
monarchy .•. q (1849). In the former, Stahl (1845,25) 
summarises the requirements of the monarchical principle as 
being that the monarch alone have the right of initiating 
legislation, while the legislative rights of the estates are-
limited to approval and petition; that he alone exercise 
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administrative power; 'that he have his own independent royal 
income, as well as control of the civic purse, except in 
specific matters of expenditure and the raising of taxes, for 
which the assent of the estates is required; and finally, 
that all these rights are real, rather than theoretical. For 
a further discussion of these matters, see Stahl,(1849). 
20. His contributions to this newspaper are covered in 
H.Schmidt, (1914~20-6) and in part reprinted in Stahl(1849). 
21. In his article of 15 July 1848, for example, Stahl states 
that "Germany should not become a simple state, but a 
Bundesstaat and not a republic, but a constitutional monarchy" 
(cited in H.Schmidt,1914,24). It must be recalled, however, 
that when Stahl uses the term "constitutional monarchy" he 
does not mean the same as liberal constitutionalists. In 
particular, he does not mean to imply parliamentary 
sovereignty. On the contrary, Stahl uses the term to denote 
a monarchy that exercises executive and legislative authority 
independently of parliament (see 5.2.3 above). For an 
exposition of his views on this matter, see Stahl,(1845 or 
1849) • 
22. The main features of the constitution approved by the 
National Assembly are of the Union plan are outlined in 4.2 
above. For the text of the former, see Schuster (1980,29-56). 
23. Examples of such liberals are the German liberal radicals 
Struve and Troxler, whose federalism is' covered in the next 
chapter of this thesis (see 6.2.3. and 6.3.3. below 
respect i ve 1 y .. ) : 
24. Stahl (1849a,eg.23-8) justifies his contention that a 
Bundesstaat must not comprise both repUblican and monarchical 
elements with two basic arguments. The first is that in a 
Bundesstaat such as that proposed by the National Assembly, 
in which the principles of rule is both monarchical and 
republican, monarchs would be very likely to be excluded 
from rule at the centre. What is more, they would therefore 
be likely to be ruled over by their subjects. Both scenarios 
are incompatible with maintaining monarchical dignity. The 
second basic argument is that the inevitable outcome of such 
a mixture of republican and monarchical structures , 
(especially in federations such as proposed by the National 
Assembly, where the former have an inbuilt dominace), would 
be the abolition of the latter (see 1849a,34-7 also). Later, 
Stahl (1854/6,IIii,xif) says, in language reminiscent of 
Pufendorf (see 2.2. above), that a Bundesstaat uniting both 
monarchical and republican elements would be a "political 
monstrosity". 
25. This thesis has translated this term as "ethical 
commonwealth". While we still believe this to be a useful 
translation, the English concept of commonwealth fails to 
capture an important component element of the German concept 
of Reich, namely the association which that word has in the 
German language with notions of monarchy, or empire. It is 
this etymological association which is used by Stahl ,to claim 
that monarchy and ethical commonwealth (sittliches Reich) are 
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intrinsically and inseparably linked. 
26. The latter was a kleindeutsch, primarily monarchical 
federation. It had a Reichstag elected by a three-class 
franchise and a Bundestag, in which the governments of the 
~constituent states of the federation were represented 
according to their relative size. Not least because of the 
size of Prussian Bundestag representation (17 Of 58 seats) 
and the fact that its King exercised the office of Kaiser, 
Prussia was the hegemonic power in the federation. For the 
constitution of the Second Reich, see Schuster (1980,70-93). 
27. Of the many additional reform conservatives whom it was 
impossible to include here because of lack of space, one of 
most fascinating is Constantin Frantz '(1817-1891). (Frantz' 
full name was Gustav Adolph Constantin~but he is almost 
always refered to as Constantin {or Konstatin} Frantz {or 
Franz}.) Most of his writings on federalism appeared in the 
second half of the nineteenth century, though there are some 
interesting ideas as to the federal structure which Germany 
should adopt in his 1850 Von der deutschen Foederation (Of the 
German Federation). For his later ideas, see for example 
Frantz (1879). Secondary literature on Frantz's federalism 
includes Deuer1ein (1972,106-110); Hartmann (1948) and 
Schaper (1940). 
28. While a student'at Goettingen, Mueller attended" Heeren's 
lectures on history (Meinecke,1928,129) and later dedicated 
his E1emente (Mue11er,1809, see 3.2. above) to Heeren. 
However, there is no evidence of Heeren's lectures having 
deeply influenced Mueller's political views. 
29. This distinction was also significant in determining. the 
relative emphasis that German liberals put upon liberalism 
(political, social or economic) as opposed to nationalism. 
Though there were exceptions such as Fries (1773-1843) and 
Struve (1805-1870), it is generally the case that the 
generation moulded by the experience of Germany's national 
humiliation and rebirth were much more likely to be prepared 
to sacrifice political liberalism to the interests of German 
nationalism, than were those liberals whose formative 
influence had been the French Revolution. Gagern (1794-1848) 
and Welcker (1790-1869) are examples of the first group, 
while Zachariae (1769-1843) and especially Behr (1775-1851)· 
are examples of the second. (See Chapter 6.2 below.) 
30. For examples of this usage, see Heeren,(1817,427); iQig, 
428 & 430; ibid,431 & 434 and ibid,432 & 434 respectively. 
31. This" desire was of course not unique to Heeren, but was 
widely held. It was even articulated by Swiss liberals such 
as" Escher and Usteri (see Escher & Usteri,1814,14f as 
discussed in 3.3. above)~ 
32. On the cosmopolitan nationalism of Heeren and others of 
this period, see Meinecke (1928,esp.206-222) 
33. Haller converted to Catholicism in 1820. On Haller and 
his influence in the circle around the later Friedrich 
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Wilhelm IV, see Heinecke, (1928, esp.223-277). For other 
Catholic conservative writers of this period, some of whom 
also advocated federation, see Ritter (1934), or Wild (1966). 
As was discussed in 5.2.2. above, Haller's influence on 
Germanic federalism in Prussia and in Austria was in part 
mediated through the writings of Jarcke (1839). See W.Schmidt 
(1910) for how the political influence of Haller's theories 
came to be be replaced by that of Stahl's theories. For the 
latter's federalism, see 5.2.3. above. 
34. Hilty (1896a,228 & 244f) makes the interesting observation 
that Haller not only omitted ever 'again to refer to the 1798 
reformist draft (which by 1831, when Berne eventually adopted 
a liberal constitution, had been completely forgotten), but 
also consistently presented the events of 1798 in a light 
that suggested that the old Bernese constitution had been 
replaced as a result of French invasion. In reality, the 
Bernese government had formally mandated Haller to write a 
more liberal constitution before the invasion. 
35. The comparison with Althusius will be discussed in 5.4. 
below 
36. Also see ~Wild(1966,esp.57-67,82-90 & 142-85)and Gassner, 
U926, esp 46-66) 
37. Despite considerable efforts at tracing the officers' 
draft constitution in numerous Swiss libraries, the author 
had no more success than Rappard (1941) in unearthing a copy. 
38. Among-the most useful essays for this purpose are the 
following: Evaluation of the assertion that the supreme 
authority of the state derives from the people, (1823-39,1, 
412-32); Historical presentation of the spirit of the age, 
(1823-39,1,387-400); Rationalism, (1823-39,2,1-18); Of the 
source of revolution, (1823-39,5,1-32) and Of popular 
sovereignty (1823-39,6,241- 52). Also of significance as an 
indication of the views Geiger values is the fact that a 
large part of volume eight is devoted to his translation into 
German of some of the writings of the French conservative, 
Bonald (Geiger,1823-39,8,1-193). 
39. Two of the most significant examples are first, the 
liberal canton of Aargau' 1841 dissolution of its monastries 
and second, the series of invasions of the territory of the 
neighbouring Catholic conservative canton of Luzern by gangs 
of radical volunters attempting to topple the latter's 
conservative government, which had recently resumed power as 
a result of a successful internal coup and had decided to 
invite Jesuits to run part of its educational system. 
Catholics' natural indignation at these events was 
hardened by two considerations. First, the dissolution of the 
monastries contravened Article 12 of the Federal Pact, which 
guaranteed the existence of monastries and their property. 
Second, in deciding to invite the Jesuits to run part of its 
educational system, Luzern was acting completely within its 
sovereign cantonal rights. These infringements of the 
existing constitutional principles made conservatives even 
more determined to defend the Federal Pact and merely 
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escalated matters. See for example Bonjour,(1948,36-121). On 
the response in the federalism of reactionary German 
conservatives, see Goerres (1845), as discussed in 5.2.2. 
above. 
40. Wild (1966,131-41) argues that the juste-milieu was 
fundamentally a liberal grouping, but this thesis takes the 
view that the juste-milieu is an example of reformist 
conservatism. Given the lack of a clearly organised movement 
and the predominance within the grouping of a number of 
notables with predictably different political emphases, any 
characterisation of the movement must proceed cautiously. 
However, we believe that there are at least two factors 
supporting the view that the juste-milieu was a reformist 
conservative, rather than a liberal grouping. First, it stood 
for reform of the federation, but only on a piecemeal basis 
that retained the most significant existing structures which, 
it may be recalled, effectively gave a veto power to the 
small, conservative cantons. Second, the underlying philosphy 
of the juste-milieu's federalism was based not upon abstract 
principles, but upon the political necessity of compromise. 
These and other points will become clear in the following 
discussion. 
41. Bluntschli has been variously described as a conservative, 
or as a liberal. His (1920,94) refers to him as " The 
intellectual head of the Zuerich conservatives ••• " , while 
Bluntschli at times descibes himself as a liberal. However, 
we believe that he was a conservative at heart. This is 
confirmed by a reading of his autobiography, at one point in 
which (Bluntschli,1884,1,290) he asserts that his role model 
includes Peel, as well as by an analysis of his writings. See 
the discussion of his federalism below, as well as Bluntschli 
(1850). 
42. Precisely the same point is made by Monnard (1833), a 
fellow member of the-Rossi Commission and also an exponent 
of Swiss reformist conservatism, who assumes that the federal 
authority exercises no sovereignty. See Stettler (1847) also. 
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CHAPTER 6: LIBERAL GERMANIC FEDERALISM· 
FROM 1815-1850 
6 •. 1. INTRODUCTION 
The main task of Part 3 of this thesis is to illustrate 
the use of Germanic federalism as political ideology in the 
period from 1815 to 1850. The preceding chapter examined the 
role of Germanic federalism as conservative ideology. The 
focus of this chapter is the manner in which Germanic 
federalism was utilised by Swiss and German liberals. Broadly 
speaking, liberals used federalism in two ways. On the one 
hand, liberal Germanic federalism sought to establish the 
• < 
nature of the existing Swiss and German federations. The 
second focus of liberal Germanic federalism was the issue of 
how the federations could or should be reformed. In other 
words~ it concerned the ~rescription of federaiions that 
would permit the realisation of the liberals' political 
goals. 
Since there is little value in merely rehearsing the 
esoteric debates about the precise delineation of the 
various types of federation contained in the Germanic 
tradition of 'federal ism, this chapter will concentrate upon 
what has been identified as the second focus of liberal 
Germanic federalism. That is to say, it will stress the use 
of federalism as liberal political ideology. However, 
proposals for the reform of an extant federation are 
necessarily predicated upon the perceptions 'of that 
federation. Accordingly, this chapter will also consider how 
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liberals characterised the existing German and Swiss 
federations, but will do so only insofar as those 
characterisations facilitate an understanding of the 
ideological nature of the relevant federalism. 
,There were of course considerable differences in emphasis 
within the broad category of political views that might be 
labelled "liberal". As was argued in Chapter 4 above, one of 
the major distinctions to be made is between "moderate" and 
"radical" liberals. It will be recalled that these two 
liberal groupings differed both in terms of their underlying 
political principles and in terms of their political tactics. 
In particular, the distinction revolves around the greater 
commitment of the "radical" liberals to the principle of 
popular sovereignty and their willingness to break existing 
laws to achieve their ends. On the other hand, "moderate" 
liberals were more circumspect, limiting their demands in the 
main to constitutionalism and economic reform and believing 
that all change should proceed only through due legal 
process. 
This distinction is reflected in the structure of this 
chapter. Thus after a brief introduction (6.2.1.), the 
SUbstantive analysis of liberal federalism in Germany will 
commence in 6.2.2. with a consideration of how federalism was 
used by moderate German liberals. Thereafter, 6.2.3. will 
examine the federalism of radical German liberals. Similarly, 
the coverage in 6.3 of liberal Germanic federalism in 
Switzerland will first look at the federalism of a number of 
moderate Swiss liberals, before moving on to the manner in 
which radical Swiss liberals utilised federalism. Finally, 
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6.4. will summarise the material covered in 6.2 and 6.3. and 
offer some conclusions as to its significance for the central 
concerns of this thesis. 
6.2. LIBERAL GERMANIC FEDERALISM IN GERMANY 
6.2.1. INTRODUCTION 
As was shown in Chapter 5 and will be furthercillustrated 
below, the '1815 to 1850 period saw significant 'change in'the 
manner in which Germanic federalism was articulated, as well 
as in the purposes to which it was put. It became'ever less 
the preserve of theorists of international relations and 
constitutional law and was instead increasingly used by 
political groupings for the purposes of political mobilization 
and rationalization. In short, it acquired a more openly , 
ideological role, being harnessed to the wagon of nineteenth 
century efforts to realise the emerging civic vision. In 
particular, the concern of this section is to illustrate how 
the federal idea came into the service of those seeking to 
promote German liberal nationalism and or liberal 
constitutionalism. 
There were a large number of contributions to German 
federalism in this period (1), but it cannot be the task of 
this thesis to consider them all. Instead, the discussion 
will be limited to six writers. 'The following sectiori will 
illustrate, by reference to the federalism of Fries, Gagern, 
Zachariae and Welcker, some of the different ways in which 
moderate German liberals used federalism as a political 
ideology.' In 6.2.3., the federalism of Behr and Struve will 
be used to demonstrate the ways in which radical German 
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liberals thought that federations could assist in the 
realisation of their political goals. The immediate task is 
to consider the federalism of moderate German liberals. " 
6.2.2. THE FEDERALISM OF MODERATE GERMAN LIBERALS 
The first example of liberal Germanic federalism in 
Germany which will be outlined in this sect~on is that of 
Jakob Fries (1773-1843). Educated by a Bohemian Protestant 
sect, Fries retained a lifelong faith in the civilising 
mission of Protestantism, as well as a distrust of clericalism 
in general and of the Catholic Church in particular. He 
identifies the latter with despotism and opposition to free 
thinking and liberal progress (eg.1816,29 & 37). From 1805, 
Fries was a professor at Jena and then at Heidelberg. He was 
influential not only as a philosopher, but also politically. 
This influence was partly through his students, one of whom 
was Gagern (see below), but also in direct political action. 
He was, for example, one of the earliest and most active 
supporters of the Burschenschaften, the German-nationalist 
student societies which Jahn founded at Jena in 1815. Indeed, 
his participation in their famous Wartburg Festival of 1817 
(see 4.2 above) resulted in his dismissal from his 
professorship. 
Since Fries' federal prescription is based upon his 
historical liberalism, this presentation of his federalism 
will commence with a brief outline of his perception of 
Germany's place in world history. Fries (1816,14-27) 
identifies three high points in the history of mankind's 
cultural progress. The first is -antiquity", which he locates 
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at about three millennia before Christ and which he says was 
characterised by considerable economic, scientific and 
building activity, all of which took place within the context 
of a hereditary caste system and theocratic rule. Given the 
absence of writing, there was a lack of free reflection and 
Fries therefore considers this to have been an age of "dead 
technical habituation" (1816,19). The second stage is that 
of ancient Greece and Rome, in which the development of the 
written word allows the start of the search for truth via 
science and reason, but where there is still greater emphasis 
upon aesthetics than truth. This stage is also distinguished 
by the liberation of economic ativity from the caste system 
and the replacement of theocracy by a developing 
republicanism. However, in the absence of Christianity, 
Greeks and Romans failed to see the inherent contradiction 
of republicanism and slavery (1816,38). 
The third stage is the Christian era, in the development 
of which the German peoples have played a significant role 
and which Fries considers to exhibit two distinguishing 
features. The first is the replacement o~ the primacy o~ 
aesthetic art and iconaltry by the religion of the eternal 
Christian truth. This spirit of truth teaches man 
contemporary science and allows him to distinguish between 
knowledge of the finite and faith in the eternal. The second 
feature of the Christian age is that the strength of this 
-living spirit" is reserved to European peoples (including 
Americans), who alone manifest the ·lively, forward striving, 
self-generating spirit in the life o~ nations, which is, 
however, orientated solely to scientific development of 
364 
'. 
reason.- (1816,17). Fries considers that the final outcome of 
the development of reason and science will inevitably be the 
fourth and final stage of the history of mankind, namely the 
era of •••• national freedom and justice within the state and 
between states in an external federation of cultured peoples 
•••• (1816,26). 
In short, Fries posits an idealist teleology, with mankind 
moving forward, by the development of scientif.ic, religious 
and political ideas, towards a Kantian ideal state of reason 
and justice. As Fries (1816,24) puts it -A spiritual idea 
drives the human spirit forward towards a still half hidden 
goal, a gl.impse of which leads to action and effort." Though 
Fries states (16f) that the goal of this spiritual idea is 
reason, he attributes to it a variety of forms and its 
precise nature thus remains unclear and often rather 
mystical. One of the most abstract definitions he offers is 
when he refers to it as the spirit of "truth, beauty and the 
good- (27). Elsewhere, he reduces this to "the spirit of 
truth- (14 & 47), or even "religious truth" (35). 
Fries moves from metaphysics to a slightly more worldly 
realm when he asserts (1816,121) that there are in the state 
two competing spirits. The one is the public or communal 
spirit (Gemeingeist). which consists of the public opinion 
of the nation ("Vo1k"); the other is the spirit of the 
executive power of the government. Elsewhere, (1816,4 & 38) 
he says that the ideas which have dominated European 
development since the Reformation are those of political 
freedom (buergerliche Freyheit) and political equality, 
based upon the Christian idea of the personal equality of 
man. However, Fries often uses the term political freedom 
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interchangeably with that of the communal spirit and both in 
a manner which suggests that he sees them as largely 
identical with patriotism (1816,eg.4-7,38,41f, 112 & 117). It 
therefore appears fair to conclude that in the context of 
early nineteenth century Europe, Fries' spiritual idea is 
virtually synonymous with nationalism. 
Fries (1816,17-27) attributes to Germany the leading role 
in the contemporary development of the spiritual idea. He 
presents a number of arguments to support his view that 
German culture and nationalism is destined to 'exercise a 
special civilising mission. These include the greater 
maturity of its reason and the bravery and spirit of its 
peoples, as evidenced by the Wars of Liberation. He argues 
that Germany has not yet reached a position where its spirit 
has been realised and thus still contains the full vitality 
and thus force of the striving spirit in religious, 
scientific and political matters. 
Fries conceives of three types of federation and his 
interest in them relates to their role in the idealist 
teleology outlined above. One (1816,26) is a Kantian, 
rational world federation which mankind will ultimately 
achieve. Yet this distant utopia does not occupy much of 
Fries' attention. The second type of federation he considers 
(1816,165) is interstate confederation (Staatenbund), which 
he rejects as lacking sufficient unity for contemporary 
Germany. What he advocates instead (1816,165-71) is a union 
of the whole German nation into a Bundesstaat. 
The constituent units of this federation are to be the 
various German provinces, each of which will deputise 
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plenipotentiaries to the Bundestag (Federal Diet). Fries 
(1816,168) argues that the federation should not be limited 
to an offensive and defensive alliance. The Bundestag should 
-become a truly supreme government, for which we wish to see 
a legislative, judicial and military power" (ibid). The 
powers of the Bundestag are to include (1816,168-71) the sole 
right to determine and revise the boundaries of'the 
constituent units; a uniform legal system, including 'a 
federal court to solve disputes between the princes and their 
subjects; a common financial system, with'common income tax, 
postage and currency systems; the abolition of all internal 
tariffs and restrictions to trade in favour of a customs 
union; a militia and the federation-wide organisation'of 
church and 'educational matters. In short, Fries is advocating 
a German intrastate-territorial federation~' 
In keeping with Fries' idealism, the long-term 'aim of this 
federation is the realisation of the rule of reason. In the 
more immediate term, its purpose is the promotion of the most 
progressive European spirit, namely that of the German 
nation. To this end, a strong German Bundesstaat will' 
guarantee Germany the necessary external security (1816,165), 
while the persistence of the constituent states will ensure 
both that despotism is avoided (1816,163) and that the 
healthy rivalry between native German traits' continues to' 
enrich the German national spirit (1816,7,162f & l6Sf). 
,Within this federation, the ·original" German language and 
culture will therefore be maintained "and 'their independence 
of foreign influence will be enhanced (1816,6f). In other 
words, it is clear that though Fries' federalism is motivated 
in part by military considerations, the prime purpose of the 
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federation he proposes is to foster German national purity 
and strength. 
However. the nationalist idealism of Fries' federalism 
impacts upon and considerably qualifies the extent to which 
the federation he proposes conforms to pure notions of the 
liberal Enlightenment. First, Fries' idealism results in an 
emphasis upon the formative influence of ideas rather than 
structures. As he frequently asserts, (eg.1816,112~15,~18, 
123-6 &134f) political structures are of secondary 
importance to promoting the national spirit. This has at 
least two important effects upon his federalism. First, it 
results in his emphasis upon the primacy of the Gemeingeist 
over liberal constitutionalism. Second, Fries argues that the 
full realisation of this Gemeingeist requires education and 
thus that the educated classes and the class of state 
bureaucrats assume a prominent role in the political systems 
of the federation (1816,6f,42f, 110 &119). 
Second, Fries' nationalist motivation is at times 
expressed in a xenophobia that fits uneasily with liberal 
ideals. One example of this is Fries' violent anti-Semitism 
(1816.6). His understandable bitterness at the country that 
recently humiliated Germany causes him also to be 
especially hostile to French ideas and customs (1816.eg.48-50 
& 163f). As a consequence, he attacks what he regards as the 
excessive optimism of the French Enlightenment and 
Revolution, eschewing foreign rational isms (1816,30-3). 
Instead, Fries expresses great faith in the long-term 
achievement of liberalism through the German Enlightenment 
(1816,5,11-313 & 112). 
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A third consequence of Fries' nationalist idealism is that 
he has great respect not only for his native Enlightenment, 
but also for native German traditions. He thus argues against 
creating constitutions according to abstract ideas (1816,146) 
and for the proposition that all reform should grow out of 
traditional structures and practices (1816,54). While 
repudiating stubborn and reactionary conservative 
historicism, which he accuses of contributing to revolution 
(1816,54f), his own prescriptions constitute a very 
. . 
gradualist, moderate liberalism, which lays great emphasis 
upon the primacy of reform over revolution (eg.1816,8-13 & 
41-6). 
The impact of these three factors is clearly visible in 
the nature of the federation Fries proposes. Though he states 
(1816,39) that -The destruction of despotism in church and 
state is ••• the motto of our public life ••• M and identifies 
the idea of political equality as one of the main formative 
principles of European history since the Reformation (1816, 
38), the realisation of these goals is left very much for the 
the future. For now, Fries accepts the monarchy and 
aristocracy of birth (1816,74-80 & 126-31) and insists that 
any changes in the extant system of rights and privileges 
must be undertaken only with appropriate compensation. For 
example, he states (1816,45) that reform of feudal dues is 
permissible only with full compensation for the current 
recipients of those services. On the economic front, Fries' 
nationalism makes him very wary of reliance upon foreign 
trade (1816,96-8), though he does not go so far as to propose 
for the German Bundesstaat the complete autarchy Fichte had 
advocated in 1800 (see 3.2 above). His nationalism is also 
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evident in the communal solidarity behind his insistence that 
it is necessary for the state to assume a more positive role 
towards alleviating poverty (1816,90-8). 
An examination of the organisation of the constituent 
states of the federation Fries proposes shows clearly that 
his federalism is much more concerned with the furtherance 
of the German national spirit than with liberal 
constitutionalism. Thus though each Province is to have its 
own Diet (Landstand), the latter are not to be elected by 
popular suffrage. Instead, they are to be composed of 
representatives of the estates, with a patriarchal and 
property-based franchise. Indeed, Fries states (1816,180) 
that one of his prime reasons for proposing the specific 
structures of these provincial diets is that they will be 
very resistant to change. 
To summarise, Fries is a liberal whose previous enthusiasm 
for pure Enlightenment ideals has been considerably defused 
by the Napoleonic experience and who at the start of the 
lifetime of the German Bund articulates a brand of liberalism 
which combines elements of the idealism and rationalism of 
Kant with an assertive, in part romanticised and xenophobic 
nationalism reminiscent of Fichte, whom he quotes approvingly 
(1816,117f). Fries has not abandoned Kant's ultimate goal of 
a universal interstate-chiliastic federation (see 2.3 above). 
However, he believes that like his ideal autarchic state 
(1816,149) governed by the principles of prosperity, spiritual 
development and justice (1816,62), universal federation lies 
far in the future. 
Fries utilises federalism to prescribe solutions to the 
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more immediate issue of the post-Napoleonic political 
structure which Germany should adopt. His historical 
liberalism makes that federalism different from those later 
liberal Germanic federal isms concerned more with 
constitutionalism or political equality (see Welcker and 
struve below, respectively). The principles of n~tionalist 
idealism which inform Fries' federalism contribute to making 
his proposed intrastate federation centralised and yet 
characterised by the primacy of traditional structures over 
constitutionalism and popular political rights. Though the 
German Bund was to prove a defender of German tradition over 
revolution, Fries was of course to be bitterly disappointed 
by the fact that it constituted merely an interstate 
federation by the consequent lack of German political and 
economic unity. 
This frustration was one of the prime factors motivating 
subsequent liberal Germanic federalism in Germany. The next 
example that this section will consider is that of Friedrich 
Gagern (1794-1848), who was influenced while a young adult 
by the wave of German patriotism that accompanied Germany's 
struggle finally to rid itself of French occupation. Gagern's 
faith in the mission of a united German nation was enhanced 
while a student at Heidelberg in 1816, where he was (Gagern, 
1856,236f) especially influenced by Fries' lectures, and was 
further reinforced by speeches for national unity which his 
father made in the German Bundestag. Like Fries, Gagern was 
also committed to the principles of a constitutional 
state, whose civil servants and rulers had to serve the 
interests not of self-aggrandisement, but of public welfare. 
He was thus similarly disappointed by what he regarded as the 
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German Bund's failure to further German national unity and 
constitutionalism. 
Gagern's essays on federalism and the German problem were 
written over a number of years and originally not intended 
for publication. They first appeared after his death, in a 
biography by his brother Heinrich (Gagern,1856). The 
following account of Friedrich Gagern's views derives from 
five of his essays, four of which were written between 1823 
and 1826. The date of the final and most complete exposition 
of Gagern's federalism is disputed, but is likely to have 
been 1833 [2]. Though Gagern's attitudes changed considerably 
during this period, it is still possible to present a 
coherent account of his views about the possible role of 
federation as a means of resolving the German problem. 
The first of two essays written in 1823 ("The Present 
Situation" Gagern,1856,269-77) has to be seen as the 
outpourings of an angry young man, lashing out with his pen 
at those he blames for the parlous state of German unity. The 
prime villains are the German princes, whom he accuses of 
putting their selfish interest in maintaining personal power 
above the good of the nation (271). He is no less ,scathing 
about "the blind vanity of liberalism", which he accuses of 
"sacrificing freedom to equality" (273). Nor do "smugglers 
••• Jews ••• and money-changers" (274) escape condemnation 
[3]. Gagern's hopes are pinned on the universities, which he 
says have ·promoted the German spirit and kindled the flame 
of patriotism" (275) and upon their product: "a young 
generation full of warm patriotism and educated in the school 
of the Greeks and Romans" (277). 
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The second essay ("Of the necessity and the means of 
establishing the political unity of Germany", Gagern,1856,278 
-291) is more reflective. It argues that if Germany were 
united into one state, that would promote its respect and 
influence abroad and its internal trade (279). The princes' 
provincialism is still his main target and his faith in the 
educative national role of the universites is undimmed. This 
essay also spells out Gagern's belief in Austria's unfitness 
for the task of uniting the nation. This is demonstrated, he 
says, by Austria's abdication of the imperial crown, her 
opposition to bourgeois demands for constitutional reform 
and her multinational character (282-4). Instead, Gagern 
sees Prussia as destined to lead German unification, a role 
for which her German character and commitment to 
constitutional government are well suited (284-6). 
Thus far, Gagern clearly prefers a unitary over a federal 
solution to what he perceives as the vital task of German 
national unification. His two 1825/6 essys (the short note 
"The Parties" and the dialogue "Unitarists and Federalists", 
Gagern,1856,356-61 & 361-71) confirm this bias, but also show 
Gagern giving a reasonably balanced account of the 
prescriptions of those arguing for a federation. Gagern says 
in "The Parties" that the crucial Question facing Germany is: 
"whether we are a nation, or whether a few princely families 
have the right to divide Germany up amongst themselves as 
though it were their own property" (356). He argues that 
Germany has three parties on this issue. The "Servi 1es" have 
no opinion of their own, merely the interest of not losing 
out in the race for favours. The ·Unitarists· "want Germany's 
unconditional political unity ••• (and include) almost all 
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educated persons, the trading class, army and the whole 
youth" (357). The "Federalists· -believe the nation's 
political divisions have old and deep roots and thus want a 
strong ••• federation, and the Bundestag as an institution 
in which the great concerns of the union are regulated, while 
the princes retain their rights of administration in their 
territories" (358). It is clear from other comments Gagern 
makes that he sees Federalists as well-intentioned, but too 
weak and thus ultimately unable to deliver the national unity 
Germany needs. 
The dialogue ·Unitarists and Federalists" is a remarkably 
succinct account of the passionate· contemporary debate in 
which ardent supporters of national unity present the Bund as 
woefully inadequate and want it completely replaced by a 
unitary state, while a more.cautious federalist camp believes 
that it is, despite its imperfections, capable of reform in 
the direction of a federal state. Neither group is satisfied 
with the Bund as it stands.' 
Thus Gagern's Unitarist states "I see no salvation for us, 
other than the unification of all German states into a single 
state. It is the general wish." (362). The advantages this 
promises. are 
Above all honour,· power and respect for the 
nation and the better development of the latter; 
a greater influence for it in the European states 
system; savings, uniformity of legislation and 
administration in all matters where such 
uniformity is desirable and advantageous; free 
trade. (362f) 
The Federalist responds that " ••• all this can also be 
achieved by means of a federation". The Unitarist replies: 
"I do not believe that. But most importantly, which federation 
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do you mean?· the one ,we ,have, or another one?"'The Federalist 
argues that-The one we have is good enough if it is taken 
seriously and kept to faithfully ••• • (363). After a debate 
on the structures and procedures of the Bundestag (363-9), 
there is a discussion on the problems posed for the'Bund by 
the unequal size of its constituent units (369f). The 
concluding exchange contains the following: 
'U. But ••• do you not see that'nobody believes in 
your federation? The large powers see it only as 
their instrument; the medium-sized powers seek ,to' 
belittle it, because they cannot be rulers in it 
and do not want to be ruled; the small states feel 
abused and undermined; - there is nobody in the 
whole nation whom it satisfies. 
F. I gladly acknowledge that I never considered 
,this federation perfect. Nor: did I feel that it 
had the best constitution. However, I do think 
that it is the best that can be achieved in the 
given circumstances, without a civil war or a 
terrible bloodbath ••• All of us in Germany want 
the same goal, but not the same road to that goal. 
U •••• But this road has now proved to be the wrong 
one and we ought not to give up the goal .•. (371) 
Gagern is patently of exactly the opposite opinion to 
Behr (see 3.2 above) regarding the utility of a confederation 
for promoting the unity of the German nation. Nor does he 
change that opinion. However, in his 1833 essay: "The 
Bundesstaat N , he not only accepts, but argues the case for, 
the utility of a federal state in promoting national unity. 
The essay (Gagern,1856,372-87) is, for a non-academic, a 
surprisingly well crafted theory of the federal state. 
Gagern defines the federal state as: 
the union of numerous states, which subordinate 
themselves to a common state authority in order to 
fully achieve the purposes of the state (Staatszweck), 
without the rulers of the individual states 
renouncing all internal sovereign rights (372) 
He goes on to say that the individual states are not 
sovereign. Each renounces all external sovereign rights to 
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the federal authority, which also has jurisdiction over those 
matters internal to the component states, but which can 
either only, or more effectively, be achieved and 
administered by the central authority (372f). Accordingly, 
the latter has the military power, since the supreme state 
authority must have coercive power. It also legislates, 
albeit with the participation of representatives of the 
individual states, whose own legislative authority is 
restricted to matters that do not adversely affect the whole. 
There must be a supreme court to resolve legal disputes 
between the component states (373). The federal state must 
be indissoluble, with no right of secession, unlike in a 
confederation. (374) 
Gagern refers to the debate about whether a state can have 
two sovereign authorities, saying that the idea of an 
indivisible sovereign is not given up in a federal state, as 
the exercise of internal and external sovereign powers 
(Hoheitsrechte) can be divided, with the latter subordinated 
to the imperial authority, while the internal authority of 
the territories persists, albeit subject to imperial 
authority (383f). The princes' powers must be clearly defined 
and they cannot be mere administrators of the Emperor, but 
will be allocated all internal sovereign powers whose 
exercise is not explicitly reserved for the imperial 
authority. All limitations of the internal sovereign rights 
of the princes must be specified in the federal constitution 
(373), which guarantees that such rights will only be limited 
where this is in the general interest (377). 
The princes have to be guaranteed an adequate, independent 
and irrevocable income. They retain their privileges of 
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rank and certain minor rights. They can, in agreement with 
their parliaments, levy taxes, but customs duties and tolls 
are reserved for the Empire. They can be arraigned before the 
supreme imperial court for contravening imperial authority, 
as well as for crimes. Hatters decided by the Reichstag 
cannot be discussed by provincial parliaments and 
responsibility for government actions lies not with the 
princes, but with state officials. The latter are subject to 
the state and law and are thus in the service of the highest 
state authority, regardless of who appointed them. 
Gagern proceeds to outline what he regards as the 
essential distinction between a confederation and an 
intrastate federation. The former is a mere interstate union 
for pursuing goals that remain common to the participants in 
the union. Individual states have not renounced their 
sovereignty. Here, federal authority rests on the collegially 
organised administration of decisions unanimously reached 
after common discussion. The minority cannot be overruled by 
a majority vote and the federal executive authority and the 
union itself last only as long as every state considers them 
appropriate for realising these purposes (375). 
In a federal state, (Bundesstaat) a supreme state 
authority exists, which constitutionally pursues the 
federation's own goals according to its own will, backed up 
by coercive authority over all individual wills (375). The 
territorial states' powers are an intermediate stage between 
the commune and the highest state authority (377). Gagern 
concludes that the Bundesstaat lies between the Staatenbund 
and the simple state, though acknowledging that this 
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distinction is an academic one and that in practice it is 
often difficult to tell them apart. This is especially the 
case with unitary states that are decentralised and 
confederations in which the central authority - exceptionally 
and contrary to the real nature of a confederation - decides 
by majority voting (375f). 
Gagern (377) argues that the Bundesstaat is preferable to 
the Staatenbund, because it corresponds more closely to the 
purpose of the state, ie. establishing as complete and secure 
a system of law as possible. While the Staatenbund interferes 
less in the freedom and independence of the individual 
states, this is at the cost of greater danger for the whole. 
Gagern (368f) considers that the experiences of the 
Netherlands and Switzerland show the problems that can arise 
if federations are too weak at the centre, ie if they are too 
like confederations rather than federal states. The natural 
wish of a large nation to be a great power demands union and 
federation. The most appropriate and powerful form is the 
Bundesstaat. 
He goes on to wonder why there are relatively few federal 
states, since he feels that they combine the virtues of large 
states - namely respec~ and power in external affairs. 
defence against external attack and the removal of internal 
obstacles of local interests to the general welfare - with 
those of small states. The latter include retaining 
sufficient independence for smaller states to regulate their 
own matters in accordance with local demands, promoting the 
par,ticipation of all citizens, and free development of 
individuality, diversity and competition (376). He suspects 
that federal states with representative constitutions will 
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become more frequent. In Europe they will tend to be 
monarchical, while in the western hemisphere republican 
types will dominate. 
In a section on the conditions in which a federal state 
might be created, Gagern stresses the importance of common 
nationality, language, customs and interests, the absence of 
which would, he believes, mean recourse to autocratic rule 
to maintain the state. He also advocates that constituent 
states be not too diverse in size and power, arguing that it 
would be better if they were, relative to the whole, small 
and numerous. However, the whole should be large and powerful 
enough successfully to withstand attacks of neighbouring 
states. He argues that the nature and form of the governments 
of individual states should be in agreement with that of the 
supreme authority and not too varied amongst themselves 
either. Gagern maintains that monarchical states can only be 
united into a federal state under an overarching monarch. 
Finally, he says that an essential requirement of a strong 
federal state is the existence of a large and well 
positioned capital (378-81). 
Gagern's prescription of the best constitution for the 
federal state is an hereditary, constitutional monarchy. The 
latter would, he asserts, provide the unity, prestige and 
stability absent in a republican'federation. Only such an 
imperial authority will possess and be able to develop the 
power to represent the nation with honour externally and 
create internal structures which can, unlike that of 
confederation, effectively counter the egotism and jealousy 
of the individual governments (377). He wants an aristocratic 
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chamber representing the "half-sovereign" states and a 
popularly elected chamber. The electoral system he advocates 
for the latter has two thirds of the seats elected by the 
territorial parliaments and the remaining third elected by 
those with higher incomes. Individual states will have 
unicameral legislatures subordinate to the legislative 
authority of the "Gesammtstaat" (381f). 
To summarise, Gagern was initially totally opposed to the 
German Bund and desired instead a representative, unitary, 
constitutional state in which German national unity could be 
guaranteed. He gradually came to accept and ultimately 
promote the idea of German national unification by means of a 
federal state. This is no~ as great a contradiction as it 
might appear. First, Gagern remained loyal throughout to the 
idea of a representative constitutional monarchy and to 
nationalism. However, he came to appreciate that a federation 
did not necessarily have to be of the confederal variety, of 
which the inadequate Bund was an example. Instead, he became 
convinced that an intrastate union of the various territorial 
states was possible and would fulfil what was for him the 
existential goal of national unification. 
Gagern's essays are significant for this thesis for a 
number of reasons. First, they are a further example of how 
federalism came into the service of liberal nationalism. 
Though one could classify Gagern's federalism as intrastate 
territorial and thus similar to that of Hugo and Puetter, it 
was different in the sense that the federation's purpose is 
not perceived to reside solely in promoting internal and 
external security, but includes as perhaps the most essential 
element the promotion of constitutional nationalism. Second, 
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as is clear from the above account, Gagern's federalism 
varies considerably over time, depending upon his 
perception of what was currently the most appropriate means 
for the achievement of his political goal. The significance 
of this is that Gagern's federalism illustrates the use of 
federalism in a politically directly prescriptive and 
contingent manner; that is to say, as a political ideology. 
The third significance of Gagern's federalism is its use of 
federalism as a constitutional principle. (In this sense, he 
is at least superficially reminiscent of Althusius.) This 
includes curbing what he regarded as the arbitrary rule of 
the princes w as well as a popularly elected chamber. The 
latter has a very limited franchise, but its principle 
demonstrates that the idea of a federal state generating a 
second level of citizenship existed in the Germanic tradition 
before de Tocqueville's "Democracy in America". The 
constitutional idea was to be developed further in German 
and Swiss liberal federalism and become one of the major 
rationalizations for intrastate federation. 
However, not all liberals advocating federation for 
Germany were supporters of intrastate federation. One example 
is Zachariae, whose earlier contributions to Germanic 
federalism (1804 & 1807) were discussed above (see 3.2). In 
an article entitled "On the contemporary condition of 
Switzerland" (Zachariae,1833), he comments on various 
proposals for reform of the Swiss federation. Many of his 
remarks betray a rather superficial knowledge of the 
background and details of the Swiss federal reform proposals 
(1833,e.g.12-16 & 36-45) and are often more speculative than 
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analytical. For example, he states (1833,49-53) that if 
Switzerland were to adopt a unitary constitution, that would 
make it more inclined to belligerency, would unleash a Swiss 
civil war and eventually result in the establishment of a 
monarchy! However, the essay does contain some interesting 
general remarks upon federation and the implications for 
. 
Germany of the Swiss situation. Accordingly, this synopsis of 
Zachariae's later federalism will focus upon the general 
conclusions Zachariae reaches about the nature and relative 
advantages of interstate and intrastate federation. 
As before, (1804,44) Zachariae again (1833,32-6) argues 
that between unitary states and mere alliances, there are 
basically two types of federation possible. One is an 
interstate federation ("Staatenbund" or ·Voelkerbund") and 
the other an intrastate federation ("Voelkerstaat"). The 
distinguishing features of the Staatenbund are that its 
purpose is limited to a defensive and offensive alliance. 
Thus while the federation is entitled to intervene to impose 
solutions to disputes between conflicting constituent 
states, the latter remain completely independent as regards 
their internal affairs. Moreover, majority decision-making 
is reserved to a few limited and clearly specified matters. 
Zachariae goes on to argue (1833,37) that a Staatenbund 
requires five further features. These are first, that the 
constitutions of the constituent states of the federation 
be compatible with each other and with that of the federation 
as a whole. Second, there must be a federal power to maintain 
internal and external peace. Third there must be a federal 
authority to decide common affairs. Fourth there must be a 
federal court. Finally, he states that there must be only 
382 
sufficient limitation of the rights of the constitutent 
states to undertake treaties amongst themselves and with 
foreign powers as is necessary for the federation to realise 
its purpose. 
By contrast, Zacharaie is rather sparing in his 
description of the features of intrastate federation. He says 
(1833,35f) that i~ has a much wider purpose and that the 
authority of the federation extends to the internal affairs 
of the constitutent units, whose sovereignty it therefore 
necessarily limits. Moreover, the decisions of the federal 
au~hority, which can be monarchical or republican, are made 
by majority votes. 
In 1804, Zachariae concluded that the Reich was an 
interstate federation, while the Swiss Mediation constituion 
had set up an intrastate federation (see 3.2 above). 
Surprisingly, he now (1833,54f) describes both the German 
Reich since 1648 and the German Bund as intrastate 
federations. He supports these characterisations by arguing 
{1833,54f)"that in both the Reich and the Bund the central 
authority intervenes in the internal affairs of the 
constitutent states. Zachariae also concludes that not only 
is the Swiss Federal Pact (1833,36) an interstate federation, 
but, again contrary to his 1804 remarks, so was the Swiss 
Mediation (1833,32). He is somewhat inconsistent in his 
characterisation of the Ross; proposals, which he at one 
stage (1833,32) says aim to make Switzerland into an 
intrastate federation, while elsewhere (1833,38-40) he is of 
the opinion that the majority of the Rossi proposals conform 
to the ideas of a Staatenbund. 
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There is, however, little doubt as to Zachariae's views as 
to the best form of federation in general and as regards 
Germany and Switzerland in particular. On the one hand, 
Zachariae agrees that the conduct of war is the weak side of 
all interstate federations (1833,42) and concedes that 
external pressures and internal economic and other changes 
mean that the Swiss federation is in need of reform (1833,36-
45). On the other hand, he also insists (1833,45) that it 
does not follow that Switzerland should change the basic 
features of its consitution. He is critical both of the 
unitary state option, 'but especially of the idea of an 
intrastate federation. 
Zachariae's argument against intrastate federation is 
similar to that of Behr (1808 & 1808a in 3.2 above). Thus he 
argues that a Voe1kerstaat mitigates rather than resolves the 
military and economic weaknesses of a Staatenbund. But most 
important, he contends that a Voelkerstaat is intrinsically 
flawed: 
A Voe1kerstaat is by its nature an intermediary 
thing, an inconsistency. It both permits to and 
withdraws from the constituent states of the 
union the administration of their internal 
affairs. They are to remain as states; and yet 
there it is difficult to reconcile a limitation 
of sovereignty in these matters through an 
. .' external power with the nature of a state. 
Insociability rules! (1833,53). 
In other words, Zachariae contends that intrastate federation 
by its very nature causes destructive friction between the 
whole and the parts of the federation (1833,37) and supports 
this by reference to the Reich and the German Bund (1833, 
54f). Moreover, he states that this ·inherent seed of 
destruction" (1833,59) is compounded by the fact that in 
intrastate federation, executive authority is divided, making 
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each of the potentially dissenting constituent states an 
armed power that can at will permanently and successfully 
resist the power of the whole (1833,55f) [4]. Zachariae 
concludes that despite the fact that it is less forceful and 
decisive in its actions, interstate federation is preferable 
to intrastate federation. 
Zacharaie's article is at times somewhat confusing and 
even contradictory, but is interesting nonetheless. First, 
Zachariae is an example of a moderate liberal who uses 
federalism for purposes of liberal constitutionalism rather 
than for strident nationalism, as is the case with Fries (see 
I . 
above). Second, Zachariae's federalism rejects intrastate 
federation in favour of confederation. In that respect, 
Zachariae's federalism is different from that of most German 
liberals covered in this chapter. The sole other case of the 
advocacy of interstate federation which will be examined is 
that of Behr (1820, see 6.2.3. below). Third, it is clear 
from Zachariae's federalism that perceptions of the Swiss 
experience of federation informed Germanic federalism in 
Germany. Finally, Zachariae's essay motivated the next 
contribution to liberal Germanic federalism which will be 
examined in this section, namely that of Carl Welcker. 
Welcker was not only a leading protagonist of liberalism 
in southern Germany, but also a lecturer in law. His 
writings show more academic refinement that those of Gagern 
and of Zachariae, but nonetheless contain many similarities. 
As the title of his 1834 article indicates [5], Welcker was 
motivated to write in response to the publications of both 
Zachariae and Troxler. Indeed, he felt obliged to rectify 
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what he considered Zachariae's rather superficial account of 
the Swiss debate on federal reform and flawed theory of 
federation (1834,eg.5-10). However, since Welcker's 1834 
article constitutes merely a preliminary version of a more 
refined later work on federation, the following account of 
his contribution to liberal Germanic federalism will 
concentrate upon his 1836 article, which is probably the 
fullest statement of his views on federation. 
Welcker's aim is to classify unions of states (Staatsver-
eine), which he says can be interstate or intrastate. The 
former can be of two types: the mere alliance (Staatsbuendniss), 
or the confederation (Staatenbund). Intrastate unions are 
federal states (Bundesstaat or Staatenstaat). All three 
types are constitutional unions (79). In intrastate 
federations " ••• the participants are united under a common 
sovereign will, to which they sacrifice a great part of 
their individual sovereignty", while in interstate unions 
-the states retain their sovereignty in all important 
respects-. In such a confederation, "numerous states share 
the exercise of an essential aspect of their external 
sovereign rights", while in a mere alliance the states 
-merely contractually oblige themselves to perform specified 
tasks" (79ff). Welcker concentrates on interstate and 
intrastate federations, using the United States, Germany, 
ancient Greece and Switzerland as his examples.-
His personal preference is for the federal state. Thus he 
asks: "Would ••• anyone wish to deny that federal relations 
(Bundesverhaeltnisse), their functions and their variety are 
highly important? ••• for a perfected federal system 
(Foederativsystem) is the highestand richest form of 
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political organisation." (78). He also states that "The 
federal state ••• is the highest ideal for the political 
union of great'nations· (108),'that "might best succeed if by 
some happy coincidence citizens and governments are 
simultaneously filled ••• with a feeling of national unity 
and the holy duty towards the common fatherland ••• " (114). 
We1cker'attacks some previous theorists of federation, 
arguing that their classifications were based on irrelevant 
or random criteria (106-15). Classification should,' he says, 
be based on unions' essential differences, which are: their", 
underlying principle (despotic, theocratic or constitutional) 
whether they are interstate or intrastate and their 
Staatszweck (reason of state) (78f). 
, Accordingly, he maintains"that the characteristics of the 
Bundesstaat are: (81-96) first, that the purpose of the union 
is the Staatszweck or Nationalzweck, ie: 
the inclusive, permanent, human purpose of the 
nation, or the legal protection and promotion of 
the common'purpose. The latter is only the purpose 
of the federation insofar as its promotion and 
protection cannot adequately be realised by the 
individual states. Only to the extent that this 
is not the case should the federal state be the 
same for the individual peoples ("Staemme") of a 
nation, 'divided as they are into individual states, 
as the state is for indivdual families ••• To this 
extent, the purpose of the union concerns not only' 
the internal and external security of the union and 
its constituent states, but also the general welfare 
of the nation. (84). 
Elsewhere, he specifies the purposes as creating a union 
organised as a closely united state, maintaining and 
promoting the free interaction and interconnectedness of the 
general national lebenselement of the people (Volk) and 
preserving and satisfying the peculiarities of the individual 
states and governments (91). 
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Second, there is therefore not only an external, but also 
a •••• moral and internal (or national) ••• purpose", for 
which the sovereign commonwealth has binding majority voting 
on all communal affairs, and a common sovereign and coercive 
authority with legislative, executive and judicial branches 
that can intervene in the internal affairs of the constituent 
states. The latter have a duty of obedience and allegiance 
and their sovereignty is thus fundamentally restricted (85). 
Third, as a state, the federation also entails rights and 
duties that cannot be fully specified at the outset. However, 
since it is a constitutional state, the federal state does 
~ot permit the federal authority to exercise unlimited power 
over the internal affairs of the constituent states, but 
merely to intervene where specified and where the latter is 
overstretched (86ff). 
Fourth, federal states are national unions and establish a 
common fatherland, to which citizens and governments belong 
and are subordinate. We1cker sees this national unity as a 
useful binding force (88f). Fifth, the federal state is not 
only a union of governments, but also of citizens, who have 
territorial and national citizenship (89). Sixth, the federal 
state therefore requires not only a representation of the 
constituent governments, but of the people or nation, upon 
whom it also operates(90). Moreover, one of the basic 
purposes of the federal state is to promote the national 
interest and reconcile it with the particular interests of 
the peoples of the individual states. The main institutions 
for the purposes of external national unity, general national 
freedom and maintaining local peculiarities are a monarch 
388 
(or his equivalent), a representative, popular assembly and 
an aristocratic senate (91f). 
Seventh, individual states give up their individual war 
power, their right of forming foreign treaties and taxation 
rights on federal matters (94). Eighth, they may not have 
internal or external subject territories (95). Ninth, their 
constitutions must be broadly similar and guaranteed by the 
federal authority (95). Finally, the federal state is 
completely indissoluble and secession not permissible (95f). 
·Welcker also applies this analysis to the confederation 
(96-105), which he ,says does not have a Staatszweck, but 
only the purpose of internal and external international 
security of each constituent state and of the whole 
confederation. It is thus but a general, permanent, 
international defensive union (Schutz-und-Trutz-Verein) (97). 
The Staatenbund is not a state, but a community of 
autonomous, mutually independent states, with reciprocal and 
equal contractual rights and duties. Any central organ of 
delegates is not a government, merely a diplomatic union of 
ambassadors. Majority voting is not allowed (98),there is no 
sovereign legislative, executive or judicial authority above 
the confederates (99). -Thus the sovereign governments 
experience no abolition or fundamental limitation of their 
sovereignty ••• M (100). Moreover, there is no significant 
interference in the internal affairs of the constituent 
states, whose constitutions are their own matter. Any 
interferences are minimal, strictly circumscribed and 
exceptional (102). A Staatenbund is not a national union and 
does not establish a common fatherland (103). There is no 
real popular membership of, or participation in, the 
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confederation. Being no confederal citizenship, there is 
also no civic obligation to the confederation, the laws of 
which only obligate individual citizens if they become laws 
of the confederated states (103). There is no popular 
representative assembly. Confederated governments retain 
external sovereign rights, standing armies and the right of 
taxation. Confederates may have subject territories and 
external dominions. There is no common internal legal system 
nor, in view of the confederated states' sovereignty, could 
one be enforced (104). Finally, the Staatenbund is not 
indissoluble,' but "lasting- and thus not as temporary as the 
alliance (105). 
Welcker's enumeration of the characteristcs of the 
alliance of states is undertaken with reference to the same 
ten aspects, but is much briefer. It merely states that the 
alliance's purpose ;s limited to the reciprocal performance 
.. ' 
of contractually specified acts, which can relate to internal 
or external matters. It creates merely completely free, 
diplomatic relations between allies. It is not a national 
union, nor does it establish a federal territory, or durable 
common relations. Lastly, it can be ended by any of the 
parties. 
Welcker thus applies federalism to the German situation, 
whilst being aware of and using examples from federations of 
the United States and Switzerland. He talks about two kinds 
of federation: the interstate confederation and the intrastate 
federation of partly sovereign territorial states. He sees 
the purpose of intrastate federation to be about more than 
mere external defence; it also has the purpose of promoting 
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national (ie popular) welfare. He insists that in federal 
states the federal power acts not only on the governments of 
the units, but also directly upon the citizens too. He lays 
great emphasis on the Bundesstaat forming a national unit, 
with popular participation via a national representative 
assembly. His contribution includes the assertion that the 
central authority in an intrastate federation does not have 
to be a physical person. 
Welcker's characterisation of a federal state contains 
many similar ingredients to that of Gagern, as well as 
elements not found in the latter's work. Of these, one of the 
most notable is Welcker's assertion that the federal state 
need not be ruled over by a monarch, but merely by "his 
eQuivalent-. (Presumably he had in mind the American 
president.) The significance of his comment is that it was 
one of the earliest departures from the almost axiomatic 
asssumption of the necessity for a federal state to be headed 
by a single human being, an assumption that had been 
predicated less on theoretical considerations, than on the 
historical fact that the Reich had since time immemorial been 
ruled (albeit often only nominally) by one man. A second 
novel aspect of Welcker's essay is that it provides a 
logical, theoretical argument for the popular second chamber 
which Gagern also wanted. Welcker's argument is based upon 
the constitutional principle of the right of participation in 
determining one's fate. Thus in a federal state which acts 
upon not only the several governmants, but also their 
citizens, the latter have the right to participate in its 
decision-making processes. Third, his faith in the constitu-
tiona1 principle means that he allows his definition of the 
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federal state to permit of that federation's scope being 
subject to subsequent extension. Conversely, Gagern has the 
powers of the centre strictly circumscribed. 
Our review of the utilisation of Germanic federalism by 
moderate German liberals is now complete. ·Before moving on, 
there will be a short summary of some of the main findings of 
this section. First, it has been shown that moderate liberals 
envisaged three of the dimensions of Germanic federalism 
" , 
identified in Part 2 of this thesis. All four of the writers 
considered conceived of both confederation and intrastate-
territorial federation, while Fries also envisaged interstate-
chi1iastic federation. Second, though each of the moderate 
German liberals examined above recognised the possibility of 
at least two types of federation, they each supported the 
adoption by Germany of just one of those types. However, the 
nature of the federation they prescribed varied, with most 
wishing to see Germany adopt an intrastate-territorial 
federation. 
Third, there were differences not only in the type of 
federation advocated, but also in both the manner in which 
that federalism was articulated and in the political 
priorities of its exponents. As has been amply demonstrated, 
these differences related in the main to the extent to which 
the liberalism of the various authors was tempered by their 
commitment to nationalism, as well as by tactical 
considerations. In short, 6.2.2. has shown how Germanic 
federalism came to be used in Germany as part of the 
ideological prescriptions of liberal nationalists and liberal 
constitutionalists. 
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The illustration of the different emphases of moderate 
liberals' federalism began with the federalism of Fries, which 
is predicated upon an idealist, historical liberalism. His 
emphasisis upon German nationalism results in the advocacy of 
an intrastate-territorial federation with a rather elitist, 
gradualist, and at times xenophobic approach to achieving 
political liberalism. The second federalism examined was that 
of Gagern. Like Fries, Gagern's prime motivation was 
nationalism. though he was also concerned with political and 
economic liberalism. Initially, Gagern supported the idea of 
a unitary German state, though he eventually came to 
. c .... ... ; 
presribe for Germany an intrastate-territorial federation 
~ 
~ A ~ 
with a greater emphasis upon liberal constitutionalism. The 
third and fourth exponents of liberal Germanic federalism 
discussed above were Zachariae and Welcker, who were both 
concerned with promoting economic liberalism and liberal 
constitutionalism, but whose prescriptions varied. Zachariae 
believed that goal was more likely to be achieved in a 
confederation, while We1cker was an advocate of intrastate-
territorial federation. Of the two, Welcker's federalism was 
the more refined and he developed the constitutionalist 
aspect as far as it was to go prior to 1848. 
Fourth, most of the writers covered in this section were 
to exercise a significant influence in German poltical life. 
Fries was a major force in the liberal-nationalist student 
associations, while the influence of Gagern was exercised 
largely through his brothers, who shared his views about the 
best constitution for Germany (Gagern,1856). Perhaps one of 
the most significant examples is his brother Heinrich, whose 
achievements include being Minister-President of his native 
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Hesse-Darmstadt, the chairmanship of the Frankfurt National 
Assembly and the chairmanship of the Federal Ministry and ,. 
the ministries of foreign and of domestic affairs. Zachariae 
was an influential member' of the Baden parliament, where he 
represented the University of Heidelberg. Welcker'was also a 
member of Baden's parliament. Together with Karl Rotteck, he 
was the leader of· the southern German Liberals and published 
the'15 volume ·Staatslexikon M (Political Encyclopaedia)' , 
(Rotteck/Welcker,1834-43),'which was the authoritative guide 
both for liberals generally and for the Frankfurt National ' 
Assembly. From March 1848, We1cker represented Baden at the 
Frankfurt National Assembly, of which he was one of the most 
influential figures. However, the willingness he demonstrated 
in that Assembly to compromise with the existing political 
system led to him being regarded by more radical liberals as 
a traitor to'liberalism. 
Despite"their differences', the aforementioned federalisms 
are all examples of moderate liberal federalism. However, 
Germany also witnessed the use of federalism by radical 
liberals for the promotion of their political ends. It is 
that federalism which"is the subject of the next section of 
this chapter. 
6~2.3. THE FEDERALISM OF RADICAL GERMAN LIBERALS 
In switzerland, the contrast between moderate and radical 
liberalism was clearly manifested well before 1848 and the 
radicals constituted a sizeable political force. By contrast, 
German radical liberalism was neither as well developed, nor 
as significant politically. As has been stated above (see 
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4.2.), there are two main factors that distinguish radical 
liberals from their moderate counterparts. The most important 
is that the radicals advocate change that goes beyond the 
moderates' liberal constitutionalism. Radicals are not only 
more committed to popular sovereignty, but frequently also 
embrace fundamental economic and social reform. Second, many 
radical liberals are more willing to engage in illegal and 
in part violent means to realise their political aims. This 
section will illustrate the use of federalism by radical 
German liberals through a discussion of the contributions of 
Wilhelm Joseph Behr (1775-1851) and Gustav Struve (1805-1870). 
Both Behr and Struve had a significant impact upon German 
political life. Behr was a one of the leading and most popular 
figures in the Bavarian liberal movement, a member of the 
Bavarian Diet and sometime Hayor of Wuerzburg. In the spring 
of 1832, at the time of the liberal-nationalist and in part 
radical Hambach Festival, Behr's enthusiasm for political 
reform caused him to make a speech, the result of which was 
his removal as Mayor and in 1836 a three year prison sentence 
for high treason. After release from prison he was for some 
years under strict police supervision, but was in 1848 still 
elected to the Frankfurt National Assembly (Hertz,1975,127-9 
& 149f). For his part, Gustav Struve believed in the efficacy 
of revolution to achieve change and together with Friedrich 
Hecker, was one of the most active radical agitators of his 
day. After a time at the Voroarlament, where he presented the 
radical proposal for a republican federal German state (see 
below), Sruve went on to lead three radical popular uprisings 
in Baden. The first was ,in April and the second in September 
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1848. The third Putsch took place between May and July 1849 
/ 
and succeeded in setting up a Baden republic. Prussian 
military intervention eventually ended that new regime and 
obliged Struve to flee for America, where he fought for the 
Union in the American Civil War. 
The first federalism that will be examined here is that of 
Behr, who in 1820 published a pamphlet entitled "On the legal 
limits to the intereference of the German Bund in the 
constitutions. legislation and judicature of its member 
states-. At first sight, this appears to be a dry, legal 
analysis, with little that one would normally associate with 
radicalism. Moreover, its classification of federations is in 
all significant respects identical to that which Behr 
advanced in his earlier federalism, written shortly after the 
establishment of the Rheinbund (1808 & 1808a, see 3.2 above). 
Thus he still conceives of interstate confederation, 
(Staatenbund or Voelkerbund) and intrastate-territorial 
federation (Voelkerstaat or Staatenstaat) and distinguishes 
between them in the same way (1820,20-24). Given this 
correspondence with his earlier views, it will suffice for 
now to note that Behr still considers the distinction between 
confederation and intrastate-territorial federation to lie 
not in their purpose but in the strict sovereignty of the 
constituent units of the former, as compared to the 
subordination of the member states of the latter under 
central authorities which can and do intervene in member 
states' internal affairs. Another important parallel with 
1808 is that Behr remains totally opposed to intrastate-
territorial federation, which like Zachariae (1833,53 see 
above) he regards as a logical contradiction (1820,43) and, 
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above all, as fatally flawed by its institutionalisation of 
centrifugal pressures (1820,3-5 & 40). 
Notwithstanding all these points, Behr's federalism is 
significant for at least three reasons. The first is that 
though Behr is not an advocate of revolution, he qualifies as 
a radical liberal under the first criterion set out above 
[Il, namely, by virtue of the radical nature of the reforms to 
which he aspires, and thus merits inclusion in this section. 
Unlike many of his liberal contemporaries, Behr's earlier 
commitment to the ideals of the liberal Enlightenment (see 
3.1 & 3.2 above) remains unshaken. While some, such as Fries, 
sacrifice liberal constitutionalism and popular sovereignty 
to the realisation of German nationalism, Behr remains an 
ardent believer in popular sovereignty and social and 
economic 1iberalisation. Indeed, throughout much of the 1815 
to 1850 period, he actively pursues these goals in Bavaria 
(Hertz,1975,127-9 & 149f), whose new 1818 constitution 
introduced a number of liberal reforms. Behr keeps striving 
for further reforms, including universal adult suffrage, 
(albeit with a small economic qualification and the 
stipulation that voters must be aware of their civic rights); 
abolition of the upper house and extension of the powers of 
the commons; municipal autonomy and transformation of the 
hereditary monarchy into a largely ceremonial, constitutional 
monarchy. It may be recalled that in 1808 his long term goals 
were the realisation of a Kantian type of universal 
federation composed of states all governed in accordance with 
the same principles of natural law and thus with popular 
sovereignty and uniform political rights, a free press, a 
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common legal system, common currency and free trade within 
and between the states. Behr retains this ideal, though it is 
not openly articulated in his 1820 pUblication. 
Indeed, the nature of the argumentation which Behr employs 
in 1820 constitutes the second reason why that federalism is 
worthy of consideration here. In 1808, Behr underpinned his 
argument about the impracticality of intrastate federation 
I ' 
and the desirability of interstate federation with a rational 
natural law theory. Though he still believes in the 
principles of universal natural rights, Behr's 1820 argument 
for confederation is couched not in terms of the promotion 
of such rights, but largely in terms of the requirement of 
the German Bund to conform to positive law (1820,eg 58). The 
employment of the language of positivist jurisprudence might 
well be academically inconsistent with Behr's real opinions 
and somewhat surprising for someone concerned with radical 
liberal reform. However, it is interesting for this thesis, 
since it illustrates how the language of federalism alters 
in the interests of promoting specific political goals. For 
it is clear that while Behr could in 1808 utilise his natural 
law theory without fear of jeopardising his political goals. 
it is equally obvious that the utilisation of the language of 
natural law was much less likely to receive a favourable 
response from the conservative forces controlling the Bund 
than was an argument based upon the respect for established 
law. What this demonstrates is the extent to which Behr's 
federalism, like that of many others, is the product of 
considerations of political strategy. 
50 far, it has been argued that Behr's federalism is 
significant by virtue of both the political aims 8ehr seeks 
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to realise and because of the manner of its articulation. The 
third point of interest in Behr's federalism relates to the 
nature and role of the federation he prescribes for the 
promotion of those aims. Unlike almost all the liberals 
considered so far (with the exception of Zachariae 1833, see 
above), Behr advocates confederation for Germany. This has to 
be understood not as derivative of Behr's commitment to the 
pure academic principle of the indivisibility of sovereignty 
(1820,43). On the contrary, the latter is a product of 
considerations of political tactics. The question Behr's 1820 
publication addresses, namely the legal rights of the German 
Bund to intervene in the constitutional, legislative and 
judicial activities of its constituent states, can be 
understood only in the context of current political events. 
The pamphlet was written in direct response to the 1819 
Carlsbad Decrees. It will be recalled (see 4.2. above) that 
the latter provided the federal authorities with the legal 
basis for intervening in the constituent states of the German 
Bund in order to suppress national and liberal movements. The 
measures approved included not only the right of the Bund to 
intervene in order to put down popular uprisings, but also 
controls upon the liberal press, and the Burschenschaften's 
liberal-nationalist activities (Buessem,1874). Though Behr 
only voices his belief in political equality and popular 
sovereignty in passing (1820,53), the vigorous defence which 
his federalism offers for interstate confederation and thus 
for the unrestricted sovereignty of constituent states over 
their internal affairs is inextricably linked with the 
promotion of Behr's radical aims. 
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Behr argues that ,the German Bund is required, by virtue 
both of its nature as an interstate federation and of its 
positive law, to protect and promote the sovereignty of its 
member states (1820,32-44). This limits its rights of 
intervention in the internal affairs of its member states to 
cases where it has been invited by the relevant state to do 
so (1820,64f). In other cases, the Bund may not sacrifice the 
independence of a state in the interests of its security, or 
even in the interests of the security of the federation 
(1820,61). An interstate federation's ultimate sanction 
against a state unwilling or unable to suppress internal 
disorder that threatens the security of that federation is 
restricted to the expulsion of that state (1820,65f). The 
logical corollary of this is that the German Bund does not 
have, and is not entitled to arrogate to itself, the legal 
authority to interfere in member states' constitutional 
matters. 
The utility of this interpretation of the nature and 
function of the German federation for the defence of Behr's 
political goals is clear. In particular, it allows Behr to 
object to the conservative central authority's attempt to 
overrule representative constitutions established by more 
liberal states such as Bavaria, by arguing that their princes 
have the right to establish representative constitutions with 
obligatory approval by the estates of taxation, as well as 
the principle of ministerial accountability (1820,45-8 & 59). 
He contends that such structures do not, as the Carlsbad 
Decrees suggest, threaten the monarchical principle and 
that the Bund therefore has no basis in positive law for 
interfering with them (50f). Instead, they merely prevent 
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arbitrary rule, promote prosperity and thereby contentment 
and stability in the relevant political systems (1820,50-2). 
Behr asserts that, on the contrary, peace is threatened by 
the conflicts engendered by the intrinsically untenable 
intrastate federation (1820,3 & 20) into which he perceives 
some to be attempting surreptitiously to transform the Bund 
(1820,19f). 
To summarise, Behr's federalism appears prima facie to be 
a dry, constitutional law argument about the principles of 
central intervention in the affairs of constituent states, 
which comes to the conclusion that in the interests of 
legality, central intervention is not permissible in the 
German Bund, the positive law of which makes it an interstate 
confederation. In reality, however, Behr's federalism is 
highly political in its motivation. The insistence upon the 
interstate nature of the German Bund constitutes a defence by 
Behr of Bavaria's liberal gains and of his hopes for the 
realisation of his much more radical aspirations against the 
influence of the conservative federal authorities under 
Metternich. 
The second and final example of radical liberalism that 
will be considered here is that of perhaps the foremost 
German radical: Gustav Struve, a Baden lawyer and radical 
republican who was active during the 1830s and 1840s in 
popular democratic protest. Struve's political writings share 
Fichte's commitment to republicanism (see 3.2. above), but 
are far more wordly than the latter. The following summary of 
Struve's federalism is based upon his four volume 
-Fundamentals of Political Science" (Struve,1847) and the 
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proposals for federal, reform he made at the Vorparlament a 
year later (reprinted in Hommsen,1952,38-41). 
Throughout, Struve refers to federation 'with the term 
"Staatenbund" , which is usually used to betoken an interstate 
confederation~However, it is clear from his application of 
that term to federations as varied as those of ancient Greece, 
the'united Provinces, the German Bund and nineteenth century 
United States that he uses the term to denote'both interstate 
and intrastate federations. For Struve, the issue of whether 
statehood is reserved to the central authority,> to the . , 
constituent units of the federation, or shared by both centre 
and constituent units, is less important than that popular 
sovereigntY'is the governing principle at both levels. The 
overriding concern of Struve's federalism'is the victory of 
democratic republicanism over monarchy and aristocracy. 
Struve is predictably 'critical of the German Bund, which 
he describes as a "system of tyranny· characterised by "the 
oppression, stupefaction and bleeding of the people, 
arbitrary rule, wealth and honours for the'rulers and their 
henchmen.~ (Mommsen,1952,38). He says that 
there has in history never 'been a federation 
more at variance with the needs of a nation, 
with the undisputed principles of constitutional 
law and even with healthy human reason, than the 
German Bund. The latter is only worthy of note 
for uniting all the shortcomings, follies and 
crimes that could otherwise only be gleaned from 
numerous federations over centuries. It was of 
'course created by a few diplomats, who took no 
notice of the needs of the German nation, but 
tried ,to secure the rights and demands of their 
princes. The result is ••• that in its most 
important' respects, the federation exists only on 
paper. The very diversity of the constitutions it 
encompasses suffices to make all real life and 
movement impossible for the German Bund (1847,246f) 
Struve rejects the inclusion of monarchical and 
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aristocratic states in a German federation. One argument he 
advances is that such states are inherently very costly to 
run and it is thus more appropriate for them to be large, so 
that their costs can be spread more widely. If federated 
states have monarchical constitutions, it is better for them 
to be united into one large state (1847,245). Among the 
advantages of federation which Struve enumerates are 
cost-effectiveness, the avoidance of excessive centralisation 
and the promotion of national strength. In other words, it 
provides an appropriate balance between unity and diversity. 
However, he goes further, claiming that a cardinal feature 
of federation is that it unites small units into a greater 
whole and thus uniquely provides republics with the 
smallness necessary for their democratic structures to be 
more than mere illusion, while simultaneously providing 
them with the strength necessary in the modern world. 
Thus Struve concludes that a federation of democratic, 
republican states is "the natural federation" (1847,248) and 
contends that - ••• the only flourishing federation with 
which history furnishes us are those amongst democracies" 
(1847,246). He cites the United Provinces and Switzerland as 
examples. However, his greatest praise is reserved for the 
United States, whose constitution he describes as ..... an 
ideal of legislative wisdom ..... (1847,243). Indeed, he is so 
convinced of its merit that his prescription of a federal 
constitution for Germany is limited in his 1847 book to a 
short description of the American constitution (1847,249-64), 
whose emulation he recommends in his 1848 programme (Mommsen, 
1952,40). 
What Struve advocates both for Germany and, by implication, 
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for all republics, is thus republican federation. He asserts 
that such federations should consist of at least twenty units 
of comparable size and prosperity, each comprising between 
one and two million residents (1847,244). Each must be 
governed in accordance with the principles of popular 
sovereignty (1847,245), have a popularly elected parliament 
and be headed by a popularly elected president (Mommsen,1952, 
40). Each constituent republic is to legislate and administer 
its domestic affairs independently (Struve,1847,244), and is 
to be united to the other republics by a strong federal 
constitution modelled on that of the United States (Mommsen, 
1952,40 & Struve,1847,242). The central authority is to 
r 
conduct external affairs and, "as needs demand", pass general 
legislation applicable to all states (Struve,1847,244). 
The purposes which the new constitution should serve are 
socio-economic, and above all political, as is clear from the 
text of the 1848 programme (Mommsen,1952,38-41). The economic 
aims include harmonisation in matters such as coinage, 
weights and measures, postage and railways (Mommsen,1952,40), 
ending restrictions to internal trade, and levying customs 
tariffs at the frontiers of a united Germany for the purpose 
of protecting domestic trade, industry and agriculture 
(Mommsen,1952,38). There is also to be a system of 
progressive income and wealth tax which guarantees a minimum 
level of subsistence for all (Mommsen,1952,38). Struve calls 
for the elevation of the condition of the working and 
middle classes and the setting up of a Ministry of Labour to 
control usury, protect labour and to secure for the latter a 
share in profits (Mommsen, 1952,40). 
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The second and most important aim of Struve's proposed 
federation is the promotion of political ends. These include 
religious tolerance and the secularisation of state and 
educational affairs. His opposition to the influence of the 
Catholic church is evident from his call for the abolition of 
all monastries (Mommsen, 1952,38), as well as his claim that 
a major source of Germany's ills is the fact that it has been 
under the influence of Rome (1847,247f). Host important, 
however, is that the federation is to ensure 'political 
equality, German nationalism and a common German citizenship, 
popular government, communal self-administration, press 
freedom, individual rights of assembly and association and 
the abolition of hereditary monarchy (Mommsen,1952,38-40). 
To summarise, the constituent units of the federation 
Struve proposes are small republics based upon popular 
sovereignty. He argues, with reference to Montesquieu, that 
republican federation is the Unatural" form. Such federations 
could be either interstate, or intrastate, though the above 
discussion suggests that what he has in mind for Germany 
would be a Quite centralised federal state. While Struve's 
federalism does mention military considerations, the 
predominant purpose of his- federation relates to "Security of 
income and person, welfare, education and freedom for all, 
regardless of birth, station and belief ••• ", and he uses 
federalism as a "means for its achievement" (Mommsen,1952, 
38). Interestingly, Struve's federalism contains not only 
Fichte's republicanism, but also suggestions of the latter's 
concern for socio-political issues related to popular 
welfare, as well nationalism. In short, Struve's federalism 
is concerned not only with realiSing the civic vision, but 
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also with social matters. 
As will be shown in 6.3.3. below, many of these 
characteristics were common to the federalism of radical 
Swiss liberals. Before proceeding to examine the use of 
Germanic federalism by Swiss liberals, it will be useful to 
summarise briefly the main conclusions of the above review of 
the federalism of radical German liberals. 
First, this section has demonstrated that while Behr 
and Struve's federalism is also used to promote liberalism, 
the nature of their political priorities and Struve's 
willingness to use armed revolution to achieve those ends 
marks them out from the moderate liberals considered in the 
preceding section. Behr and Struve's political goals also 
include German nationalism and liberal constitutionalism, but 
they have a greater commitment to political equality and 
popular sovereignty than the moderate liberals. Consequently, 
their reform proposals also embrace fundamental political and 
socio-economic change. Their aims include not only 
republicanism, but also universal adult suffrage, freedoms of 
assembly, association, speech and the press, a redistributive 
taxation system, a minimum income and profit sharing for 
labour. 
Second, despite these common political aims, the radical 
liberals examined above differed in the type of federation 
they prescribed for Germany. This was a product of tactical 
considerations. Behr's staunch defence in 1820 of interstate 
federation was designed to protect liberal advances within 
the constituent states of the German Bund against the 
conservative influence of the centre, as expressed in the 
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Carlsbad Decrees. Writing in the late 1840s, Struve believed 
" 
that it was now possible to establish an intrastate 
federation with a progressive centre that would intervene to 
enforce radical liberal policies throughout the federation. 
Third, the manner in which the federalism of radical 
liberals was articulated was again contingent upon political 
expediency. Thus the conservative environment of the 1820s 
explains why it was advisable for 8ehr's 1820 federalism to 
be articulated in the form of sober legal positivism and 
. 
not openly to proclaim his political goals. However, those 
goals are more clearly spe1t out in Struve's use of the 
language of natural rights in 1847 and especially in the 
polemical federalism he employed in 1848, when the control of 
the conservative forces appeared to be broken. 
The final point worth stressing relates to the types of 
federation that the federalism of radical German liberals 
envisaged. Like the moderate liberals, the radicals conceived 
of the-possibility of interstate confederation, intrastate-
territorial federation and universal-chiliastic federation 
[71. However, Struve's federalism also refers to a type of 
federation that is distinct from those previously identified 
in this thesis. The federation he proposes for Germany is 
clearly intrastate and yet it is neither composed of 
corporations and estates of the realm, nor is sovereignty 
shared between constituent states and the centre. The 
federation is therefore neither intrastate-territorial, nor 
intrastate-corporate. Instead, in Struve's proposed 
federation, sovereignty is located in the population and the 
constituent units of that federation are not sovereign or 
even quasi-sovereign territories, but subdivisions of the 
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sovereign people. It therefore appears appropriate to 
conclude that Struve's federalism contains a sixth dimension 
of Germanic federalism. In view of its constituent units and 
the location within the federation of sovereignty, it is 
proposed to label this dimension of Germanic federalism 
"intrastate-popular". 
The next task of this chapter is to examine the 
federalism of Swiss liberals. It will be interesting to see 
whether this new dimension of Germanic federalism also 
appeared in the federalism of radical Swiss liberals. 
6.3. LIBERAL GERMANIC FEDERALISM IN SWITZERLAND 
6.3.1. INTRODUCTION 
The following account of liberal Germanic federalism in . 
switzerland will be subdivided into two sections. In 6.3.2. 
the federalism of moderate Swiss liberals will be considered. 
The examples that will be used are the federal isms of 
Zschokke,' Pfyffer, Roger, Cherbuliez and Fazy-Pasteur. The 
federalism of radical Swiss liberals will be the subject of 
6~2.3., which will concentrate upon the manner in which 
Troxler and Fazy utilised federalism for the promotion of 
their political ends. 
6.3.2. THE FEDERALISM OF MODERATE SWISS LIBERALS 
The only Restoration author (Baumgartner,1853/4,I,160) to 
publish proposals for federal reform in the direction of 
greater centralisation was Heinrich Zschokke, a Prussian 
immigrant who became President of the liberal-nationalist 
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Helvetic soc~ety [8J. Zschokke remained "a faithful adherent 
to German idealism" (Bonjour,et.al.1952, 255f), though his 
short 1824 pamphlet lacks any reference to liberal ideals. It 
- .~ 
is concerned almost exclusively with demonstrating that the 
Federal Pact is too weak to guarantee Swiss independence at 
times of external military threat. 
He says that the federation's supreme body (the Diet) is a 
legislative, rather than an effective executive organ (1824, 
9). Executive authority is given to the Vorort cantons, but 
Zschokke doubts whether this is appropriate for times of 
military emergency, since the powers given to the Vorort are 
too weak, and a Vorort might be occupied by an invading 
power, leaving the Confederation in a state of confusion and 
lacking central authority (1824,10f). 
In particular, Zschokke attacks the federation's emergency 
provisions, as set out in Article 9 of the Federal Pact. He 
argues that the Diet must firm up the provisions for the 
exercise of central,authorty in times of emergency. As it 
stands, the Federal Pact is at odds with the military 
interests of the federation (Bundesstaat) and this is due to 
the federation's lack of a strong central authority which is 
independent of the constituent units (1824,21-24). He 
concludes that "As the welfare of the Swiss people requires 
independence of foreign power, so the maintenance of that 
independence requires the creation of a strong federal 
authority· (23). 
zschokke does not offer a well-developed, theoretical 
consideration of the nature and purpose of federations. 
Indeed, at one stage he uses the word Bundesstaat to denote 
the Swiss federation during the period prior to 1798, (1824, 
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7), while elsewhere applying the same term to Switzerland 
under the Federal Pact (1824,21). Still less does Zschokke 
justify reform by reference to liberal principles, as Escher 
and Usteri (1814) had dared to do some ten years earlier (see 
3.3. above). Nonetheless, his pamphlet is significant for at 
least two reasons. First, it is one of the earliest, if not 
the only publication of the highly censored Restoration to 
call for greater centralisation of the federation. Second, it 
is a good example of how Restoration liberals had to justify 
their calls for more centralisation in the federation by 
reference not to political and economic, but to security 
considerations. The fact that Zschokke does not directly 
advocate liberal principles is to be regarded as largely the 
result of a desire to avoid censorship. 
This very guarded liberal federalism of the Restoration 
was replaced during the Regeneration by a much more 
self-confident liberalism. This greater confidence was a 
result of at least three factors. First, 1829 saw the lifting 
of the press censorship which the Diet had imposed in 1823 
(Guggenbuhl,1931,229-32 & 261-8). This in part helps account 
for what appears to have been a spontaneous (Wild,1966,79) 
increase in political interest. Second, the number of cantons 
that had succumbed to liberal regeneration had grown 
substantially, increasing liberal optimism that the tide of 
change was moving their way. Third, the 1830 revolutions had 
undermined the power of the conservative forces in Europe, 
thereby providing liberals with a window of opportunity for 
federal reform without the previously feared external 
intervention (Wild,1966,91). Finally, an important trigger 
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for the vigorous debate on the structure of the federation 
were the Diet's 1831 decisions to intervene to stop the 
regeneration process in the cantons of Basel and Schwyz 
(Wild,1966,96-9). 
In the early 1830s, there were thus countless liberal 
contributions to the debate about the best structure for the 
Swiss federation. The heyday of liberal federalism was 
relatively shortlived, ,however. Conservative opposition was 
not long in coming, for example by the setting up of the 
League of Sarnen to counter the liberal Concordat of the 
Seven (Wild,1966,100-105). By the time the Rossi Commission 
reported in December 1832, the initial popular enthusiasm for 
liberal political reform had died down. The two hostile camps 
that were eventually to fight the 1847 civil war were already 
emerging. Moreover, while confessional politics had been 
largely absent during the Restoration and early Regeneration, 
they started to appear after the 1834 Baden Conference. 
opposition to the liberals from another quarter also grew, 
namely from the Radicals, whose federalism we shall examine 
in section 6.3.3. below. 
The following elucidation of Swiss liberal federalism 
during the Regeneration will thus start with an examination 
of two assertive, liberal federal isms, articulated during 
the early 1830s peak of liberal influence and self-confidence. 
namely, those of Pfyffer and Roger, who both advocated 
intrastate-territorial federation. We shall then look at the 
more fatalisitc liberal federalism of Cherbuliez before 
proceeding to the much more hesitant liberal federalism of 
Fazy-Pasteur, which supported confederation for Switzerland. 
Kasimir Pfyffer was a prominent Luzern liberal from an old 
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aristocratic family (Rappard,1941,19). He was active in the 
Helvetic Society and from the 1820s held high political 
office in his native canton, by which he was for a while also 
deputised to the Diet (Baumgartner,1853/4,I,169f). Pfyffer 
was a leading figure in the process of internal liberal 
regeneration which Catholic Luzern completed in 1830. In 
January 1831, it was Luzern's turn to assume the role of 
Vorort canton. Pfyffer's 1831 "Appeal to the confederal 
Vorort Luzern on its assumption of the directorship of 
federal affairs· was designed to encourage Luzern to use the 
opportunity of directoral canton status to initiate a 
complete reform of the Swiss federation. 
Pfyffer's federalism is very candid about the political 
principles which his proposed federal constitution seeks to 
implement (1831,5-9). He describes the replacement of 
aristocratic constitutions by representative systems based 
upon the principles of popular sovereignty and political 
equality as the ·greatest fruit of the whole of Europe's 
contemporary cultural history" (1831,5f). He sees 1798 to 
1813 as the period in which the application of these 
principles to Switzerland was first attempted and attributes 
at least part of the blame for the failure of that initial 
attempt to the fact that they were externally imposed. He 
then condems the Moutrageous Reaction" for having worked 
against regeneration since 1815 and identifies the 
completion of the political and intellectual regeneration of 
the Confederation in accordance with the principles of 
political equality and popular sovereignty as the duty of 
contemporary Switzerland. 
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Switzerland is, he says, about to enter the final and 
decisive period of development, namely, that in which the 
principles of political regeneration will be realised. 
Moreover, this will occur not as a product of external 
imposition, as was the case with the Helvetic Republic of 
1798 to 1803, but as a result of the self-determination of 
the combined Swiss ·national will· (1831,7f). 
Pfyffer has two main targets for political reform. The 
immediate targets are the cantonal constitutions, which he 
wishes to be organised on the principle of liberal 
representation. To this end, Pfyffer's proposals insist that 
there is to be no armed federal intervention in cantonal 
affairs. Cantonal governments threatened with popular 
overthrow are to be left to their fate, since intervention 
would be counter to what Pfyffer regards as the prime 
principle of the state, namely, popular sovereignty. Where 
the federation engages in arbitration between a cantonal 
government and its people, it should do so on the basis of 
accepting legitimate popular demands and in accordance with 
the principle of liberal constitutionalism. Pfyffer proposes 
that in the longer term, all cantonal constitutions be based 
upon the principles of political equality, popular 
sovereignty, the separation of powers and parliamentarism 
(1831.9-13). He argues that the creation of cantonal 
constitutions based on liberal representative principles will 
promote ••.• higher intellectual, moral and industrial 
development ••• • (1831,8). 
The second and main target of Pfyffer's reform proposals 
is the federation. He attacks the existing federation, 
arguing that 
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••• all insightful and educated Swiss wish for a 
more complete federal constitution; they see that 
the present weak cantonal union makes any common 
creation or national undertaking impossible; that 
industry is locked into the narrowest of confines, 
trade is everywhere restricted and intellectual 
forces lack the greatest and most noble incentive: 
the consciousness of working for a nation; they see 
that ••• given this inner strife, Switzerland must 
remain weak and powerless in the midst of other 
states. All Swiss ••• therefore wish for a federal 
state [sic Bundesstaat] and not a confederation 
[sic staatenbund}. (1831,14). 
Pfyffer goes on to say that until now Switzerland has, like 
Germany, undeniably been more of an interstate, rather than 
an intrastate federation. He argues that it has as yet been 
impossible to create the latter because the constituent units 
have lacked the common constitutional principles and 
structures that would guarantee common interests. As might be 
expected of a rationalist, he has faith in the power of 
constitutions to mould human behaviour, arguing that 
·constitutions completely determine the direction of the 
domestic and foreign policies of states". In his opinion, the 
fact that Swiss aristocratic groupings conspire with foreign 
against the national interest and that foreign ambassadors 
interfere in internal swiss divisions is a product of a lack 
of constitutional homogeneity (1831,16). The victory of 
popular cantonal constitutions would, he contends, get rid 
of the rule of the aristocratic factions and establish 
constitutions with the same principles and structures. This 
would give all cantons common interests to defend and thus 
would facilitate their union into a federal state, which 
would then speedily ensure the flowering of a true and strong 
national spirit and universal love of the fatherland (1831,17). 
Pfyffer's proposals for the structure of the new federation 
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are presented in the form of a draft constitution. The first 
section comprises seven articles, the first of which 
establishes that the twenty-two Swiss cantons are to form a 
federal state (Bundesstaat). By virtue of the fact that the 
cantonal constitutions are to be based upon common 
principles, this federal state will elevate those cantons 
into a single nation. The remaining articles of this section 
state that popular sovereignty is to be the basis of all 
constitutions, that there is to be political and legal 
equality of all citizens and that all individual and class 
privileges are abolished. Only direct and representative 
political structures are to be permitted, and thus the 
Principality of Neuchatel will have to alter its constitution 
if it wishes to remain in Switzerland. Finally, free 
residence throughout Switzerland for all Swiss citizens and 
freedom of the press are guaranteed (1831,18f). 
The second section concerns the structures of the central 
federal authorities (1831,19-29). The provisions relating to 
the central legislative authority (1831,19-26) propose some 
significant changes to the system pertaining under the Pact. 
First, the Diet is to be replaced by an indirectly elected 
"Federal Council· (Bundesrat), in which majority votes are 
to be binding. Second, Pfyffer considers that instruction 
voting does not lend itself to creating a true central power 
or national authority and would thus prefer representatives 
to vote in accordance with their conscience and for cantonal 
representation in the Federal Council to be based upon the 
size of their populations and unspecified "other factors". 
Third, Pfyffer proposes the abolition of the Vorort system 
and its replacement by a Committee elected by the Federal 
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Council and responsible to it. The Committee is to be 
entrusted with federal affairs between sittings of the 
Federal Council. Majority decisions of the Committee are to 
be binding until confirmed or amended by the Federal Council. 
Fourth, the competences Pfyffer assigns to the legislature 
are very wide-ranging. Predictably, the list includes 
military matters and foreign policy. However, it also 
encompases numerous matters not within the power of the 
central authority of the Pact. These include both external 
and internal security, the approval or rejection not only of 
all treaties between cantons and foreign powers, but also of 
all intercantona1 treaties. The extension of the federation's 
economic powers are very marked. Thus postage, coinage, 
weights and measures, intercantona1 trade and industry, the 
supervision of highways, roads and waterways, the setting of 
road and bridge tolls and the abolition of all internal 
import and export tariffs are all to become federal 
prerogatives. 
Pfyffer also grants considerable political powers to his 
proposed federal authority. For example, it is to guarantee 
all constitutions, as well as the application throughout the 
federation of the principles of political equality and 
popular sovereignty. In cases of their contravention, the 
federation may arbitrate or, failing that, refer the matter 
to the Federal Court. In a few cases, it is to be permitted 
to intervene militarily in cantonal disputes, but this is 
restricted to responses to armed cantonal aggression, civil 
war and the illegal suppression of cantonal popular and 
constitutional 'rights. However, even here, the aim of 
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intervention is to force the disputing parties to submit 
themselves to the arbitration of the Federal Court. 
The third section of Pfyffer's draft constitution (1831, 
26-8) specifies the role of the Federal Council. It is to 
constitute the Court of Appeal in serious criminal and 
civil law matters, but its prime role will be to adjudicate 
upon intercantonal disputes and claims of breaches of 
cantonal constitutions. Significantly, Pfyffer stipulates 
that the Federal Council may arbitrate in disputes between 
cantonal governments and their people not only at the request 
of the former, but also at the request of the latter. 
Finally, Pfyffer's draft provides for a Federal Executive 
Authority to execute Federal Council resolutions during the 
latter's sittings. The Executive Federal Authority is elected 
by and from the Federal Council at each session, as is a 
President who chairs the Authority. Between Federal Council 
sittings, the function of the Executive Authority is 
transferred to the Federal Committee (1831,20&26). 
To sum up, Pfyffer's federalism amounted to the advocacy 
of a new, intrastate federation for Switzerland. Baumgartner 
(1853/4,I,164) states that Pfyffer's Appeal was the first 
federalism which "unambiguously took up and proclaimed a plan 
for the reform of the whole Confederation and gave notice to 
the existing conditions" [9]. Second, it was highly 
influential in terms of both the formal (10) and informal 
debates on the Swiss federation. Third, Pfyffer is notable 
by the nature and extent of the powers he attribute. to the 
central authority. They are so wide-ranging, that even 
Baumgartner, Pfyffer's liberal contemporary and ally, states 
that the powers Pfyffer gives to the central authority 
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include -all important material interests", and concludes 
that the consistent application of Pfyffer's proposals would 
have had the effect of making the cantons merely regional 
bodies. Switzerland would have been a Bundesstaat in form, a 
a unitary state by its nature (1853/4,1,166-70) [11]. 
If that is the opinion of a committed liberal, it is not 
surprising that conservatives strongly opposed Pfyffer. He 
felt obliged to defend himself against their charge that his 
proposals amounted to a ·return to the unitary Helvetic 
Republic, arguing that in his federal state, the cantons 
were to continue an independent existence. He conceded that 
cantonal sovereignty would be reduced, but denied that it 
would be abolished, pointing out that cantons would retain 
control over civil and criminal law, taxation and the 
administrative system (cited in Baumgartner,1853/4,I,168). 
Despite these assurances, it is easy to see why his 
opponents should be concerned. References to cantonal 
sovereignty are notable by their absence from Pfyffer's 
Appeal, whose only reference to sovereignty relates to 
popular sovereignty. Presumably motivated by a desire to meet 
some of his opponents concerns, Pfyffer chaired (Lauber,1910, 
24f) the discussions of a group of liberals including 
Baumgartner (Rappard,1941,87), which drafted a revised federal 
proposal. This appeared anonymously in the summer of 1832 and 
was widely discussed in the press (Rappard,ibid). 
This new proposal (Baumgartner/Pfyffer,1832) also prescibes 
a Swiss Bundesstaat (1832,3). The main differences between 
it and Pfyffer's original proposal relate to four matters; 
the first concerns the federal legislature, which resumes its 
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previous designation of Diet (Tagsatzung). Instead of being 
based strictly on population size, differences in the size of 
cantonal representation are to be limited. Accordingly, the 
five largest cantons receive four representatives, the next 
six largest three and the rest retain two representatives 
each (1832,4f). The Diet is to rotate its venue biennially 
between the Federal Pact's three directoral cantons (1832, 
11). Second, there are changes in the federal executive 
authority. Though the restoration of the directoral system is 
not proposed, the changes do move in that direction. Thus 
the President elected by the Diet for a two year term chairs 
a -Federal Council" the four other members of which are 
elected by the Diet from the Swiss citizens of the canton in 
which the Diet is then located (1832,10-12). Third, the new 
draft constitution explicitly refers to the cantons as 
·sovereign states. which exercise all rights of sovereignty 
••• not explicitly transferred to the federal authority by 
this Federal Constitution." (ibid,4). This concession to 
cantonal sovereignty is accompanied by a reduction in the 
economic powers Pfyffer's Appeal had granted to the federal 
authority. There is no mention of common weights and 
measures and cantons are to be allowed to retain, at least 
temporarily. some rights to levy tolls and customs (1832,43f). 
It is clear from a comparison of Pfyffer's first and 
second federal proposals that his initial enthusiasm for a 
centralised intrastate federation to promote political and 
economic liberalism had soon to be tempered. However, there 
were in the early Regeneration other liberal federal isms that 
had shared his enthusiasm for a centralised federal state. 
One example is that published in the spring of 1831 by Roger, 
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a French-speaking major in the Swiss Federal Engineers. 
Roger's contribution is divided into two parts. The first 
(1831,5-18) sets out his motives for proposing a centralised 
federal state for Switzerland, while the second part (1831, 
19-40) comprises a seventy-six article draft constitution. It 
is possible to summarise the concerns that motivated Roger's 
federalism under four headings, namely, considerations of a 
nationalist, security, economic and' political nature. 
He is clearly committed to the idea of a Swiss nation and 
welcomes the activities of the various private societies that 
are contributing to the development of a Swiss national 
spirit (183l,6f). Conversely, he is very critical of what he 
regards as a Quarter of a century of cantonal unwillingness 
to forego any individual advantages in the interests of the 
whole. Roger's praise for General Washington and his 
commitment to his country, is reminiscent of that expressed 
in the conservative federalism of his fellow army officers, 
Bontemps and Maillardoz (1830, see 5.3.2. above). 
The same applies to Roger's second motivation, namely, his 
concern about what he considers Switzerland's lack of 
prestige abroad and its military, vulnerability. To counter 
this, he advocates a strengthening of its militia, a more 
assertive foreign policy, and the abandonment of its 
"pacifist role" (1831,15). He regards as intolerable the fact 
that a Swiss canton is subject to a foreign ruler and says 
that the first task of a Swiss President should be to 
negotiate to put an end to that canton's dependency [12]. 
Roger's third complaint about Switzerland's situation 
under the Federal Pact concerns economic matters. He attacks 
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the fact that the cantons can and do levy their own tolls and 
custom duties, which he regards as a cause of constant 
intercantonal conflict. Second, he says that tolls are a 
source of despair for travellers and are the death of 
commerce. Third, he argues that they are a contravention of 
the principle of ·laissez passer, laissez-faire" (1831,8), 
which is itself bound up with the principle of individual 
liberty. He also objects to the lack of a common monetary 
system, and argues for.federal control over postage. 
Though the constitutional proposals which Roger makes in 
the second part of his essay demonstrate beyond doubt his 
commitment to political liberalism, this aspect is not 
emphasised in the introductory section of his publication, 
the liberalism of which is reserved to economic matters. The 
comments he does make on the political situation are limited 
to the following. First, he argues that federations have both 
advantages and disadvantages; the former include the fact 
that their small size militates against the neglect of parts 
of the country, as well as the simplicity and economy of 
their administrative systems. However, federations' 
disadvantages include concentrating interests into separate 
provinces and making these into distinct states. Given this 
tendency" it is necessary for a federation to have a central 
institution which rises above partial interests and has only 
the interests' of the whole at heart. Roger thus dismisses the 
directora1 canton system as an absurdity. He argues that the 
weakness of the central authority of the current federation 
is reflected in Switzerland's lack of power externally and 
therefore he advocates an end to this "fictive" federation 
(1831,6) by the introduction of a presidential system. 
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The details of Roger's proposed federation are outlined in 
the second part of his pamphlet (19-40). Though he uses the 
terms confederal and federal rather loosely, it is clear that 
he desires the creation of an intrastate federation. Article 
1 of his draft constitution states: 
switzerland is a confederated state and composed 
of twenty-two cantons intimately united with each 
"other by the bond of the federal authority. This 
institution reduces the individual independence 
of each of them, imposes on them the sacrifices 
necessary to obtain the precious advantage of a 
unity of sentiment and of action, the sole means 
to strength and being respected. (1831,19). 
sovereignty is not ascribed to the cantons, which enjoy 
merely residual powers, but to the federal legislature:, the 
Diete. The other institutions at the federal level are the 
President, who exercises executive authority and three 
administrative bodies: the Senate, Military Council and 
Court of Appeal (1831,21). 
The Diet is composed of three deputies for the most 
populous canton, one deputy for the eleven smallest cantons 
and two for the remaining ten cantons. Since Roger does not 
stipulate otherwise, it is to be assumed that the deputies 
are to remain indirectly elected and that they are to be 
bound to cantonal instructions. The most important functions 
of the Diet include the election of the "Senate", "Military 
Council· and ·Court of Appeal", as well as the ratification 
of all treaties and the approval of legislation. 
The Senate comprises six persons from at least four 
different cantons, who are elected by the Diet for a term of 
six years and are re-electable after an interval of four 
years. The prime duties of the Senate are the administration 
of federal finances and federal monopolies on postage, tolls, 
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and coinage, as well as the preparation, in conjunction with 
the President, of bills to be presented to the Diet. 
Executive power is invested in a President, who is to be 
popularily elected for a six year term, probably through an 
electoral college. He is re-electable after a six year 
interval. He chairs the Diet, to which he makes an annual 
report, and drafts proposed legislation with the assistance 
of the Senate and the Military Council. He is also ,solely 
responsible for diplomatic relations and the negotiation of 
foreign treaties, which remain subject, however, to Diet 
ratification. Roger places great importance upon the 
President giving an example of simplicity of mores and of 
patriotism. He also frequently approvingly cites the examples 
of Washington and Franklyn (1831,25-27,37,&39f). 
Roger's draft constitution is also notable for stipulating 
a number of liberal principles. As regards the economy, these 
include free residence and exercise of commerce for all 
citizens throughout Switzerland, as well as free trade in 
agricultural and industrial goods and the abolition of all 
internal transit duties (Articles 3,4 & 13). On the political 
front (1831,19-21), he stipulates that there is to be a free 
press, free religious worship no subject territories or 
privileges of birth and that all citizens are to enjoy full 
political rights in their canton of domicile. Unlike Pfyffer, 
however, Roger makes no further rulings about the nature of ' 
cantonal political institutions. 
Though the presidential system Roger outlines is distinct 
from the parliamentary sovereignty contained in Pfyffer's 
Zuruf, the two draft constitutions have much else in common. 
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Both are examples of liberal federalism. Though Pfyffer and 
Roger place more stress on political and economic liberalism 
respectively, they both advocate an intrastate-territorial 
federation for the purposes of promoting Swiss national pride 
and security, as well as liberalism. It does not require much 
knowledge of the American constitution to agree with Rappard 
(1941,75f) that the presidential system Roger puts forward 
owes much to aspects of United States' experience. However, 
both Pfyffer and Roger retain the unicameral principle and 
leave sovereignty located at the centre. They are both 
examples of the assertive, self-confident, liberal federalism 
of the early Regeneration. 
The next exponent of federalism we shall consider is A.E. 
Cherbuliez, a French-speaking Genevan, whose writings offer 
an interesting alternative liberal perspective on the nature 
and function of federation [13]. His 1833 essay ("Essay on 
the conditions of federal alliances in general and on the new 
draft federal constitution") recognises confederations and 
intrastate-territorial federations (-confederations· and 
-etats federatif-) and regards the extant Swiss federation as 
an example of the former. He points to the apparent paradox 
that although federal systems of government allegedly combine 
the virtues of small and large states, few confederations 
other than the Swiss have survived for long (10) and seeks 
to explain this by -A careful examination of the elements 
that characterise this form of government ••• ". His argument 
is based upon what he sees as a generic structural weakness 
of confederations. 
In simple states, decision-making in the central 
legislature is undertaken by individuals. Where a minority 
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opposes a decision reached, this does not pose insurmountable 
problems for the central executive authority. Since both 
within and without the legislature, minority opposition is 
made up of individuals, the executive power" ••• acts only 
upon individuals, and as a result meets only the resistance 
of individuals •••• (11f). By contrast, confederal decision-
makers are not individuals, but states. Consequently, 
dissenting minorities are well-defined, sovereign states, 
with constitutionally entrenched powers. Resistance to the 
implementation of majority decisions is thus likely to meet 
not the resistance of individuals, but 
••• organised national resistance, sustained by a 
sort of legality. If such resistance actually 
occurs, the government of the federation has no 
other recourse, no other means of implementation 
but the forces of those states constituting the 
majority, and that means ••• making them respect 
the law via a civil war.(12f) 
Cherbuliez considers utilisation of force to be morally 
unacceptable in civilised societies and also impractical in 
those such as Switzerland which have a civil militia (14),and 
concludes that confederal government is thus unfortunately 
characterised by an absence of ..... all realistic means of 
implementation of a certain number of the resolutions that 
it might perhaps wish to take." (15) 
The powers of the central authority being unable to 
counter such national (i.e. constituent state) opposition, 
the stability of confederations has to rely upon minimising 
intercantonal differences. Cherbuliez believes this can be 
achieved only by a -moral bond which I call accord" (20). 
It is only in such an accord that one can find a 
real guarantee against the dissolution that would 
otherwise threaten it by the forced impotence of 
the central government. Inasmuch as this accord 
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exists, ••• inasmuch as every confederated government 
consents to allow the general interests to prevail 
over its particular interest, the Confederation is 
happy internally, strong externally; it constitutes 
the best possible type of government. (16) 
Such accords derive from a more or less complete community 
of views and interests between the confederated states. He 
identifies three factors conducive to such an accord (16-22). 
The first is homogeneity in social, economic, religious, 
political and" other matters. The second is a common national 
identity, though he stresses that the latter does not exclude 
considerable diversity amongst the constituent states. What 
he considers significant is that the similarities between 
them continue to outweigh both their differences and any 
similarities they may have to neighbouring states. The third 
factor Cherbuliez considers conducive to an accord is shared 
geo-political interests. 
Cherbuliez regards the uniformity of interests underlying 
the accords - and thus confederations in general - to lack 
durability • 
••• that uniformity of interests relies upon 
happy circumstances, some external, some internal, 
that the subsequent development of confederated 
states tends gradually to neutralise and which 
general progress of civilisation finally ends up 
destroying entirely. Once the accord is destroyed, 
the authority of the central government is sooner 
or later put to the test, it succumbs, the federal 
bond is broken, and the dissolution of the federal 
body would be inevitable, unless a new organisation 
reuniting the dispersed members of the body, arises 
to form a new whole. (27f) 
He claims that the history of the Swiss Confederation 
shows that there was homogeneity between the three initial 
members of the union of 1291 as regards linguistic, cultural, 
political and defence matters. Though this weakened over the 
next two centuries with the addition of nine new cantons, 
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Switzerland retained a republican identity that kept it 
distinct from its neighbours. However, the Reformtaion led to 
serious schisms and subsequent developments enhanced cantonal 
identity to the detriment of the national identity. Finally, 
though increased communications have reduced national 
hostilities, the recent development of civilisation has 
resulted in (cantons') selfish materialism taking precedence 
over the general interest. This threatens to bring about the 
end of the Confederation and makes reform a matter of urgency. 
In short, Cherbu1iez is arguing that confederations are 
necessarily structurally unstable. NThe more complete the 
sovereignty of each canton, the more the special interests 
of its population will have this national character"(29f). He 
argues that the only way for the Swiss Confederation to 
overcome this problem is by means of reform designed to 
reduce the capacity of cantons to offer national resistance. 
If therefore the cantons consent, in abandoning 
part of their sovereignty, to denationa1ise their 
. interests, they would make the existence of the 
Confederation possible, they would resolve the 
problem of its reorganisation. 
Denationalise their interests, centralise powers, 
that is, in ·two words the condition of life to which 
they must submit; that also must be the main idea, 
the ruling principle of the new alliance.(3C) 
He goes onto say·(31f) that there is nobody who does not feel 
strongly about the values of cantonal sovereignty and that 
The very word centralisation gives birth to 
notions of abuse and arbitrariness; whoever 
pronounces it brings himself into discredit; 
However, I do not see in all this any more than a 
matter of fact. I do not feel any preference for 
centralisation in theory; but I believe in its 
current necessity. I believe in the following maxim: 
centralise or perish; ••• M (emphasis in original) 
What Cherbuliez advocates is that the Swiss Confederaion 
be centralised into a federal state. He therefore approves of 
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the Rossi Pact, since it has not tried to develop a model 
federation (45), but has recognised the current necessities 
and has centralisation as its dominant principle (46). 
Moreover, Cherbuliez approves of its proposals for the 
partial abandonment of cantonal sovereignty, a permanent 
and distinct federal government 
He responds to those who are concerned about where the 
centralisation will end by asserting that he too dislikes 
centralisation in theory, but considers it necessary in 
practice. But he goes further: 
I am ••• deeply convinced that the necessity for 
centralisation will sooner or later again become 
apparent; for the favourable circumstances that 
alone'can maintain a confederation of independent 
states are tending to continually disappear. The 
times are mercilessly destroying them one after 
another •••• The Federal Act of 1832 is but a 
. transitory work. The immense amount that it leaves 
to cantonal sovereignty is but a temporary concession, 
determined by another necessity, that of making the 
acceptance of the project possible. (43f) 
However, there were other liberal federal isms in this 
period that remained very sceptical about the desirability of 
an intrastate federation and were decidedly opposed to a 
centralised federal state, which some also saw as the likely 
outcome of even the prima facie moderate proposals for 
greater centralisation. This more hesitant liberal federalism 
is well articulated in the writings of the French-speaking 
Genevan, Fazy-Pasteur (1831,1833 & 1847). 
In July 1831, he published his ·Observations on the 
changes demanded to the Swiss Federal Pact", which 
constitutes a review of and response to recent proposals for 
fed~ral reform. He divides the latter into those relating to 
intercantonal relations, and those concerning the nature of 
the federal authority. The first category includes proposals 
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to allow all Swiss to exercise political rights in their 
canton of residence. proposals for military reform, and for 
internal economic harmonisation and liberalisation (1a31,3f). 
He examines all the proposals in turn and, with the exception 
of the suggestion that a military fund be established to arm 
and equip troops, he dismisses them all. His most frequently 
used justifications relate to implementation problems and to 
cost (1831,4-14). 
Next, Fazy-Pasteur turns to the second category of 
proposals, namely, those concerned with not merely improving, 
but replacing the Federal Pact. He identifies four such 
publications, including those of Bontemps and Maillardoz, 
Roger and Pfyffer (1831,4) [14]. He says that they have four 
implicit criticisms of the extant Swiss federation. The first 
is that cantonal voting strengths in the Diet are not 
proportional to cantonal population size. The second is that 
the Diet operates on the basis of instruction voting, rather 
than permiting deputies to vote in accordance with their 
conscience. Third, the directoral canton represents a 
cantonal rather than the national interest. Finally, they 
consider the central power insufficiently united and too slow 
in reaching decisions (1831,23). 
Fazy-Pasteur argues that their proposals to remedy these 
problems share five characteristics (1831,14-22) [15]. The 
first is the aim of replacing the directoral canton system by 
a president or a council comprising a Landamann and senators. 
The second is the intention of replacing the current Diet of 
equal cantonal representation by one where Swiss laws would 
de facto be made by the large cantons. Third, he argues that 
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this also amounts to substituting cantonal equality with the 
dominance of German-speaking over French-speaking Switzerland 
[18]. Fourth, he argues that by abolishing instruction voting 
in favour of free voting representatives, the proposals will 
all substitute cantonal sovereignty by the sovereignty of 
individuals. Finally, he contends that the effect of all this 
will be to change Switzerland more or less quickly to an 
aristocratic, if not despotic, system of government, and 
probably to move it towards the horrors of civil war. 
Though Fazy-Pasteur states that ftThe question is not 
whether these errors are more or less real, but if one can. 
given the state in which we find ourselves, change them for 
the better.- (1831,23, emphasis in the original), he proceeds 
(1831,23-7) to argue in turn against the each of reformers' 
above mentioned four implicit criticisms of the Pact. He 
concludes that the Federal Pact is not as bad as it is made 
out and that what is required is its gradual amendment, 
rather than its replacement. He raises a number of additional 
objections to the proposals advanced by those seeking 
complete reform of the federation. First, he argues that the 
cost of the proposed new systems would require a substantial 
increase in taxation and would thus adversely affect Swiss 
industry (1831,34). Second, he argues that paying members of 
the federal government would result in their being motivated 
by pecuniary considerations and (by implication) not by 
patriotism (1831,28f). Third, he feels that the external 
threat to Switzerland is currently too grave for the country 
to engage in such sweeping reform (1831,3 & 36). Fourth, he 
notes that -All the proposed changes are more or less based 
upon the United States ••• - (1831,34), but insists that the 
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latter is an inappropriate example. He ascribes its 
prosperity to it~ geographical position and its economic 
situation, rather than its constitution. Moreover, he points 
out that it still tolerates slavery, its presidential 
election fosters party interests above the general welfare of 
the fatherland and it is also rent by severe internal 
divisions (1831,34-6). Finally, he argues that the proposed 
reforms would not succeed in their aim of removing 
aristocratic government, but would instead 
bring about internal disharmony and jealousy and 
"make the-small cantons think that the others are 
trying to arrogate to themselves a supremacy over 
them; that they are trying to bring about such a 
concentration of power that would impudently grasp 
at Swiss liberty and kill off cantonal sovereignty. 
(1831,36f) 
Fazy-Pasteur's comments clearly amount to a defence of the 
existing confederation and of cantonal sovereignty. He 
concedes that confederations have disadvantages: 
They are perhaps somewhat slow in decision-making, 
having a less compact central authority than 
does a unitary system, and are not as diplomatic 
and secretive in their decision-making and as a 
consequence are not able to fool others as easily, 
though I doubt whether the Swiss regret the latter. 
(1831,23f) 
However, he insists that these disadvantages are outweighed 
by the advantages confederations offer. Among those he 
enumerates (1831,24) are that they permit the people to be 
ruled by native governments which correspond to their laws, 
customs and culture, that they are very economical, that they 
are better defenders of liberty and, finally, that they 
promote greater popular involvement in politics and enhance 
patriotism. It is clear from this last point that for 
Fazy-Pasteur, patriotism relates not only to commitment to an 
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overarching swiss nation, though he does support the 
. activities of those all-Swiss associations that enhance such 
federal patriotism (1831,43), but also to a commitment to the 
cantonal fatherland. 
There is little in the above account of Fazy-Pasteur's 
views on the proposed federal reforms that would be out of 
place-in a conservative critique. However, Fazy-Pasteur's 
motivation was not conservative. This is evident not only 
from the fact that he was (Rappard,1941,73) a liberal member 
of the Genevan parliament, but also from a closer examination 
of his text.- For example, he sums up his objections to the 
proposals as·fol1ows: 
these projects unite, in a more or less 
pronounced manner, the errors that others might 
call advantages; for I, who am without doubt for 
a republican-democratic Switzerland, because I, who 
believe that Switzerland is ••• ripe for republican 
institutions ••• and desire that every canton and 
every Swiss enjoy as much liberty as possible, I 
do not hestitate to call the direction in which 
these projects would lead us erroneous. (1831,19f) 
His argument against Switzerland' total reconstruction 
into an intrastate federation and in favour of the retention 
of an interstate federation is based upon two fundamental 
considerations, both of which are compatible with liberalism. 
The first is a commitment to constitutionalism and due legal 
process. Fazy-Pasteur points out that the existing Swiss 
constitution requires that all proposed constitutional 
changes be approved unanimously. Since unanimous support for 
the proposals he has described is very unlikely to be 
forthcoming, he concludes that the only way to proceed is by 
persuasion and persistence, rather than by coercion (1831, 
38). Earlier in his essay he writes that 
it is by enlightening and persuading that we 
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'must above all proceed and not by imposing our 
views on sovereign states, with whom we should 
never make any headway by this method; and whilst 
awaiting an unanimous agreement, it is by individual 
agreements that we must win the cantons over, one 
by one. This will form a past that is all the more 
solid for being based upon conviction. (1831,13). 
He therefore advocates a three part strategy (1831,38-41). 
First~ the provisions of the existing Pact must be more 
rigorously implemented. In particular, he mentions Article 
11, which stipulates,that there is to be free trade 
throughout the Confederation, though this has never been 
observed. Second, he proposes reforms that are not subject to 
unanimous cantonal support, such as in the area of enhancing 
the Confederation's military preparedness. Finally, he 
believes that there should be attempts at extending the scope 
of the federal authority (1831,41), but repeats that this can 
and should only be done by consent. 
The second fundamental consideration of a liberal nature 
motivating Fazy-Pasteur to argue against reform of the 
existing 'Swiss confederation in the direction of greater 
centralisation is his fear of concentration of power. His 
concern is based upon considerations both of principle and of 
practical politics. It is the former that he has in mind when 
he writes that 
Concentration of power should never be at the 
expense of liberty and the stifling of liberty 
and revolution are the only outcomes of the 
proposed centralisation. Such concentration of 
power would also undermine patriotism and ••• 
weaken the country. (1831,27) 
But Fazy-Pasteur is unenthusiastic about centralisation for 
practical reasons also. Thus he argues that while the 
existing Diet was unwise to have involved itself in the 
internal affairs of the cantons, and especially in their 
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recent revolutions, the situation would have been far worse 
had there been a more centralised, or despotic, government. 
He fears that the latter would have been likely to have put 
down cantonal change in favour of aristocratic government and 
thereby to have engendered a civil war (1831,34). In short, 
Fazy-Pasteur believes that a concentration of power could 
lead to majority despotism. 
Finally, Fazy-Pasteur's liberal credentials are evident 
from the kind of political and economic reforms which he says 
he would like to see implemented in the Swiss confederation. 
These are indicated in a general sense when he asserts his 
commitment to -a republican-democratic Switzerland and 
the maximum possible liberty for every canton and every 
Swiss· (1831,19f). The meaning of this is firmed up at the 
end of his essay (1831,41), when he specifies the ways in 
which he would like to see the Pact extended. Interestingly, 
they are substantially the same as the proposals for the 
reform of intercantonal relations which he opposed at the 
start of his essay (see above). His economic proposals 
include ending all internal tolls in Switzerland, central 
control of postage, a uniform monetary system and common 
weights and measures. He also advocates that all Swiss be 
free to take up residence, and to practise their profession 
and religion in any part of switzerland. Third, he envisages 
a supreme federal court to oversee not cantonal law, but 
the implementation of the Federal Pact and to adjudicate on 
charges of treason against the Confederation. Finally there 
should be provision, for times of extreme danger, of 
temporary executive federal power to be concentrated not in 
the hands of one person, but in the hands of a small number 
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of people. But as he says earlier, this . . . beneficial 
extension of the Pact would occur as the times and cantonal 
conviction and financial means permit."(1831,41). 
An examination of two of Fazy-Pasteur's later publications 
(1833 & 1841) shows that he remained loyal to the idea of a 
confederation for Switzerland, as well as to the liberal 
principles underlying that choice. The two relevant 
publications are his "Reflections· on the proposals of the 
Rossi Commission and his "Examination" of the draft constitu-
tion for Geneva published in 1847 by the Radicals who had 
taken over the canton following the successful revolution led 
by James Fazy in 1846. The full details of his comments are 
not relevant here. However, it is worth noting how the main 
thrust of his argument corresponds to the underlying liberal 
principles we have identified in his 1831 essay, namely, the 
support of liberal political and economic policies, the fear 
of concentration of power and the insistence upon due legal 
process and the rejection of coercion. 
His commitment to liberal political structures is amply 
illustrated in his "Reflections", which supports the 
provisions that require cantonal constitutions to have 
liberal representative, or direct democratic structures [171. 
Indeed, one of his two main objections to the Rossi proposals 
is that the regulations are not strict enough. He says they 
would permit foreign principalities such as the Prussian 
canton of Neuchatel to be members of the federation, which he 
considers a contravention of the spirit of the constitution. 
He therefore proposes additional prerequisites for a cantonal 
constitution to be accepted by - and hence for the canton to 
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be'admitted into - the federation. These are that cantonal 
executives be popularly nominated and that every Swiss canton 
be its own sovereign, i.e. not subject to a foreign ruler 
(1833,7-9)~ 
The Reflections also contain evidence of Fazy-Pasteur's 
commitment to liberal economic policies. He explicitly 
approves of the Commission's proposals for federal control of 
postage,'"for common coinage, weights and measures and a 
common currency, as well as the principle of free residence 
throughout Switzerland for all Swiss (1833,14f) [18]. In his 
response to the Genevan Radicals' draft cantonal constitution, 
Fazy-Pasteur's support"of liberal policies takes the form of 
oppostion to government intervention. This is articulated in 
his "opposition to state interference in private associations 
and private property (1847,37-52), as well as his rejection 
of what he claims (not fully justifiably) to be intolerance 
vis-a-vis Geneva's Protestant community (1847,48-56 & 63). 
The second liberal principle we have identified as 
underlying 'the moderate liberal federalism of Fazy-Pasteur is 
the fear of concentraion"of power. It underlies the vehement 
opposition of Fazy-Pasteur and other moderate liberals to the 
Radicals. Fazy-Pasteur's 1847 Examination of the Radicals' 
draft constitution for Geneva concludes that: 
under the guise of liberalism and glvlng all to 
the people, it is in reality the most despotic 
constitution that has ever existed in Geneva and 
that has surely ever existed in the whole of 
Switzerland, in that it concentrates all powers, 
without exception ••• (1847,57). 
As we have noted previously, concern about the 
concentration of power and the its potential for majority 
tyranny was an important factor motivating Fazy-Pasteur to 
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support a swiss interstate federation with cantonal 
sovereignty. The same consideration lies behind his second 
main objection to the Rossi Pact. FazY-Pasteur takes 
exception to part of the provisions concerning how federal 
intervention to enforce a guaranteed cantonal constitution 
can be initiated. Amongst other possible ways in which 
assistance can be initiated, the relevant article (19) states 
that where a cantonal government has been overthrown and is 
therefore unable to make a formal request to the Diet for 
assistance, the latter may intervene without being formally 
requested. He believes that this provision would give 
cantonal governments deposed because of their unpopularity a 
legal right to be restored by federal military assistance. 
Indeed, he claims that the consequence of this provision 
would be that the national political majority would " ••• 
legally be be ruler of the country and would be able to 
fashion it at its will and, sadly but legally, be able to 
maintain that position ••• " (1833,12). 
The third and final liberal principle determining 
Fazy-Pasteur's interstate federalism is his insistence upon 
constitutionalism and due legal process, rather than 
coercion. This is of course another reason why he is so 
opposed to the Radicals, whom he accuses of acting in total 
disregard for natural and legal rights (1847,47). The primacy 
of persuasion and consent over compulsion is also strongly 
asserted in his Reflections on the Rossi proposals. Thus he 
states categorically that the majority does not have the 
right to compel the minority, since ..••• that would be an 
oppressive and unjust act." (1833,19f). While he tries hard 
to persuade those cantons he thinks unlikely to want to 
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support the Rossi Pact to do so, he recognises that it will 
be necessary to accept the verdict of the sovereign cantons. 
We ardently desire that the cantons enter the 
new He1vetic Pact, we believe that the Pact does 
not contain anything that is contrary to their 
own institutions; but if they still refuse at 
present to take part in the new Switzerland, 
Switzerland would still be able to survive 
without [sic their} help. (1833,24f) 
In other words, Fazy-Pasteur takes the principles of cantonal 
sovereignty and non-compulsion so seriously that he is 
willing to-countenance the possibility of a new interstate 
federation without dissenting cantons initially being 
members. 
This section has demonstrated the considerable differences 
in the federalism of moderate Swiss liberals during the 
Restoration on the one hand and the Regeneration on the 
other. It has also demonstrated that some moderate liberals 
advocated intrastate-territorial federation, while others 
espoused interstate confederation. Moreover, this section has 
illustrated the way in which those prescriptions depended 
upon the relevant author's evaluation of the political 
situation and which type of federation was most likely to 
promote the desired political goals. 
As was noted in Chapter 3.3. above, Swiss liberal 
federalism had already become rather disingenuous by the end 
of the Napoleonic period. Once the Restoration set in, the 
conservative political climate and the pressures of 
censorship combined to restrict political debate even more 
severely. There was almost no public discussion of a new 
federal constitution, except in organisations such as the 
liberal-nationalist Helvetic Society. The sole liberal 
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criticism of federal matters published was that of Zschokke, 
which was limited to the Msafe" demand for greater 
centralisation to promote military security. During the 
Restoration, outspokenly liberal federalism was notable by 
its absence. 
At the start of the Regeneration, Swiss liberals were 
hopeful of a political breakthrough for liberalism and one 
finds a much more assertively "liberal" federalism such as 
that of Pfyffer and Roger. Both not only advocated a Swiss 
intrastate-territorial federation, but also justified their 
calls by reference both to military arguments, and to economic 
and political liberalism. Pfyffer even prescribed federal 
intervention in support of cantonal political rights. We then 
looked at the federalism of Cherbuliez, whose support for 
intrastate-territorial federalism was characterised by a less 
pronounced commitment to liberalism and by a degree of 
fatalism. He,argued that the remaining concessions to 
cantonal soverereignty were but temporary. 
Finally, this section examined the more hestitant liberal 
federalism of Fazy-Pasteur. Though more outspokenly in favour 
of economic social and political change than Zschokke had 
been in 1824, Fazy-Pasteur's federalism advocated interstate 
confederation with only very moderate and gradual liberal 
reforms and was distrustful of proposals for greater 
centralisation., He wished to see cantonal sovereignty 
retained in order to preserve the liberal cantons against 
conservative intervention. In many ways, Fazy-Pasteur's 
federalism denotes a return to the strategic considerations 
of earlier liberal federalism. On the other hand, it is also 
indicative of the-failure of the moderate liberals' 
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gradualism. In part, this is attributable to conservative 
intransigence. On the other hand, it both reflects and 
foreshadows the moderate liberals' loss of the political 
initiative to the Radicals. 
6.3.3. THE FEDERALISM OF RADICAL SWISS LIBERALS 
Federalism was used by a number of radical Swiss liberals 
to advance their political cause [20]. This section will 
illustrate that use by reference to the federalism of the two 
most prominent: the German-speaking radical, Ignaz Paul Vital 
Troxler and James Fazy, his French-speaking counterpart 
Troxler (1780-1866) was born in Luzern of a devout, but 
open-minded Catholic family [21]. As a young adult, he warmly 
welcomed the new revolutionary principles and was in 1798 
given a governmental post under Luzern's post-revolutionary 
regime. However, his concern at what he regarded as excessive 
French influence led in 1800 to his departure for Germany, 
where he studied medicine at Jena, Goettingen and Vienna. His 
original enthusiasm for the principles of the liberal 
enlightenment was developed in an idealist and metaphysical 
direction while at Jena, where he was greatly influenced by 
Schelling, whose favourite student h~ became [22]. Troxler 
finally returned to Luzern in 1809. Until 1830, he earned his 
living as a teacher and medical practitioner in Luzern and 
Aarau. From 1830 to 1831 he had a short and stormy spell as 
professor of philosophy and history at Basel [23]. In 1832, 
he was elected to Aarau's cantonal parliament, from which he 
resigned in 1834, to take up a chair of philosophy at Bern, 
where he worked until his retirement in 1853. 
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Troxler held public office twice and largely determined 
the shape of the constitution adopted by Luzern in 1831 after 
its regeneration. However, his greatest contribution to Swiss 
politics took the form of unofficial activity. He was widely 
regarded as the foremost of Swiss radicals and is notable 
above all for his role in nationalist associations such as 
the Helvetic Society, of which he was president in 1822/23, 
and for his polemical political writings, which appeared in 
various newspapers and in a host of political pamphlets [24]. 
Troxler described himself as a radical (e.g.1833a,10) and 
therefore attacked conservatives and moderate liberals alike. 
Throughout, he maintained his commitment to the principles of 
popular sovereignty and political equality [25] and though he 
did not himself engage directly in revolutionary activity, 
his polemics provided the inspiration for many young radicals 
who did [21]. Rappard (1941,96) concludes that Troxler 
exercised a considerable indirect influence upon the drafting 
of the 1848 federal constitution, though his radical 
reputation meant that this was not acknowledged in the 
official parliamentary debates. Prior to 1848, however, 
Troxler's ideas on the manner in which the Swiss federation 
should be reformed were adopted and popularised by a number 
of his admirers, including James Fazy, whose federalism will 
be examined shortly. 
In order to understand -Troxler's federalism, it is 
necessary to be aware of the broad thrust of his political 
philosophy. Like that of Stahl (see 5.2.3. above), it is in 
part derivative of Schelling's thinking, but also developed 
into a political philosophy in its own right. Underlying that 
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philosophy [27] are three propositions. The first is his 
belief that man is the product of God's creation. This 
results in Troxler's dismissal of Haller's patrimonial theory 
of the rule of the strongest (see 5.3.2. above) in favour of 
the principle of the moral and hence legal and political 
equality of man. Troxler's second proposition is the idealist 
notion that man's ultimate purpose in life is the assertion 
of his higher, ethical nature over his lower desires, that is 
to say, the pursuit of wisdom, freedom, justice and 
patriotism. The state's prime purpose is thus promoting the 
ethical spirit of man's higher nature. Since virtue is only 
possible in situations where one rules oneself, popular 
sovereignty is the logical corollary of Troxler's second 
proposition. 
His third proposition is that an important expression of 
man's nobler self is his innate sociability. This leads him 
to reject Rousseau and Kant's theories for overemphasising 
the individual. Instead, Troxler espouses an organic and 
collectivist theory. He argues that the state is to be seen 
not merely as the product of nature, nor exclusively of man's 
intellect, but as the embodiment of natural human 
sociability. Troxler sees the supreme manifestation of human 
sociability or fellowship to be nationalism and therefore 
contends that it is essential for theories of the state to 
proceed from the nation, since the state is not an 
association constructed for the promotion of individuals' 
material ends, but is the embodiment of the ethical spirit of 
the nation (eg 1822,56-8). As he puts it, "Nation and state 
are the original and direct manifestations of the development 
and sociability (Geselligkeit) of mankind in time and space. 
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This is the Divine order of life." (cited in Goetz,1915,44). 
Yet while Troxler places a heavy premium upon nationalism, 
he conceives of the nation not primarily in terms of a 
cultural entity and certainly not as a union for the purposes 
of territorial aggrandisement, but as an ethical fellowship. 
Since the state is about the promotion of the ethical spirit 
and nationalism is one of the highest expressions of man's 
ethical development, it follows for Troxler that the state 
has a duty to advance national unity. He attributes the 
leadership role in the fostering of this ethical or national 
spirit (-Volksgeist") to the German tribes (Goetz,1915,35) 
and, within the latter, to the middle classes (eg1822,11-16). 
Indeed, Troxler asserts that the most important distinction 
between states relates not to what he calls their "mechanical 
form" (1822,66), but to whether they place promotion of the 
ethical spirit above satisfaction of material desires. 
Nonetheless, Troxler does not sacrfice liberal constitu-
tionalism to nationalism in the manner of liberal-nationalists 
such as Fries (see 6.2.2 above). Unlike Stahl, Troxler insists 
that promotion of the ethical spirit is incompatible with 
rule by princes, corporations or individuals, but only with 
the nation ruling itself by means of a popularily elected 
government. Troxler thus argues for a republic with 
representative structures, separation of powers, freedoms of 
speech, the press, association and petition, as well as the 
right to resist oppressive governments [28J. He uses his 
notion 'of the state being a living organism to argue against 
the utopian visions of both Rousseau and Kant, since they are 
equally predicated upon the assumption of the possibility of 
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a static state. Troxler holds the organic nature of the state 
to imply that the state is in a constant process of change 
and thus, unlike conservative exponents of organicism such as 
Mueller (eg.1809), Troxler's organicism legitimates political 
radicalism. 
In short, Troxler's philosophical assumptions of the 
innate moral equality and sociability of man and his duty to 
promote ethical over material ends directly support his 
radical political demands for political equality, popular 
sovereignty and national unity. They also determine the 
language and substance of his federalism [29]. The two types 
of federation Troxler identifies (the "Staatenbund" and the 
MBundesstaat") are thus distinguished primarily by reference 
not to legal or institutional criteria, but to their 
political ideals. For he is interested not in determining the 
structural anatomy of federations, but in how a Swiss 
federation might be utilised for the promotion of the ideals 
of radical liberalism. To paraphrase him (1822,55): 
federation is in itself neither good nor bad. Its utility 
depends upon the'use made of it. 
What he advocates for Switzerland is a Bundesstaat, for 
which he uses the term "Eidgenossenschaft" interchangeably. 
When he 'asserts that the Swiss people 
desire neither Staatenbund, nor Bundesstaat, for 
even their lordships themselves do not know what 
this is, but above all Eidgenosssenschaft and no 
more and no less than Eidgenossenschaft (1833c,3), 
this should not be understood as discriminating between 
Eidgenosenschaft and Bundesstaat. On the contrary, as he 
demonstrates elsewhere (eg.1833a,10), it means that Troxler 
considers Eidgenossenschaft to be the political value which a 
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true Bundesstaat must promote. To explain this point, an 
understanding of which is crucial to an appreciation of the 
nature and function of the federation Troxler prescribes for 
his native country, it is necessary to explain the term 
Eidgenossenschaft. The latter is the German word traditionally 
used to denote the Swiss federation; literally translated, it 
means "Oath Fellowship". Troxler's repeated emphasis upon it 
is intended to indicate that the core of true federation lies 
in fellowship. In other words, it requires a recognition of 
the equality of man and the promotion of his higher, social 
nature. 
Troxler argues (eg.1833d,4-6) that the original Swiss 
federation of 1291 was just such an Eidgenossenschaft. It was 
a collectivity initiated and sustained by the principles of 
reason, communal freedom and virtue. Its members were not the 
governments of sovereign cantons, but free and equal peoples. 
It recognised the moral equality and innate fellowship or 
sociability of man. which was manifested in a common identity 
and found institutional expression in legal and political 
equality and popular sovereignty. 
The history of Switzerland after 1291 is interpreted by 
Troxler as a digression from this original, ethical federation 
and is attributed by him to two related developments. The 
first is Switzerland's territorial aggrandisement and its 
subjugation of the lands acquired in this process by the 
establishment of co-dominions (see 2.1. above). The second 
departure from the ideals of 1291 concerns the establishment 
within the cantons of oligarchic and aristocratic structures. 
The abandonment of political equality and popular sovereignty 
which these two developments entailed was elevated into law 
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in 1481 by a formal agreement [30] in which the cantons 
undertook mutually to guarantee their internal and external 
security. Given that the parties to this agreement were no 
longer the people, but cantonal governments and that the 
structures being guaranteed were based upon political 
inequality, Troxler considers (1822,47) that the federation 
thereby established was not a Bundesstaat. Instead, it was a 
staatenbund, a confederation between ruling elites, to the 
deliberate exclusion of popular rights and a collective Swiss 
identity. Popular life was extinguished and the history of 
the Swiss federation henceforth became the history merely of 
governments. 
Troxler blames the weakness of Switzerland in the period 
up to its invasion and defeat in 1798 upon this Staatenbund 
and its emphasis upon cantonal sovereignty, which he regards 
as synonymous with the institutionalisation of political 
inequality and oligarchic rule. While he feels that the 
Mediation constitution was the nearest to returning to the 
original principles of the Swiss Bundesstaat. it was 
seriously flawed by its lack of popular representation at the 
federal level. Troxler argues (eg.1833a,5f & 17f) that the 
Federal Pact of 1815 is but the latest incarnation of the 
Staatenbund into which the original Eidgenossenschaft 
degenerated. It was imposed upon the Swiss by violence, fraud 
and foreign influence. As the first ever Swiss constitution 
explicitly to proclaim the principle of cantonal sovereignty 
(1833d,4), the Pact has elevated the maintenance of political 
inequality to a constitutional principle (1833a,21 & 1833b. 
9f). This explains for Troxler why the Federal Pact and its 
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guarantee of cantonal sovereignty is defended most avidly 
wherever the privileged have taken over government (1833d,5). 
Troxler's interpretation of the history of Switzerland as 
a perversion of the original principles of political equality 
and popular sovereignty allows him to assert (eg1833c,8) that 
the liberal revolutions of the 1830s are in reality the 
purest forms of restoration, while what the conservatives 
deem restoration is but an attempt to maintain a perverted 
form of federation that deprives the Swiss of political 
rights and national unity. He rejects the reform proposals of 
the Rossi Commission [31] as serving the same purpose. 
His criticisms of them amount to the repeated emphasis, in 
often very emotive language, of five basic points [32]. 
First, Troxler rejects as a "cardinal sin" the Rossi Pact's 
retention of the principle of cantonal sovereignty (eg1833b, 
3f). In its place, he wishes to see the principle of an 
independent sovereign nation (eg.ibid,13). Second, he opposes 
the proposal to restrict the representative structures at the 
federal level to the equal representation of the grossly 
unequally populated cantons, which he considers to amount to 
the entrenchment of political inequality. His preference is 
for the size of cantons' representation to be more in 
accordance with the respective size of their populations and 
for there to be a new body based upon popular representation 
(eg.1833a,13f & 21). Third, Troxler maintains that the Rossi 
Pact's proposed federal guarantee of cantonal constitutions 
is not sufficiently rigorous regarding the political rights 
which cantons have to provide [33). What Troxler wishes to 
see (eg.1833b,7f & 14) is legal and political equality and 
popular sovereignty applied unconditionally and universally 
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throughout the federation. Fourth, he argues that the Federal 
Tribunal envisaged by the Rossi Commission "is but a 
committee for the welfare of federal and cantonal governments 
at the cost of the nation as a whole and of Swiss citizens in 
particular " (1833b,11f). In its place, he wishes to see 
individual citizens have the right of appeal to the Tribunal 
against infringements of their rights by federal or cantonal 
authorities. Finally, Troxler contends that the Rossi Pact is 
deficient by virtue of the fact that the centralisation it 
proposes is limited to military and economic affairs and 
neglects to centralise the most important aspects, namely. 
(1833b,8 & 14) those that will enhance the higher, spiritual 
strength of the nation. In particular, he suggests a national 
education system, press freedom and a common Swiss 
citizenship. 
Troxler argues that the federation proposed by Rossi 
would formally still be. a Staatenbund, which requires its 
constituent states to be sovereign. However, it would in fact 
permit much greater central interference in internal cantonal 
affairs than is compatible with the latter's sovereignty. 
Moreover, this confederation would also fail to promote 
political.~qua1ity, popular sovereignty and the national 
spirit. He therefore concludes that it would amount to a 
"bastard- type of federation (1833c,5) that would if anything 
be even worse than the "federal betrayal" (1833a,7) of 1815, 
in that. it would betray both popular and cantonal 
sovereignty. Troxler considers the source of all these sins 
to derive from the manner in which the reform process is 
being conducted (eg. 1833a,3-6 & 12), describing the 
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delegation of federal reform to the Diet, rather than to a 
popular constituent assembly, as an example of transforming 
poachers into gamekeepers (1833b,13). The main aim of those 
gamekeepers is to use such a centralised confederation to 
deprive the Swiss of the fruits of their liberal cantonal 
revolutions (eg.1833a,15-17 & 1833c,8) by means of what 
amounts to a strengthening of local tyranny and the 
institutionalisation of a federal oligarchy (1833d,7f). Such 
a confederation would be an even greater threat than the 1815 
Pact to progress, the development of cosmopolitanism and all 
that is noble in the human spirit (1833d,7f & 1833c,12). It 
would constitute high treason against the Swiss people 
(1833a,8 & 10). 
In short, Troxler refuses to see any liberal advances in 
the Rossi Pact. He describes it as the product of a shameful 
alliance between conservatives and those liberals willing to 
betray liberty and the Swiss people by accepting reform on a 
basis other than that of political equality and popular 
sovereignty (1833b,7f;1833a;1833b;1833d,12f & 1840,3). In 
defence of.this contention, Troxler (1833c,11-13) employs 
Kuhn's terminology (see 3.2. above), arguing that the Rossi 
commission constitutes an attempt to reconcile, by means of 
"Judas kisses", the aristocrats' "federalism of privilege" 
with the moderate liberals' "federalism of demagogy" (1833c, 
11') • 
Stung into action by accusations that he was a critic 
incapable of constructive proposals (1833c,46). Troxler 
published a draft Swiss federal constitution in March 1833 
(Troxler,1833c) [34]. The first of its 59 articles stipulates 
that Switzerland is to be a "Bundesstaat N , founded upon 
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popular sovereignty. and endowed with a representative 
constitution. The principle behind the federal representation 
is spelt out in Article 34, which states that 
The only sovereign in the federation is the 
nation, but in accordance with the nature of 
a Bundesstaat, it has a twofold representation. 
The original and general is •.• the population, 
and the derivative and particular are the cantons 
of the federation. 
In other words, Troxler proposes bicameralism. In the popular 
chamber, there will be one representative for every 25,000 
souls, with no minimal representation for each canton (Art. 
39). The representatives will be directly or indirectly 
elected by the population and will vote in accordance with 
their conscience (Art.3S). This popular chamber will be 
labelled the -Great Federal Council" or "First Federal 
Council" and will have the sole right to initiate federal 
legislation. The scrutinisation and decision upon those bills 
is to be reserved to the "Senate" or "Small Federal Council", 
in which each canton will have one representative, elected 
either by popular vote, or by the cantonal parliament and who 
will vote without cantonal instructions (Arts.36,37 & 43). 
Majority votes will be binding in both chambers (Art.48). 
United as the Diet, the two chambers will elect the 
federation's executive and judicial bodies (Art.44). The 
former is the "Executive Council", which consists of a 
"Bundesamman" and two State Secretaries. Together, they will 
be responsible for the execution of the decisions of the 
federal legislature, as well as for the supervision of 
federal administration (Arts.44,49 & 54). The federation's 
Supreme court will contain a President, six judges, four 
alternates and a public prosecutor. The Court will hear cases 
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of impeachment of federal officials and appeals against 
criminal convictions. It will be permitted for citizens to 
appeal to it not only in civil disputes, but also in defence 
of rights infringed by cantonal authorities (Arts.50 & 51). 
Though Troxler's federalism continually stresses the value 
of the American model, his draft constitution is based 
primarily upon'the various draft federal constitutions of the 
Helvetic period [35]. For example, the limitation of the 
powers of the popular chamber to the initiation of legislation 
and the exclusive right of its scrutiny and approval being 
accorded to the Senate is taken not from United States 
practice, but from that of the First Helvetic constitution 
(Goetz,1915,175f). Similarly, Troxler's Bundesamman bears 
little resemblance to the United States' President. One can 
speculate that the fact that the Helvetic consitutions were 
association in the Swiss mind with invasion and defeat 
inclined Troxler not to advocate their emulation openly and 
to opt instead for an emphasis upon the value of the United 
states model. He argues (eg.1848,9) that the seed of the 
federal republicanism enshrined in the American constitution 
was originally sown in Switzerland. In proposing the American 
model for Switzerland, he is thus not advocating the 
application of anything foreign. On the contrary, he is 
arguing for the return to switzerland of something original 
and autochthonous to it. 
In any event, Troxler's draft constitution remains vague, 
or even completely silent, on how many important issues would 
be regulated in his proposed federation. For example, he 
leaves open the mode of election and term of office of the 
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members of the Executive Council and Supreme Court. He also 
fails to address two of the most controversial aspects of all 
federal constitutions, namely, the division of legislative 
and of administrative competences between the federal and 
cantonal authorities. 
Troxler's federalism (both in his draft constitution and 
elsewhere) is also remarkably silent on military matters. To 
be sure, there is the customary reference in his draft 
constitution (Art.5) to defence as one of the formal purposes 
of the federation and some mention of the war power (Art.6) 
and of security (Art.33), but it is obvious that military 
matters are of secondary importance to Troxler. The reference 
to them in the draft is little more than token. Though they 
figure more prominently, economic affairs are also not his 
prime concern. There are provisions relating, for example, to 
freedoms of trade and profession, the harmonisation of 
coinage and weights and measures (Arts.19 & 21), and even the 
radical proposal for a system of progressive taxation on 
wealth (Art. 24). Yet Troxler's does not deem it necessary to 
stipulate in his draft constitution critical economic issues 
such as the respective roles of the federal and cantonal 
authorites in the raising and utilisation of revenues. 
There is no escaping the conclusion that the main 
motivation of Troxler's draft federal constitution is not 
military or economic, but is identical to that of the 
federalism contained in his various publications, namely, 
political idealism. Accordingly, the contours of Troxler's 
proposed federation are defined less in terms of constitu-
tional structures, than by reference to the political ideals 
the federation is to promote, namely, legal and political 
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equality, popular sovereignty and an ethical national spirit. 
All three figure frequently and prominently in his draft 
constitution. The emphasis upon promotion of nationalism is 
of course in keeping with Troxler's longstanding commitments 
and his idealist philosophy (see above). Eleven years earlier 
(1822,53f), he argued that national strength is the sole 
source of life and needs to be reawakened, since salvation 
for Switzerland is to be found not in statutes,or structures, 
but in patriotism. This explains his annoyance (1833c,12 & 
28) at Rossi's dismissal of Swiss nationalism as mere poetry. 
Article 16 of Troxler's draft constitution responds by 
asserting that: 
The highest concern of the supreme authorities 
is to be national education and the most sacred 
duty the founding of a central point for national 
education through the centralisation of higher 
public education. 
However, Troxler's nationalism is most definitely not at 
the expense of political liberalism. His draft constitution 
repeatedly emphasises that the principle of popular 
sovereignty is to apply throughout the federation (eg.Arts.8, 
9,27,31,34,38 & 55) [38]. There are also frequent statements 
of the principle of legal and political equality (eg.Arts.7, 
8,17,19,31 & 40). The wide range of political liberties to be 
enjoyed universally include freedom of the press, of 
assembly. of association and of petition. There is to be 
freedom to carry arms, freedom from arbitrary arrest. 
inviolability of the home, due legal process, freedom of 
profession and of residence. Unlike the Rossi Pact and the 
proposals of most other liberals, Troxler's federalism not 
only contains a commitment to religious toleration (Art.14), 
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but also stresses the importance of the Christian religion 
(Art. 13f) and proposes a state guarantee of church property, 
wherever the latter is used for ecclesiastical or educative 
purposes, or for the relief of poverty (Art.28). 
To summarise, Troxler conceives of two types of 
federation. He uses the term Staatenbund to describe the 
first of these, the constituent units of which are sovereign 
states. In terms of its structures and formal purposes, 
Troxler's Staatenbund corresponds to the traditional notion 
of a confederation. For Troxler, the most important structural 
feature of a Staatenbund is its limitation to a union between 
governments, to the exclusion of the people. However, 
Troxler's classification of federations is based less upon 
their structural features, than upon the political ideals 
which he sees as underpining them. Accordingly, the 
underlying principle which he deduces from this structural 
characteristic is that the Staatenbund is contrary to the 
principles of legal and political equality, popular 
sovereignty and the promotion of man's higher, social spirit. 
The second federation Troxler identifies is the 
Bundesstaat. Unlike the Staatenbund, its constitutent units 
are not sovereign states. Moreover, Troxler explicitly 
(1833c,20) rejects the notion that a Bundesstaat contains a 
double sovereignty, shared between the centre and the 
cantons, as well as the idea that central sovereignty is 
derivative of the cantons. Troxler's Bundesstaat is therefore 
not an intrastate-territorial federation akin, for example, 
to those of Hugo or Puetter (see 2.2 and 32. above). It is a 
federation in which sovereignty is not shared between the 
centre and constituent states, but, as he frequently 
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states (eg1833a,10), is located in the people, whom he 
considers to be the true constituent elements of the 
federation. Moreover, this is for Troxler merely an external 
manifestation of what really distinguishes a Bundesstaat from 
a Staatenbund, namely, that its purpose is the promotion of 
the development of the higher nature of social man. In other 
words, the type of federation which Troxler prescribes for 
switzerland is defined more in terms of political ideals than 
of constitutional structures. In view of its purpose and the 
location within it of sovereignty, Troxler's Bundesstaat 
constitutes another example of the type of federation 
proposed by struve, which we have classified (see 6.2.2. 
above) as intrastate-popular. 
The second and final exponent of radical Swiss liberal 
federalism to be considered in this section is James Fazy, 
who was born in Geneva in 1794 of a wealthy Genevan family 
that used to provide members of the city's ruling "Council of 
Representatives". Like Fries (see 6.2.2. above), Fazy was 
educated by a Bohemian Protestant sect, which perhaps helps 
account for his strong opposition to Catholicism. Though he 
studied for a while in Germany, Fazy spent much of the 
Restoration period in Paris, where apart from getting into 
considerable debt as a result of share speculation, he got to 
know many' revolutionaries and through La Fayette (Rappard, 
1941,104f), acquired his interest in the American federation, 
the emulation of the bicameralism of which was to constitute 
one of his major contributions to the Swiss debate on 
federation. In 1830, Fazy's republican sympathies resulted in 
a short spell in prison, after which he returned to Geneva, 
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where he continued to use his journalistic skills to mobilise 
for radical political change. 
popular opposition to the liberalising conservative 
Genevan government led to the introduction in 1842 of a more 
liberal constitution. Though Fazy had participated in its 
drafting, he remained dissatisfied with the new system and in 
1846 eventually managed to channel working-class, petit-
bourgeois and Catholic [31] protest into the successful 
-Fazy Revolution-. As Fazy was the prime mover in the 1846 
Genevan constitution that resulted, it is worth mentioning 
some of its main innovations, which are indicative of the 
radical liberal goals behind Fazy's federalism. They included 
the abolition of the political and economic privileges of the 
aristocracy; the separation of church and state; considerable 
easing of the regulations for the acquisition of Genevan 
citizenship (in particular, Fazy's constitution allowed all 
resident Swiss and all resident foreigners born in Geneva to 
exercise full political rights); universal male suffrage and 
the direct popular election not only of the Genevan 
parliament, but also of its government. The extent to which 
these measures exceeded those desired by moderate liberals is 
evident from the strength of the latter's opposition to them 
(e.g. Fazy-Pasteur,1847). 
Fazy thus qualifies as a radical liberal by virtue both of 
his leadership of the Genevan revolution and his consistent 
application of the principles of popular sovereignty and 
political equality to the political realm and beyond (e.g. 
the secularisation of Geneva and the abolition of institutio-
nalised economic privileges of the aristiocracy) [38]. The 
following exposition of Fazy's views on the reform of the 
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swiss federation derives from an undated pamphlet (Fazy,n.d.), 
probably written between 1831 and 1837 [39]. Its content may 
be divided into three broad aspects. The first concerns his 
interpretation of the origins and nature of the existing 
Swiss federation. The second relates to his proposals for 
federal reform and the third constitutes the advantages he 
alleges will accrue to Switzerland if it adopts his 
suggestions. The following account will deal with each of 
these three aspects in turn. That having been done, there 
will be a summary of Fazy's federalism and an assessment of 
the major differences between it and that of Troxler. 
like Troxler, Fazy (n.d.,1Sf) idealises the ancient Swiss 
federation, arguing that it originated as an alliance between 
individuals for the purpose of the defence of individual 
liberty against domestic oppression. However, as the cantons 
developed into states and then engaged in colonisation, these 
initial individualist and liberal purposes became perverted. 
The federation was transformed into a purely interstate 
alliance that now imposed on others servitude akin to that 
against which the founders of the Swiss federation had 
originally united. 
Fazy's criticisms of the Swiss federation established by 
the 1815 Pact can be summarised under four headings. First, 
he contends (n.d.,1f,8,10 & 27) that the federation lacks 
external independence. Though it might appear he is making a 
military point, closer examination shows his underlying 
concern to be of a political nature. Thus the European 
conflict he feels certain will shortly break out, and for 
which Switzerland must prepare itself, will be between the 
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forces of reaction and progress (n.d.,2). Moreover, the 
foreign dependency to which he objects is that upon the 
conservative Holy Alliance (n.d.,1 & 27), which breached 
Swiss neutrality in 1815 and then intervened in its domestic 
affairs, not least through the Carlsbad Decrees. The latter 
impelled the Diet to violate cantonal rights by interfering 
to, for example, muzzle the press and abolish rights of 
asylum. For their part, cantonal governments have with 
impunity violated popular political rights guaranteed by the 
Pact (n.d.,27).Second, Fazy points to the economic 
shortcomings of the present federation (n.d.,a & 27f). These 
relate both to the problems caused for the domestic Swiss 
economy by the lack of sufficient economic harmonisation and 
a single internal market, as well as to the adverse impact 
of this upon Switzerlands's capacity to compete effectively 
internationally. 
Fazy's third and most important objection to the existing 
federation relates to its political inadequacies (n.d.,eg.1f 
& 27f). He believes the Pact to be contrary to progress, the 
principles of human dignity, political equality and popular 
sovereignty. He therefore dismisses it as but a continuation 
of the perverted federation into which the original liberal 
alliance degenerated, since it has established cantonal 
self-interest over the interests of the whole of Switzerland 
(n.d.,3 & 28) and constitutes nothing more than "a kind of 
mutual assurance between reactionaries" (n.d.,19). Fourth, 
Fazy argues that all these faults are reflected in and 
exacerbated by the federation's central political structures 
(n.d.,1,3-5,20,24,26 & 38). He complains about the absence of 
a permanent federal governemnt (n.d.,26), but is especially 
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critical about the Diet, which he claims (n.d.,3) to be too 
slow and too restricted in its scope. He attacks (n.d.,26) 
the principles of equal representation of unequal units and 
the system of imperative mandates, which he says results in 
the promotion of cantonal egotism, and "puerile opposition 
based upon obstinacy and ignorance" (n.d.,4). In short, it 
leads to "votes by state and not by brain" (n.d.,26). 
Fazy concludes from all this that contemporary Switzerland 
is not a true federation, but simply an alliance 
without real external strength, and which, as 
all alliances between states in which the people 
do not have a voice, too often results only in 
the founding of mutual assurance between all 
local injustices against the particular and 
general interests of the citizens. (n.d.,28). 
Accordingly, the main theme of the Fazy's federalism can be 
described as the provision for the Swiss federation of that 
absent popular voice. 
This is clear in the first article of his draft federal 
constitution, which reads: "The twenty two cantons that 
compose Switzerland and the citizens that live in it form a 
confederation ••.• (n.d.,10, emphasis added). The structures 
of the proposed federation are modelled upon those of the 
united States. Thus Fazy envisages bicameralism, with coequal 
·Senate" and "House of Representatives". In the former, the 
cantons are each to have two representatives, nominated by 
cantonal legislatures, and in principle bound to cantonal 
instructions. Meanwhile, the latter chamber is to represent 
. 
the Swiss people, with each canton having at least one 
repre~entative and additional representation based upon the 
size of its population. Voting is to be in accordance with 
the conscience of individual representatives, though it is 
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not clear whether their popular election is to be mediated 
through cantonal electoral colleges (n.d.,13f,Arts.13 & 14). 
The right of initiation of legislation is held by individual 
cantons, both Chambers, as well as by the Swiss chief 
executive: the landamann. Finally, the federation is to have 
a "Federal Tribuna1 N charged with maintaining cantonal and 
federal constitutional laws, and to which appeals can be 
directed not only from federal authorities, cantonal 
governments and constituted bodies, but also from private 
citizens (n.d.,16f). There are a number of differences between 
Fazy's proposals and the American federal constitution, not 
least of which is the fact that the Swiss landamann is to be 
elected by the Chamber of Representatives and that he, the 
three Federal Ministers he nominates, the senators and the 
Representatives are to be elected annually (n.d.,12-15). 
The formal purposes of the federation are outlined in 
Article 1 as follows: 
mutual protection against arbitrariness, 
maintaining the rights of all, the independence 
of the country, territorial integrity, sustaining 
the dignity of the cantons and of the federal 
union, making the cantonal and federal 
institutions respected against all attacks. 
(n.d.,10). 
However, it is clear from other provisions of the constitution 
[40) and from Fazy's commentary upon it (41) that the main 
motivation behind Fazy's proposals relates to radical 
political liberalism. Thus Article 2 provides for the 
separation of powers and guarantees private property, popular 
sovereignty, political equality and freedoms of speech, of 
the press, of religion and movement (n.d.,11). Fazy's 
thinking is clearly visible in the following statement: 
It can be seen from the outset that the 
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principle of the federation that we propose 
for Switzerland has as its aim an alliance 
between citizens, as much as between cantons. (n.d.,18) 
He goes on to maintain that only federations that provide for 
the representation of both their constituent states and their 
constitutent peoples are "the real expression of a true sense 
of all confederations" (ibid). Moreover, he is particularly 
enamoured of this idea of double representation not only 
because it corresponds to what he considers to have been the 
original principle of the Swiss alliance (n.d.,19), but 
because it 
is also a social advance, in that it offers to 
institutions and to individual rights a guarantee 
outside the cantonal unit. (n.d.,18) 
To summarise, Fazy's federalism is motivated not by a 
desire to develop an academic theory of federation, but to 
prescribe solutions for the specific case of the Swiss 
federation. Accordingly, he does not seek to distinguish 
conceptually between interstate and intrastate federations. 
Though what he proposes amounts to the latter type, he uses 
the terms federation and confederation interchangeably. His 
prime concern is that throughout the Swiss federation, the 
principles of popular sovereignty and political equality 
apply. His main objection to the existing swiss federation is 
directed at the fact that it does not facilitate those 
principles. This is caused both by its vulnerability to 
foreign, ,reactionary pressures, as mediated through the 
federal authority and to the lack of structures to defend 
popular cantonal rights against illiberal cantonal 
governments. The federation he proposes thus establishes a 
strong federal authority able to isolate Switzerland from the 
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external pressures of the Holy Alliance, as well as a federal 
constitution that guarantees popular sovereigny and liberal 
political rights at both the federal and cantonal levels. 
This section has examined the federalism two radical Swiss 
liberals. As has been shown, there are a number of respects 
in which those federal isms differ. First, while the idealist 
language and motivation of Troxler's federalism means that 
the structures of his proposed federation are often rather 
vague, Fazy's federalism is much more specific. Second, 
Troxler is more concerned than Fazy with promoting Swiss 
nationalism. Moreover, when Fazy does mention nationalism, he 
conceives of it more as a collectivity of individuals united 
by a common citizenship, rather than as an ethical bond. (As 
a 
he is member of a minority Swiss linguistic community, it is 
A 
perhaps not'surprising that Fazy does not posit Swiss 
nationalism as a cultural community.) Overall, Fazy's 
federalism is much more individualist than that of Troxler. 
Third, Fazy is, on the other hand, more interested in 
economic matters than Troxler and prescribes various measures 
to promote economic liberalism. Fourth, there are a number 
of differences in the federal political structures proposed 
by Troxler and Fazy. For example, though they both advocate 
bicameralism, they differ considerably as to the· division 
of powers between the two chambers [42]. Fifth, while both 
are for religious tolerance, they disagree about the 
relationship that should exist between church and state. 
Troxler elevates the defence of both the Christian religion 
and of church property to a constitutional principle, while 
Fazy is for a thoroughgoing secularisation of the state [43]. 
Notwithstanding these differences, the above,discussion of 
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Fazy and Troxler has shown that federalism was used by 
radical swiss,liberals.as a political ideology. Both Fazy and 
Troxler saw themselves as opposing the federalism not only 
of Swiss conservatives, but also of moderate Swiss liberals. 
The prime aim of the federalism of Troxler and Fazy was the 
realisation of the goals of radical political liberalism~ 
legal and political equality and popular sovereignty • 
. ' 
6.4. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
. . 
Since each subsection of this chapter concluded with an 
ov~rview of the material covered, the following summary of 
this chapter can be quite brief. It will address three 
aspects covered in this chapter. The first is the development 
of the debate within liberal Germanic federalism on how to 
distinguish between different types of federation. The 
second concerns the dimensions of federalism used by liberal 
Germanic federalism. The third relates to the reasons why 
German and'Swiss liberals differed in the federations they 
prescribed. Thereafter, this section will conclude by 
highlighting the significance of some of the findings of this 
Chapter for the thesis. 
In many respects, the arguments used by liberal Germanic 
federalism'in the 1815 to 1850 period to characterise the 
various types of federation it identified were similar to 
those utilised' previously (see Chapters 2,3 & 5 above). Thus 
the criteria considered relevant to distinguishing between 
interstate-confederal and intrastate-territorial federations 
included their formal purpose; the nature of their 
constituent units and central authority; the scope of the 
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latter's powers (in particular whether it was entitled to 
intervene in the, internal affairs of the federation's 
constituent states); and whether the citizens of the several 
states were members of" had any rights of representation in, 
or duties of compliance with, the will of the central 
authorities. of the respective federations. 
There were also some interesting innovations in this 
debate, however. First, liberals' reflections upon intrastate 
federation led to a new twist in the old debate (see Chapter 
2) on the (in)divisibiltity of sovereignty. Gagern and 
Welcker, for example, articulated the view that while the 
constituent states of intrastate-territorial federations were 
not fully sovereign, they were nonetheless partially 
sovereign, inasmuch as certain sovereign rights (Hoheitsrechte) 
were strictly reserved for them. The significance of this is 
that it constitutes an early development of the theory of the 
separartion of powers. Moreover, its articulation by Gagern 
and Welcker preceded the publication of de Tocequville's 
famous Democracy in America, thus demonstrating that the 
latter's ideas were not merely repeated by, but had 
precedents in, the Germanic tradition of federalism [44]. 
Second, previous German federalism had been predicated 
upon the monarchical principle. Combined with the adherence 
by some to the principle that all states - federal or 
otherwise - required a human being at their head, this 
amounted to one of the most intractable problems for German 
federalism, since Austro-Prussian rivalry meant that there 
was no likelihood of a peaceful resolution to the issue of 
who would occupy this position. However, German liberal 
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federalism had by 1850 taken on board the possibility of a 
republican federal state. This development is not 
necessarily to be attributed to the influence of the United 
States, for German liberals (eg. We1cker and Zachariae) 
were also greatly influenced by Swiss practice. 
A third innovation which liberal federalists brought to 
the Germanic tradition of federalism concerns the issue of 
the relationship within an intrastate-territorial federation 
between the citizens of its constituent states and the 
centre. The traditional perception had been that a federation 
was a union solely between the governments of the states, 
while individual citizens had no relationship to the 
decisions of the federation unless and until these were 
enacted by the parialaments of their individual states. In 
the first half of the nineteenth century, Germanic federalism 
changed to include the view that the central authority of an 
intrastate federation did act directly on the citizens, who 
were now deemed to have a double citizenship. This aspect 
was of course inextricably linked with a fourth innovation, 
namely, the gradual acceptance of majority voting by the 
central legislature and an intrastate federation's 
legitimate right to intervene in the internal affairs of its 
constituent states. That is not to say that the latter was 
universally accepted, nor that it amounted to an unrestricted 
entitlement. As just mentioned, the notion of co-ordinate 
and independent exercise of sovereign rights by both the 
centre and the constituent units was increasingly the norm, 
especially after Waitz's contribution (1853 & 1862). 
Lastly, during 1815 to 1850, Germanic federalism witnessed 
important changes in respect of the proposed organisation of 
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intrastate federations. Of these, the most important was 
perhaps the view that such federations ought to be composed 
of two chambers, one representing the constituent states and 
the other representing the population of the federation. This 
idea of bicamerlaism of course made intrastate federation 
not only considerably more acceptable to German and Swiss 
conservatives (see Chapter 5), but also to German liberals, 
since the possibility of bicameralism permitted the much 
sought after extension of the franchise, while compromising 
with the extant monarchical/aristocratic principle. It also 
resulted in the development of a new dimension of Germanic 
federalism. 
In Chapter 4, it was stated that one aim of Part 3 of 
this thesis was to establish which of the dimensions of 
Germanic federalism identified in Part 2 were articulated 
during 1815 to 1850 and whether any new dimensions appeared. 
The first point to be made is that during 1815 to 1850, 
liberal Germanic federalism included references to three of 
the dimensions of Germanic federalism already identified in 
this thesis. The first is interstate-chiliastic federalism, 
which remained the ideal for a number of liberal federalists, 
including Fries and 8ehr. However, as practical and 
philosophical considerations moved from the issue of 
absolutism - where sovereignty was seen mainly in terms of 
external defence and internal order - to concern with the 
-rights of man" and the internal, constitutional and 
socia-economic development of the state, so federalism came 
to concentrate predominantly upon intrastate federation. 
Almost all liberal Germanic federalists refered to those 
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dimensions of Germanic federalism which this thesis has 
characterised as intrastate-territorial and interstate-
confederal. 
This chapter has also shown that in addition to these 
three dimensions, there emerged among radical liberals in 
both Germany and Switzerland a new dimension ~f Germanic 
federalism, which posits an intrastate federation different 
from the two intrastate varieties encountered previously. It 
is different from the intrastate-corporate federalism of 
A1thusius. in that the purpose of the federation is not true 
worship and the entrenchment of the corporate rights of its 
constituent units. It is also different from the intrastate-
territorial federation identified with. for example, Hugo and 
Puetter, since it is not composed of sovereign states and nor 
is sovereignty divided between (the governments of) its 
constituent units and the centre. Instead, the exponents of 
what has in this chapter been termed "intrastate-popular" 
federalism expressly state that in the federation they 
prescribe for their coun~ries, sovereignty is located in the 
people. One of those authors (Troxler) considers the 
constituent units to be the people, while others (Struve and 
Fazy) argue that the constituent units are both the people 
and the sub-state territorial divisions. All three agree that 
the main purpose of this intrastate-popular federation is the 
promotion of legal and political equality and of popular 
sovereignty. 
This leads us to the third subject of these concluding 
remarks, namely, the motivation behind the federal isms 
examined. It will be recalled that this thesis set out to 
demonstrate the ideological nature of federalism and to test 
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the validity of the Riker hypothesis regarding the primacy 
of military factors for the desire to establish 
federations. There are examples of federalism considered 
above, in which Riker's "expansion condition" (1964 & 1975) 
does apply. A relevant case is that of Fries. However,this 
chapter has demonstrated beyond any doubt first, that 
military considerations were frequently not articulated and 
second, that even where they were expressed, they were often 
not the prime motivation of the relevant federalism. They 
were frequently used (ego Zschokke) merely to rationalise 
what were primarily political concerns. In short, this 
chapter has proven that federalism was used as liberal 
political ideology and that the prime motivation for the 
various federal prescriptions of liberal Germanic federalism 
were political, rather than military. 
The language used by liberal Germanic federalism varied. 
Some articulated their federalism in academic language (e.g. 
We1cker & Behr), while others resorted to polemics (eg. 
Gagern & Troxler). Moreover, there were also differences 
between those who utilised idealist terminology (eg. Fries & 
Troxler), and those who were more pragmatic (eg. Fazy-Pasteur 
& Welcker). Finally, there were considerable differences in 
the extent,to which the exponents of liberal Germanic 
federalism examined above were comitted to nationalism. In 
general, the greater the author's commitment to nationalism, 
the greater the likelihood that he would advocate intrastate 
federation rather than confederation. Significantly, while 
nationalism resulted in a reduced emphasis by some such as 
Fries upon liberal constitutionalism, there were others 
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such as Troxler for whom the two goals did not become 
mutually exclusive and who still retained cosMopolitan ideas. 
Moreover, there were some liberals (eg. Cherbuliez) who 
thought of nationalism not at the level of the state, but at 
the level of the constituent units of the federation. 
The preceding sections of this chapter have also shown 
that the type. of federation proposed by German and Swiss 
liberals was significantly infleunced by considerations of 
political tactics. In particular, those proposing 
confederation did so primarily out of a desire to avoid 
central conservative interference which might undermine local 
liberal advances. Examples include moderate liberals such as 
Fazy-Pasteur, as well as radical liberals such as Behr. 
Others equally concerned by the threat to liberal structures 
by conservative interference in the internal affairs of the 
constituent units of the federation concluded that the best 
strategy was to guarantee those structures through the 
establishment of a strong federation, governed by liberal 
principles. This view was held by both moderate and radical 
liberals. Examples are Gagern and Pfyffer, and Struve and 
Fazy respectively. 
The difference in the types of federation advocated was 
thus not a consequence of differences in political ends. 
Instead, it resulted from differences in the objective or 
subjective situation of the relevant federalist. In other 
words, the federalism advanced was contingent upon perceptions 
of what type of federation was most likely to facilitate 
the liberal ends sought. For example, though Behr, Struve and 
Fazy largely agree in their radical liberal goals, Behr 
advocates a confederation, the constituent states of which 
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would be completely independent in their internal affairs, 
while Fazy and Struve prescribe an intrastate federation, the 
political structures of the constituent units OT which are to 
be prescribed by the federal constitution and enforced by the 
federation's central authority. These different prescriptions 
can be understood only as a consequence differences in the 
objective or subjective political context in which the men 
were writing. From the perspective of relatively liberal 
1820 Bavaria, Behr regarded the conservative forces 
determining the central authority OT the German Bund as a 
hostile threat to liberals and thus advocated a Tederation 
that would help isolate Bavaria from their inTluence. Fazy's 
federalism was written in the relatively conservative Geneva 
of the 1830s and, like Struve in 1848, Fazy regards the 
centre as a potentially liberalising force. The type of 
federation proposed is therefore demonstrably not the result 
of fundemantal considerations of the need for their countries 
to conform to some abstract, ideal-type federation. Instead, 
it is a product of political tactics, OT the relevant 
writer's perception OT which type oT federation is, in the 
given circumstances, best suited for the realisation OT his 
political goal. 
To conclude, this chapter has shown that federalism was 
used by liberals as a political ideology. The nature of the 
federation proposed and the manner of its advocacy were the 
product of considerations of political priorities and 
political strategy. All the exponents of federalism examined 
were influential in the political processes of their 
respective countries. Moreover, there was considerable 
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cross-border interpenetration between the federal isms of the 
various liberals discussed. For example, it is clear that 
swiss liberalism was not distinct Tram that aT Germany, but 
was closely allied to it. German liberalism was spread into 
'Switzerland through key persons. For example, Escher, Usteri 
and Rengger (Flach,1916,57-73). were powerfully influenced 
by the Enlightenment ideas they acquired while at Goettingen, 
and helped spread them upon their return to Switzerland. 
Similari1y, Zschokke and Snell, key figures in moderate and 
radical Swiss liberal federalism respectively. were in fact 
immigrants from Germany. Troxler was aT course another Swiss 
liberal who was greatly influenced while a student in 
Germany by the same ideas that moulded German federalists 
such as Gagern. For their part, the contributions of Gagern 
and Welcker were to prove important for Germanic federalism 
not only in Germany. but also in switzerland (Lauber,1910,22) 
[~.], while Troxler himself exercised a significant 
influence upon the ideas of Welcker [47). 
Finally. there is no escaping the paradox of the fact that 
while during the 1798 to 1815 period many liberals had been 
vehemently opposed to federation, during the Regeneration 
they came to be among its most avid champions. Indeed. by 
1850, the most radical of liberals (eg. Struve and Troxler) 
could claim that federation and radical political liberalism 
were intrinsically and inextricably linked. Troxler, Fazy and 
Struve all saw radical liberalism as the staunchest defender 
of true federation. 
NOTES FOR CHAPTER 6 
1. For details of a wider selection, see for example Brie 
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(1874), Deuerlein (1972), Magi (1931) and Wild (1966). 
2. Gagern's brother claims (1856,387) that the essay was 
written -twenty years- before the events of 1848 and 1849. 
However, Brie (1874,54f) argues convincingly that it was 
written at the end of 1833. 
3. Gagern was of course not the only German liberal to be 
anti-Semitic. As was noted above, that was also a feature of 
his erstwhile teacher, Fries. 
4. This argument was also utilised by Behr and by Cherbuliez. 
See 3.2. above and 6.3;2. below repective1y. 
5. "Of federal constitutions and federal reform. of creation 
and limits of federal authority. With reference above all to 
the Swiss federation and to Troxler and Zachariae's writings 
on it- (Welcker,1834). 
6. See Chapter 4 and Chapter 6.1. above. 
7. Both Behr and Struve accepted the notions of interstate 
confederation and intrastate-territorial federation. Behr 
also conceived of a chi1iastic-universal federation. See 
above. 
8. The nature of the federation was of course the subject of 
some newspaper coverage and one can get a feel for some 
liberal concerns about the Pact by an evaluation of the 
press. See Wild (1966,46-56 & 67-82) for such an analysis. 
9. In Rappard's opinion, (1941,90) Pfyffer was therefore 
justified to claim, on the morrow of the new federal 
constitution of 1848, that he had in 1831 been the first to 
propose thoroughgoing federal reform. 
10. The Rossi Pact, though rejected by liberals as too 
conservative, came to be called the "Pfyffer Booklet" by some 
conservatives, because o~ its alleged similarity to Pfyffer's 
1831 proposals (Baumgartner, 1854,I,382}, 
11. Similarly, Wild (1966,116) argues that during the early 
1830s, the liberals' proposals were ..... built upon a clearly 
unitary foundation; it was only a question of time as to how 
long their concessions ••• [sic to the cantons] would last. In 
principle, the independence of the cantons was given up ••• ". 
12. The canton being refered to here is Neuchatel, which had 
become a full member of the Confederation in 1814 with the 
full approval, indeed the insistence, of its ruler. The fact 
that throughout the Regeneration it remained a principality 
of the Prussian crown was a source of much annoyance for 
Swiss liberals. (See Pfyffer's comments above and those of 
Fazy-Pasteur below.) It was only in 1848 that an internal 
republican revolution succeeded in removing it from Prussian 
rule, though this gave rise of a distinct possibility of 
armed Prussian intervention. 1856 saw an unsuccessful 
royalist counter-coup. 
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13. It is 'at times difficult to draw a precise distinction 
between exponents of moderate liberalism and of reformist 
conservatism. This is the case with Cherbuliez, whom some 
consider to have been a conservative (Lauber,1910,32). In 
support of such a conclusion, one could cite his statement of 
opposition to total reform (1833,9) and to centralisation in 
theory (ibid,31f). Moreover, like Bluntschli, Cherbuliez's 
willingnes to support reform is motivated less by a desire to 
see the introduction of specific principles of social, 
economic, or political organisation, than by a feeling that 
in order to preserve Switzerland as an entity, it is 
necessary to accommodate extant pressures. 
Alternatively, others regard Cherbuliez as more of a 
liberal (Wild,1966,132). In his 1833 essay, Cherbuliez 
expresses regret at the post-Napoleonic uduel to the death 
with liberal ideas" (29f) and speaks about the "yoke of the 
Reaction- (ibid,34). In his federalism (see below), he is 
prepared to see far more centralisation than Bluntschli and 
is far more supportive of liberal ideas. In addition, it is 
legitimate to regard his statement about the inevitability 
of reform as indicative of a commitment to liberal ideas of 
progress: -The development of human societies has its laws 
and its phases, just as the development of individuals. Just 
as there are physical necessities, so too are there social 
and political necessities."(10) On balance, we therefore 
consider Cherbuliez a moderate liberal, rather than a 
reformist conservative. 
14. All three proposals have been dealt with above. See 
5.3.3. for Bontemps/Maillardoz,(1830) and immediately above 
for Pfyffer (1831) and Roger (1831). 
15. To be precise, Fazy-Pasteur's evaluation excludes 
Pfyffer, for he concludes that it is impossible to come to a judgement on the latter's writings yet, since they are 
constantly being modified (1831,16). 
16. Fazy-Pasteur (1831,21) is especially critical of the 
stipulation in Roger's draft constitution (1831,39) that 
twelve years after the constitution has come into force, 
persons not versed in reading and writing in German will not 
be permitted to be Diet representatives, or members of the 
Federal Goverment, and that from then onwards, no Diet 
speeches other than those made in German will be minuted. 
17. It may be recalled (see section on Rossi in 5.3.3. above) 
that Article 6 says that cantonal constitutions must be 
guaranteed by the Confederation, but that to receive such a 
guarantee, they must " ••• a) not contain provisions contrary 
to the federal constitution; b) provide for political rights 
to be exercised in accordance with representative or direct 
democratic principles ••• ; c) declare the possibility and 
method of their revision by legal and constitutional means 
••. " (Acte,1832,7). 
18. His support is not unqualified, however. Amongst other 
things, he proposes a certain dilution of some proposals, as 
well as that the economic and other specific policy changes 
formally be left out of the constitution, so as to facilitate 
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the acceptance'of the proposal as a whole (1833,15-17). 
19. Article 5 states that -The Confederation provides the 
cantons with a guarantee of their territory, their 
sovereignty and their independence .•. the maintenance of 
public order within their interior, their constitutions, and 
••• the rights and liberties of the people, as well as the 
rights and the prerogatives of the authorities." (Acte,1832, 
6). Article 52 m) spells out the circumstances in which the 
Confederation may 'engage in armed intervention in a canton in 
support of the constitutional rights and prerogatives 
enumerated in Article 5. The provisions to which Fazy-Pasteur 
objects are the following: • The Diet ••• may intervene at 
the summons of the supreme executive power of the requesting 
canton. But it may also intervene without a cantonal summons 
••• In cases of the violent overthrow of a cantonal 
government, or when the latter is unable to invoke the 
assistance of the Diet; ••• " (Acte,1832,33). 
20.These include Bornhauser (1832), Kasthofer (1833) and 
Snell (1831 & 1839). See Wild (1966,esp.142-56). 
21. The following biographical material derives from Goetz 
(1915). 
22. Starting from an idealism akin to that of the early 
Fichte, Schelling had developed a "philosophy of nature", 
characterised above all by its organic and pantheistic vision 
of society (see footnote 23 in 3.2 above). Paradoxically, 
Schelling's organicism influenced not only the radicalism of 
Troxler, but also informed the thinkingo~ conservatives such 
as Stahl (see 5.2.3. above) and of Romantlcs such as Goerres 
(see 3.2 and 5.2.2. above). See Meinecke,(1928,133f), Aris 
(1936,288-319) and Bluntsch1i (1867,540-44) also. There is 
very little in English on Schelling; see for example Watson 
(1892). 
23. Troxler's tenure as a professor at Basel coincided with 
the outbreak of the conflict between the oligarchic, urban 
part and the democratic, rural part of the city canton of 
Basel. Troxler was an outspoken supporter of the latter half 
and of the young radicals' demonstrations against the urban 
elite. Not surprisingly, this eventually cost him his Basel 
chair (Goetz,1915,109-27). 
24. See the 78 items listed by Goetz (1915,179-82). One of 
these (Troxler,1832) constitutes a compilation of Troxler's 
newspaper articles in one year and runs to about 50 articles. 
25. An exception to this is to be found in an 1814 article 
directed at the Austrian representative in Zuerich with a 
view to seeking the latter's support for a post-Napoleonic 
constitution for Troxler's native Luzern which would have 
mitigated what Troxler considered the excessively 
centralised control of the canton. In the course of the 
pamphlet, he states that uno democracy is-more repressive and 
disgusting than the demagogic variety, in that it makes the 
raw popular will sovereign ••• " (1814,11). This deviation 
from Troxler's commitment to pure popular sovereignty may be 
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explained by the political needs of the moment. 
26. For example, Troxler was the author in 1814 of an 
anonymous radical petition which called upon the restored 
aristocratic Luzern government to introduce direct popular 
elections. Troxler was imprisoned for 5 weeks, though he had 
then to be released for lack of evidence (Goetz,1915,24-B). 
27. The following necessarily brief account of Troxler's 
philosophical views derives from a philosphical section of an 
essay written in 1814 (Troxler,1814), as well as from 
summaries of four philosophical publications from the 1816 to 
1820 period. The source for the latter is Goetz (1915,34-8, 
42-5 & 52-5). Incidentally, though there is no mention in his 
biography (Goetz,1915) of any direct influence from Fries, it 
is interesting to note that upon his appointment as a teacher 
in Luzern. Troxler was (Goetz,1915, 56) to. introduce his 
students to the practice of physical education so typical of 
the German nationlist student associations with which Fries 
was heavily involved at ~ena (see 6.2.2.above). More 
significant. perhaps, is the fact that like Fries, Troxler 
was committed to nationalism. . 
28. Thus in 1821, Troxler succeeded, despite the censorship 
that then existed, in publishing translations of the writings 
of Buchanan and Hilton. His purpose was to counter Haller's 
patrimonial theory of the state and to assert the primacy of 
the people,' the limitation of kings and the right of the 
people to rid itself of tyrants. Troxler was accused of 
defending regicide and thus threatening internal cantonal 
order. as well as compromising Switzerland vis-a-vis foreign 
powers. The outcome was Troxler's dismissal from his teaching 
post in Luzern (Goetz,1915,59-68). 
29. The following account of Troxler's views on federation 
will be based upon his biography (Goetz,1915) and some 
eleven of his political pamphlets, which span the whole of 
the period covered in this chapter. These are: Troxler 1814, 
1B22, 1B32, 1833a, 1833b, 1833c, 1833d, 1833e, 1838, 1838 
and 1B48. 
30. The relevant agreement was the NCovenent of Stans". See 
2.1. above. 
31. For details of its provisions, see the discussion of its 
proposals in 5.3.3. above, as well as Rossi (1832) and Acte 
(1832). 
32. The following summary is based upon six of Troxler's 
pamphlets (Troxler,1832 & 1833a-e), though the points are 
also to be found scattered throughout all the subsequent 
Troxler publications listed in footnote 29 above. One of the 
most succinct of the tide of polemical publications Troxler 
directed against the Rossi Commission's proposals is entitled 
"Of the Seven Cardinal Sins of the Federal Document" 
(Troxler,1833b). 
33. See footnotes 17 & 19 above and Chapter 5.3.3 •• 
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34. The following discussion of the contents of the draft 
will dispense with page references. Instead, reference will 
be made to the appropriate article number. For the text of 
the draft constitution, see Troxler (1833c,31-45). It is also 
reprinted in Goetz (1915,167-78). For commentary upon it, see 
Goetz (1915,136-8) as well as for example Lauber (1910,25-29), 
Rappard (1941,94-6) and Wild (1966,123-7). 
35. See the very interesting indications which Goetz (1915, 
167-78) gives of the sources of many of the articles of 
Troxler's draft constitution. For details of the Helvetic 
Republic constitutions, see Chapter 3.1 above and the 
references cited in footnote 5 of that chapter. 
Interestingly, Troxler later published the relevant seven 
Helvetic constitutions and wrote a short introduction to them 
(Troxler,1838). 
36. Two months later (1833d,9), Troxler insists that his 
demand for a federal republic with popular representation at 
both the local and the federal level is no modern invention, 
but is the basis of the ancient Swiss federation. "Without 
national representation there is no nation, without popular 
representation no Yolk in the federation and no federation 
for the Yolk". 
37. Given Fazy's Protestant background and vehement 
opposition to the Catholic Sonderbund, the support of the 
Catholics might seem paradoxical, but is understandable if 
one considers that the aristocratic classes whom the 
revolution replaced were the mainstays of Geneva's Calvinist 
state church. 
38. Fazy's radicalism did have its limits, however. He was 
not a socialist, as is evident from his opposition to 
measures such as income tax, which he considered an 
illegitimate .interference with private property. 
39. The pamphlet's title states that it is a compilation of 
articles previously published in the Journal de Geneve. This 
is a publication over which Fazy exercised some influence. 
The first ten sides of the thirty two sides of the undated 
pamphlet are an almost ad verbatim copy of an article which 
appeared in the Journal de Geneve on September 15th 1831 
(Fazy,1831). The remaining material comprises three sections. 
The first contains a draft federal constitution (Fazy,n.d., 
10-17); the second is a commentary on that draft (ibid,18-23) 
and the third relates to Fazy's proposals for how the reform 
process ought to be undertaken (~,24-32). This later 
material has been dated as deriving from 1835 or 1837 (see 
Rappard,1941,105f). 
40. In particular, Articles 2,3,7,13,15,18-20 & 22, (Fazy, 
n.d.,11-17). 
41. See for example Fazy,n.d.,3-7 & 19-22. 
42. Two points need to be made. First, the above exposition 
of Troxler's views is based upon his opinions in the early 
1830s and upon the draft constitution of March 1833 (1833c) 
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in particular. He subsequently departed from the latter and 
on the eve of the new Swiss constitution published a 
translation of the United States constitution and recommended 
the adoption of its bicameralism (1848,esp.3-12). The extent 
to which his views on bicameralism had changed is evident 
from the fact that he was wholly content with the new 
constitution adopted that year (Goetz,1915,161). Second, it 
must be stressed that not all radical Swiss liberals were 
supporters of bicameralism. Some such as Snell (1831) 
advocated unicamerlism (see Fazy, n.d.,22f). There were of 
course also others who supported a unitary state, though they 
are irrelevant for this thesis. (see Wild,1966). 
43. As the dispute over swiss federal reform increasingly 
became intertwined with the denominational conflict 
between Catholics and Protestants (see 4.2. above), Troxler 
became estranged from his erstwhile radical comrades, who 
conducted a bitter and often personal literary battle with 
him. This conflict was a consequence both of Troxler's 
Catholicism and of his belief that the religious issue was 
distracting the Swiss from the prime goal of political 
reform (Goetz,1915,141). At one stage (Goetz,1915,150-59), 
Troxler was accused of having lapsed into an incurable 
mysticism akin to that of Goerres (see 3.2 and 5.2.2. above 
for Goerres' mysticism). For Troxler's views on the 
confessional issue, see, for example, Troxler (1840), which 
constitutes a compilation of various newpaper articles he had 
published during 1838. 
44. That is of course not to deny that his ideas were of 
significance and furthered the Germanic debate, as is 
demonstrated by the later contribution to Germanic federalism 
of Waitz (1853 & 1862). 
45. These differences in emphasis upon nationalism are in 
part explainable by distinctions in age cohort. Thus those 
such as Zachariae, whose formative period coincided with the 
pre-Napoleonic period, were more influenced by Enlightenment 
ideas, while those such as Gagern, whose experience of 
national humiliation and the subsequent uprising against 
Napoe1on were inclined to a greater emphasis upon nationalism. 
46. Note also that the ideas of Gagern were known in 
switzerland (see Monnard,1849) 
47. See Brie, (1874,68), Welcker (1834,4 & 59-64) and Troxler 
(1848,31-7). 
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PART 4 CONCLUSION 
CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSION 
7.1. INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 1 spelled out two main aims for this thesis (pp.37 
-44 above). The first was to fill a gap in the Anglo-Saxon 
academic literature on matters federal by identifying the 
nature of the tradition of federalism in Austria, Switzerland 
and Germany. As part of that endeavour, the thesis was to 
show both the multidimensionality of that tradition and the 
extent to which it is distinct from the Anglo-Saxon paradigm 
and constitutes a tradition in its own right: a Germanic 
tradition of federalism. Building upon the distinction it 
advances between federalism and federation, this thesis' 
second main aim was stated to be to examine, by reference to 
the period in Austrian, Swiss and German federal history 
preceding the advent of modern political parties, the use of 
federalism as a political ideology. That is to say. how 
federalism was employed in political disputes as a vehicle 
for the rationalisation and or promotion of its exponents' 
goals. 
It was also asserted (p.41 above) that together, these two 
aims amounted'to providing -a preliminary framework for the 
analysis of West European federal systems in a new context, 
namely, by reference to the interaction within them of 
federalism and federation- and that by doing so, the thesis 
hoped to -furnish insights into not only how and why 
federalism is a significant element in explaining the 
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dynamics of federations, but also into how and why parties 
are such important agents in their maintenance". 
The purpose of this concluding chapter is not to rehearse 
this thesis' detailed discussions of the various federalisms 
covered, but to outline the extent to which we believe that 
the thesis has fulfiled its self-appointed tasks. To do so, 
this chapter will be structured around three issues. First, 
section 7.2. will summarise the main findings of the thesis 
concerning the nature of the Germanic tradition. Thereafter, 
section 1.3. will highlight what we consider to be some of 
the main insights offered by the application in this thesis 
of our approach of treating federalism as a distinct and 
ideological phenomenon and analysing its role in federations. 
Finally, 1.4. will conclude by summarising the contributions 
which we believe that this thesis has made to the Anglo-Saxon 
academic debate on federation. 
7.2. THE GERMANIC TRADITION OF FEDERALISM 
In order to establish the type of federation which an 
exponent of Germanic federalism was discussing, this thesis 
asked three basic Questions. These concerned the nature of 
the units constituting the federation, the location within 
the latter of sovereignty and the formal purpose of the 
federation. On the basis of the answers to these Questions, 
the thesis identified various "dimensions" of federalism. The 
preceding analysis of Germanic federalism from its early 
seventeenth century origins until 1850 has found it to 
contain six such dimensions. They are depicted in Figure 2 
overleaf. Two refer to interstate federations, namely, the 
interstate-confederal and interstate-chiliastic types. The 
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four remaining dimensions relate to intrastate federations 
and comprise: intrastate-corportate, intrastate-territorial, 
intrastate-imperial and intrastate-popular federalism. 
FIGU~E 2: The Dimensions of Germanic Federalism Articulated 
by 1850. 
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The Germanic tradition of federalism is thus without doubt 
multidimensional. Moreover, the existence within it of the 
intrastate-corporate dimension demonstrates that Livingston 
(1952,85) is wrong to assert that ·writers who profess to see 
federal elements in the various forms of pluralism, such as 
feudalism or corporativism ••• have added a meaning that was 
not there before.- (see pp28-30 above). In defence of 
Livingston, one might respond that this thesis has only 
identified one dimension of the Germanic tradition of 
federalism in which the constituent units of the federation 
being discussed were not territorial. That would be correct. 
However, not only is one example sufficient to disprove his 
allegation, but if this thesis had been able to consider the 
development of Germanic federalism in the second part of the 
nineteenth century, it would have been able to reinforce its 
argument in two ways. 
First, it would have been able to direct attention to the 
revival of the intrastate-corporate federalism of A1thusius. 
It was expressed in the academic writings of Gierke (1880), 
but was also to be found in the political realm. One exponent 
was Georg Winkelbach, the first edition of whose four volume 
Investigations into the Organisation of Labour (1886) was 
published in stages from 1849 [1]. Once political parties 
began to be ~stablished, intrastate-corporate federalism was 
also to be expressed in the party manifestos of, for example, 
Catholic-conservatives (Wedl,1969; see Weber,1980a,25-8 also). 
Second, as the poltical spotlight was increasingly turned 
on the social dimension, the latter half of the nineteenth 
century witnessed the articulation of at least two new 
di~nsions of Germanic federalism in Which the proposed 
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federations include units that are not territorially-based. 
The first type of non-territorial federation to be advanced 
is that usually identified with Proudhon (1863). It takes the 
interest of those such as Winkel bach in the possible role OT 
federation in the social and economic sphere a stage further 
and proposes a federation that is not to constitute a state, 
nor to be composed of states and would therefore fit into 
neither our intrastate, nor our interstate category. Its 
constituent units are to be not territories, but economic 
units. In view of this and the fact that it is not to have an 
overarching sovereign head, one might term this first new 
type of non-territorial federalism "acephalous-economic· [2]. 
Two authors associated with the second new, non-territorial 
federalism articulated in the latter half of the nineteenth 
century are Fischhof (1870) and Renner (1899 & 1902). Their 
proposals amount to a re-organisation of the Austro-Hungarian 
monarchy on the basis of a federation comprising not only 
territorial units of rule, but also the various component 
nationalities of that Dual Monarchy. The latter would, 
regardless of their territorial location, also be constituent 
elements of the federation (see Wierer,1960 & Schlesinger, 
1945 also). One might term this second additional dimension 
of Germanic federalism "intrastate-national-. 
To demonstrate beyond doubt the variegated nature of the 
Germanic tradition of federalism was only one part of the 
first main aim of this thesis. Chapter 1.3 said that this 
thesis would also show that the Germanic tradition of 
federalism is significantly different from the Anglo-Saxon 
and constitutes a genre in its own right: a Germanic 
federalism. The next task of this section is to summarise 
what the above analysis of the Germanic tradition suggests 
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its distinctive elements to be. These can be grouped under 
two headings. 
. 
The first relates to the manner of the Germanic tradition's 
articulation. As our numerous examples have shown, Germanic 
federalism has been articulated not only at a wide range of 
different intellectual levels, but also through the medium of 
in part very different political philosophies. The levels 
used vary from polemicism such as that of Geiger, Gagern, or 
Troxler, to philosophical treatises such as that of A1thusius. 
At this higher intellectual level, there have been exponents 
of Germanic federalism whose views were put forward in a 
manner very similar to that of much of the Anglo-Saxon 
tradition [3]. That is to say, they used the mechanistic 
language of rational, liberal constitutionalism, emphasising 
aspects such as representation, separation of powers and 
parliamentarism. Examples inclUde Welcker (1834 & 1836), Behr 
(1808 & 1820) and Struve (1847 & Homrnsen,1952). 
On the other hand, the Germanic tradition includes 
contributions as varied as, for example, the transcendental 
idealism of Fichte and Kant, or the mystical Romanticism of 
Goerres (1814/16, 1819 & 1821). It also contains a large 
proportion of theological argumentation, of which authors 
from Althusius to Geiger, Goerres and Stahl are examples. 
That is not to suggest that religious, or theological 
argumentation does not exist in the Anglo-Saxon tradition. An 
example would be the emphasis by E1azar (eg.1987) upon the 
biblical origins of the allegedly core notion of covenant. 
However, the Germanic tradition is different both by virtue 
of the extent to which such argumentation is advanced and 
because of the fact that much of it is of course closely 
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linked not to the Protestant tradtion inherited by the 
Anglo-Saxon literature, but to Roman Catholicism. 
The second set of factors that mark the Germanic tradition 
out as distinct from the Anglo-Saxon relate not to the manner 
of its expression, but to its substance. The structures of 
the federations proposed include a revived Holy Roman Empire, 
i.e. a federation with authority in the ecclesiastical and 
secular realm divided between the Pope and the Emperor 
respectively, as well as an intrastate-corporate federation 
with feudal elements. Neither type of structure is to be 
found in the Anglo-Saxon tradition. 
This raises the interesting question of what caused the 
distinctiveness of the Germanic tradition. This thesis 
suggests that in any answer to that question, two basic 
factors must figure prominently. The first is the different 
philosophical milieu in which it developed. Especially from 
, , 
the eighteenth century, that milieu was characterised above 
all by the interplay of two broad elements. On the one hand, 
there was the was the extremely abstract philosophical 
rationalism of the likes of Kant and Fichte, as reflected in 
the at times metaphysical idealism of, for example, Fries, 
Stahl and Troxler. While parts of that philosophical 
rationalism also coloured the background to the Anglo-Saxon 
debate on federation (e.g.J.S.Mill), the latter was much less 
abstract; Moreover, though the ideational background to 
Anglo-Saxon federalism also contained a struggle between 
rationalism and conservatism (eg.Burke), the nature of the 
conservative element in the German speaking states was 
different. There was a much stronger presence of anti-rational 
conservative philosophy and, in the case of many Romantics 
such as Goerres, even irrationalism. Moreover, the 
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conservatism of German-speaking states also contained close 
links to feudal and religious (often Catholic) ideas of 
organicism and social hierarchy. In addition to the 
philosophical milieu of which it was in part a reflection, 
the second factor causing the Germanic traditon of federali~m 
to be distinct from its Anglo-Saxon counterpart was its 
political context. This included the political weakness in 
most of Germany of liberalism; the strength of feudal and 
corporatist institutions, and the persistence of 
monarchical structures. 
We will return to the significance of the political 
factors shortly (see 7.~ below). Prior to that, there is one 
last factor that points to the existence of a Germanic 
tradition that needs to be stressed: its interrelated nature. 
First, this thesis' detailed analysis of Germanic federalism 
has demonstrated that the ·dimensions· of that tradition were 
articulated across the German-speaking states of Europe. The 
only exception is the intrastate-imperial dimension, which 
was articulated throughout the states of 'Germany, but, for 
obvious political reasons, not in Switzerland. Second, there 
have been frequent illustrations in this thesis of the fact 
that many of the individual contributors to the Germanic 
tradition were influential in more than one of the countries 
(examples include liberals such as We1cker and Zachariae, as 
we11'as conservatives such as Haller and Bluntschli). 
For all the'reasons set out here, we are confident that 
this thesis'has both identified the Germanic tradition of 
federalism and demonstrated its distinctiveness. Having dealt 
with the ways in which this thesis has fulfilled the first 
main task it set itself, it is time to move on to a discussion 
485 
of what it has achieved as regards its second main aim. 
7.3. FEDERALISM AS POLITICAL IDEOLOGY 
Put simply, the second main aim of this thesis amounted to 
demonstrating that by distinguishing between federalism and 
federation (see pp30-34 above) and undertaking a detailed 
analysis of how the former operates within the latter, one 
can gain interesting insights into both the political nature 
of federalism and the interaction of federalism and 
federation. Though our detailed investigation of federalism 
as political ideology was undertaken primarily in Part 3 of 
this thesis, which focussed on the period from 1815 to 
1848, the discussion in Part 2 of Germanic federalism prior 
to 1815 also referred to federalism's political role. We 
believe those chapters to have offered the following six main 
insights. 
First, they have demonstrated the Riker hypothesis (1964 & 
1975) regarding the allegedly universal relevance of his 
-military- and -expansion- conditions to be in need of 
modification. When prescribing federation, a few exponents of 
Germanic federalism (eg. Fries, Goerres and Stahl) undeniably 
did have expansionist aims. Moreover, the motivations of a 
significant number of federal isms did include external 
military security. However, this thesis has also shown first, 
that neither of Riker's two conditions were universally 
relevant. Second. federalism was proposed not only to 
instigate, but also to avoid expansionism. This thesis gave 
the example of the cosmopolitan federalism of Heeren, which 
advocated confederation not in order to facilitate German 
expansionism, but to prevent it [4]. Third, in a number of 
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the federal isms where military security was cited as one of 
the goals of a proposed federation, our detailed 
investigation has shown that military considerations were 
often not as significant in motivating the federalism as 
\ 
might prima facie appear to have been the case. A good 
example is Zschokke, whose emphasis upon military matters was 
largely a product of the need to restrict his federalism to 
politically ·safe- issues, though his real concern was to 
, " 
prescribe a federation which would promote liberalism. 
In sum, while it may be correct to stress security and 
even expansionist considerations as the prime factors 
motivating confederations of the ancient and early modern 
periods, that approach is not very helpful for an 
understanding of modern federalism. As this thesis' detailed 
investigation of Germanic federalism from the late eighteenth 
century until 1850 has shown, those factors were not always 
as dominant as Riker suggests [5]. Though military 
considerations were still highly salient in the period (see 
Chapter 4.2 above), excessive emphasis upon the issue of 
security causes one to lose sight of what it is that was (to 
use Riker's language) to be defended,or expanded. 
While the first conclusion which our investigation into 
the use of Germanic federalism offers is the "negative" 
conclusion that security issues were not as important a 
factor in determining federal isms as has been suggested, our 
second, positive finding is that a much fuller understanding 
of both the motivations and function of federalism can be 
achieved by taki~into account that it is almost invariably 
advanced as part of a domestic political debate, where its 
purpo~e is to defend or promote particular political causes. 
Its utilisation for such political purposes makes federalism 
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a political ideology. 
Not only have we shown federalism to be a political 
ideology, but we have also documented how, in the period 
immediately prior to the crystallisation of the party systems 
of Austria, switzerland and Germany, federalism was used by 
individuals and groups right across the political spectrum 
for the promotion of their political aims. At the one end of 
that spectrum, it was harnessed by reactionary conservatives 
(eg.Jarcke and Haller), for the defence or re-establishment 
of, for example, a feudal social, economic and political 
hierarchy. At the other end of that spectrum, it was utilised 
by revolutionaries like Struve, whose desired federation 
would have brought about not only popular sovereignty, but 
also progressive income tax, a wealth tax, workers' profit 
sharing and a minimum wage. Nearer the "centre" of this 
spectrum there Were liberal constitutionalists (eg. Welcker 
and Cherbuliez), who hoped that the federation they proposed 
would ensure, for example, the separation of powers, due 
legal process, parliamentary sovereignty and freedoms of 
speech and of the press. 
Providing this illustration of the variety of political 
uses to which the political ideology of federalism was put is 
valuable both in its own right, as well as by virtue of the 
fact that it explains why almost all modern political parties 
in Austria, Switzerland and Germany can and do claim, with 
some justification, to be the heirs of the Germanic tradition 
of federalism [sJ. In Switzerland, for example, the liberal 
victors of the 1847,civil war became keen defenders of the 
new federation and presented federation as an intrinsic and 
long-standing component of liberalism {eg.Rappard,1948; 
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· Nawiasky,1918 & Fleiner,1916). For their part, Swiss Catholic 
conservatives, confronted by a largely liberal and Protestant 
national majority, claimed that it was they who were the 
true defenders of the federal principle (see Segesser,eg. 
1877 & Hueller,1938). Especially during the Kulturkampf of 
the 1870s and 1880s, Catholic groupings in both Germany and 
Switzerland used federalism to defend Catholic values and the 
Roman Catholic Church against the secularising influence of 
the central authority of their repective federations (Frantz, 
eg.1879). In the Austro-Hungarian Empire, on the other hand; 
federalism was used by various liberal and nationalist 
groupings as vehicle for their resistance against what was in 
that federation a Catholic and conservative central authority 
(Wierer,1960; Schlesinger,1945). While the manner in which 
some of these federal isms were articulated made ~he wider, 
political purposes of th;ir authors obvious (eg.Frantz,1879), 
that was not always the case. 
This brings us to our third major finding about federalism 
as pol tical ideology: the need to distinguish between what 
one might call the various "agendas· of federalism. All the 
federal isms considered in this thesis ascribed to their 
federations certain formal purposes, as summarised in Figures 
1 & 2. At times, this formal, or manifest agenda does make at 
least some of its exponent's political aims reasonably clear. 
Examples include the interstate-chiliastic federalism of Kant 
and Fichte, as well as the intrastate-imperial federalism of 
Goerres. However, there are many more occasions when it is 
only by eliciting a federalism's latent agenda that one can 
establish the full motivations behind a proposed federation. 
Examples of the numerous occasions on which our investigation 
into what this thesis has earlier (p350) referred to as the 
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·sma11 print· of federalism has provided a much better 
understanding of the real motivations of a federalism than 
would otherwise have been the case include the federal isms 
of Behr (1820). Bontemps and Hail1ardoz (eg.1830) and 
Bluntschli (1831). 
Fourth. this thesis' assertion that federalism must be 
understood in its political context has been underscored by 
its illustration of two aspects. The first is the politically 
contingent nature of federalism. This was done in part by an 
analysis of its various "agendas", but also by establishing 
that the political situation of an exponent of federalism was 
perhaps the most important factors determining the type of 
federation prescribed. Since this has been a recurrent theme 
of this thesis, one example will suffice for now. Though 
Behr and Fazy were both radical liberals and shared many 
political goals, the former's federalism of 1820 was adamant 
that Germany must remain an confederation, while Fazy's 
federalism of the 1830s was equally convinced of the need for 
a Swiss Swiss intrastate federation. This disparity in their 
presciptions is largely a product of their respective 
political situations. From the perspective of (relatively) 
liberal Bavaria, Behr was concerned to keep the more 
conservative central authority at bay. For his part, Fazy was 
located in conservative Geneva and hoped that the centre of 
the intrastate federation he advocated would be a liberalising 
influence (see 6.2.3. & 6.3.3. above). 
Further evidence provided by this thesis of the 
politically contingent nature of federalism concerns cases 
where specific exponents of Germanic federalism. or specific 
political groupings have altered the type of federation they 
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proposed as a direct result of considerations of political 
strategy. For example, Haller's prescriptions regarding the 
most appropriate type of federation for Switzerland changeQ 
considerably (see 3.3 & 5.3. above). In 1798, he was willing 
to countenance either an intrastate, or an interstate 
federation, but in 1799, he became an advocate of the former, 
since that appeared the best way to secure a restoration of 
the conservative cantons. In 1801, however, he again 
supported intrastate federation, when it became obvious 
that an interstate 'federation was no longer a politically 
viable proposition. Finally, in the period after 1815, Haller 
was of course a defender of the confederal Swiss Federal 
Pact. Another exponent of Germanic federalism whose federal 
prescription changed as a direct result of tactical 
considerations is Stahl. Although he did not vaciltate as 
much as Haller, it is clear that his decision to leave his 
earlier preference for a German confederation and to support 
a monarchical Bundesstaat was a consequence of the changed 
circumstances brought about by the 1848 revolutions. Indeed, 
it has even been shown how changes in the political situation 
between 1848 and 1849 impacted upon his federalism (see 
5.2.3. above). 
Such tactical reassessments were evident not merely in 
individual exponents of federalism, but also in the approach 
to federation of political groupings. The Swiss liberal 
unitarians of the early nineteenth century are a good 
example. They were initially totally opposed to any kind of 
federation (eg.Kuhn), but by 1815 became supporters of a 
Swiss confederation (eg.Rengger), since they were in a 
~ 
political minority and were afraid that a more centralised 
federation would enable the conservative majority to threaten 
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their local liberal advances. By the late 1840s, however, 
wh~n they th~MSelves constituted the national majority, most 
liberals (eg.Pfyffer) became supporters of intrastate 
federation as a means of countering local conservatism [7]. 
On the other hand, it would be wrong to assume that 
federalism was a purely dependent variable. The second aspect 
of federalism's relationship to its political context that 
was highlighted is the fact that some of the federal isms 
discussed were themselves a significant political force. For 
example. the federalism of Stahl impacted upon the 
proceedings of the Erfurt Union, the federal proposals of 
which were similar in many respects similar to the federation 
adopted by Germany in 1871 (see 5.2.3.). The federalism of 
Gagern also exercised an influence upon the course of German 
politics, albeit through his brother Heinrich, who was to 
preside over the Frankfurt National Assembly. Another 
federalist who was a .leading figure at Frankfurt is Welcker 
(on both Gagern & Welcker, see 6.2.2.). In Switzerland, 
examples of influential federal isms include that of Monneron 
. , 
of whom it is alleged that his federalism was read by 
Napoleon, whose subsequent Mediation constitution it helped 
determine (see 3.3.). For their part, both Rossi and Troxler 
appear, each in their own way, to have contributed to shaping 
the Swiss federal constitution adopted in 1848 (see 5.2.3. & 
6.3.3. resp.). In other words, it would be as erroneous to 
claim that federalism is a purely contingent variable, as it 
would to allege that federation is the mere product of 
federalism. The relationship between the two is clearly 
symbiotic. 
The final point of this section is that when combined, the 
492 
various findings listed in this concluding chapter appear to 
suggest a preliminary framework for the analysis of West 
European federal systems in a new context: by reference to 
the interaction within them of federalism and federation. 
First, even though the manner of its articulcation, the 
nature of its prescriptions and the political goals motivating 
it will vary, it is clear, as we have argued elsewhere 
(Luther,1985 & 1986), that federalism is an intrinsically 
legitimate ideology in all federtions. In other words, 
federations by their very nature lend themselves to what 
Elazar (1979,42) has described as "a continuing seminar in 
governance-. Second, as a political ideology, federalism can 
be utilised for the legitimation of an existing system, or 
for its reform. Either use of federalism is potentially 
significant for what has earlier in this thesis been referred 
to as the -maintenance- of the -federal bargain- (Riker,1964, 
51, see point 4 in 1.2 above). That is to say, federalism can 
be used either to help secure an existing distribution of 
power and influence between the central authority and 
constitutent units of a federation, or to change that 
distribution. 
Third, it will be recalled that in Chapter 1.2 above, we 
expressed agreement with the view that one of the prime 
agencies that influence the -federal bargain" is the 
party system of a federation. This thesis has now shown how, 
in the period prior to the establishment of the modern party 
system, it was the political groupings constituting the 
antecedents of modern political parties that were the main 
exponents of federalism, as well as how, because federalism 
was utilised by groupings across the whole political 
spectrum, it is possible for modern political parties to 
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legitimately claim some part in the tradition of federalism. 
Together, these two facts help explain why it is political 
parties that are today the main vehicles of federalism. 
What our thesis therefore suggests is that rather than 
examining merely the legal and institutional aspects of how 
the -federal bargain- is maintained, one ought perhaps to 
devote greater attention to the role which federalism plays, 
particularly through the medium of the party system, in 
sustaining, or changing that balance. The clear evidence of 
this thesis is that which of these two roles federalism 
exercises and how intensely it pursues that role will in 
large measure be related to the extent to which the there is 
a conflict within that federation over political values and 
aspirations • 
. Put differently, federalism is related to the degree of 
symmetry in a federation. A good indicator of likely strain 
in a federation is the extent of political asymmetry between 
the governments of the constiutent units of the federation 
and the centre. As we have demonstrated elsewhere by 
reference to recent developments in Austria (Luther,1985 & 
1986), federalism tends to be used against the centre when 
there is a marked or sustained asymmetry between local and 
central political elites and political values. We believe 
that a comparative study linking the concepts,of asymmetry in 
federations (as measured, for example, in terms of the 
local and national party systems, but also by reference to 
economic factors) with an investigation of how those tensions 
impact upon and are utilised by federalism, would offer 
interesting new perspectives into the workings of federal 
political systems. 
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In short, it is the contention of this thesis that 
federalism should not be dismissed as irrelevant ideology, 
but that more attent.ion should be devoted to the study of 
how it is used in federations for the protection, or 
promotion of particular political interets and, conversely, 
how the nature of the federation and the distribution of 
political power and influe~ce within it impacts upon 
federalism. In other words, we are proposing that attention 
be directed to the interaction of federalism and federation as 
a'significant element in the dynamics of federal political 
systems. 
1 .4. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, we believe that the contributions that this 
, 
thesis has made to the Anglo-Saxon academic study of 
federation can be summarised under five headings. First, it 
has undertaken a systematic, comparative analysis of a large 
body of German, Austrian and Swiss federal thought that was 
previously covered in the Anglo-Saxon literature in at best a 
fragmented, or unsystematic manner. Second, it has 
. demonstrated that body of though to constitute a distinctive 
tradition. In the course of that exercise, it has developed a 
.typology of the -Germanic tradition of federalism", which 
should be applicable to the examination of federal isms 
elsewhere. 
Third, this thesis has carefully tested two hypotheses of 
the Anglo-Saxon literature against the experience of Germanic 
federalism and has subsequently revised those hypotheses. 
Fourth, by means of a very detailed analysis of the use of 
federalism as a political ideology in Germany; 'Austria and 
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switzerland between 1815 and 1850, this thesis has illustrated 
some of the advantages of an analysis predicated upon 
distinguishing bet~een federalism and federation. These 
include the insights it offers into the fascinating, ' 
symbiotic relationship between federalism and federation. 
Finally, by virtue of its exposition both of the nature of 
the Germanic tradition of federalism and of the political 
uses made of federalism. this thesis believes that it has 
offered a preliminary framework for the study of West 
European federal systems in a new context: by examining how 
federalism is used within existing federations for the 
purposes both of their legitimation and of their reform. 
NOTES FOR CHAPTER 7 
1. For a discussion of Winkelbach's life and the development 
of his ideas, see the biography by Biermann, W.E. (1909) Karl 
Georg Winkelbach: sein Leben und sein Werk, 2.Vols., Leipzig. 
Interestingly, Winkelbach was initially influenced by Stahl 
and Haller, though his federalism tried to reconcile 
older, estates-based theories of society and ideas of democracy. 
2. An alternative designation could be anarcho-federal, as 
used by Susser (1979) in his discussion of the federalism of 
Martin Buber. 
Predictably, a considerable literature has arisen on 
Proudon's federalism. See, for example, the introduction to 
Vernon's recent edition of The Federal Principle (Proudhon, 
~863, xi-xlvii). While some commentators contend that it 
would be wrong to describe Proudhon's proposed economic 
associations as federations, others argue that his later 
work, in which he advocates confederation, is a more mature 
work that better represents Proudhon's views. Though it 
would be inappropriate for this thesis to get involved in 
such debates, it is worth responding with two brief points. 
First, the former objection is an example of the "federalism 
is what I say it is· approach that this thesis rejects. 
Second, even if it is the case that Proudhon's later 
writings on federation are more intellectually stimulating, 
that should not lead one to dismiss his earlier wirtings. 
They too served a purpose, as Vernon's above mentioned 
introduction to Proudhon's Federal Principle itself 
illustrates. 
3. Perhaps surprisingly, one difficulty in establishing the 
distinctiveness of the Germanic tradition of federalism 
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vis-a-vis the Anglo-Saxon is the fact that there are few 
detailed and systematic accounts of the latter. Though it 
lacks a systematic approach, one of the best single sources 
for an overview of that tradition is still Mogi (1931,esp.I. 
21-325). though Davis (1978) also offers some interesting 
insights. It appears that there might well be some utility in 
applying the systematic analysis offered in this thesis to 
the Anglo-Saxon tradition. In the meantime. we shall content 
ourselves with repeating (see Chapter 1 above. p34) Aiyar's 
assertion (1961,59) that Anglo-Saxon federations are "the 
product of liberal thinking and ••• clearly associated with 
mechanistic attitudes toward government". 
4. An analogous point of course applies to Kant and Fichte's 
interstate-chiliastic federalism. 
5. Dikshit (1971,189) makes a similar point, though he appears 
to be arguing for the significance of economic aspects, 
rather than what he refers to as purposes that are Mnarrowly 
political or mi1itary-. This thesis does not deny the 
importance of economic considerations, which it has in fact 
frequently referred to. Its emphasis upon the political 
nature of federalism is designed to stress the relevance of 
federalism in the political process. Economic issues can be 
and are of course also subjects of this process. For other 
criticisms of Riker's emphasis on security issues, which 
was discussed in 1.2 above, see Davis (1978) and King 
(1982). 
6. To illustrate this point thoroughly would itself require a 
thesis and we cannot therefore go into detail here. See for 
example Wedl's (1969) fascinating account of the use since 
the 1860s of federalism in the manifestos of Austrian and 
German parties, as well as Schild's documentation (1971) of 
the political use of federalism in Swiss referendums. For an 
example of how federalism has been claimed by Catholics to be 
an intrinsic part of a Catholic world view, see for example, 
Soden (1931). For a wider approach, see Korff (1908), or 
Hy1ander (1946). Of the many contributions to the issue of 
the relationship between the principles of federalism and 
subsidiartity, see Stadler (1951). On the use of federalism 
in a wider, social context, see Roemheld's weighty tomes on 
so-called -integral federa1ism- (1977). For a much briefer 
exposition of a related perspective, see Kinsky (1979). Also 
of interest are Pernthaler (1981) and Weber~(1980a) summaries 
on the various ways" in which the concept of "federalism" has 
been used. 
7. We are of course not suggesting that all Swiss liberals 
were originally opposed to federation and that they all 
changed to become supporters of the Federal Pact and so on. 
However, there is clear evidence to show that there was a 
signific~nt change in the orientation of a large number of 
liberals at the times and in the directions indicated (see 
3.3. and 6.3. above, as well as Wild,1966). 
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